JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The appellants are the defendants, who after having lost before both the learned courts below, have filed the instant second appeal. 2. The parties shall be referred to as the “plaintiffs” and “defendants”. 3. Briefly stated the facts leading to filing of the present appeal are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction against the defendants on the ground that they were the owners in possession of the suit land comprised in Khata No. 53 min, Khatauni No. 56 min, Khasra No.655/453, measuring 1 Kanal 2 Marlas, situated in Tikka Tikkar, Mauza Mehalta, Tehsil and District Hamirpur. It was claimed that the plaintiffs were poor and illiterate ladies and defendant No.1, who was private medical practitioner, after taking advantage of this fact was trying to dispossess them forcibly from the suit land. Hence, the suit. 4. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statement taking therein preliminary objections regarding cause of action, locus standi, maintainability, valuation and lastly that the defendants had become owners of the suit land by way of adverse possession. On merits, it was denied that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land. It was claimed that defendant No.1 had constructed his house and cattle shed over the suit land in the year 1967 and his possession over the suit land was continuous, un-interrupted, hostile and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and had become owners of the suit land by eflux of time. It was further claimed that the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs Mahantu had executed an agreement to sell the suit land with the defendants for a consideration of Rs.5000/- on 15.10.1990 and since then they were in possession of the suit land and that being so, the plaintiffs were estopped from filing the suit by their own acts and conduct. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court on 11.10.1993 framed the following issues:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit by their act and conduct, as alleged? OPD 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD 4. Whether the defendants are owners of the suit land and have become owners thereof by way of adverse possession? OPD 5. Relief. 6. OPP 2. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the suit by their act and conduct, as alleged? OPD 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD 4. Whether the defendants are owners of the suit land and have become owners thereof by way of adverse possession? OPD 5. Relief. 6. After recording the evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial court vide judgment and decree dated 19.6.1996 allowed the suit by passing decree for mandatory injunction by way of demolition of superstructure raised over the suit land by the defendants and further decree for permanent prohibitory injunction against the defendants thereby permanently restraining the defendants from causing any sort of interference over the suit land was also passed. The appeal filed against the said judgment and decree came to be dismissed by the learned first appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 27.3.2004 leading to the filing of the present appeal. 7. On 23.3.2006 the instant appeal came to be admitted on following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the suit was not valued correctly for the purpose of court fee and therefore, it should not have been tried on merits? 2. Whether any prejudice has been caused to the appellant/defendant on account of non-framing of a specific issue pertaining to his plea that there had been an engagement to sell, executed in his favour by the father of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs/respondents? 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record carefully. Substantial Question of Law No.1 9. The question as formulated is only academic because even if it is assumed that the value of property is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned trial Court, the same will have no bearing on the validity of the judgment and decree passed by it, more particularly when the defendants have failed to question the judgment and decree so passed on the ground that there has been prejudice on the merits. (Refer: Kiran Singh versus Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 ). 10. (Refer: Kiran Singh versus Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 ). 10. This issue has already been considered by this Court in RSA No.115 of 2014, titled Surinder Singh Sautha versus Raja Yogindra Chandra, decided on 29.05.2014, wherein it was held as under:- “18.The next point raised by learned counsel for the appellant is that the order passed by a Court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction is void, ab initio and, therefore, the judgment passed by the learned trial Court as affirmed by the learned lower Appellate Court is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set-aside. He referred to number of decisions of the various High Courts on the question viz. Mamraj Agarwala and others vs. Ahamad Ali Mahamad AIR 1919, Calcutta 984, Mool Chand Moti Lal vs. Ram Kishan and others AIR 1933 Allahabad 249, Shyam Nandan Sahay and others vs. Dhanpati Kuer and others AIR 1960 Patna 244 and Controller of Stores and another vs. M/s Kapoor Textile Agencies, AIR 1975 Punjab 321. 19. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant would not be of much significance and have lost efficacy in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and others vs. Chaman Paswan and others AIR 1954 SC 340 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when a case had been tried by a court on merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections of jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. Further it may be observed that there have been a number of subsequent pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court and also by this Court on this issue which otherwise are binding on this Court. The same are referred to and discussed in detail in the later part of the judgment. 20. The entire law with regard to the decree passed by a Court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction has been discussed in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Mahadevasa Habib vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (dead) by LRs. And others (2007) 13 SCC 650 and the position has been summed up as follows: “33. 20. The entire law with regard to the decree passed by a Court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction has been discussed in detail by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Mahadevasa Habib vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (dead) by LRs. And others (2007) 13 SCC 650 and the position has been summed up as follows: “33. What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the socalled finding in OS No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. 34. It may be noted that Section 21 provided that no objection as to place of the suing can be allowed by even an appellate or revisional court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. In 1976, the existing section was numbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was added relating to pecuniary jurisdiction by providing that no objection as to competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional court unless such objection had been taken in the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and unless there had been a consequent failure of justice. Section 21-A also was introduced in 1976 with effect from 1.2.1977 creating a bar to the institution of any suit challenging the validity of a decree passed in a former suit between the same parties on any ground based on an objection as to the place of suing. The amendment by Act 104 of 1976 came into force only on 1.2.1977 when OS No. 4 of 1972 was pending. The amendment by Act 104 of 1976 came into force only on 1.2.1977 when OS No. 4 of 1972 was pending. By virtue of Section 97 (2) (c ) of the Amendment Act, 1976, the said suit had to be tried and disposed of as if Section 21 of the Code had not been amended by adding sub-section (2) thereto. Of course, by virtue of Section 97 (3) Section 21-A had to be applied, if it has application. But then, Section 21-A on its wording covers only what it calls a defect as to place of suing. 35. Though Section 21-A of the Code speaks of a suit not being maintainable for challenging the validity of a prior decree between the same parties on a ground based on an objection as to “the place of suing”, there is no reason to restrict its operation only to an objection based on territorial jurisdiction and excluding from its purview a defect based on pecuniary jurisdiction. In the sense in which the expression “place of suing” has been used in the Code it could be understood as taking within it both territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. 36. Section 15 of the Code deals with pecuniary jurisdiction and, Sections 15 to 20 of the Code deal with “place of This Court in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu AIR 1966 SC 634 made no distinction between Section 15 on the one hand and Sections 16 to 20 on the other, in the context of Section 21 of the Code. Even otherwise, considering the interpretation placed by this Court on Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and treating it as equivalent in effect to Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed prior to the amendment in 1976, it is possible to say, especially in the context of the amendment brought about in Section 21 of the Code by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, that Section 21-A was intended to cover a challenge to a prior decree as regards lack of jurisdiction, both territorial and pecuniary, with reference to the place of suing, meaning thereby the court in which the suit was instituted. 37. 37. As can be seen, Amendment Act 104 of 1976 introduced subsection (2) relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and put it on a par with the objection to territorial jurisdiction and the competence to raise an objection in that regard even in an appeal from the very decree. This was obviously done in the light of the interpretation placed on Section 21 of the Code as it existed and Section11 of the Suits Valuation Act by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan AIR 1954 SC 340 followed by Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath AIR 1962 SC 199 and Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J.Pappu AIR 1966 SC 634 . Therefore, there is no justification in understanding the expression “objection as to place of suing” occurring in Section 21-A as being confined to an objection only in the territorial sense and not in the pecuniary sense. Both could be understood, especially in the context of the amendment to Section 21 brought about by the Amendment Act, as objection to place of suing. 38. It appears that when the Law Commission recommended insertion of Section 21-A into the Code, the specific provision subsequently introduced in sub-section (2) of Section 21 relating to pecuniary jurisdiction was not there. Therefore, when introducing subsection (2) of Section 21 by Amendment Act 104 of 1976, the wordings of Section 21-A as proposed by the Law Commission were not suitably altered or made comprehensive. Perhaps, it was not necessary in view of the placing of Sections 15 to 20 in the Code and the approach of this Court in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 634 . But we see that an objection to territorial jurisdiction and to pecuniary jurisdiction, is treated on a par by Section 21. The placing of Sections 15 to 20 under the heading “place of suing” also supports this position. Taking note of the object of the amendment in the light of the law as expounded by this Court, it would be incongruous to hold that Section 21-A takes in only an objection to territorial jurisdiction and not to pecuniary jurisdiction. We are therefore inclined to hold that in the suit OS No. 4 of 1972, the validity of the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 could not have been questioned based on alleged lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. We are therefore inclined to hold that in the suit OS No. 4 of 1972, the validity of the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 could not have been questioned based on alleged lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Of course, the suit itself was not for challenging the validity of the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 an the question of the effect of the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 only incidentally arose. In a strict sense, therefore, Section 21-A of the Code may not ipso facto apply to the situation. 39. But the fact that Section 21 (2) or Section 21-A of the Code may not apply would not make any difference in view of the fact that the position was covered by the relevant provision in the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act provided that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 578 (Section 99 of the present Code covering errors or irregularity) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit had exercised it by reason of undervaluation could not be entertained by an appellate court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at or before the hearing at which the issues were first framed or the appellate court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that the overvaluing or undervaluing of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. There was some confusion about the content of the section. 40. The entire question was considered by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . Since in the present case, the objection is based on the valuation of the suit or the pecuniary jurisdiction, we think it proper to refer to that part of the judgment dealing with Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. Their Lordships held: (AIR p. 342, para 7) “7. ….It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits.” In Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 , it was held that: (AIR p.201, para 4) “4….. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” In Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu AIR 1966 SC 634 , it was held Section 21 is a statutory recognition of the principle that the defect as to the place of suing under Sections 15 to 20 of the Code may be waived and that even independently of Section 21, a defendant may waive the objection and may be subsequently precluded from taking it.” 21. In fact, a similar proposition came up before this Court (Coram : Deepak Gupta, J, as his Lordship then was) in Tikam Ram and others vs. Purshotam Ram and others 2011 (3) Shim. L.C. 251 wherein again after noticing all the relevant provisions along with law, it was held as under: “19. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 21 of the CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act which read as follows: Civil Procedure Code: “21. Objections to jurisdiction. – [(1) No. objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (2) No objection as to the competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.” Suits Valuation Act “11. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.” Suits Valuation Act “11. Procedure where objection is taken on appeal on revision that a suit or appeal was not properly valued for jurisdictional purposes.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in [Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882)] and objection that by reason of the overvaluation or under-valuation of suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless.- (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in memorandum of appeal to that Court, or (b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was overvalued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or undervaluation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeals as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower Appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suits or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of the Section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable, apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under [Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (14 of 1882)] or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) This Section shall come into force on the first day of July, 1887.” 20. The Apex Court in Kiran Singh and others vs. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 (41), SC 340 was dealing with a case for recovery of possession of more than 12 acres of land. The suit was dismissed. The plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal in the court of District Judge who also dismissed the appeal. In the second appeal, the plaintiffs for the first time raised an objection that the suit itself had not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction and prayed that their appeal should be treated as a first appeal against the order of the learned trial Court. The High Court rejected the plea of the plaintiffs on the ground that the defendants could succeed only when they established prejudice on the merits of the case. An appeal was filed before the Apex Court and it was urged that the decree passed by the District Judge was a nullity because in an original suit having valuation of Rs.9980/-, appeal would lie to the High Court alone and not to the District Judge. The Apex Court held as follows:- “It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” 21. Relying upon these observations, Sh. Bhupender Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the decree and judgment of the learned trial Court is a nullity and the learned District Judge was justified in ordering the return of the plaint. Relying upon these observations, Sh. Bhupender Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that the decree and judgment of the learned trial Court is a nullity and the learned District Judge was justified in ordering the return of the plaint. This argument cannot be accepted to be correct because it was after making these observations that the Apex Court dealt with Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. 22. Dealing with the import of the word prejudice occurring in Section 11, the Apex Court held as follows:- “The language of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is plainly against such a view. It provides that over valuation or undervaluation must have prejudicially affected the disposal of the case on the merits. The prejudice on the merits must be directly attributable to over valuation or under valuation and an error in a finding of fact reached on a consideration of the evidence cannot possibly be said to have been caused by over valuation or undervaluation. Mere errors in the conclusions on the points for determination would therefore be clearly precluded by the language of the Section.” 23. It is also important to note that the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court was rendered much before the amendment of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Vide Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976, sub-sections 2 and 3 were introduced in Section 21 and sub-section 2 clearly provides that no objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate Court unless such objection was taken in the court of the first instance at the earliest possible opportunity before settlement of issues and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. Sub section 2 clearly envisages that not only should the objections have been taken at the first instance but there should have been consequent failure of justice. If there is no failure of justice then the Court would not entertain the objection as to the competence of the Court with reference to its pecuniary limits. This aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the lower appellate Court. 24. If there is no failure of justice then the Court would not entertain the objection as to the competence of the Court with reference to its pecuniary limits. This aspect of the matter has not at all been considered by the lower appellate Court. 24. In Sat Paul and another v. Jai Bhan Ananta Saini, AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 58 decided prior to the amendment to Section 21 and only taking into consideration Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that without showing that any prejudice has been caused, the Appellate Court could not set aside the judgment only on the ground of the suit being improperly valued. 25. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and another 2005 (7) SCC 791 the Apex Court held as follows: “We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a Court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.” 26. The Apex Court further went on to hold that the Courts at Delhi did not have jurisdiction under Section 16 to decide the issue and, therefore, lacked inherent jurisdiction to decide the matter. 27. An order passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.” 26. The Apex Court further went on to hold that the Courts at Delhi did not have jurisdiction under Section 16 to decide the issue and, therefore, lacked inherent jurisdiction to decide the matter. 27. The then Hon’ble Chief Justice of this Court in Ajay Singh v. Tikka Brijendra Singh and others, 2006 (2) SLC 394 considered this question in detail and after noting the provisions of Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section11 of the Suits Valuation Act held as follows: “A combined reading of the aforesaid three provisions of law clearly suggests, first and foremost that no objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to its pecuniary limits of jurisdiction shall be allowed unless there has been a consequential failure of justice, and secondly, that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied etc. on account of any error etc. including an error of jurisdiction which does not affect the merits of the case and thirdly, no objection about the jurisdiction of a Court for over valuation or under valuation of a suit etc. shall be entertained by an Appellate Court unless, apart from the objection having been taken in the Court of first instance etc., the Appeal Court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded in writing that such overvaluation or under valuation has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit by the trial Court.” 28. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad and others, 2007 (2) SCC 355 , the Apex Court held as follows:- “24. We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a Court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate Court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with.” 29. Whereas in the former case, the appellate Court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with.” 29. It would be pertinent to mention that the Apex Court and this Court clearly laid down that so far as objections to the territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction are concerned, the objections must be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and order of the Court not having pecuniary jurisdiction cannot be said to be an nullity. The Court does not lack jurisdiction to decide such a dispute. It only does not have the pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Therefore, if it entertains and tries the matter and decides these disputes then the learned Appellate Court cannot set aside its findings unless it comes to the conclusion that prejudice has been caused in terms of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act and consequent failure of justice in terms of Section 21 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.” This substantial question of law is accordingly answered against the defendants. Substantial Question of Law No.2 11. It would be noticed that the defendants had raised specific plea to the effect that they had become owners in possession of the suit land by way of adverse possession. In addition to this, they had also pleaded that there had been an agreement to sell executed in their favour by the father of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. 12 Both these pleas are conflicting because it is more than settled that the plea of ownership simpliciter is based on the concept of title, which one may acquire through various sources like succession, gift, will, sale, exchange, grant etc. etc. and the person in possession is essentially to be treated as being in lawful possession, whereas on the other hand when the plea of adverse possession is projected inherent is the plea that someone else is in the ownership of the property. (See: P. Periasami (dead) by L.Rs. vs. P. Periathambi and others (1995) 6 SCC 523 ). Having said so, it can safely be concluded that the pleas based on title and simultaneously on adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. (Ref: Mohan Lal (deceased) vs. Mira Abdul Gaffar and another (1996) 1 SCC 639 and L.N. Aswathama & anr. Having said so, it can safely be concluded that the pleas based on title and simultaneously on adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. (Ref: Mohan Lal (deceased) vs. Mira Abdul Gaffar and another (1996) 1 SCC 639 and L.N. Aswathama & anr. vs. P. Prakash (2009) 13 SCC 229 ). 13. In such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the defendants to have chosen one line of defence and they could not have raised plea of ownership as also plea of adverse possession at the same time and it is for this reason that the defendants chose the line of adverse possession and it was for this precise reason that issue No.4(supra) was framed by the learned trial court. Having chosen plea of adverse possession being line of defence, it is now too late in the day for the defendants to claim that specific issue, pertaining to their plea that there had been an engagement to sell executed in their favour by the father of the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, should have been framed. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly against the defendants. 14. In view of aforesaid discussions, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.