JUDGMENT Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J.—The instant appeal emanates for the judgment and order dated 16.3.2018 passed by learned single Judge in Writ - A No. 10647 of 2012 (Ramendra Kumar v. State of U.P. and others), whereby the aforesaid writ petition was dismissed. The writ petition was filed against the order dated 25.1.2012 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur. Brief facts of the case 2. The appellant was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade on 30.6.1989 on ad hoc basis against the substantive vacancy after following the procedure prescribed under Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921. He joined the institution Yamuna Khadar Inter College, Kamboh Marza, District Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘institution’) as an Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade on 1.7.1989. The approval to the appointment of appellant as L.T. Grade Teacher was accorded by the District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as ‘DIOS’) vide his order dated 7.7.1989. The service of appellant as Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade in the institution was regularized by regional committee vide order dated 30.7.2002. The appellant tendered resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 addressed to the Manager, Committee of Management of the institution and requested therein to accept his resignation forthwith. The said resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 was accepted by the Committee of Management of the institution in its meeting dated 24.12.2010. A copy of the resolution of the Committee of Management of the institution dated 24.12.2010 was forwarded to the DIOS, Saharanpur for granting approval. 3. One Rajneesh Chauhan, Secretary, U.P. Secondary Education, Teachers’ Association, herein submitted a representation dated 13.1.2011 on behalf of appellant before the Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur, stating therein that by way of conspiracy, a forged and fabricated resignation letter of the appellant had been prepared by the principal of the institution and same has been accepted by the Committee of Management of the institution. It is specifically stated in the representation that during that period appellant was on medical leave and he never submitted/tendered any resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 and the same was false and fabricated. It is specifically stated in the representation that during that period appellant was on medical leave and he never submitted/tendered any resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 and the same was false and fabricated. The Secretary of Madhyamic Shiksha Sangh submitted aforesaid representation dated 13.1.2011 before the Commissioner, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur for redressal of grievance of the appellant and the Commissioner, Saharanpur Region, passed an order dated 13.1.2011, directing the DIOS, Saharanpur to lodge an FIR against the principal and Manager of the Committee of Management of the institution, in case the aforesaid resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 is found to be forged and fabricated. The appellant submitted a representation in the form of an affidavit dated 14.1.2011 stating therein all facts as stated above before the DIOS. 4. District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur passed an order dated 27.4.2011, directing the appellant to file representation before Committee of Management of the institution and same may be decided by the Committee of Management within a period of fifteen days. Instead of filing representation before the Committee of Management as per direction dated 27.4.2011, the appellant filed an appeal against the order dated 27.4.2011 passed by DIOS, Saharanpur before the Joint Director of Education, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur. The Joint Director of Education, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur vide order dated 28.6.2011, directed to the DIOS, Saharanpur to take appropriate decision within a period of one week. Subsequently, the appellant also filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 56207 of 2011 before this Court challenging the order dated 27.4.2011 passed by DIOS, Saharanpur. The learned single Judge of this Court vide order dated 30.9.2011 passed the following order/s : “Thus the situation which emerges from the aforementioned facts is that the matter is before the D.I.O.S., Saharanpur pursuant to the order of the Joint Director of Education and even otherwise under law and in the opinion of the Court also the D.I.O.S., Saharanpur is the competent authority to take a decision and record his own finding as to whether or not the appellant has tendered his resignation voluntarily. In that view of the matter this petition is disposed of with a direction to the D.I.O.S., Saharanpur, respondent No. 3 to reexamine the matter and pass appropriate orders after giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and to take expert opinion also if necessary. In that view of the matter this petition is disposed of with a direction to the D.I.O.S., Saharanpur, respondent No. 3 to reexamine the matter and pass appropriate orders after giving opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and to take expert opinion also if necessary. This exercise may be undertaken and a final decision be taken within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. It is made clear that this Court has not adjudicated the claim of the appellant on merits.” 5. In compliance of order dated 30.9.2011 passed by learned single Judge of this Court, notices were issued by the DIOS, Saharanpur to the parties concerned and hearing of the matter was taken place on 28.12.2011. The DIOS, Saharanpur, re-examined the matter and passed an order admittedly, after giving full opportunity of hearing to the parties and has taken expert opinion, perused various documents which were placed before him. The appellant has admittedly appeared before the DIOS. The hand writing expert report was taken into consideration, according to which the disputed writing and signatures were written and made by the same person, who has written the admitted exhibits and admitted signature. The DIOS, Saharanpur vide order dated 25.1.2012, rejected the claim of appellant with the finding that the resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 has been submitted by the appellant himself and the ground of appellant to the extent that the said resignation letter is forged and fabricated has no legs. It has been mentioned in the aforesaid order of the DIOS that the resignation letter was examined by the hand writing expert and after examining the hand writing, the expert has given the following observations: ^^fu:i.k ,oa dkj.kksa ds vk/kkj ij esjk ,d ek= laxfBr fopkjiwoZd fo'oluh; fuf'pr er gS fd fookfnr ys[k rFkk gLrk{kj mlh O;fDr dk fy[kk gS ftlus U;k;n'kZ ys[k rFkk gLrk{kjksa dks fy[kk gSA^^ 6. Aggrieved by the order dated 25.1.2012 passed by DIOS, writ petition No. 10647 of 2012 was filed by the appellant with the following prayers : “i). issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 25.1.2012 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur (Annexure 12 to the writ petition). ii). Aggrieved by the order dated 25.1.2012 passed by DIOS, writ petition No. 10647 of 2012 was filed by the appellant with the following prayers : “i). issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 25.1.2012 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur (Annexure 12 to the writ petition). ii). issue a writ, order or direction in the nature mandamus commanding the District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur to take immediate steps for payment of arrears of salary and current salary of the appellant as assistant teacher in L.T. Grade in Yamuna Khadar Inter College Camboh Mazra, District Saharanpur.” 7. Counter-affidavit in the aforesaid writ petition, was filed by the Manager of the Committee of Management of the institution. The each and every contentions made in the writ petition were denied by the deponent of the counter-affidavit. 8. In the counter-affidavit, it is contended that the conduct of the appellant as a teacher was always remain in dispute and he was always remain negligent towards his duties as assistant teacher in the college. He had been involved in illicit relation with former student. But considering future of both, matter was dropped though he remain suspended for sometime. It is stated that he often neglected his duties in U.P. Board Examination. A complaint was also lodged by S.D.M., Behat in this regard. 9. It is further contended in the counter-affidavit that the appellant has never applied for any medical leave as stated by him. In fact on 16.11.2010, he has moved an application for casual leave of one day i.e. for 18.11.2010 on the ground of marriage engagement of his niece. The principal has granted the leave only for one day. Thereafter he never moved any application to grant leave on any score. He came on 15.12.2010 for the first time after 16.11.2010 and tendered his aforesaid willful resignation. 10. The resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 was hand written and signed by the appellant himself. The same letter was submitted by him to concerned clerk of the institution. The said resignation letter was accepted by the Committee of Management by passing resolution dated 24.12.2010. 11. In counter-affidavit, it is contended that the Committee of Management after accepting the resignation of the appellant, has communicated it’s decision to the appellant vide its letter dated 27.12.2010 through registered post at the residential address of the appellant on 28.12.2010. The said resignation letter was accepted by the Committee of Management by passing resolution dated 24.12.2010. 11. In counter-affidavit, it is contended that the Committee of Management after accepting the resignation of the appellant, has communicated it’s decision to the appellant vide its letter dated 27.12.2010 through registered post at the residential address of the appellant on 28.12.2010. The appellant has deliberately concealed the factum of the case that the Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur got conducted an enquiry on the complaint of the appellant itself by the independent authority, namely, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Saharanpur, who after making detailed enquiry and collecting the evidence has submitted report dated 17.8.2011 in which entire allegations of the appellant has been found to be wrong and incorrect and his resignation has been established to be genuine and also established willful. Moreover, the signature of the appellant on the resignation letter was compared with his other admitted signature and hand writing by Sri Vinod Kumar Agarwal expert who gave his conclusive report to the effect that the signature and hand writing on the resignation letter is of the appellant. 12. The DIOS, Saharanpur given notice to the appellant and the contesting respondents for giving the evidence and hearing the said dispute. The contesting respondents have filed the aforesaid documentary evidence and other evidences in support of their claim. The appellant was also heard by the DIOS, Saharanpur and after hearing both the parties on 25.1.2012, the DIOS has passed a reasoned order upholding the genuineness of the resignation letter submitted by the appellant. 13. It is contended that the controversy involved in the present case is a factual, which cannot be decided by this Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is however, submitted that the order passed by the DIOS, Saharanpur based on the evidence on record and under the order of this Court, the DiOS, Saharanpur has upheld the genuineness and validity of the resignation submitted by the appellant by recording a specific finding of fact, based on the evidence, the appellant has also made the concealment of material fact in the writ petition, therefore, he is not entitled to get any relief from this Court. 14. The appellant filed rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit filed by the Manager of the College. There are following averments made in the rejoinder-affidavit. 15. 14. The appellant filed rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit filed by the Manager of the College. There are following averments made in the rejoinder-affidavit. 15. The appellant went on casual leave on 18.11.2010 and 19.11.2010 and sent medical certificate, in which, complete rest was advised to him. The appellant has not sent any application to the institution. When the institution refused to accept the application only then the application dated 27.11.2010 alongwith documents were submitted to the DIOS, as such, it is incorrect to say that no communication was made by the appellant after the application dated 18.11.2010. It is incorrect to state that the appellant reached at the institution and submitted his resignation. The entire story setup by the respondent with regard to submission of resignation is incorrect, inasmuch as, the aforesaid resignation is a result of fraud with the appellant by the principal and the Committee of Management. There is no question of submission of resignation and the entire exercise as alleged by the respondent is wholly illegal. The story setup by the respondents with regard to the alleged meeting dated 24.12.2010 and the acceptance of alleged resignation of the appellant is incorrect. The DIOS while passing the order did not consider the single evidence on record, which makes the order bad and liable to be set aside. The appellant never submitted his resignation and as such the entire story alleged in paragraph under reply is not only incorrect, but illegal too. The alleged resignation is nothing but a forged document and the DIOS miserably failed to record a single finding on the aforesaid issue. The handwriting expert report was also an ex parte report, which is of no value and as such the allegations made in paragraph under reply are denied. It is submitted that the report submitted by Special Land Acquisition Officer was also an illegal, which was corrected only by this Court vide order dated 30.9.2011 passed in C.M. Writ Petition No. 56207 of 2011. The impact of the report dated 17.8.2011 has already been wiped out by the order of this Court. 16. It is submitted that the report submitted by Special Land Acquisition Officer was also an illegal, which was corrected only by this Court vide order dated 30.9.2011 passed in C.M. Writ Petition No. 56207 of 2011. The impact of the report dated 17.8.2011 has already been wiped out by the order of this Court. 16. In the rejoinder-affidavit, it is stated that the handwriting and signature of the appellant was verified is absolutely incorrect, inasmuch as from a bare perusal of the report, it is evident that the same was allegedly handed over to the handwriting and finger print to the expert on 11.5.2011 and a report was given on 26.5.2011, based upon which, order was passed on 25.1.2012. The appellant herein was never permitted to bring his own handwriting expert report and the DIOS wrongly and illegally relied upon a solitary report given by the alleged handwriting expert that too without application of mind, which is against the settled principle of Indian Evidence Act. 17. In rejoinder-affidavit, it is further stated that apparently resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 is forged and fictitious, which has been incorrectly relied upon by the DIOS, which is nothing but a forged document. 18. After completion of pleadings and hearing the arguments on behalf of the parties, the learned single Judge vide order dated 16.3.2018 dismissed the above said writ petition and passed the following orders : “On perusal of the record, I find that the order of the Commissioner for appointing independent enquiry officer and the enquiry report submitted by him namely SLAO is dated 17.8.2011. Noticing all these facts, this Court has specifically directed the District Inspector of Schools to re-examine the matter and pass appropriate orders after giving opportunity of hearing to lead evidence and to take expert opinion also, if necessary. The appellant did not lead any evidence in his support and did not ask for any expert opinion or never ask the authority concerned to grant him permission to submit handwriting expert report of his own as per record, and did not submit any fresh or further submissions before passing of the impugned order by the DIOS. The appellant did not lead any evidence in his support and did not ask for any expert opinion or never ask the authority concerned to grant him permission to submit handwriting expert report of his own as per record, and did not submit any fresh or further submissions before passing of the impugned order by the DIOS. The appellant never raised any objection regarding the enquiry report submitted by the SLAO, which was based on the expert opinion and therefore, it is clear that the expert report was never disputed by the appellant and the same is now being sought to be raised in this petition. It is settled law that the Court cannot sit in appeal over the finding of fact as recorded by the competent authority in the impugned order. It is also pertinent to note that this report was within the knowledge of the appellant before the writ petition No. 56207 of 2011 was disposed of on 30.9.2011 and prima facie, it is only for this reason order with liberty to lead fresh evidence and take expert opinion was passed by this Court. In such view of the matter, I do not find any legal infirmity in the orders impugned herein and the same are left with no interference. The present petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.” 19. Sri Radha Kant Ojha, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of appellant submitted that the learned single Judge has erred in law for not taking into account the Regulation 26 read with Regulation 29 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. He further submitted that on conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions implies that the employee does not have unfettered right to resign, he can tender his resignation only by giving 3 month’s notice or 3 month’s pay in lieu thereof. Any resignation letter tendered in contravention of the aforesaid provisions would render the resignation letter as invalid and ineffective. 20. It is further submitted that the resignation cannot be termed as valid one before the expiry of three months from the date of intimation of the resignation letter itself. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that it is settled law that the resignation letter, even if, it has been accepted, can be withdrawn, revoked before the expiry of three months period. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that it is settled law that the resignation letter, even if, it has been accepted, can be withdrawn, revoked before the expiry of three months period. In the instant case, assuming that there was a resignation letter tendered by the appellant, it was disputed at the earliest by way of an affidavit filed on 14.1.2011, wherein the appellant categorically denied the resignation letter. In the affidavit, it is clearly stated that the resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 was not written/submitted by the appellant. The said resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 was forged and fabricated by the principal of the institution and same was accepted by the Committee of Management in connivance with the principal. Resolution of the minutes of the meeting was sent to the DIOS for further approval. In the representation made by the Secretary, Madhyamic Shiksha Sangh, it is mentioned that the same resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 is prepared by the principal of the institution, when appellant was on medical leave to destroy his entire career and reputation. 21. To buttress the submissions made, the learned Senior Counsel referred to the judicial pronouncements dealing with the aspects, he was seeking to canvas. The same are dealt with as under: 22. In the case of Shiv Raj Singh v. Shri Derji Mal Asha Ram Paliwal and others, 1982 UPLBEC 476, this Court has held as follows: “11. In our view the main trust of Regulation 29 is to give to the employee a discretion to give to the management pay in lieu of the period of notice. He is however, not bound to pay. What is required is that if the employee does not give payment as required under Regulation 29, his resignation can be valid only if he gives the requisite notice. In other words, the employee can either give three months’ pay in lieu of the notice or else his resignation will be valid only if a three months’ notice is given. 12. Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes i.e., he neither gives payment of three months’ pay nor expressly gives three months notice. 12. Now what would be the situation in case an employee may not have indicated either of the modes i.e., he neither gives payment of three months’ pay nor expressly gives three months notice. In our opinion in such case where the employee has not exercised his discretion by not actually paying the three months pay or giving the 3 months notice of resignation as required by Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26, the resignation cannot be termed as a valid resignation before the expiry of three months from the date of lodging of the resignation letter itself. The resignation would be deemed to be ineffective before the expiry of three months from the date on which the resignation was lodged with the management. 14. In the present case the resignation letter was lodged with the management on October 16, 1971. It would become effective on the expiry of three months period of notice, namely on January 16, 1972. Resignation being effective in the month of January, attracts the first proviso to Regulation 29. Under it no employee shall give notice expiring in the month of January, February or March. In view of the proviso the notice deemed to have been given by the plaintiff appellant by his resignation letter dated October 16, 1971 will be invalid since it expired in the month of January, 1972. The resignation was hence ab initio void and could not rupture the relationship between the parties. In this view the resolution passed on October 24, 1971 by the Managing Committee lost its utility and could have no legal effect. 16. Out attention was invited to Clause (iv) to Regulation 29, which says that it would be open to the management to waive its claim to the notice. This Clause will apply where the management can possibly waive a claim. It can do so by expressly saying or permitting the employee to resign without giving notice. But Clause (iv) cannot over-ride Clause (I) to Regulation 29, which prohibits the giving of notice expiring in the month of January, February or March. If an employee is prohibited from giving notice expiring in those three months, it cannot be said that the management can waive its claim to any such notice. The question of waiver of notice can arise where an employee has a right to receive any particular kind of notice. If an employee is prohibited from giving notice expiring in those three months, it cannot be said that the management can waive its claim to any such notice. The question of waiver of notice can arise where an employee has a right to receive any particular kind of notice. On the facts of the present case, there was no question of attracting or applying of the provisions of Clause (iv) aforesaid.” 23. In the case of A.K. Roy v. State of Punjab, 1986 LawSuit (SC) 343, wherein Apex Court in para-10 held as under: “10. A careful analysis of the language of s. 20(l) of the Act clearly shows that it inhibits institution of prosecutions for an offence under the Act except on fulfillment of one or the other or the two conditions. Either the prosecutions must be instituted by the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorized in that behalf by the Central Government or the State Government, or the prosecutions should be instituted with the written consent of any of the four specified categories of authorities or persons. If either of these two conditions is satisfied, there would be sufficient authority for the institution of such a prosecution for an offence under the Act. The provision contained in Section 20(1) of the Act does not contemplate the institution of a prosecution by any person other than those designated. The terms of Section 20 (1) do not envisage further delegation of powers by the person authorized, except that such prosecution may be instituted with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or the person authorized. The use of the negative words in Section 20(1) “No prosecution for an offence under this Act... shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of” plainly make the requirements of the section imperative. The use of the negative words in Section 20(1) “No prosecution for an offence under this Act... shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of” plainly make the requirements of the section imperative. That conclusion of ours must necessarily follow from the well- known rule of construction of inference to be drawn from the negative language used in a statute stated by Craies on Statute Law, 6th edn., p. 263 in his own terse language: “If the requirements of a statute which prescribe the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner and in no other manner, it has been laid down that those requirements are in all cases absolute, and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate the whole proceeding.” Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. The intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 20(1) was to confer a power on the authorities specified therein which power had to be exercised in the manner provided and not otherwise. 24. In the case of Panna Lal Pathak v. District Inspector of Schools, Aligarh and others, 1988 UPLBEC 827. “6. In our opinion the possible textual and contextual interpretation of Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26 under Chapter III, would be that unless a head clerk submits his resignation giving 3 months notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof, the resignation cannot be deemed to be valid. From the record it appears that in the instant case the resignation was not communicated even to the relevant authorities including regional Inspectress of Girls School etc. Had the resignation actually been submitted, relevant authority including respondents 1 and 2 would have itself commented about the validity of the resignation or otherwise. 7. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion that a permanent head clerk can resign only by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. In the instant case there is no evidence on the record to show that appellant resigned by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. In the instant case there is no evidence on the record to show that appellant resigned by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof. In the counter-affidavit nothing has been pointed out to establish that appellant submitted resignation by giving 3 months prior notice or by paying 3 months pay in lieu thereof or the Committee of Management while accepting the resignation condoned the notice. Therefore, the said resignation (Annexure-4 to C.A.) if any, cannot be said to have made in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Regulation 29 read with Regulation 26 and same cannot be treated to be resignation in the eye of law. The view which we are taking also finds support from a Division Bench case Shivraj Singh v. Shri Devji Mal (Asha Ram Paliwal and others, (1982 UPLBEC 476) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. It was held in para 9 that under U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, Regulations were framed. Those Regulations control both the management as well as the teachers rights to terminate or resign from service. Regulation 26 is in positive terms. Giving of the three months notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the services of an employee. Similarly in Kumari Rama Chauhan v. Committee of Management, (1981 UPLBEC 721) it was held that a resignation without following the procedure prescribed under Regulations 26 and 29 framed under Chapter III, cannot be treated to be a letter of resignation at all.” 25. Per contra Sri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, at the threshold itself stated that he has no quibble with all the legal propositions advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant or with judicial pronouncements referred to aforesaid. It is submitted that the appellant has tendered the resignation on his own and the appellant could not in law withdraw his resignation after it once having been submitted and accepted by the authority concerned. It is further submitted the appellant has concealed the fact regarding the enquiry conducted under the directions of the Commissioner and the report submitted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Saharanpur, who was appointed as an independent enquiry officer and who is not connected with the dispute or college. The said report was admittedly supplied to the appellant. It is further submitted the appellant has concealed the fact regarding the enquiry conducted under the directions of the Commissioner and the report submitted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Saharanpur, who was appointed as an independent enquiry officer and who is not connected with the dispute or college. The said report was admittedly supplied to the appellant. 26. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent submitted that the appellant always remain negligent towards his duties as Assistant Teacher in the College. The management has given warning to him several times. 27. On behalf of respondents, it has been submitted that the papers regarding resignation of the appellant and copy of the resolution of the Committee of Management were forwarded to the DIOS, Saharanpur to grant the approval. No question arises of sending the resignation or resolution of the Committee to the DIOS, Saharanpur for approval as there is no provision in U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 to seek the approval of the resignation. It is further submitted that the salary pay bill of the month of December, 2010 of the College Staff excluding the salary of appellant due to his absence and resignation were forwarded to the DIOS, Saharanpur, which was accepted and granted by him accordingly. 28. It is also submitted on behalf of the respondents that there is no dispute regarding the dismissal or removal of the appellant. The appellant has not been dispense with/dismissed by the Committee of Management but the appellant himself willfully resigned from service, the provision of Section 21A of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, therefore, does not apply in the present case. 29. The resignation letter dated 15.12.2010 accepted with immediate effect as per his request. The resignation letter is reproduced as follows: **lsok esa] Jheku~ izcU/kd egksn;] ;equk [kknj mŒekŒ fo|ky;] dEcksg etjk ¼lgkjuiqj½ egksn;] fuosnu ;g gS fd izkFkhZ vkids fo|ky; ;Œ[kŒbaŒdkŒ dEcksg etjk esa lŒvŒ ds in ij dk;Zjr gSA ?kjsyw ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds dkj.k izkFkhZ mDr in ij dk;Z djus esa vleFkZ gSA vr% vkils vuqjks/k gS fd izkFkhZ dk R;kx i= lŒvŒ ds in ls rRdky Lohdkj djus dh d`ik djsaA vkidh vfr d`ik gksxhA Jh jesUnz dqekj iq= j.kthr falag ;Œ[kŒbaŒdkŒ dEcksg etjk] ftyk&lgkjuiqj izfrfyfi lwpukFkZ ,oa vko/;d dk;Zokgh gsrqA 1- iz/kkukpk;Z ;Œ[kŒbaŒdkŒ dEcksg etjk 2- ftŒfoŒfuŒ lgkjuiqjA Jh jesUnz dqekj lŒvŒ** 30. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and we have also gone through the documents forming part of the proceedings. 31. Before we deal with the aforesaid issues, certain crystallized facts of matter as evident from facts as narrated above and the statutory framework, need to be noted. 32. The Committee of Management is a non-statutory body. It is created in accordance with the Scheme of Administration formulated under 16A(1) of the Intermediate Education Act, providing, inter alias, for the constitution of a Committee vested with the authority to manage and conduct the affairs of the institution. The Committee is created by the Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed there-under. In order that an institution can be considered a statutory body, it must be established that it was created under the Statute. This is distinct from an institution, which is not created by or under Statute but is governed by certain Statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. The adoption of certain Statutory provisions by itself is not sufficient to clothe the institution with Statutory character. 33. Regulation 29 Chapter III of Intermediate Education Act makes provision for resignation by an employee of the College. It says: “29. Any employee may resign by giving a notice or pay in lieu thereof to which he would have been entitled in case of termination of his services by the management: Provided that- (I) no employee shall give notice expiring in the month of January, February or March. (ii) Summer Vacation may be included in the period of notice; (iii) an employee selected for appointment in Government service or the service of any local body shall not be required to give due notice and shall be required to resign from service in time to join the new appointment if the application for the post had been made through proper channel; (iv) it will be open to the management to waive its claim to the notice.” 34. The notice or pay in lieu thereof to which the employee is entitled in case of termination of his services by the Management are specified in Regulation 26 as under: “26. (1) The services of permanent employee may be terminated by giving him three months’ notice or three months’ pay in lieu thereof, on the ground of the abolition of the post which the employee is holding. (1) The services of permanent employee may be terminated by giving him three months’ notice or three months’ pay in lieu thereof, on the ground of the abolition of the post which the employee is holding. The abolition may due to one of the following ‘reason’: (a) Retrenchment decided upon for reasons of financial stringency. (b) Abolition of subject. (c) Abolition of Section or Class. (2) For the purpose of computing the period of notice mentioned in clause (1) or for determining the amount to be paid in lieu thereof the period of summer vacation shall be excluded.” 35. The Statutory regulations framed under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921, control both the management as well as the teacher’s right to terminate or resign from service. Regulation 26 is in positive terms. Under it the management can terminate the service of a permanent employee by giving him three month’s notice or three month’s pay in lieu thereof. Giving of the three months’ notice or pay in lieu thereof is a condition precedent for the management to exercise its right to terminate the services of an employee. Regulation 29 enable an employee to resign either by giving notice or pay in lieu thereof. The notice or pay refer to the notice or pay to which he would have been entitled in case of termination by the management. Accordingly, an employee can resign only by giving a notice of three months’ or pay in lieu thereof. This shows that an employee has no unfettered right to resign. 36. Regulation 29 enables an employee to resign with certain conditions with intention to protect the interest of the institution/management. If, we carefully read Regulations 29 and 30, it is crystal clear that an employee has no unfettered right to resign. He can exercise the right of resignation only in accordance with the provisions of Regulations 29 and 30. The requirement of furnishing three months’ notice under the aforesaid regulations is to ensure for the benefit of the management and is therefore, a requirement which can be waived by the management. 37. In the case in hand, the appellant wanted to withdraw the resignation on the ground that same was fake and fabricated, which was proved otherwise by the expert report. The resignation was withdrawn by the appellant after a substantial delay and in any event after it was accepted and communicated to him. 37. In the case in hand, the appellant wanted to withdraw the resignation on the ground that same was fake and fabricated, which was proved otherwise by the expert report. The resignation was withdrawn by the appellant after a substantial delay and in any event after it was accepted and communicated to him. Moreover, regard be had to the letter dated 13.1.2011 addressed to the Commissioner, it would be apparent that grounds which were setup have been belatedly setup as an after thought. 38. A period of three months’ notice is provided for the benefit of the management so that the management would not find any difficulty in appointing a substantive teacher. Therefore, it is open for the management to give up the advantage conferred by the regulation and accept the resignation forthwith. 39. As per our view, the plain implication of Regulations 29 and 30 is that it is for the management to either waive the period of notice by accepting pay in lieu thereof. In a case such as the present one, where the letter of resignation was with immediate effect and was accepted by the management, evidently there was no question of the resignation being withdrawn upon its acceptance. It is settled preposition of law that where an employee has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and it will not be open to the employee to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. 40. In the case of Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 , in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties. 6. The alternative ground raised by counsel that acceptance of the resignation amounts to dismissal from employment and failure to comply with the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution vitiates the order accepting the resignation has no force. The order of dismissal; the Government of India accepted the resignation submitted by the appellant, they did not purport to terminate the appointment for any misconduct on the part of the appellant, or as a measure of penalty.” 41. In P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 , the question as to when an employee can withdraw his resignation came up for consideration of an employee who was not a Government servant. The employee in this case was lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P.S.G. College of Technology, Coimbatore. In P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 , the question as to when an employee can withdraw his resignation came up for consideration of an employee who was not a Government servant. The employee in this case was lecturer in the Department of Electronics in P.S.G. College of Technology, Coimbatore. Hon’ble Supreme Court again relying upon the judgment of Raj Kumar (Supra) held that the services of a Government servant normally stands terminated from the date on which letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority unless there is any law of specific rule governing conditions of service to the contrary. It was further held that the same principle would apply to the case of any other employee. In effect this is an authority for the proposition that even a teacher of the educational institution would be governed by the same principles as wound govern the Government servants unless there is any rule or governing conditions of service which is contrary. 42. In the case of Nand Keshwar Prasad v. Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd. and others, 1998 (5) SCC 461 , the Apex Court held as follows: “11. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that the law is well-settled by this Court in a number of decisions that unless controlled by condition of service or the statutory provisions, the retirement mentioned in the letter of resignation must take effect from the date mentioned therein and such date cannot be advanced by accepting the resignation from an earlier date when the employee concerned did not intend to retire from such earlier date. It has also been held by this Court that it is open to the employee concerned to withdraw letter of resignation before the same becomes effective. 12. It, however, appears to us that it is not the case of the appellant that though he had tendered resignation voluntarily intending to retire from a prospective date, but later on he had changed his mind and had withdrawn the same before it became effective. Persistently, the appellant’s case on the contrary is that he had not tendered resignation voluntarily and the letter of voluntary resignation was obtained under coercion and by giving out the threat of disciplinary proceeding. Persistently, the appellant’s case on the contrary is that he had not tendered resignation voluntarily and the letter of voluntary resignation was obtained under coercion and by giving out the threat of disciplinary proceeding. The appellant, therefore, intended to resume his duties by asking the authorities concerned not to take notice of the purported letter of resignation. It has, however, been found by the Labour Court on evidence adduced by the parties that the appellant had submitted letter of resignation voluntarily and in the absence of any threat or coercion. Since the appellant did not intimate that he intended to withdraw the letter of voluntary resignation, it cannot be held in the facts of the case, that letter ol voluntary resignation was intended to be withdrawn before expiry of the date from which the resignation was to take effect. The appellant on the contrary, took the stand that there was no voluntary resignation on his part but a letter purporting to be voluntary resignation was obtained from him under threat and coercion and such purported resignation letter could not be given effect to. It may also be indicated here that the appellant even did not return the salary received by him from the employer for the entire period, namely, from the date of submission of letter of retirement up to the period from which the resignation was to be effective. 13. The High Court has considered such special features of the case and therefore refused to interfere in the writ petition. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, we do not think any interference by this Court is called for in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.” 43. In the case of Karachi Education Society v. Pruthviraj R. Merchant, 2005 E-Juris (Bom) (1) 51, the High Court of Bombay held as follows: 4.”Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 reads as follows : 40. Resignation: (1) A permanent employee may leave service after giving three calender months notice and a non permanent employee may leave service after giving one calender month’s notice. Resignation: (1) A permanent employee may leave service after giving three calender months notice and a non permanent employee may leave service after giving one calender month’s notice. The management may, however, allow an employee to leave service earlier on payment of pay (excluding allowances) for three months, or as the case may be, one month in lieu of notice by the employee. The amount in lieu of notice shall be restricted to the pay for the period falls short. (2) If any Management allows an employees to leave service earlier either without due notice or without making payment of pay in lieu of notice as specified in Sub-rule (1), a appropriate amount of pay in lieu of notice shall be deducted from the grant due to the school concerned. (3) An employee entitled to vacation shall not give notice of resignation during the vacation or so as to cover any part of the vacation. The notice of resignation shall not be given within a month after the beginning of the first term of the year. 11.Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, however, submitted that respondent No. 1 withdrew his resignation on the very next date i.e. on 2.3.1998. The said letter does not constitute withdrawal of the letter of resignation. In that letter, respondent No. 1 has written that he has been forced to resign under letter dated 1.3.1998. In my view, there is a clear and well-marked distinction between the withdrawal of a resignation and the assertion that the resignation made earlier was forced and involuntary. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel that the letter of resignation may be withdrawn any time before it is accepted is untenable here.” 44. In the case of Secretary Technical Education, U.P. and others v. Lalit Mohan Upadhyay and another, 2007(2) ESC 317 (SC), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows: “6. It appears from the record that on receipt of the Report of the DSW, the Principal of the College summoned Shri L. M. Upadhyay and apprised him about the complaint made against him by Ms. Geetanjali and as also about the Report submitted by the DSW. It appears from the record that on receipt of the Report of the DSW, the Principal of the College summoned Shri L. M. Upadhyay and apprised him about the complaint made against him by Ms. Geetanjali and as also about the Report submitted by the DSW. The respondent No. 1, just to save himself from any consequential disciplinary action likely to be taken against him by the Principal or the authority of the College and also to avoid his condemnation by the members of the staff, teachers and the students of the College, submitted a letter of resignation to the Principal on 6.9.1993 and insisted for its acceptance immediately. He left the College thereafter in haste with his father. Shri L. M. Upadhyay in his letter of resignation indicated his unequivocal intention to resign with immediate effect and the letter having been communicated to the Principal and received by him on 6.9.1993, he observed: “Resignation letter accepted with immediate effect as per his request.” Sd/- 6.9.1993. The Principal further stated : “Although usually one month’s notice is required to be given by the employee while resigning, it is upto the Board of Governors to accept the resignation with immediate effect and to waive the notice period.” 12. The general principle is that a Government servant/or functionary who cannot, under the conditions of his service/or office, by his own unilateral act of tendering resignation, gives up his service/or office normally the tender of resignation becomes effective and his service/or office tenure gets terminated when it is accepted by the competent authority. Thus, having regard to the letter of resignation (Annexure P-2), in the present case, there can be no doubt that Shri. L. M. Upadhyay had in his letter dated 6.9.1993, indicated his unequivocal intention to resign in the clearest possible terms with immediate effect. The resignation was tendered by Shri. Upadhyay voluntarily without any pressure or coercion from the Principal of the College as recorded by all the Inquiry Officers in their respective fact finding reports and the counter allegation of Shri. Upadhyay against the Principal was found unwarranted and unfounded. The resignation was tendered by Shri. Upadhyay voluntarily without any pressure or coercion from the Principal of the College as recorded by all the Inquiry Officers in their respective fact finding reports and the counter allegation of Shri. Upadhyay against the Principal was found unwarranted and unfounded. The Principal in fact, had protected the reputation, saved the future career and unnecessary humiliation and embellishment of Shri. Upadhyay from the students, staff members and teachers of the College by permitting him to leave the College immediately before his letter of resignation was forwarded to the competent authority for its acceptance. 13. We have carefully gone through the representation/ complaint dated 10.9.1993 (Annexure P-3) submitted by Shri L. M. Upadhyay to the Governor, the Chief Secretary and the Secretary, Technical Education. There is no whisper in the said representation that he intended to withdraw his letter of resignation dated 6.9.1993. Thus, finding of the High Court that Shri L. M. Upadhyay had withdrawn his letter of resignation dated 6.9.1993 by a subsequent letter dated 10.9.1993 was not born out from the record. Similarly, the High Court is not right in holding that the letter of resignation dated 6.9.1993 submitted by Shri L. M. Upadhyay was accepted by the State Government and not by the Board of Governors is not tenable. As noticed above, the letter of resignation tendered by Shri L.M. Upadhyay to the Principal was forwarded by the Principal on the same day to the Board of Governors for its acceptance with immediate effect with a request to waive the period of notice of one month required to be given by the employee before tendering his resignation. The documents marked as Annexures P-6 and P-7 would clearly and plainly establish that the letter of resignation tendered by Shri L. M. Upadhyay was accepted by the competent authority after receipt of the inquiry reports of the inquiry officers. It is not in dispute that the Chief Secretary was the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the College and the Joint Secretary of the Department of Technical Education, State of U. P., had only conveyed the decision of the acceptance of the resignation taken by the Chairman, Board of Governors, to the Principal of the College. It is not in dispute that the Chief Secretary was the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the College and the Joint Secretary of the Department of Technical Education, State of U. P., had only conveyed the decision of the acceptance of the resignation taken by the Chairman, Board of Governors, to the Principal of the College. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that the letter of resignation of Shri L. M. Upadhyay was accepted by the Principal of the KEC or by the State Government as submitted by respondent No. 1. 14. There cannot be any quarrel on the settled principle of law that an employee is entitled to withdraw his resignation before its acceptance by the competent authority. We have gone through the decisions of this Court in M/s J. K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills Company Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U. P. and others [ AIR 1990 SC 1808 ] and Union of India and others v. Gopal Chandra Misra and others [ (1978) 2 SCC 301 ] relied upon by the learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1. He contended that before terminating the services of the respondent No. 1 on the basis of the complaint of the girl student and subsequent inquiry reports of the Inquiry Officers, it was obligatory upon the Authority to hold regular departmental inquiry for the alleged misconduct and then to proceed against respondent No. 1 in accordance with relevant Rules. We are afraid to accept this submission. Admittedly, Shri L. M. Upadhyay was on probation and the Authority was empowered to judge his fitness for work or suitability to the post of teacher at the time of acceptance of his resignation. In our view, the services of Shri L.M. Upadhyay during probation period could have been terminated by the Authority, but the Principal and the Board of Governors had adopted a reasonable and fair mode of accepting his pending letter of resignation instead of terminating his services for unsuitability.” 45. In this connection, reference is required to be made to the English decision. In the case of Rev Oswald Joseph Reichel (1889 House of Lords, Vol. XIV, page 259). In this connection, reference is required to be made to the English decision. In the case of Rev Oswald Joseph Reichel (1889 House of Lords, Vol. XIV, page 259). In the said case, Reichel had on his own free will entered into a perfectly binding agreement with the Bishop and the Bishop had agreed to abstain from commencing an enquiry into the serious charges against Reichel, if the letter tendered his resignation and in pursuance of that agreement, Reichel tendered his resignation and did all to complete it, and the Bishop also abstained from instituting proceedings against him in the Ecclesiastical Court. It was found that said agreement with consideration and having acted upon and communicated before the supposed withdrawal of the resignation of Mr. Reichel, who could not, therefore, be permitted to upset the agreement at his unilateral option and withdraw the resignation without the consent of the Bishop. Considering the said aspect, it was found that Reichel’s resignation had become absolute and irrevocable. 46. Before giving any conclusion with regard to the merit of this case, what is to be considered in the present case is the conduct of the appellant. It is stated that the conduct of the appellant as teacher was always remain in dispute and he was always remain negligent towards his duties as teacher in the College. There were serious allegations against him that he had involved in illicit relationship with former student, but considering future of both, matter was dropped. He was suspended from service for some time. The appellant submitted forged medical certificate for ‘7 days rest’ on 19.11.2010. The appellant alleged that a forged and fabricated resignation was prepared by the management of the institution. The Commissioner, Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur got conducted an enquiry on the aforesaid allegation of the appellant by the independent authority, namely, Special Land Acquisition Officer, Saharanpur, who after making detailed enquiry and collecting the evidence has submitted report dated 17.8.2011, in which entire allegations of the appellant had been found to be wrong and incorrect and his resignation has been established to be genuine and willful. Moreover, the signature of the appellant on the resignation was compared with his other admitted signatures found true signature of the appellant, handwriting expert has also given the report in this regard to his handwriting, it was found that the handwriting on resignation letter is of the appellant. Moreover, the signature of the appellant on the resignation was compared with his other admitted signatures found true signature of the appellant, handwriting expert has also given the report in this regard to his handwriting, it was found that the handwriting on resignation letter is of the appellant. The aforesaid action/conduct of the appellant is trying to defraud the authority by first resigning from his post and then trying to withdraw his resignation, while alleging the management and seeking protection of technicalities of law do not call for protection to be given to such a person specially in extra-ordinary, discretionary and equity jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The conduct, as well as the circumstances may not warrant that any relief be given to the appellant. 47. Before we rest the case, we would like to bring to the fore and disparage the conduct of appellant, who hold high and respectful position as teacher and abuse and misuse the power and position that flows such authority. In the words of the American President, Abraham Lincon, “Nearly all men can stand adversity, but of you want to test a man’s character give him position.” In the instant case the conduct of appellant being a teacher was not good and he always involved in the controversies. He was negligent towards his duties. He submitted the forged medical report to the management. He has been always absent from duty without intimating the management. 48. Considering the aforesaid view and discussion, in our view, even though a prospective resignation can be withdrawn at any point of time but before it becomes effective. In the instant case, the appellant had tendered his resignation with request to accept the same forthwith. The Committee of Management accepted his resignation in its meeting held on 24.12.2010 and he was duly informed about the acceptance of his resignation vide letter dated 27.12.2010 of the Manager of the College. Regulations 29 and 30, enable an employee to resign with certain conditions with intention to protect the interest of the management. The requirement of furnishing three month’s notice under the aforesaid regulations to ensure for the benefit of the management and is therefore, a requirement can be waived by the management. The conduct of the appellant as discussed above, may also not warrant that any relief be given to him. 49. The requirement of furnishing three month’s notice under the aforesaid regulations to ensure for the benefit of the management and is therefore, a requirement can be waived by the management. The conduct of the appellant as discussed above, may also not warrant that any relief be given to him. 49. In that view of the matter, we do not think that we should go in further detail on the merits of the contentions. We do not find any error in the impugned order dated 16.3.2018 passed by learned single Judge. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The order dated 25.1.2012 passed by District Inspector of Schools, Saharanpur is confirmed. 50. Accordingly, special appeal is dismissed. 51. No order as to costs.