JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In terms of the present reference, this Court is called upon to answer the following question of law, arising out of order dated 21.5.2010 (Annexure A-1), passed by Chairperson, H.P. Tax Tribunal Dharamshala, Camp at Shimla, in Appeal No. 109 of 2009, titled as M/s Shivalik Tyres vs. The Excise and Taxation Commissioner, H.P.: “Whether under section 14 in Chapter-IV “Goods of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce” of CST Act, 1956, subentry (XIV) of main entry No. (IV) containing reference to “tyres” could be construed as tyres made of “rubber” even when the main classification is of ‘Iron and Steel’?” 2. Facts are not in dispute. Respondent assessee, who is in the business of retreading of tyres was assessed to tax under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968 (hereafter referred to as the ‘State Act’). The Assessing Officer, vide order dated 27.11.2003 (Annexure A-2) found the assessee to have furnished incorrect returns resulting into evasion of tax and as such, after carrying out addition, assessed the component of tax and resultant penalty payable by the Assessee. In all the amount of tax assessed is Rs.1,21,000/-. 3. In an appeal preferred by the Assessee, the said order came to be affirmed by the Excise & Taxation Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, vide order dated 28.8.2009 passed in Appeal No. 171/06/07, titled as M/s Shivalik Tyres Kumarhatti vs. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner (Annexure A-3). 4. However, the Tribunal, vide order dated 21.5.2010 (Annexure A-1), while remanding the matter back to the Assessing Authority held the case of the Assessee to fall within the ambit and scope of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Central Act’) and not the ‘State Act’. 5. Accordingly vide order dated 4.2.2011, the Tribunal has made the instant Reference. 6. The relevant provisions of the ‘Central Act’ are reproduced as under: The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956: “14. 5. Accordingly vide order dated 4.2.2011, the Tribunal has made the instant Reference. 6. The relevant provisions of the ‘Central Act’ are reproduced as under: The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956: “14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce.- It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce:- (i) to (iii) … … … (iv) iron and steel, that is to say, - (i) to (xiii) … … … (xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheels sets; (xv) … … … (xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings, or end pieces of any of the above categories. (v) to (vi) … … … 15. Restrictions and conditions in regard to tax on sale or purchase of declared goods within a State.- Every sales tax law of a State shall, in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of declared goods, be subject to the following restrictions and conditions, namely:- (a) the tax payable under that law in respect of any sale or purchase of such goods inside the State shall not exceed five per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof; (b) to (d) … … …” 7. In the instant case there is no question of repugnancy between the two Statutes. There is no dispute about the Assessee being subjected to levy of tax. The only issue being applicability of the Statutes, Central or the State Act. If the case of the Assessee was to fall within the ambit and scope of the provisions of Section 14 of the ‘Central Act’, the Assessee is liable to be assessed at a lesser amount of duty. 8. In our considered view the word “tyres” in entry (xiv) of sub-section (iv) of Section 14 of the ‘Central Act’ cannot be read in isolation and has to be read in the group of items in which the entry is made. Sub-section (iv) starts with the words “iron and steels”, thus items referred to in entry (xiv) necessarily has to be read contextually in that background along with other entries being the ‘wheels, tyres, axles and wheels sets’. Here the word “tyres” cannot be read so as to mean rubber tyres. It has to be read conjunctively with other entries, genus of which is iron and steel. Here the word “tyres” cannot be read so as to mean rubber tyres. It has to be read conjunctively with other entries, genus of which is iron and steel. Tyres necessarily would not acquire the connotation of rubber tyres so understood in common parlance, unlike a trader specifically dealing with the product. 9. The principle to be adopted for construction of tariff entries is no longer res integra. In the absence of statutory definitions, excisable goods mentioned in tariff entries are to be construed according to the trade practice. 10. In Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. vs. Union of India & others, (2002) 9 SCC 545 , the Apex Court observed as under: “4. The learned counsel contended that the plastic torch manufactured by the petitioner is nothing else but plastic tube made of plastic in which certain other devices are inserted so as to make it a torch but it nonetheless retains the character of a plastic tube. A mere reference to Tariff Item 15-A(2) would show that the articles therein described are plastic material in different shapes and forms and not articles made from such plastic material. There is a noticeable difference between plastic material in different shapes and forms such as tubes, rods, sheets, etc. and articles made from such plastic material such as plastic torch. It would be doing violence to the language if one were to include plastic torch in articles under Tariff Item 15-A(2) on the ground that a plastic tube is used for manufacturing plastic torch. Articles such as tubes, rods, sheets, foils, sticks, etc., of plastic material merely describe plastic material in different shapes and forms and each word used therein takes its colour from the word just preceding and just succeeding and the adjectival clause “articles made of plastics”. Articles made of plastic means articles made wholly of commodity commercially known as plastics, and not articles made from plastics along with other materials. By no canon of construction, a plastic torch can be read in conjunction with plastic tubes, rods, sheets, foils, etc., made of plastics. Plastic torch is a distinct and different commodity commonly known in the market as torch. Ordinarily, torch is not described by the name of the material used in the tube in which the device of torch is housed. The commodity known, advertised, sold and offered in the market is torch. Plastic torch is a distinct and different commodity commonly known in the market as torch. Ordinarily, torch is not described by the name of the material used in the tube in which the device of torch is housed. The commodity known, advertised, sold and offered in the market is torch. The prefix plastic merely describes the quality of torch as distinguished from other types of torches. It is not sold primarily as plastic tube. 5. By a catena of decisions it is settled law that an expression used in a taxing statute for describing a commodity must be given the meaning which is generally given to it by a person in the trade or in the market of commodities and should be interpreted in the sense the person conversant with the subject-matter of the statute and dealing with it would attribute to it. (See Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Asstt. STO, AIR 1961 SC 1325 .) The High Court approached the matter from this angle and reached the correct conclusion that the expression “articles made of plastics” used in Tariff Item 15-A(2) does not cover such articles which are not directly made from the material indicated in sub-item (1) but are made from articles made out of such material.” 11. In Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi vs. Connaught Plaza Restaurant Private Limited, New Delhi, (2012) 13 SCC 639, the apex Court reiterated its earlier principle and observed as under: “20. Time and again, the principle of common parlance as the standard for interpreting terms in the taxing statutes, albeit subject to certain exceptions, where the statutory context runs to the contrary, has been reiterated. The application of the common parlance test is an extension of the general principle of interpretation of statutes for deciphering the mind of the law maker; "it is an attempt to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used by it, keeping always in mind, that the language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of actual human thoughts." [See : Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. v. CCE, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 716]. 12. In the said decision, Court held that fruits and vegetables could not be construed to be salted peanuts or for that matter beetle leaves could not be held to be vegetables. Further it reiterated its view taken in its earlier decisions in the following terms: “27. 12. In the said decision, Court held that fruits and vegetables could not be construed to be salted peanuts or for that matter beetle leaves could not be held to be vegetables. Further it reiterated its view taken in its earlier decisions in the following terms: “27. In Collector of Central Excise, Kanpur Vs. Krishna Carbon Paper Co., (1989) 1 SCC 150 this Court has opined thus : "12. It is a well settled principle of construction, as mentioned before, that where the word has a scientific or technical meaning and also an ordinary meaning according to common parlance, it is in the latter sense that in a taxing statute the word must be held to have been used, unless contrary intention is clearly expressed by the legislature…..…But there is a word of caution that has to be borne in mind in this connection, the words must be understood in popular sense, that is to say, these must be confined to the words used in a particular statute and then if in respect of that particular items, as artificial definition is given in the sense that a special meaning is attached to particular words in the statute then the ordinary sense or dictionary meaning would not be applicable but the meaning of that type of goods dealt with by that type of goods in that type of market, should be searched." 28. In Reliance Cellulose Products Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad-I Division, Hyderabad, (1997) 6 SCC 464 it was observed: "20. In other words, if the word used in a fiscal statute is understood in common parlance or in the commercial world in a particular sense, it must be taken that the Excise Act has used that word in the commonly understood sense. That sense cannot be taken away by attributing a technical meaning to the word. But if the legislature itself has adopted a technical term, then that technical term has to be understood in the technical sense. That sense cannot be taken away by attributing a technical meaning to the word. But if the legislature itself has adopted a technical term, then that technical term has to be understood in the technical sense. In other words, if in the fiscal statute, the article in question falls within the ambit of a technical term used under a particular entry, then that article cannot be taken away from that entry and placed under the residuary entry on the pretext that the article, even though it comes within the ambit of the technical term used in a particular entry, has acquired some other meaning in market parlance. For example, if a type of explosive (RDX) is known in the market as Kala Sabun by a section of the people who uses these explosives, the manufacturer or importer of these explosives cannot claim that the explosives must be classified as soap and not as explosive." 29. … … … 30. In Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhavan Ltd. Vs. Collector of Central Excise, Nagpur, (1996) 9 SCC 402 , this Court while applying the common parlance test held that the appellant's product "Dant Lal Manjan" could not qualify as a medicament and held as follows: "3. …The Tribunal rightly points out that in interpreting statutes like the Excise Act the primary object of which is to raise revenue and for which purpose various products are differently classified, resort should not be had to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms and expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say the meaning attached to them by those using the product. It is for this reason that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that scientific and technical meanings would not advance the case of the appellants if the same runs counter to how the product is understood in popular parlance."” 13. The origin of the word “tyres”, as is so described in the dictionary, was in the 15th century denoting curved pieces of iron with which the carriage wheels were shod. In fact, it is also described as a strengthening band of metal fitted around the rim of a wheel especially of a railway vehicle. There can be a case where such tyres may be having a rubber covering, but then it would definitely not cover the activity of the Assessee who is in the business of retreading of rubber tyres. In fact, it is also described as a strengthening band of metal fitted around the rim of a wheel especially of a railway vehicle. There can be a case where such tyres may be having a rubber covering, but then it would definitely not cover the activity of the Assessee who is in the business of retreading of rubber tyres. 14. As such, in our considered view the entry “tyres” in the central legislation would not be construed as tyres retreaded with rubber, even though the main classification is that of iron and steel. Thus the Assessee would be liable to be assessed as per the ‘State Act’ and not the ‘Central Act’. The Reference is answered accordingly.