JUDGMENT & ORDER : From the note of the Registry dated 24.04.2014, it appears that all the respondents have received the notice properly, but there is no representation from them. By the order dated 05.05.2014 this court has observed as under: “Notices also served on the respondents, but the respondents chosen to remain silent.” 2. This is an appeal under Section 100 of the CPC from the order dated 30.11.2013 passed by the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, as he then was, in Civil Misc. Appeal No.02 of 2013. By the said order dated 20.11.2013, the order dated 09.07.2013 delivered in Civil Misc. 02 of 2013 in EXE (T) 3/2012 by the Executing Court [the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division] Udaipur, South Tripura, as he then was] has been affirmed. 3. By the order dated 19.03.2014, this appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law for hearing: “Whether the Judgment & Decree passed by the Court’s below suffer from perversity?” 4. The appellant was given leave to raise further substantial question of law, but no such endeavour has been made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. According to the appellant, he was not party to the Suit being TS 20/08 as instituted by Shri Suchitra Kumar Baidya, the respondent No.1 herein. In that suit, Sri Prafulla Pal, son of late Radhakrishna Pal and Shri Kalipada Pal, son of Shri Prafulla Pal were the defendants. But at the time of execution of the decree dated 20.07.2010 issued in TS No.20 of 2008, the present appellants in order to protect their possession over the part of decreetal land filed an application under Order XXI Rule 99 read with Section 151 of the C.P.C. seeking intervention of the executing court [the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division], Udaipur, as he then was] being Civil Misc. 02/2013 for apprehension of their dispossession during execution of the said decree. In the said application, what the appellants herein as the applicants had asserted is required to be noted in brief. The piece of land measuring 0.01 acre corresponding to 2 karas 1 dhur appertaining to Khatian No.133, comprised in the old plot No.2746/4708 corresponding to RS Plot No.5757 at Mouja Jitendranagar described elaborately in the schedule provided in the said application. The piece of land measuring 0.01 acre corresponding to 2 karas 1 dhur appertaining to Khatian No.133, comprised in the old plot No.2746/4708 corresponding to RS Plot No.5757 at Mouja Jitendranagar described elaborately in the schedule provided in the said application. If the said land is compared with the land as described in the decree, it would appear that the land and the land as described in the schedule do bear the same description. For purpose of reference, the schedule of the decretal land as provided in the decree is extracted hereunder: SCHEDULE OF THE DECREETAL LAND Within P.S. Kakraban Under Mouja: Jitendranagar, R.S. Khatian No.133, Sabek Dag No.2746/4708, Hal Plot No.5757, Nature: Dokan, the land butted and bounded by: North : Legal heirs of Late Raimohan Shom namely Babul Shom & others. South : Milan Kar. East : P.W.D. Road. West : Legal heirs of Aswini Kumar Shom namely Ranjan Dhom & Others. Within this boundary land measuring .01 acre. 5. The appellant as the applicants have asserted further that their predecessor namely Ashwini Kumar Some acquired the land measuring 1 drone 1 kani 14 gandas including the decretal land by dint of a registered exchange deed bearing No.1520 dated 26.04.1963 executed by one Saiyad Ali and six others through their lawful attorney and got physical possession of the suit property which is described by the specific boundary. Thereafter, the said land, based on the said exchange deed was recorded in the khatian after mutation. Aswini Kumar Some died in the year 1965. After his death the said land devolved to the appellants by inheritance. The substantive part of the said land were sold to different persons by executing the deeds of sale as per law. The remaining land including the decretal land was surveyed under the old C.S. Plot No.2746, 2746/4708, 4710 corresponding to R.S. Plot No.5742, 5744, 5746, 5747, 5749, 5756, 5763 and 5757 and those were recorded in Khatian No.129/1, 129/2 and 133 at Mouja Jitendra Nagar for an area of 0.45 acre in the name of the appellant-applicants. The remaining land including the decretal land was surveyed under the old C.S. Plot No.2746, 2746/4708, 4710 corresponding to R.S. Plot No.5742, 5744, 5746, 5747, 5749, 5756, 5763 and 5757 and those were recorded in Khatian No.129/1, 129/2 and 133 at Mouja Jitendra Nagar for an area of 0.45 acre in the name of the appellant-applicants. Out of the said land, an area of land measuring about 0.02 acre corresponding to 1 ganda 2 dhurs within C.S. Plot No.2746/4708 was recorded in the name of the applicant-appellants in the Khatian No.781 at Mouja Jitendra Nagar showing one Ratan Kumar Paul as forcible possessor since 1371 B.S. Subsequently, Ratan Kumar Paul purchased the land measuring 3 karas from the applicant-appellants by the registered sale-deed dated 05.06.1989 from C.S. Plot No.2746/4709. It has been asserted that Ratan Kumar Paul surrendered the vacant possession of the said land measuring 0.02 acre to the applicant-appellants. Out of the plot No.2746/4708, during the revisional settlement operation the decree holder managed to record 50% of the aforesaid land i.e. measuring 0.01 acre within R.S. Plot No.5757 in his name in Khatian No.133 as korfa, but the applicant-appellants had allowed none including parties in the said suit to possess the said land (the decretal land) either as a korfa or otherwise. The decree holder managed to record his name in the khatian during the revisional settlement operation in collusion with the settlement officials. 6. The applicant-appellants had duly approached the competent authority for cancellation of the said khatian. The applicant-appellants did let out the decretal land to the proforma-defendant on 1st Baishak, 1415 B.S. corresponding to 14th April, 2008. Those defendants were holding the decretal land as tenant under the applicant-appellants. They don’t have any title over the said land. The said plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein before instituting the suit met those tenants for purpose of recovery of the possession. The suit was decreed pursuant to the judgment dated 20.07.2010. The appeal, preferred therefrom, being Title Appeal 27 of 2010 in the court of the District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur was dismissed on 16.04.2012 on the ground of maintainability. Thereafter, the Execution Case No.3 of 2012 was instituted for execution of the said decree. Since the applicant-appellants were not made party, according to them, they were deliberately kept out from contesting the suit and hence the said decree cannot be binding on them. Thereafter, the Execution Case No.3 of 2012 was instituted for execution of the said decree. Since the applicant-appellants were not made party, according to them, they were deliberately kept out from contesting the suit and hence the said decree cannot be binding on them. In para-9 of the said application filed under Order 21 Rule 99 read with Section 151 of the CPC the applicant-appellants have submitted that the suit was instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 on the fact of dispossession. In the factual context, the applicant-appellants opposed the execution by delivery of possession to the decree-holder. The said application was dismissed by the Execution Court by the order dated 09.07.2013. While dismissing the said application, it has been observed as under: “Moreover, the petitioners admitted in their petition that the Decree-holder Suchitra Kr. Baidya is possessing the decretal land of measuring 0.01 acre under Khatian No.133 corresponding to Plot No.5757 as Korfa. Thus if the petitioners are willing to get the right, title and interest over the decretal land they are at liberty to institute a separate suit which they have already instituted in this Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Udaipur, South Tirpura vide No. T.S. 16 of 2012. Lastly, to consider, as the main suit vide No. T.S. 20/2008 is decreed in favour of the decree-holder the executing Court cannot go behind the decree deciding afresh the right, title and interest regarding the decretal land. 7. The suit being Title Suit No.20/2008 was for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. By the decree, the plaintiff was declared entitled to recover the possession of the suit land from the defendants by evicting them or their men or agent therefrom and removing all sorts of construction/obstructions at by the cost of the defendants. The plaintiff was also given some compensation as consequent of the said dis-possession. The appeal against the said judgment being Title Appeal No.27 of 2010 was dismissed on 16.04.2012 holding that the appeal was not maintainable as the appeal is clearly barred under Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. No further challenge was carried out by the parties against the said order of dismissal. The appeal against the said judgment being Title Appeal No.27 of 2010 was dismissed on 16.04.2012 holding that the appeal was not maintainable as the appeal is clearly barred under Section 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. No further challenge was carried out by the parties against the said order of dismissal. True it is that, Section-63 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prohibits appeal from the decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and as such there is no infirmity in the judgment dated 16.04.2012. Moreover, no further action was carried out by the aggrieved defendant-appellants. 8. Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the present appellants are not the judgment-debtor but they have instituted an application under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC, which was registered as Civil Misc. Case No.2/2013. However, the Executing Court by observing that the Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree, dismissed the said petition by the order dated 09.07.2013. The said order dated 09.07.2013 had been challenged in this miscellaneous appeal on the fundamental ground that if the execution is allowed to be complete, the appellants will suffer irreparable loss and injuries. In order to protect the possession over the part of decretal land, the said application under Order XXI Rule 99 of the CPC was filed. That apart, it has been asserted in the appeal that even though the appellants were on possession as the tenant of the defendants and as such the decree is not executable against them inasmuch as the said decree cannot bind them in any manner. Since the appellants were not made party in the Title Suit No.20 of 2008 and in Execution (T) 03/2012. From the documents filed in the TS 20/2008, according to the appellants, it clearly surfaced that the original owner of the decretal land was the predecessor of the appellants and thereafter the ownership lies with the appellants. 9. Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the Executing Court has failed to appreciate the provisions of Rules 97 to 106 of Order XXI of the CPC. More particularly, the provisions of Rule 99. Else it would have been observed that the decree holder cannot get the delivery of the possession. 10. 9. Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the Executing Court has failed to appreciate the provisions of Rules 97 to 106 of Order XXI of the CPC. More particularly, the provisions of Rule 99. Else it would have been observed that the decree holder cannot get the delivery of the possession. 10. The finding as returned by the Executing Court that the said court cannot go beyond the decree or the said court cannot decide afresh the right, title and interest regarding the decretal land is wholly contrary to what have been provided in the statute. Before we embark on appreciating the grounds let us was examine the scope and ambit of Rule 97 and Rule 99 of the Order XXI of the CPC. Rule 97 and Rule 99 extend protection but have been engrafted for two different purposes. Rule 97 provides that when the holder puts the decree for recovering the possession of immovable property or moves for the purchase of any such property has been sold in execution of a decree, if it is resisted or obstructed by any person for possession of the property, he may make an application to the court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. In this regard it may not be out of place to refer that the apex court in Shreenath vs. Rajesh reported in AIR 1998 SC 1827 has enunciated the law by stating that a third party in possession of a property claiming independent right against a decree for possession of immovable property under execution, could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objection under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. 11. Rule 99 provides that where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of the immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, he may make an application to the Executing Court complaining of such dispossession. Thus, it clearly appears that the Rule 97 has expounded a legal action prior to dispossession and in order to resist the dispossession. But Rule 99 expounds the right of the person who was not the judgment-debtor and has been dispossessed from his possession. It is provided that he may come to the Executing Court against such dispossession. 12. Thus, it clearly appears that the Rule 97 has expounded a legal action prior to dispossession and in order to resist the dispossession. But Rule 99 expounds the right of the person who was not the judgment-debtor and has been dispossessed from his possession. It is provided that he may come to the Executing Court against such dispossession. 12. Rule 100 of Order XXI of the CPC stipulates the duty of the court, whereas the Rule 101 and 102 have laid down the limit of the determination by providing that all questions, including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or Rule 99 or their representatives, relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. But it has been clearly provided in Rule 102 that nothing in Rules 98 and Rule 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed. Any order passed in those proceedings after adjudication under Rule 98 and Rule 100, the said order shall have the same force and subject to the same condition as to an appeal or otherwise, as if it were a decree. 13. Further procedural aspects have been dealt in Rule 105 and Rule 106 of Order XXI of the CPC. Thus from such order, the appeal shall lie to the court where ordinarily an appeal would lie from the judgment. Thus there is no infirmity in the appeal. It has been, however, strangely observed in the judgment dated 30.11.2013 delivered in Civil Misc. Appeal No.02 of 2013 as preferred by the judgment-debtor that: “….the appellants are not the third party and not in possession of the land. They have filed independent suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. It has been, however, strangely observed in the judgment dated 30.11.2013 delivered in Civil Misc. Appeal No.02 of 2013 as preferred by the judgment-debtor that: “….the appellants are not the third party and not in possession of the land. They have filed independent suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession. The matter is pending.” But finally as stated earlier, the appeal was dismissed with observation that: “…while deciding the objection of the other party resisting the execution, the Court may decide title of the person who resisted. In case of eviction from the decretal land in course of execution of decree the third party is at liberty to file petition under Order-21, Rule-99 for restoration of possession. The suit is maintainable in that perspective. But in the instant case, no such question was raised and the actual occupier of the land did not file any such petition or objection. The appellants claiming themselves as the original owner. Decretal land was not in possession of the appellants while TS 20 of 2008 was filed. He was not intervener in that suit. The story of tenancy was not decided there or raised. Now the petitioner who is not third party or stranger in this case cannot get the benefit in the stage of execution or raise any objection without any possession of the land at any time.” 14. The said application was filed by the present appellants for adjudication of their right. When the application was dismissed, they filed the said appeal being Misc Appeal No.2 of 2013 asserting that the land measuring 0.01 acre corresponding to 2 karas and 1 dhur appertaining to Khatian No.133 comprised in old plot No.2746/4708 corresponding to R.S Plot No.5757 at Mouja Jitendranagar [described as the decretal land] was originally owned by the predecessor of the present appellant namely Aswini Kumar Some who died in the year 1965 and on his death, the present appellants became the owner in possession as stated above. One Ratan Kumar Paul as stated was shown as the forcible occupier, but later on the said land was surrendered vacant by said Ratan Paul in favour of the appellants. But they were not made party in the suit being Title Suit No.20 of 2008. One Ratan Kumar Paul as stated was shown as the forcible occupier, but later on the said land was surrendered vacant by said Ratan Paul in favour of the appellants. But they were not made party in the suit being Title Suit No.20 of 2008. Their tenants were made the defendants in the suit alleging that they had dispossessed the plaintiff-respondent No.1 from the said land and accordingly a decree under Section-6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 was issued on completion of the trial. Against the said judgment, an appeal was filed and on hearing the said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court. Hence, the appellants have contended that the decree was not binding upon them and their possession shall be restored. 15. In the perspective-fact and on having appreciated the grounds of objection as projected in the memorandum of appeal, two fundamental questions emerged for decision viz: (i) Whether the appellants do have any right to apply before the Executing Court under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI of the CPC inasmuch as the admitted position is that even though they claimed the ownership of the said land, but they were not in possession? (ii) Whether by a decree under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the ownership of the land was decided or can be decided? (iii) If the remedy is not within the provisions of Rule 97 or Rule 99, Order XXI of the CPC, whether the appellants can file a suit for recovery of the land as the owner by filing a suit under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? 16. So far the applicability of the provisions under Rule 99 or Rule 97 of Order XXI of the CPC are concerned, this court is of the view that the appellants cannot in the circumstances of the case maintain such application and hence this court even though for a different reason is of the view that no interference is warranted in the impugned order. There cannot be any amount of doubt that a judgment or decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot determine the title. Such suit shall only determine the dispossession preceding 6(six) months of the institution of the suit. There cannot be any amount of doubt that a judgment or decree passed in a suit instituted under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 cannot determine the title. Such suit shall only determine the dispossession preceding 6(six) months of the institution of the suit. If it is found after the trial, the dispossession was not in accordance with law, then by the decree the restoration of the possession can be directed in favour of those persons who were so dispossessed. 17. So far the question related to the right of the present appellants who are claiming that they are the owner but their possession has been disturbed by the said decree, they can on the basis of their title, file a suit under Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act and recover the decretal land as the owner subject to the pleading and the evidence of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 herein. That apart, if the appellants consumed time in pursuing a wrong forum for getting remedy, they shall also be entitled to discount in terms of Section-14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Thus the remedy of the appellants are in a separate suit, not in the proceeding under Rule 97 or Rule 99 of Order XXI of the CPC. In this regard, the observation made in the judgment dated 30.11.2013 delivered in Civil Misc. No.2 of 2013 is not in the context of the case in hand and hence those will have no force at all if the appellants instituted a suit for declaration and recovery of the possession of the said land which has so far been referred as the decretal land. Hence, those observations made in the appellate order dated 30.11.2013 are interfered with. 18. Mr. D.K. Daschoudhury, learned counsel appearing for the appellants has referred a few decisions of the apex court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Another reported in AIR 1997 SC 856 , NSS Narayana Sarma and Others vs. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd. and Others reported in AIR 2002 SC 251 and Tanzeem-e-Sufia vs. Bibi Haliman and Others reported in AIR 2002 SC 3083 . But those decisions are not relevant in the present context inasmuch as the applicant-appellants have asserted that: “It is admitted position that the Applicants are the owners of the decretal land and they never let out the decretal land to the decree holder and the decree holder never possessed the decretal land at any time and in collusion with the settlement staff he managed to record the decretal land in his name as korfa raivat which is alien to the modern revenue law and the decree holder never possessed the decretal land at any time, but by virtue of the aforesaid illegal record of rights he instituted the title suit for recovery of possession of the decretal land against the Pro-forma Opposite Parties under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 basing on his alleged and imaginary previous possession and as such aforesaid decree liable to be set aside and ought to have been dismissed the instant execution proceeding in limine and as the Applicants were not parties in the said title suit, they could not project the correct picture before the Learned trial court. They have further stated: That, it is pertinent to be mentioned here the present Applicants filed a title suit in the court of Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Udaipur for declaration of title confirmation of possession and perpetual injunction against the present decree holder. Therefore if the decree holder able to complete execution proceeding in absence of the present Applicants the said Title Suit bearing No.16 of 2012 would be frustrated and moreover in absence of the present Applicants if the decree holder allow to execute the decree in the instant proceeding the present Applicants will suffer irreparable loss and injuries and hence the Applicants preferred this instant Application as bonafide one.” 19. The admission is the assertion of the appellants herein as none in the proceeding has admitted such assertion. There are prima facie materials that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 namely Suchitra Kumar Baidya was in possession and he brought the suit being Title Suit No.20/2008 on the allegation that the proforma-defendants namely Prafulla Paul and his son namely Kalipada Paul dispossessed him from the said land. After the trial the suit was decreed. There are prima facie materials that the plaintiff-respondent No.1 namely Suchitra Kumar Baidya was in possession and he brought the suit being Title Suit No.20/2008 on the allegation that the proforma-defendants namely Prafulla Paul and his son namely Kalipada Paul dispossessed him from the said land. After the trial the suit was decreed. For a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only the persons who dispossessed are to be made party inasmuch as in the suit the title is not decided. 20. For the claim as raised by the appellants, it has created a complex situation and this court is of the view that the judgment and decree passed in the Title Suit No.20 of 2008 is not in any manner binding in the appellants. In the suit as brought by them, they can raise all the questions including the title, possession and other attendant rights. To avert multiplicity of the litigation, this court will observe that if it is proved in Title Suit No.16 of 2012 as instituted by the appellants that they were in possession not the plaintiff-respondent No.1 (Suchitra Kr. Baidya), their possession may also be confirmed even if the decree passed in Title Suit No.20 of 2008 is executed for the reason that the appellants were not impleaded in the suit. By passing the decree of confirmation of possession, the Civil Court shall have the jurisdiction in that context to make restitution as the said dis-possession had taken place when the suit was awaiting for decision. The appellants may pursue their suit having regard to the above observation and without any prejudice. What have been observed in the judgment delivered in Title Suit No.20 of 2008 will have no effect in deciding the dispute as brought by the appellants. But since in the order dated 09.07.2013 delivered in Civil Misc. 2 of 2013, it has been recorded by the Executing Court that the appellants in their petition has stated that on 14.04.2008 they let out the decretal land measuring 0.01 acre to the defendant-opposite parties, Prafulla Pal and Kalipada Pal and they were holding possession of the decretal land as tenants. 21. This court is not inclined to remand the matter back for hearing in accordance with the provisions as provided under Rule 105 of Order XXI of the CPC. Subject to what has been observed above, this appeal stands dismissed. 21. This court is not inclined to remand the matter back for hearing in accordance with the provisions as provided under Rule 105 of Order XXI of the CPC. Subject to what has been observed above, this appeal stands dismissed. Draw the decree accordingly. Send down the records thereafter.