JUDGMENT : SANJAY KAROL, J. 1. In all these petitions, challenge is laid to the three orders passed by the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in OA No.3896 of 2016, titled as Joginder Pal v. State of H.P. & others; OA No.3442 of 2017, titled as Rakesh Kumar & another v. State of H.P. & others; and Rev. Pet. No.11 of 2017, titled as Amit Kumar & others v. State of Himachal Pradesh & others. 2. In the year 1993, by virtue of Entry No.25 of List-3 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, a Central Legislation by the name of National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as NCTE Act) was enacted and notified on 29.12.1993. The said Act prescribes the functions of the Council, inter alia, providing for determination and maintenance of standards of teacher education, and providing guidelines in respect of minimum qualification of a person to be employed as a teacher in the schools or in any one of the recognized institutions. 3. With the 86th Amendment in the Constitution of India, again, in exercise of its power under the Constitution, another Central legislation by the name of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as RTE Act), was enacted and notified w.e.f. 1.4.2010. Qualification for appointment of teachers could be fixed and prescribed in terms thereof. 4. In exercise of its constitutional power and not in derogation to the power of the Centre, by virtue of delegated legislation, the State of Himachal Pradesh, on 23.8.2012 notified the Himachal Pradesh Elementary Education Department Junior Basic Trained Teacher, Class-III (Non-Gazetted) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as the 2012 Rules), inter alia, prescribing the criteria for selection to the post of Junior Basic Trained Teachers (JBT). 5. In terms of these Rules, 21696 posts of Class-III were to be notified and filled up by way of direct recruitment (100%, either on regular basis or contractual basis). Marks obtained in TET were the sole eligibility criterion. 6. Relevant portion of the eligibility criteria reads as under: “15. Selection for appointment to the post by direct recruitment. 5. In terms of these Rules, 21696 posts of Class-III were to be notified and filled up by way of direct recruitment (100%, either on regular basis or contractual basis). Marks obtained in TET were the sole eligibility criterion. 6. Relevant portion of the eligibility criteria reads as under: “15. Selection for appointment to the post by direct recruitment. Selection of candidate for appointment to JBT post in the case of direct recruitment (regular or contract basis), will be made by the Deputy Director of the concerned district out of TET (class 1 to V) pass candidate in following manner: 1. Category-wise number of posts to be filled up in the District will be notified by the Deputy Director concerned to the Employment Exchange with in the district and local newspaper. 2. A category-wise merit would be drawn by the Deputy Director concerned on the basis of marks obtained by the candidate in the TET. 3. The candidates who apply in response to the advertisement and those who are sponsored by the Employment Exchange with in the district will be called for counseling by the Deputy Director at District office; where in original certificates/documents would be checked. 4. The Deputy Director will draw a category-wise merit of the candidates based on TET score. In case the candidates have same TET score then their interse merit would be decided on the basis of combined score of TET and JBT final year score. Still there being a tie the candidate senior in age would be placed above the junior, in the merit. 5. The Ist posting to the candidates shall be offered in remote and difficult areas of the district, where they shall have to serve for minimum 5 years. Further, if considered necessary or expedient selection may also be made by a screening test followed by interview with the prior approval of the Govt.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. The Tribunal, seeking reliance upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Civil Appeals No.4347-4375 of 2014, titled as State of U.P. & others v. Shiv Kumar Pathak & others (reported in AIR 2017 SC 3612 ), vide order dated 16.11.2017, passed in OA No.3896 of 2016, titled as Joginder Pal (supra), struck down the eligibility criteria No.2 & 4 prescribed in the 2012 Rules (reproduced supra). 8. 8. The Tribunal further reiterated its view vide order dated 30.8.2017, passed in OA No.3442 of 2017, titled as Rakesh Kumar (supra). 9. Review of such order passed in Rakesh Kumar (supra) was sought by some of the aggrieved candidates, which application was disposed of by the Tribunal, vide order dated 11.1.2018, passed in Rev. Pet. No.11 of 2017, titled as Amit Kumar (supra). 10. Thus, all these orders referred to in Paras 7, 8 & 9 ibid are subject matter of the present petition. 11. Since prior to the passing of the orders, State had already initiated its process of recruitment, for filling up some of the posts, so notified, it appears that for saving the same and prescribing fresh criteria, perhaps, with the avowed object of bringing in transparency, the 2012 Rules were repealed and new Rules, termed as the Himachal Pradesh Elementary Education Department Junior Basic Trained Teacher, Class-III (Non- Gazetted) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as the 2017 Rules), were notified on 22.9.2017. The notification reads as under: “Government of Himachal Pradesh Elementary Education Department (Education-C) No.EDN-C-A (3)-1/2016 Dated: Shimla-171002 22-09-2017 NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, in consultation with the Himachal Pradesh Public Service Commission, is pleased to make the Recruitment and Promotion Rules, for the Post of Junior Basic Trained Teacher Class-III, (Non- Gazetted) in the Department of Elementary Education, Himachal Pradesh as per Annexure-“A” attached to this notification; namely: 1. Short title and commencement: 1. (1) These rules may be called the Himachal Pradesh, Elementary Education Department, Junior Basic Trained Teacher, Class-III (Non-Gazetted) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2017. (2) These rules shall come into force from the date of publication in the Rajpatra, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Repeal and savings: 2. (1) The Himachal Pradesh, Elementary Education Department, Junior Basic Trained Teacher, Class-III (Non-Gazetted) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2012, notified vide notification No. EDN-C-A(3)- 1/2002, dated 23-08-2012, as published in the Rajpatra Himachal Pradesh vide notification of even number dated 25th August, 2012 are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, any appointment made or anything done or any action taken under the rules, so repealed under sub-rule (1) supra shall be deemed to have been validly made, done or taken under these rules. By orders Pr. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, any appointment made or anything done or any action taken under the rules, so repealed under sub-rule (1) supra shall be deemed to have been validly made, done or taken under these rules. By orders Pr. Secretary (Education) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.” Evidently, the old process for recruitment or action taken in terms of the 2012 Rules stands protected. 12. Vide third order dated 11.1.2018, the Tribunal clarified that the ongoing process for recruitment of JBT Teacher stands protected in view of the repealing and saving clause. 13. With this factual backdrop, we proceed to decide the present petitions, which on first blush appeared to be only an academic examination, but as insisted by the writ petitioners, we think it prudent to decide the issues one way or the other. 14. Noticeably, save and except for referring to and relying upon the opinion rendered by the Apex Court in Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra), making it alone the basis, the Tribunal has not assigned any other reason for quashing the Rules providing the eligibility criteria. Though in a passing reference in Para-7 of the order passed in Joginder Pal (supra), following observations are also made: “7. The NCTE had suggested to the States to give weightage to teacher eligibility test (TET) score in the recruitment process. It is expressed in clear terms that the TET score was not the sole criteria for selection. By making TET merit the sole criteria, the respondents have not given weightage to the academic qualification and co-curricular activities etc. The TET is also not a screening test. The TET merit on the basis of performance of one or two years is not sufficient to assess the suitability. Action of the respondents is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.” 15. We may observe that the Tribunal was dealing with a legislation and not an administrative order. It is a settled principle of law that scope for challenging a legislation, be it delegated or primary, is restricted and limited in nature, unlike an administrative order. 16. Be that as it may, we proceed to examine as to whether the Tribunal was right in basing its decision solely on the decision rendered in Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra) or not. 17. 16. Be that as it may, we proceed to examine as to whether the Tribunal was right in basing its decision solely on the decision rendered in Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra) or not. 17. Having carefully gone through and objectively considered the same, we are of the considered view that had the Tribunal gone through the judgment in its entirety and examined the issues raised and the ratio of law laid down therein, perhaps it would have refrained itself from relying upon certain solitary observations made contextually, specific to the attending facts and circumstances therein, and not interfered by quashing the most relevant and operative portion of the instant legislation. 18. To our reading, Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra) categorically does not deal with the Rules, with which we are concerned. Primarily, the issue before the Apex Court was that of conflict and repugnancy of different legislations, i.e. Central Legislations, like NCTE Act & RTE Act, and State Legislation that of the State of Uttar Pradesh, as is evident form Para-1 of the said Report. 19. There, for appointment of teachers, initially the State of Uttar Pradesh had formulated rules, prescribing the eligibility criteria of 'quality point marks’. However, with the notification of the central legislations (NCTE Act and RTE Act), these rules for appointment as a teacher were amended, making passing of Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) as a compulsory qualification. While the process for recruitment to posts under such process was underway, it came to the notice of the State that there had been mass scale bungling, also influenced by monetary considerations. Resultantly, rules were amended, prescribing the earlier eligibility criteria of quality point marks and not the clearance of TET, which action was quashed by the High Court on the ground of repugnancy. 20. It is in this backdrop, the Apex Court, noticing the intent, object and purpose of the central legislation and the power of the Central Government to legislate, upheld the order of the High Court, interfering with the action of the State in amending the rules, incorporating the condition of 'quality point marks’, directly in conflict with the Central Legislation, holding it to be ultra vires the Constitution. 21. The issue as to whether marks obtained by the candidate in TET alone could be the eligibility criteria or not, was never an issue for consideration before the Apex Court. 21. The issue as to whether marks obtained by the candidate in TET alone could be the eligibility criteria or not, was never an issue for consideration before the Apex Court. Notwithstanding Question No. (b), framed for its consideration, observation made in Para-16 of the said Report, which we reproduce herein after, are to be read in the backdrop that NCTE itself had taken a stand that giving weightage to the marks obtained in TET, was not mandatory: “16. There is no manner of doubt that the NCTE, acting as an 'academic authority’ under Section 23 of the RTE Act, under the Notification dated 31st March, 2010 issued by the Central Government as well as under Sections 12 and 12A of the NCTE Act, was competent to issue Notifications dated 23rd August, 2010 and 11th February, 2011. The State Government was under obligation to act as per the said notifications and not to give effect to any contrary rule. However, since NCTE itself has taken the stand that notification dated 11th February, 2011 with regard to the weightage to be given to the marks obtained in TET is not mandatory which is also a possible interpretation, the view of the High Court in quashing the 15th Amendment to the 1981 Rules has to be interfered with. Accordingly, while we uphold the view that qualifications prescribed by the NCTE are binding, requirement of weightage to TET marks is not a mandatory requirement.” 22. It is not the mandate of the central legislation that result of TET alone cannot be the eligibility criteria. Nothing to the contrary has been brought to our notice. 23. All that the central legislature/authorities thereunder provide for is that qualification of passing TET is compulsory and the reason is not far to seek, for after all, these legislations came into existence only to enhance the standard of education in all the schools to fulfill the constitutional goals of imparting quality education and ensuring overall health, growth and development of the children, undertaking education in various schools, as enshrined in Para-III of the Constitution of India and more specifically Article 21A thereof, which mandates that the State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine. 24. 24. The rationale for including TET as a minimum qualification for a person to be eligible for appointment as a teacher is to bring national standards and benchmark of teacher quality in the recruitment process; induce teacher education institutions and students from these institutions to further improve their performance standards; and send a positive signal to all stakeholders that the Government lays special emphasis on teacher quality. It is only to enhance excellence in the field of education. 25. Question (b) framed by the Apex Court in Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra) reads as under: “ (b) Whether the marks obtained in the TET Examination is the sole criterion for filling up the vacancies?” However, the question was never answered as such, in view of the stand taken by the NCTE, as observed in Para-16 (reproduced supra). 26. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No.612 of 2017, titled as Abhimanyu Rathore and other connected matters, decided on 22.12.2017, in extenso, has examined and dealt with the circumstances, under which a legislation can be held to be ultra vires the Constitution, in the following terms: “81. We have ourselves researched, minutely examined and found several decisions of the Apex Court, explaining as to what really is the meaning of “equality before law”, what are the grounds on which a legislation, primary or delegated, can be assailed; what are the constraints of the Court in holding the same to be ultra vires and what is the approach which the Court must adopt in examining its constitutional validity. 82. To our mind, principle stands best culled out by the Apex Court in Subramaniam Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2014) 8 SCC 682 (five- Judge Bench) and Shayra Bano (supra). 83. Lest we mis-read the same, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of what the Apex Court observed in Subramaniam (supra): “41. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v Justice SR Tendolkar & Ors, 1959 SCR 279 , the Constitution Bench of five Judges further culled out the following principles enunciated in the above cases: "11. 83. Lest we mis-read the same, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of what the Apex Court observed in Subramaniam (supra): “41. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v Justice SR Tendolkar & Ors, 1959 SCR 279 , the Constitution Bench of five Judges further culled out the following principles enunciated in the above cases: "11. … (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation." Further: “43.……………… "12. ……. ……. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law. (ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several individual persons or things but no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination.” 44. In Nagpur Improvement Trust and Anr v Vithal Rao and Ors, (1973) 1 SCC 500 , the five-Judge Constitution Bench had an occasion to consider the test of reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution. It noted that the State can make a reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation and that the classification in order to be reasonable must satisfy two tests: (i) the classification must be founded on intelligible differentia and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation with the object sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. The Court emphasized that in this regard object itself should be lawful and it cannot be discriminatory. If the object is to discriminate against one section of the minority, the discrimination cannot be justified on the ground that there is a reasonable classification because it has rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. 45. The constitutionality of Special Courts Bill, 1978 came up for consideration in Special Courts Bill, 1978, In Re: President of India v. The Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380 as the President of India made a reference to this Court under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution for consideration of the question whether the "Special Courts Bill" or any of its provisions, if enacted would be constitutionally invalid. The seven Judge Constitution Bench dealt with the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution. Noticing the earlier decisions of this Court in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191 , Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 , CI Emden v State of U.P., 1960 2 SCR 592 , Kangsari Haldar & Anr v State of West Bengal, 1960 2 SCR 646 , Jyoti Pershad v. UT of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 457 and State of Gujarat & Anr v Shri Ambica Mills Ltd, Ahmedabad & Anr, (1974) 3 SCR 760 , in the majority judgment the then Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, inter alia, exposited the following propositions relating to Article 14: " (1) * * * (2) The State, in the exercise of its governmental power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws. (3) * * * (4) * * * (5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well- defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. (6) The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. (7) The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.” 84. What is “arbitrary” also stands explained by the Apex Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , where it held that: “7. Now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Article 14 : what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article ? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach._ No attempt should be made to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Another, 1974 2 SCR 348 namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14".……..” (Emphasis supplied) 85. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & others, (2005) 8 SCC 534 (seven- Judge Bench), held: “40. In State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 , also a seven-Judge bench of this Court culled out and summarized the ratio of this Court in Kesavananda bharati. Fazal Ali, J. extracted and set out the relevant extract from the opinion of several Judges in Kesavananda Bharati and then opined: "164. In view of the principles adumbrated by this court it is clear that the directive principles form the fundamental feature and the social conscience of the Constitution and the Constitution enjoins upon the State to implement these directive principles. The directives thus provide the policy, the guidelines and the end of socio-economic freedom and Articles 14 and 16 are the means to implement the policy to achieve the ends sought to be promoted by the directive principles. So far as the courts are concerned where there is no apparent inconsistency between the directive principles contained in Part IV and the fundamental rights mentioned in Part III, which in fact supplement each other, there is no difficulty in putting a harmonious construction which advances the object of the Constitution. Once this basic fact is kept in mind, the interpretation of Articles 14 and 16 and their scope and ambit become as clear as day." 41. … A restriction placed on any Fundamental right, aimed at securing Directive Principles will be held as reasonable and hence intra vires subject to two limitations: first, that it does not run in clear conflict with the fundamental right, and secondly that it has been enacted within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature under Part xi Chapter I of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 86. In the present case, respondents made an argument that in exercise of power under judicial review striking down a legislation only on the basis of “arbitrariness” is not permissible in view of State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 and Binoy Viswam (supra). The submission needs to be rejected in view of authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution Bench (3:2) in Shayra Bano (supra), which states, in no uncertain terms, in Paragraph-99, that both these judgments were in fact per incurium, and that laws/legislations can be struck down on the ground of arbitrariness, if found to be violative of Article 14. It held: “87. The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire fundamental rights Chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is obviously unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of law, would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent contradiction in the three Judges’ Bench decision in State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709 , when it is said that a constitutional challenge can succeed on the ground that a law is “disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable”, yet such challenge would fail on the very ground of the law being “unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted”. The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to legislation obviously would not involve the latter challenge but would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and citizens in Part III of the Constitution.” “99. However, in State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453 at paragraph 22, in State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 at paragraphs 17 to 19, in Rajbala v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 445 at paragraphs 53 to 65 and Binoy Viswam v. Union of India, (2017) 7 SCC 59 at paragraphs 80 to 82, McDowell (supra) was read as being an absolute bar to the use of “arbitrariness” as a tool to strike down legislation under Article 14. As has been noted by us earlier in this judgment, Mcdowell (supra) itself is per incuriam, not having noticed several judgments of Benches of equal or higher strength, its reasoning even otherwise being flawed. As has been noted by us earlier in this judgment, Mcdowell (supra) itself is per incuriam, not having noticed several judgments of Benches of equal or higher strength, its reasoning even otherwise being flawed. The judgments, following McDowell (supra) are, therefore, no longer good law.” 100. ………….. 44. Also, in Sharma Transport v. State of A.P. [ (2002) 2 SCC 188 ], this Court held: (SCC pp. 203-04, para 25) “25. … The tests of arbitrary action applicable to executive action do not necessarily apply to delegated legislation. In order to strike down a delegated legislation as arbitrary it has to be established that there is manifest arbitrariness. In order to be described as arbitrary, it must be shown that it was not reasonable and manifestly arbitrary. The expression “arbitrarily” means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the will alone.” (at pages 736-737) 101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such 391 legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14.” (Emphasis supplied) 87. The Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Dr.) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226 (three-Judge Bench) struck down a 1986 Tamil Nadu Act on the ground that it was arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14. Two separate arguments were addressed under Article 14. One that the Act in question was discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Article 14. The Apex Court in K.R. Lakshmanan (Dr.) v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226 (three-Judge Bench) struck down a 1986 Tamil Nadu Act on the ground that it was arbitrary and, therefore, violative of Article 14. Two separate arguments were addressed under Article 14. One that the Act in question was discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Article 14. The other that in any case the Act was arbitrary and for that reason would also violate the separate facet of Article 14. The issues were decided as under: “48. … We fail to understand how the State Government can acquire and take over the functioning of the race club when it has already enacted the 1974 Act with the avowed object of declaring horse racing as gambling? Having enacted a law to abolish betting on horse racing and stoutly defending the same before this Court in the name of public good and public morality, it is not open to the State Government to acquire the undertaking of horse racing again in the name of public good and public purpose. It is ex-facie irrational to invoke "public good and public purpose" for declaring horse racing as gambling and as such prohibited under law, and at the same time speak of "public purpose and public good" for acquiring the race club and conducting the horse racing by the Government itself. Arbitrariness is writ large on the face of the provisions of the 1985 Act.” 88. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud. It has a positive concept. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. (Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab and others, (2010) 11 SCC 455 ).” 27. In the instant case, the State Government, to attain the constitutional goal prescribed higher standards of eligibility criteria, and that being not only qualification of TET, so undertaken by the State Government, through a centralized process, but also to ensure that the best and only the best, being the most meritorious, should be selected, based on their performance in the examination. Well, what is wrong with such criteria. We see no conflict between the State legislation and the Central legislation. 28. Well, what is wrong with such criteria. We see no conflict between the State legislation and the Central legislation. 28. Repetitively though, we may observe that Shiv Kumar Pathak (supra) was dealing with a case where the State Government had framed Rules, which were directly in conflict with the Central Legislation (subordinate in nature) and the repugnancy between the State and the Central law was subject matter of consideration before the High Court and the Supreme Court. The Court also observed that the NCTE had made passing of TET as an essential criterion. The NCTE vide Notification dated 11.2.2011 had prescribed the minimum qualifying marks, with a suggestion that due weightage should be given to the score obtained in TET. 29. Noticeably, the State Government had not framed any rules, making marks obtained in TET to be the sole criteria, which is the case in hand. It is in this backdrop, the Apex Court held that the TET was not a mandatory requirement, but a mere suggestion. 30. Now, let us examine as to whether the instant rules are arbitrary in any manner or not. To begin with, we do not find there to be any conflict between the legislative powers. The only other issue, which needs to be considered, is as to whether prescription of such criterion is demonstratively arbitrary or not. Well, in our considered view, there is nothing arbitrary about the same, for after all, TET is an examination conducted by a reputed centralized agency of the State. It is open for all. All can participate, regardless of the scores obtained by them in their various qualifying examinations. The criterion is uniformly applied across the State, for filling up all the posts of teachers and there is nothing discriminatory about the same. Making the marks obtained in TET to be the sole eligibility criterion is an endeavour to enhance excellence in the field of education, for after all the best and only the best must be engaged in imparting education for fulfilling the constitutional goals and obligations. Future of the country lies in the hands of the children who must be educated and groomed by the best. 31. Noticeably, marks obtained in the Common Entrance Tests, is the criterion uniformly applied for all admissions, be it admission to Medical Colleges, Engineering Colleges or other professional disciplines and services. Administrative services is one such example. 32. Future of the country lies in the hands of the children who must be educated and groomed by the best. 31. Noticeably, marks obtained in the Common Entrance Tests, is the criterion uniformly applied for all admissions, be it admission to Medical Colleges, Engineering Colleges or other professional disciplines and services. Administrative services is one such example. 32. We are not in agreement with the observations made by the learned Tribunal in Para-7 of the order passed in Joginder Pal (supra). Weightage, if any, to the past education should or should not be given is to be decided by the employer and not by the Courts. Applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Subramaniam Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2014) 8 SCC 682 ; Shayra Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 ; Special Courts Bill, 1978, In Re: President of India v. The Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380 ; Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ; and Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , we do not find that the criterion fixed in the Rules framed by the State to be in any manner unreasonable. Rules cannot be said to have been framed capriciously, at pleasure without adequate determining principles or not founded in the nature of things, which are irrational or not based on sound reasoning and judgment. It is also not excessively disproportionate to the object sought to be achieved. The Rules are framed to achieve the constitutional goal of socialistic pattern of society and to give best education to the children by recruiting the meritorious teachers on the basis of centralized test. 33. Thus, under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that the Tribunal seriously erred in allowing the Original Applications, by quashing the legislation. 34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we quash and set aside the impugned orders, referred to in Para-1 supra. We clarify that the recruitment process so undertaken under the 2012 Rules shall be completed, in terms thereof. All the petitions stand disposed of, so also pending application (s), if any.