JUDGMENT : Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, J. The question framed for being answered by this Full Bench involves an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the 1948 Act') which makes a provision for an appeal to the High Court from an order of the Employees Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. The doubt expressed while making the reference was as to whether a Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable in terms of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna as contained in Appendix E of the Rules of the High Court at Patna against the judgment of a learned Single Judge deciding an appeal under Section 82 (2) of the 1948 Act. The doubt arose on account of a stipulation of a bar to appeals as recited in the opening words of Sub-section (1) of Section 82 of the 1948 Act'. Since the same issue was raised and referred in Letters Patent Appeal No.111 of 1992, the present reference was also directed to come up for hearing before the Full Bench along with the reference made therein. From the records it appears that Letters Patent Appeal No. 111 of 1992 came to be dismissed in default on 13th of February, 2006. 2. This is how the reference being alive in this appeal has come up before us. The question referred is as follows: "Whether a letters patent appeal is maintainable against the order passed by the Single Judge of the High Court under Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act ?" 3. Shri Saurendra Pandey appearing on behalf of the appellants has invited the attention of the Court to the decisions relating to the maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals keeping in view the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and to commence his arguments he has placed reliance on a 3 Judges decision in the case of Subal Paul versus Malina Paul and another reported in, (2003) 10 SCC 361 where in an appeal arising out of Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act the Apex Court while interpreting Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta High Court, as extended to the Gauhati High Court, came to the conclusion that a Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable. 4. 4. The next decision is of a Constitution Bench in the case of P.S. Sathappan versus Andhra Bank Ltd. reported in, (2004) 11 SCC 672 where the entire law on the subject was thrashed out and explained by a majority of 3:2 by the Apex Court where it came to the conclusion, that the two earlier decisions on the issue that were in relation to Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal as applicable in Orissa (the same as at Patna) namely that of New Kenilworth Hotel (P) Ltd. vs. Orissa Sate Finance Corporation reported in, (1997) 3 SCC 462 , Resham Singh Pyara Sngh vs. Abdul Sattar reported in, (1996) 1 SCC 49 , did not lay down the correct law keeping in view the earlier Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Gulab Rai vs. Puniya reported in, (1966) 2 SCR 102 . 5. The Apex Court in another case came to consider the provisions of Section 50 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and while evaluating the law on the said issue arrived at the conclusion that if a special statute completely bars the remedy of an appeal, then in that event a Letters Patent Appeal would not be maintainable. The said judgment in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Limited Vs. Jindal Exports Limited reported in, (2011) 8 SCC 333 . 6. The Court has also come across the judgment in the case of Gaudiya Mission vs. Shobha Bose and Anr. reported in, (2008) 17 SCC 714 wherein in paragraph 28 it was held that a Division Bench of the High Court in an intra-court appeal had the power to consider all questions whether of facts or of law, which could be raised before a Single Bench. In other words, the party aggrieved before the Division Bench in an intracourt/letters patent appeal can raise all those questions which could be raised before a Single Judge of the High Court in the first appeal. 7. In other words, the party aggrieved before the Division Bench in an intracourt/letters patent appeal can raise all those questions which could be raised before a Single Judge of the High Court in the first appeal. 7. On the strength of these decisions Shri Pandey contends that an appeal before the Division Bench under Clause 10 in the present case would be available against judgment of a learned Single Judge under Section 82 (2) of the 1948 Act, inasmuch as, the dispute which has arisen for consideration is a matter that has to be governed by a substantive right of appeal that was available prior to the amendment in Section 100 A of the Civil Procedure Code brought about in the year 2002. He, therefore, submits that since the said amendment is prospective in nature as held by the Apex Court in the case of Kamla Devi vs. Kushal Kanwar reported in, (2006) 13 SCC 295, the issue involved in the present reference has to be answered keeping in view the law as it existed then that is prior to the 2002 amendment in Section 100A of the Civil Procedure Code. 8. Responding to the said submissions Dr. Anshuman, learned counsel appearing for the Employees State Insurance Corporation contends that since the 1948 Act' is a special Act and it bars appeals as per Sub-section (1) of Section 82 thereof and provides for an appeal only on a substantial question of law, the same should be read akin to the provisions of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code and the proceedings before the High Court in appeal should be inferred as a second appellate exercise of power. He, therefore, submits that if this interpretation is accepted then a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be available to the appellants. His submission, therefore, is that if under a special statute the appeal is barred as held by the Apex Court in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Limited (supra) then in that event the present Letters Patent Appeal being not maintainable deserves to be dismissed and the reference should be answered accordingly. 9. We have considered the submissions raised at the Bar as well as the decisions that have been cited at the bar. 10. 9. We have considered the submissions raised at the Bar as well as the decisions that have been cited at the bar. 10. The legal issues have almost been settled and are no longer res-integra keeping in view the Constitution Bench judgment in the case of P.S. Sathappan (supra) as explained by the Apex Court in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Limited (supra). The Apex Court while proceeding to consider the legal provisions and the availability of the right of an intra-court appeal held in paragraph 29 of the said decision that the Constitution Bench decision in the case of P.S. Sathappan (supra) was actually an authority on the interplay of Section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court. For this the Apex Court relied on paragraph 6 of the judgment in the case of P.S. Sathappan (supra) and to put the matter in a nut shell, we may gainfully reproduce paragraphs 29 and 30 of the report in Fuerst Day Lawson Limited (supra) that is extracted hereinunder: "29. P.S. Sathappan is actually an authority on the interplay of section 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Letters Patent jurisdiction of the High Court. The majority judgment went into the history of the matter and pointed out that under the Civil Procedure Codes of 1877 and 1882 there was a divergence of opinion among the different High Courts on the point whether the finality attached to orders passed under Section 588 (corresponding to Section 104 of the present Code) precluded any further appeals, including a letters patent appeal. The question, then, came up before the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder Chowdry v. Kali Sundari Debia, (1883) 9 ILR(Cal) 482 (PC). But the decision of the Privy Council, rather than settling the issue gave rise to further conflicting decisions by different High Courts in the country. The Bombay, Calcutta and Madras High Courts held that Section 588 did not take away the right of appeal given under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court took a different view and held that a letters patent appeal was barred under Section 588 of the Code. In view of this conflict of views, the legislature stepped in and amended the law. It introduced Section 4 and Section 104 in the Code. 30. On the other hand, the Allahabad High Court took a different view and held that a letters patent appeal was barred under Section 588 of the Code. In view of this conflict of views, the legislature stepped in and amended the law. It introduced Section 4 and Section 104 in the Code. 30. Having, thus, put the controversy in the historical perspective, the Court in P.S. Sathappan case referred to Sections 4 and 104 of the Code and made the following observation in paragraph 6 of the judgment: (SCC p.685) "6.....To be immediately noted that now the legislature provides that the provision of this Code will not affect or limit special law unless specifically excluded. The legislature also simultaneously saves, in Section 104(1), appeals under 'any law for the time being in force'. These would include letters patent appeals." The above is really the kernel of the decision in P.S. Sathappan and the rest of the judgment is only an elucidation of this point." 11. After discussing the impact of the judgment in P.S. Sathappan (supra) the Apex Court in paragraph 36 of the report in Fuerst Day Lawson Limited (supra) culled out the broad principles relating to availability of such a right of intra-court appeal which is reproduced hereinunder: "36. The decisions noticed so far lay down certain broad principles that may be stated as follows: (i) Normally, once an appeal reaches the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of the High Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which the High Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that power. (ii) When a statute merely directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court. (iii) The High Court derives its intra-court appeal jurisdiction under the Charter by which it was established and its powers under the Letters Patent were recognized and saved by Section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and finally, by Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, therefore, cannot be divested of its Letters Patent jurisdiction unless provided for expressly or by necessary intendment by some special statute. The High Court, therefore, cannot be divested of its Letters Patent jurisdiction unless provided for expressly or by necessary intendment by some special statute. (iv) If the pronouncement of the Single Judge qualifies as a "judgment", in the absence of any bar created by a statute either expressly or by necessary implication, it would be subject to appeal under the relevant clause of the Letters Patent of the High Court. (v) Since Section 104(1) CPC specifically saves the letters patent appeal; it could only be excluded by an express mention in Section 104(2). In the absence of any express mention in Section 104(2), the maintainability of a letters patent appeal is saved by virtue of section 104(1). (vi) Limitation of a right of appeal in absence of any provision in a statute cannot be readily inferred. The appellate jurisdiction of a superior court cannot be taken as excluded simply because a subordinate court exercises its special jurisdiction. (vii) The exception to the aforementioned rule is where the special Act sets out a self contained code and in that event the applicability of the general law procedure would be impliedly excluded. The express provision need not refer to or use the words "letters patent" but if on a reading of the provision it is clear that all further appeals are barred then even a letters patent appeal would be barred." 12. In order to appreciate the controversy in the light of the law laid down by the Apex Court the ratio which is relevant to the present controversy is clearly referable to Clause (vii) of the Principles as enunciated by the Apex Court in the above quoted paragraph. 13. Applying the aforesaid principles we may now proceed to examine the nature of the provision of appeal and the bar if any created in terms of Section 82 of the 1948 Act'. Section 82 of the 1948 Act' is reproduced hereinunder: "82.Appeal.-(1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3)The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves a substantial question of law. (3)The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4)The provisions of sections 5 and 12 of the [Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall apply to appeals under this section." 14. The words used by the legislature in the above provision are unambiguous and as clear as a window pane. The first Subsection of Section 82 clearly raises a complete bar with an exception that no appeal shall lie from an order of the Employees Insurance Court save as expressly provided in the Section. Sub- section (2) confers a right of appeal to the High Court from an order of the Employees Insurance Court to the aggrieved person if it involves a substantial question of law. Thus there cannot be any misgiving about the aforesaid provision which on the one hand disallows the filing of any appeal except if the issue involves a substantial question of law before the High Court. In our considered opinion the aforesaid statutory provision, therefore, confers a right of appeal on an aggrieved person without any inhibition if the case involves a substantial question of law. 15. The argument on behalf of the respondent to the effect that this is akin to section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code has to be understood in accordance with the scheme of the 1948 Act' where the appeal under section 82 is in the nature of an appeal at the first instance against the order of the Employees Insurance Court. It may not be unnecessary to point out that in the instance case the proceedings arose out of a claim instituted on behalf of the appellants in relation to a dispute that came to be registered under the provisions of section 76 read with section 77 of the 1948 Act' being E.S.I. Case No.2 of 1977 before the Labour Court and the Employees Insurance Court, Patna. The appeal before the High Court was filed against the judgment pronounced by the said court and, therefore, it cannot be said that it was a second appeal. The appeal before the High Court was filed against the judgment pronounced by the said court and, therefore, it cannot be said that it was a second appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent attempted to draw a parity with the provisions of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that an adjudication under section 77 of the 1948 Act' is a second step in the process of any realization of contribution, inasmuch as, the provisions of recovery under section 45A and 45B of the 1948 Act' are a step prior to such adjudication. It was contended that the said recovery proceeding being the initial step, the proceeding under section 77 of the 1948 Act' that are in the nature of adjudication of a dispute virtually amounts to a first appeal. This argument cannot be accepted inasmuch as the proceedings of recovery under the E.S.I. Act are a separate function that is to be discharged by the Authorized Officer who is empowered under the Act to proceed to make such recovery and an appeal against any such order passed for deposit of contribution is available before the Appellate Authority in terms of Regulation 31 D of the Employees' State Insurance (General) Regulation 1950. It can thus be seen that the Act provides for a different forum in relation to recovery on the basis of default or otherwise by the employer and which is not akin to the adjudicatory forum as provided under Chapter VI of the 1948 Act'. The 1948 Act' provides for adjudication of disputes and claims in relation to matters which are prescribed under section 75 and it is these proceedings the institution whereof is permissible in terms of sections 76 and 77 before the concerned court. Thus these are court proceedings as defined under the 1948 Act' and the adjudication whereof is enforceable as if it were a decree of Civil Court. This is an initial adjudication of a dispute and not a second step as urged by learned counsel of the ESI. It is in this context that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 82 has to be construed providing for a first step of appeal, and not a second appeal, which is limited only to a substantial question of law. 16. It is in this context that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 82 has to be construed providing for a first step of appeal, and not a second appeal, which is limited only to a substantial question of law. 16. Accordingly what we find is that even though the language of sub-section (2) of Section 82 confines the filing of appeal only on a substantial question of law but the same itself does not transform it as a second appellate jurisdiction as urged on behalf of the respondent as understood under section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The argument to that effect on behalf of the respondent, therefore, has to be rejected. 17. As indicated hereinabove unless the statute places a blanket bar, there is no occasion for us to limit the powers of this Court as engrained in Clause 10 of the Letters Patent that is extracted hereinunder: "10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court.- And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the Judgment (not being a Judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order) made in the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of Revisional Jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that not withstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court. Pursuant to Section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February, One thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, in the exercise of Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of Appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the Judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from the other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." 18. A perusal of Clause 10 would leave no room for doubt that it does not create any such inhibition or prohibition so as to disallow the maintainability of an intra-court appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge while deciding an appeal under section 82 of the 1948 Act' as per the law existing when the dispute in the present case arose. 19. Consequently the question as referred to us, therefore, stands answered as follows: "An intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against an appeal decided by the learned Single Judge in terms of section 82 (2) of the Employees' Insurance Act, 1948 would lie as per the law as it then stood." 20. Let the matter be now placed before the appropriate Division Bench for being heard on merits.