JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This special appeal has been filed by petitioner-appellant Ram Lal challenging the order dated 13.08.2008 of the learned Single Judge, by which the writ petition filed by him has been dismissed. The petitioner-appellant in the writ petition had challenged the order of dismissal from service dated 31.03.2004 and the order dated 08.10.2004 by which the appeal preferred there against was dismissed. 2. The petitioner-appellant was appointed on the post of Constable in R.A.C. 9th Battalion, Jodhpur, on 15.12.1991 on the basis of the mark-sheet of 8th standard, in which his date of birth was recorded as 21.04.1974. He was later on transferred to District Tonk. A charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1958’) was served upon the petitioner-appellant on 02.04.2003. There were two charges against the petitioner-appellant. The first charge was to the effect that while submitting application for appointment on the post of Constable in the year 1991, the petitioner-appellant had enclosed therewith mark-sheet of 8th standard passed with Roll Number 323 and Admission Number 2314 issued by the Government Secondary School, Tilonia, District Ajmer, in which his date of birth was recorded as 21.04.1974, but the petitioner-appellant by interpolation made the same as 21.04.1972. He thus secured the appointment on the post of Constable on the strength of forged document. The second charge was to the effect that an F.I.R. No.183/2002 for offence under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 472 of the I.P.C. was lodged against him at Police Station Mandore, District Jodhpur, on the allegation of forging the mark-sheet. The petitioner-appellant was granted time from 24.01.2004 to 16.02.2004 to submit the reply to the charge-sheet served under the Rules of 1958. Thereafter this time was extended up to 24.02.2004. The petitioner-appellant did not submit the reply to the charge-sheet and therefore the enquiry proceeded ex-parte against him. The department examined five witnesses, namely, Jagdish Chand (PW-1), Bhawani Singh (PW-2), Karan Sharma (PW-3), Shrawan Lal (PW-4) and Raj Singh (PW-5). The defence-nominee of the petitioner-appellant cross-examined them. The petitioner-appellant submitted reply to the show-cause-notice/representation. He was thereafter provided opportunity of personal hearing. He denied the allegations of interpolation/forgery in the mark-sheet and maintained that his actual date of birth is 21.04.1972. 3. The defence-nominee of the petitioner-appellant cross-examined them. The petitioner-appellant submitted reply to the show-cause-notice/representation. He was thereafter provided opportunity of personal hearing. He denied the allegations of interpolation/forgery in the mark-sheet and maintained that his actual date of birth is 21.04.1972. 3. The disciplinary authority in the impugned order has recorded that during personal hearing the petitioner-appellant denied the allegation that he made any interpolation/forgery in the mark-sheet and maintained that his actual date of birth is 21.04.1972. He did not appear in the examination of 10th standard but when the mark-sheet of 10th standard was shown to him, he stated that it was of one Ram Lal, who was from his native place and also classmate and he too appeared in the 10th standard examination but when he was asked to give his father’s name and his caste, the petitioner-appellant denied to have any knowledge thereabout and also stated that he was not aware as to where he was presently residing. He however stated that complaint against him on the aforesaid allegation was made by his cousin named Shrawan Lal. When he was asked about the overwriting in the application to make 1974 as 1972, what he stated was that it was quite possible in the application form for the post of Constable that he might have initially written 1974 by mistake and by overwriting it might have changed it to as 1972. He stated that the record with regard to his date of birth was maintained in the Panchayat Samiti but according to his horoscope his date of birth was 21.04.1972. The disciplinary authority rejected the objection of the petitioner-appellant that he was not supplied copies of the statements. He, in this connection, called for the comments from the enquiry officer vide letter dated 18.10.2004, who clarified that the record was made available for inspection to the petitioner-appellant and the copies thereof were also supplied to him. A charge-sheet against the petitioner-appellant in the aforementioned F.I.R. was filed on 24.04.2003 with the conclusion of the enquiry officer that actual date of birth of the petitioner-appellant (the delinquent) was 21.04.1974 and not 21.04.1972. Since the petitioner-appellant at the time of appointment did not attain the age of 18 years on the basis of his date of birth 21.04.1974, the aforesaid date of birth was changed to 21.04.1972. The petitioner-appellant was the only beneficiary of this forgery/interpolation. Since the petitioner-appellant at the time of appointment did not attain the age of 18 years on the basis of his date of birth 21.04.1974, the aforesaid date of birth was changed to 21.04.1972. The petitioner-appellant was the only beneficiary of this forgery/interpolation. The disciplinary authority by the impugned order dated 31.03.2004 concurring with the report of the enquiry officer dismissed the petitioner-appellant from the service. He was also sanctioned 147 days unpaid leave for his absence during the period of suspension from the Headquarters and 39 days privilege leave. 4. The appeal filed by the petitioner-appellant against the order of dismissal was also rejected by the Additional Director General of Police, Armed Battalion, Rajasthan, Jaipur, vide order dated 08.10.2004. The petitioner-appellant did not challenge the order of his dismissal for as long as four years. It is stated that in the Criminal Case No.152/2004 arising out of the said F.I.R., the trial court convicted the petitioner-appellant for offence under Section 420 of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo three years’ imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine he was ordered to further undergo one month’s simple imprisonment. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-appellant preferred appeal before the court of Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur. The learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur, vide judgment dated 24.08.2007, allowed the Criminal Appeal No.38/2006 and acquitted the petitioner-appellant for offence under Section 420 IPC. It was thereafter that the petitioner-appellant made representation to the Inspector General of Police, Armed Battalion, Rajasthan, Jaipur, for reconsideration of the appeal of the petitioner-appellant as he has now been acquitted of the charges. His representation was rejected vide order dated 29.03.2008. The petitioner-appellant then filed review petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan, which too was rejected vide order dated 25.06.2008. It was only in the month of August, 2008, the petitioner-appellant filed the writ petition, which too was dismissed in limine by learned Single Judge vide order dated 13.08.2008. Hence this appeal. 5. Smt. Anjoo Shukla, learned counsel for petitioner-appellant, has argued that the charges against the petitioner-appellant were common both in the disciplinary proceedings as also in the criminal case. Once the petitioner-appellant was acquitted of the charges, the disciplinary authority ought to have revoked the order of dismissal and should have reinstated him in service. Hence this appeal. 5. Smt. Anjoo Shukla, learned counsel for petitioner-appellant, has argued that the charges against the petitioner-appellant were common both in the disciplinary proceedings as also in the criminal case. Once the petitioner-appellant was acquitted of the charges, the disciplinary authority ought to have revoked the order of dismissal and should have reinstated him in service. The disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner-appellant were illegally continued as the law is that it should have been deferred till conclusion of the criminal trial, which aspect of the matter has been ignored by both the disciplinary and the appellate authority. The competent criminal court acquitted the petitioner-appellant of the charge holding that the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution filed the charge-sheet against the petitioner-appellant on the basis of the duplicate papers and originals thereof were not produced, which was mandatory requirement of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The disciplinary authority, therefore, wrongly held the charges against the petitioner-appellant to have been proved. The Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur, while allowing the appeal of the petitioner-appellant, has acquitted him vide judgment dated 24.08.2007 by setting aside the order of his conviction. The disciplinary authority in this case, therefore, has drawn a wrong conclusion about the guilt of the petitioner-appellant. Similarly, the reviewing authority has also erred in law in rejecting the review petition of the petitioner-appellant. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant argued that the penalty imposed on the basis of the evidence in departmental proceedings, is liable to be set aside, if it is founded on the same set of evidence as in criminal trial. Learned counsel, in support of this argument, relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. - (1999) 3 SCC 679 . The appellate authority has also erred in law in mechanically dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner-appellant without due application of mind. The charges cannot be taken to have been proved in the disciplinary proceedings on eventual acquittal of the delinquent in the criminal trial. If the enquiry report/order of dismissal passed in the domestic enquiry is founded on the same set of evidence and is contrary to the findings recorded by the judicial court in a criminal trial, the latter shall prevail. 7. If the enquiry report/order of dismissal passed in the domestic enquiry is founded on the same set of evidence and is contrary to the findings recorded by the judicial court in a criminal trial, the latter shall prevail. 7. Learned counsel in this regard also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Angad Das Vs. Union of India and Others – (2010) 3 SCC 463 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the disciplinary authority must exercise his power judiciously, according to laws and human compassion. He should not be oblivious of problems of humble and modest subordinates. In that case, the appellate authority had enhanced the penalty of compulsory retirement converting the same into removal, however, the Supreme Court restored back the penalty of removal. Learned counsel alternatively submitted that penalty of dismissal is excessive penalty and the petitioner-appellant at the best could have been compulsorily retired. 8. Shri Rajendra Prasad, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent State, opposed the appeal and supported the judgment/order passed by the learned Single Judge. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that the standard and degree of proof required in a domestic enquiry is preponderance of probabilities whereas in the criminal appeal it is beyond reasonable doubt. It may be that the prosecution was unable to prove the charges against the petitioner-appellant by the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal trial, that however cannot become basis of exonerating the petitioner-appellant in the domestic enquiry. The petitioner-appellant, in this case, cannot question the correctness of the order of dismissal as he, by immediately not challenging the same, acquiesced therewith and the writ petition was filed only after his acquittal from the appellate court in criminal appeal. The writ petition was therefore rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 9. It is argued that the allegation against the petitioner-appellant was so serious, that the penalty of dismissal could in no way be said to be disproportionate or excessive. The appellate authority has passed a reasoned and well considered order. Since the reviewing authority had concurred with the view taken by the disciplinary authority, it was not required to pass a detailed order. This appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. 10. We have given our thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. The appellate authority has passed a reasoned and well considered order. Since the reviewing authority had concurred with the view taken by the disciplinary authority, it was not required to pass a detailed order. This appeal is therefore liable to be dismissed. 10. We have given our thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. Learned Single Judge, in the present case, in our view, has rightly held that the standard of proof in the criminal trial is always stringent as compared to the departmental enquiry and both the proceedings stand on different footings. While in the departmental enquiry, the charges against the delinquent can be proved by preponderance of probabilities, whereas in criminal trial, such charges have to be proved by stringent standard of beyond reasonable doubt. The enquiry officer, in the present case, offered full opportunity to the petitioner-appellant and found the charges proved against him. A copy of the enquiry report was made available to the delinquent-petitioner-appellant seeking his explanation and calling for representation. The disciplinary authority accepted the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. Looking to the seriousness of the charges, the penalty of dismissal from service cannot be said to be excessive. The appellate authority as well as the reviewing authority both upheld the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner-appellant has not been able to point out infraction of any of the Clauses of Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. Shri Saubhag Singh, Assistant Commandant, was appointed as defence nominee to defend the petitioner-appellant in the departmental enquiry. The defence nominee cross-examined all the five witnesses produced by the department. The petitioner-appellant was provided opportunity of personal hearing by the disciplinary authority. 12. Relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Angad Das, supra, stands on entirely different footings and does not in any manner help the petitioner-appellant. On the scope of interference by the High Court in disciplinary matters arising out of disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme Court in Union of India and Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran - (2015) 2 SCC 610 , held in para 13 of the judgment as under:- “Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. P. Gunasekaran - (2015) 2 SCC 610 , held in para 13 of the judgment as under:- “Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 13. Even otherwise, mere acquittal in the criminal trial, does not entitle the petitioner-appellant to claim reinstatement in service. We may, in this connection, rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 13. Even otherwise, mere acquittal in the criminal trial, does not entitle the petitioner-appellant to claim reinstatement in service. We may, in this connection, rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Purushottam – (2015) 3 SCC 779 , wherein it was held as under:- “14 …..This Court has concluded, and we respectfully think correctly, that acquittal of an employee by a Criminal Court would not automatically and conclusively impact Departmental proceedings. 14.1. Firstly, this is because of the disparate degrees of proof in the two, viz. beyond reasonable doubt in criminal prosecution contrasted by preponderant proof in civil or departmental enquiries. 14.2. Secondly, criminal prosecution is not within the control of the department concerned and acquittal could be the consequence of shoddy investigation or slovenly assimilation of evidence, or lackadaisical if not collusive conduct of the trial, etc. 14.3. Thirdly, an acquittal in a criminal prosecution may preclude a contrary conclusion in a departmental enquiry if the former is a positive decision in contradistinction to a passive verdict which may be predicated on technical infirmities. In other words, the Criminal Court must conclude that the accused is innocent and not merely conclude that he has not been proved to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt.” 14. Even if therefore the prosecution failed to prove the charge of forgery against the petitioner-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal trial, the charges in the disciplinary proceedings were independently proved against him by preponderance of probabilities. The appellate authority has passed a detailed and reasoned order deciding appeal of the petitioner-appellant and the reviewing authority also concurred with those findings. The penalty of dismissal of the petitioner-appellant from service, in the facts of the case, cannot be said to excessive or disproportionate. 15. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.