JUDGMENT : 1. The application being G.A. 1452 of 2016 is for condonation of delay. There is delay of 40 days in instituting the appeal. Mr. Prahladka, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner has agreed to disposal of this application for condonation of delay without filing of affidavits. 2. We have gone through the application and in particular, paragraphs 4 to 11 thereof. We are satisfied that there was sufficient cause for which the appellant could not prefer the appeal within prescribed period. We accordingly condone the delay in filing the appeal. 3. We are taking up the appeal and the application together for hearing. On consent of the learned Advocates for the parties, Mr. Prahladka has waived of service of notice of appeal. All other formalities are also dispensed with on consent of the learned counsel for the parties for making the appeal ready. 4. On 19th February, 2015, the respondent-writ petitioner was detained and the appellants’ case is that three pieces of gold having total weight of 3 Kgs. were seized from his possession. There is some variation between the inventory list and the show cause notice as regards the quantum of gold alleged to have been seized from him but that factor is not of material relevance so far as the present appeal is concerned. 5. Notice was issued on 4th August, 2015 with the following caption:- “NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE UNDER SECTION 124 OF THE CUSTOMS ACT, 1962 IN RESPECT OF SEIZURE CASE NO.29/IMP/CL/GOLD/P&I/CCP/WB/2014-15 DATED 19/02/2015” 6. It appears, however, that the aforesaid notice was actually issued in terms of Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. We find from the show cause notice itself that the points on which the addressee, being the respondent-writ petitioner was to respond were:- “(i) The period of issuance of Notice of Show Cause under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 shall not be extended for further period of 6 (six) months in accordance with the Proviso to the Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962. (ii) The said notice is allowed to appear in person or through his authorized representative on his behalf for personal hearing on 10.08.2015 at 15.30 hrs., before the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), at the office mentioned above with the documents in his support.” 7. Admitted position is that the notice was delivered to the writ petitioner on 11th August, 2015. (ii) The said notice is allowed to appear in person or through his authorized representative on his behalf for personal hearing on 10.08.2015 at 15.30 hrs., before the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), at the office mentioned above with the documents in his support.” 7. Admitted position is that the notice was delivered to the writ petitioner on 11th August, 2015. According to the respondent/writ petitioner, he ascertained from the track record of the postal authorities that the notice was posted for delivery by speed post on 7th August, 2015. 8. The writ petition, out of which this appeal arises was instituted mainly questioning the legality of action of the Customs Authorities in proceeding with hearing for extension of time, for which notice was not received by the writ petitioner within time. Various other grounds were taken in the writ petition but it appears this was the main point on which the case was argued before the First Court. 9. The learned First Court allowed the writ petition by a judgment and order delivered on 9th February, 2016. The learned First Court held:- “The Court: The petitioner challenges an order of August 13, 2015 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) on the ground that a notice for hearing dated August 4, 2015 was received by the assessee on August 11, 2015, one day after the scheduled date of hearing on August 10, 2015. Since the facts are undisputed and it is evident that the petitioning assessee was prevented by sufficient cause from being represented at the hearing, the order impugned dated August 13, 2015 is set aside and the relevant Commissioner is requested to cause a fresh notice to be issued to the petitioning assessee for further hearing before passing an order in accordance with law. W.P. No.1142 of 2015 succeeds as above. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.” 10. It is this order which is assailed by the Customs Authorities before us. Mr. W.P. No.1142 of 2015 succeeds as above. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.” 10. It is this order which is assailed by the Customs Authorities before us. Mr. Ganguli, learned counsel appearing for the Customs Authorities has mainly argued that under the statute there was no necessity of giving opportunity of hearing or for that matter notice to the person from whom goods have been seized for extension of time for issue of show-cause notice if such notice was given in this case, the same was a superfluous exercise and not a legal necessity. His further submission is that in the event the judgment under appeal is sustained, the extended period would also lapse and the entire exercise of the seizure would collapse. 11. Mr. Prahladka, however, relied on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of I.J. Rao, Asstt. Collector of Customs And Others Versus Bibhuti Bhushan Bagh And Another ( AIR 1989 SC 1884 ) to contend that such notice is a legal necessity. He has relied on paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the said Report in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held:- “14. We have said that notice must go to the person, from whose possession the goods have been seized, before the expiry of the original period of six months. It is possible that while notice is issued before the expiry of that period, service of such notice may not be effected on the person concerned in sufficient time to enable the Collector to make the order of extension before that period expires. Service of the notice may be postponed or delayed or rendered ineffective by reason of the person sought to be served attempting to avoid service of notice or for any other reason beyond the control of the Customs authorities. In that event, it would be open to the Collector, if he finds that sufficient cause has been made out before him in that behalf to extend the time beyond the original period of six months, and thereafter, after notice has been served on the person concerned, to afford a post-decisional hearing to him in order to determine whether the order of extension should be cancelled or not. Having regard to the seriousness and the magnitude of injury to the public interest in the case of the illicit importation of goods, and having regard to considerations of the damage to economic policy underlying the formulation of import and export planning, it seems necessary to reconcile the need to afford an opportunity to the person affected with the larger considerations of public interest. 15. Our attention has been drawn to Ganeshmul Channilal v. Collector of Cenral Excise and Asst. Collector, Bangalore, AIR 1968 Mys 89 where the High Court of Mysore has held that no notice is necessary to the person from whose possession the goods are seized when the Collector proceeds to consider whether the original period of six months should be extended. Reliance has also been placed on Sheikh Mohammed Sayeed V. Asst. Collector of Customs for Preventive (I), AIR 1970 Cal 134 which proceeds on the view that the Collector has to satisfy himself only subjectively on the point whether extension is called for. In Karsandas Popatlat Dhineja v. Union of India, 1981 ELT268(Guj) the High Court defined the implications of the use of the words “on sufficient cause being shown” in a statutory proceeding. None of these cases convince us that the person from whose possession the goods have been seized is not entitled to notice of the proposal to extend the period. 16. In our opinion, the person from whose possession the goods have been seized is entitled to notice of the proposal before the Collector of Customs for the extension of the original period of six months mentioned in S.110(2) of the Customs Act, and he is entitled to be heard upon such proposal but subject to the restrictions referred to earlier in regard to the need for maintaining confidentiality of the investigation proceedings.” 11. This being the position of law laid down by a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. There is no material before us on the basis of which we can come to a conclusion that the noticee had indulged any evasive tactics which would justify post-decisional hearing. No other cogent reason has been cited for which the notice was not sent within time. In this judgment that question is not in lis before us. There is no material before us on the basis of which we can come to a conclusion that the noticee had indulged any evasive tactics which would justify post-decisional hearing. No other cogent reason has been cited for which the notice was not sent within time. In this judgment that question is not in lis before us. Mr.Ganguli had also argued that the proceeding under Sections 110 and 124 play on mutually exclusive fields and on that proposition he had relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harbans Lal vs. Collector of Central Excise & Customs reported in 1993(67) ELT 20 (SC). But that point of law does not arise in this proceeding. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The appeal and the stay petition shall both stand dismissed.