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Jharkhand High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1851 (JHR)

Jardine Henderson Limited v. Binod Kumar Mishra

2018-08-14

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2018
ORDER : 1. The present batch of writ petitions have been preferred for quashing and setting aside the judgment dated 10th December, 2015 passed in M.J. Case No.134 of 2010, M.J. Case No.70 of 2010 and M.J. Case No.29 of 2010, respectively, by the Labour Court, Dhanbad under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act, 1947’), whereby the claim of the concerned workmen (respondents herein) has been allowed on contest and the petitioner-Management has been directed to pay all the dues, allowances and other monetary benefits, including the increment and other benefits arising due to pay revision from time to time on the basis of same principles/formula applied towards 30 workmen whose names have been placed in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 and has further been directed that the said computation/calculation should be made from the date of retrenchment i.e. 13th January, 1988 till the death of the workman or the date of superannuation or the date of disposal of the said cases whichever is earlier along with simple interest thereon @ 12% per annum from the date of dues of each month till the date of actual payment as well as the lump-sum cost of Rs.2,000/- per workman. 2. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the petitioner-Management used to have two establishments i.e. Meameco Division of Jardine Henderson Ltd. and Jardine Henderson Victor Ltd. The petitioner-Management applied before the State Government for retrenchment of certain workmen of both of its establishments on 14th November, 1987 under Section 25N of the Act, 1947. Thereafter, on 13th January, 1988 the petitioner retrenched 101 workmen of Meameco Division of Jardine Henderson Ltd. and 22 workmen of Jardine Henderson Victor Ltd. on the basis of deemed permission granted by the State Government, presuming expiry of the statutory period of 60 days. 3. An industrial dispute was raised on behalf of the workmen against the said action of the petitioner-Management. The matter was referred by the appropriate government to the Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad and the same was registered as Ref. Case No.05 of 1988. The Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad vide award dated 25th November, 1993 upheld the retrenchment made by the petitioner-Management. The said award was challenged by the Trade Union by filing a writ petition before the Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench, being CWJC no.1408 of 1994(R). Case No.05 of 1988. The Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad vide award dated 25th November, 1993 upheld the retrenchment made by the petitioner-Management. The said award was challenged by the Trade Union by filing a writ petition before the Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench, being CWJC no.1408 of 1994(R). The said writ petition was allowed vide order dated 23rd August, 2002 in relation to 101 workmen of Meameco Division of Jardine Henderson Ltd. primarily on the ground of non-compliance of the mandatory provision of Section 25N of the Act, 1947 with a direction that the said 101 workmen would be entitled for consequential benefits including monetary benefits for which they were entitled under the law. However, the award with respect to 22 workmen of Jardine Henderson Victor Ltd. was upheld. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred L.P.A. No.577 of 2002, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 30th April, 2003 and finally Civil Appeal No.4466 of 2004 filed by the petitioner before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was also dismissed. In the meantime, out of 101 workmen, a set of 30 workmen filed Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003, wherein a group of 71 workmen filed an intervention application, which was rejected. During the pendency of the said contempt case, the set of said 30 workmen were paid all the benefits in terms with the order passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) and the same was, accordingly, disposed of vide order dated 30th March, 2007. Some of the workmen out of the set of 71 workmen filed another contempt case, being Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007, which was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 17th February, 2009, holding inter alia that no wilful disobedience has been found on the part of the petitioner-Management. 5. Thereafter, 63 workmen out of 71 filed four sets of cases before the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 for computation and payment of benefits in terms with the judgment dated 23rd August, 2002 passed by this Court in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). The petitioner challenged the maintainability of the said cases on the ground of res-judicata contending that the said workmen had already settled their claims during the pendency of CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R), however, the said application of the petitioner was rejected by the learned Labour Court. 6. The petitioner challenged the maintainability of the said cases on the ground of res-judicata contending that the said workmen had already settled their claims during the pendency of CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R), however, the said application of the petitioner was rejected by the learned Labour Court. 6. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said action of the Labour Court filed W.P.(L) No.5908 of 2010, W.P.(L) No.1349 of 2011 and W.P.(L) No.841 of 2012 before this Court, which were dismissed by separate orders dated 19th February, 2015. However, the petitioner was given liberty to raise the plea of res-judicata, estoppel, maintainability, jurisdiction etc. at the time of final hearing. 7. The petitioner again preferred L.P.A. Nos.192, 195 & 196 of 2015 against the orders dated 19th February, 2015, which were also dismissed with a direction to the Labour Court to decide the cases within a timeframe of three months. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court heard all the three cases filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 together and decided the issue in favour of the respondents-workmen vide judgment dated 10th December, 2015. The operative part of the said judgment reads as under: “1. That M.J Case No. 43 of 2011 is hereby dismissed on contest being not maintainable. However, it is made clear that applicants are at liberty to file a fresh case with correct pleading if so advise. 2. That M.J. Case No. 29 of 2010, M.J Case No. 70 of 2010 and M.J case no. 134 of 2010 are hereby allowed on contest. Consequently, M/s Jardine Henderson Ltd. & Others/Ops are hereby directed:- (i) to pay all the due wages, allowances and other monetary benefits which includes increment and other benefits arises due to pay revision from time to time within 60 days from passing of this order to all 61 applicants of these three cases on the basis of same principle/formula upon which company has calculated and paid the dues of 30 workmen of contempt case No. 811 of 2003 subject to modification of pay revision etc. and period that such computation/calculation should be made from the date of retrenchment i.e 13.01.1988 till:- (a) the date of death of workman or (b) the date of superannuation of the workman or (c) the date of disposal of this case, whichever may come earlier (ii) to pay simple interest @ 12% per annum from the date of due of each month till the date of actual payment. (iii) to pay lump sum cost of litigation @ Rs.2000/- per workmen. (iv) Company/OP is at liberty to deduct the amount already paid to workmen/applicants under the alleged settlement shown by vouchers exhibit M-1 to M-65.” 8. The petitioner-Management has filed the present batch of writ petitions against the judgment dated 10th December, 2015 passed by the learned Labour Court. An application for stay of the impugned judgment was filed before this Court, which was rejected by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The petitioner, thereafter, filed L.P.A No. 106 of 2017, which was also dismissed by the learned Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 12th April, 2017. Civil Appeal Nos.1771-1772 of 2018 filed by the petitioner-Management before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was, however, disposed of vide order dated 8th February, 2018 with the following observations: “We, therefore, set aside the observations made by the Division Bench in paragraphs 6 and 9 of the impugned order. We request the learned Single Judge of the Jharkhand High Court to decide the W.P.(L) No. 835 of 2016 expeditiously and in accordance with law, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Both the parties shall not seek any adjournment in the matter. The learned Single Judge shall decide the matter on merits without being influenced by any observations made by the Division Bench. Status quo as on today shall be maintained by the parties. We may further mention here that during the pendency of the matter the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs.1,48,40,863/- pursuant to the directions given in the execution case preferred by the respondents. The amount has been withdrawn by the respondents. The withdrawal of the amount mentioned above will be subject to the decision of the writ petition. We may further mention here that during the pendency of the matter the petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs.1,48,40,863/- pursuant to the directions given in the execution case preferred by the respondents. The amount has been withdrawn by the respondents. The withdrawal of the amount mentioned above will be subject to the decision of the writ petition. If any amount out of the deposit so made by the petitioner is still lying with the executing Court, it will be open for the concerned respondents to withdraw the same.” 9. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner-Management submits that the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that during the pendency of C.W.J.C No.1408 of 1994(R) a group of 71 workmen had settled their claims and had received the amount as full and final settlement of their claims and the said fact is substantiated by their conduct, as they did not join their hands with rest 30 workmen, who filed Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003. As such, the cases of the said 30 workmen who continued with their litigation and were subsequently paid the consequential benefits in terms with the order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) cannot be equated with the petitioners who are presently 61 in numbers, as they had already entered the settlement with the petitioner-Management and, thereby, had separated themselves from the affairs of the Company. It is further submitted that the learned Labour Court also committed serious error of jurisdiction in entertaining the applications filed by the respondent-workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 despite huge unexplained delay of more than 20 years and without making any enquiry as to whether the said workmen were gainfully employed elsewhere during the said period. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also submits that the learned Labour Court ought to have dismissed the cases filed by the respondents-workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, as they could not bring on record any evidence whatsoever in respect of their claims for computation of the wages. Learned Labour Court erroneously proceeded to decide the said cases as fresh industrial dispute, such as validity or otherwise of closure of the industrial establishment in the year 2006, which was already rejected by this Court in Cont. Learned Labour Court erroneously proceeded to decide the said cases as fresh industrial dispute, such as validity or otherwise of closure of the industrial establishment in the year 2006, which was already rejected by this Court in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 wherein wages have been directed to be paid to the said set of 30 workmen only up to the date of closure i.e. till 2006. Moreover, a Bench of this Court rejected the intervention of 71 workmen in Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007, which included the respondents workmen herein and, thus, the claim of the workmen was barred by the principles of res-judicata. Learned Labour Court also failed to appreciate that the order dated 17th February, 2009 passed in Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007 having not been challenged in the higher courts became final and binding on the parties. It is also submitted that the impugned judgment is also perverse and illegal, being contrary to the materials on record. The learned Labour Court has also committed serious error by not appreciating the fact that the amount of gratuity, retrenchment compensation, provident fund and other terminal benefits were already accepted by the respondents-workmen way back 23 years ago and thereby they had accepted the cessation of their employment and as such they were not under the category of “Workmen” construed within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act, 1947. Thus, the applications filed by them under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 were not maintainable. 10. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submits that the learned Labour Court committed serious error in issuing fresh direction to the petitioner-Management exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 for payment of settled amount to the respondents-workmen instead of making proper computation of the same. The said direction of the learned Trial Court itself goes contrary to the very requirement of Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947. The respondents-workmen, at best, could have been treated as the workmen from the date of their retrenchment till the final settlement was arrived with them by the petitioner-Management. It is also submitted that even the Trade Union only recognized 30 workmen, as Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 was filed only with respect to them for the purpose of getting consequential benefits in terms with the order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). It is also submitted that even the Trade Union only recognized 30 workmen, as Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 was filed only with respect to them for the purpose of getting consequential benefits in terms with the order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). The Learned Labour Court should have at least dismissed the claim of six workmen (claimants of M.J. Case No.134 of 2010), as the Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007 filed by them was dismissed by a Bench of this Court vide order dated 17th February, 2009. So far as the remaining 55 workmen are concerned, the Trade Union sought intervention on their behalf in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003, which was also dismissed vide order dated 30th March, 2007 and, therefore, the learned Labour Court also should not have entertained their cases. Further, as per the observation of the learned Labour Court itself, no evidence was adduced by the respondents-workmen as to on what basis monetary claims put forth by them could have been calculated. It is further submitted that the Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 has merely to act as an executing court and therefore, in absence of any basis for calculation of the monetary claim, the said applications filed by the respondents-workmen were not maintainable at all. The learned Labour Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, has no space to make full-fledged adjudication of the dispute in the manner the same could be done under Section 10 of the Act, 1947. The impugned judgment passed by the learned Labour Court also suggests that the cases were hurriedly disposed of without calling for appropriate evidence to get the claims substantiated by the respondents-workmen due to the timeframe fixed for disposal of the said cases by this Court. The learned Labour Court has seriously erred in directing the petitioner-Management to pay all the due wages, allowances and other monetary benefits to all 61 workmen, including the six workmen, whose contempt case was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 17th February, 2009 on the basis of same principle/formula upon which the petitioner-Management had calculated and paid the dues to the set of 30 workmen who were part of the Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003. 11. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-workmen submits that the petitioner-Management filed three separate writ petitions before this Court putting challenge to the interim order passed by the learned Labour Court rejecting the objection raised by the petitioner with regard to maintainability of the applications filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 and all these three wit petitions were dismissed vide orders dated 19th February, 2015 in which the effect of dismissal of Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007 preferred by six workmen out of 71 was also considered and was held that the observation made in the contempt proceeding cannot be the sole basis for denying the claim, if any, of the remaining 71 workmen. The order dated 17th February, 2009 passed in Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007 also does not indicate that all relevant materials were brought by the petitioner-Management to the notice of this Court to substantiate the fact that there had been a final settlement between it and the respondents-workmen. The dismissal of the said contempt case cannot be construed to mean that the applicants in M.J. cases (cases filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947) did not have surviving right flowing from the order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed in CWJC No.1409 of 1994(R) 12. A Bench of this Court while dismissing W.P.(L) No.5908 of 2010, W.P.(L) No.1349 of 2011 and W.P.(L) No.841 of 2012 vide orders dated 19th February, 2015 respectively also noticed the fact that the petitioner-Management did not bring on record the copies of the alleged settlement in the earlier contempt proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondents-workmen also submits that the amount paid to the respondents-workmen by the petitioner-Management was, in fact, in relation to the period prior to 13.1.1988 and not for latter period. Moreover, by any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the said amount was paid in terms with the order dated 23rd August, 2002 passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R), whereby the petitioner-Management was specifically directed to pay the consequential benefits to 101 workmen including the monetary benefits admissible under the law. The said direction issued in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) has further been clarified by this Court in Cont. The said direction issued in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) has further been clarified by this Court in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003, observing, inter alia, that the consequential benefits are to be construed to mean all consequences emanating from the order setting aside the retrenchment of the workmen. The natural and legal consequence of setting aside the order of retrenchment is that all such workmen were deemed to be in service. 13. It is emphatically submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents-workmen that the alleged settlement arrived at between the petitioner-Management and the respondents-workmen cannot be said to be the settlement in terms with the order passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). Learned Labour Court has rightly taken note of the fact that merely receiving certain amount under the alleged settlement without following the provisions of the Act, 1947 and the relevant rules framed thereunder does not amount to waiver by conduct. The specific case of the respondents-workmen is that they have received certain amount from the petitioner-Management for the period prior to their retrenchment. The said fact has also been accepted by the petitioner’s witness, namely, Saradindu Bhattacharya who has accepted in paragraph no.32 of his deposition that all such payment relate to the period prior to 13th January, 1988 and not for the latter period. It is also submitted that in the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, though the respondents-workmen had admitted that they have received some payment as contained in Exts.M/1 to M/3 and Exts.M/4 to M/65 (vouchers), the same cannot be treated to be a settlement as being contended by the petitioner-Management. The learned Labour Court has rightly refused to accept the contention of the petitioner-Management that the agreement with the respondents-workmen should be treated as the final settlement to put the litigation to an end for good. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents-workmen puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Oswal Agro Furnace Ltd. and Anr. Vs. Oswal Agro Furnace Workers Union & Ors., reported in (2005) 3 SCC 224 , and submits that the settlement of industrial dispute can only be arrived at between the employer and workmen in accordance with law. Any agreement, which opposes public policy as laid down in law would be void having no effect. Vs. Oswal Agro Furnace Workers Union & Ors., reported in (2005) 3 SCC 224 , and submits that the settlement of industrial dispute can only be arrived at between the employer and workmen in accordance with law. Any agreement, which opposes public policy as laid down in law would be void having no effect. Learned counsel also puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Manohar Joshi Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. with analogous cases, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 619 and submits that when law requires an act to be done in a particular manner, the same has to be done in the said manner and not otherwise. 15. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents-workmen that so far as the issue regarding closure of the unit is concerned, M.W./1 has deposed in paragraph nos.35 and 41 of his deposition that no permission was obtained for closure of Meameco Division. The said witness has further deposed that M/s. Jardine Henderson Ltd. is still running. The learned Labour Court has thus, observed that no reliable evidence was brought on record by the petitioner-Management to substantiate the date of closure of Meameco Division and the legality thereof. Keeping that aspect in view, the learned Labour Court has directed the petitioner-Management to pay all due wages, allowances and other monetary benefits arising out of the pay revision from time to time within 60 days from the date of passing of the said order to all 61 applicants/workmen of these three cases on the basis of the same principle/formula on which the petitioner-Management calculated and paid dues of 30 workmen of Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003, subject to modification of pay revision etc., the computation of which is to be made from the date of retrenchment i.e. 13th January, 1988 till the date of death of the workman or the date of superannuation of the workman or the date of disposal of the said cases whichever comes earlier, along with interest @ 12% till the date of actual payment plus lump-sum litigation cost of Rs.2000/- giving liberty to the petitioner-Management to deduct the amount already paid to the workmen under the alleged settlement shown in the vouchers exhibited as Exts. M/1 to M/65. M/1 to M/65. It is also submitted that so far as the workman, namely, Uma Shankar Prasad (represented through Ramawati Devi in W.P.(L) No.301 of 2016 as respondent no.9) is concerned, admittedly, the petitioner-Management has not been able to produce any voucher showing payment to him in terms of the purported settlement. 16. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The thrust of the argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the issue in the present case has already been decided by this Court in contempt proceeding, wherein it has been held that the concerned workmen have already settled their claim and, thus, they have no right to agitate the matter again. I have perused the order dated 17th February, 2009 passed in Cont. Case (Civil) No.638 of 2007, the operative part of which reads as under: “7. As per the counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 4 in the present case, there is also amicable settlement between the present petitioner and 71 workmen in February, 1994 onwards and, therefore, they are not entitled to any benefits. The date of settlement is varying from workman to workman. Counsel appearing for the respondent no. 4 has also brought to the notice of this Court that subsequently 30 workmen had preferred the contempt application before this Court being Contempt Case (C) No. 811 of 2003 wherein paragraph no. 4 it has been observed as under:- “During the pendency of the litigation, 71 workmen out of 101 settled with the Company. However, remaining 30 workmen i.e the petitioners herein have filed the present contempt petition.” 8. Thus, cognizance has been taken by the Court while disposing of the Contempt case No. 811 of 2003 vide order dated 12th January, 2007 that there was settlement between 71 workmen out of 101 workmen with the respondent no. 4. 9. The present petitioners had also filed application for joining himself as a party in the aforesaid Contempt Petition through Trade Union, which was not allowed by this Court. Thus, the present petitioners were knowing the result of the earlier Contempt Application preferred by 30 workmen. 10. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and reasons especially that there was a full and final settlement between the present petitioner and respondent no. Thus, the present petitioners were knowing the result of the earlier Contempt Application preferred by 30 workmen. 10. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and reasons especially that there was a full and final settlement between the present petitioner and respondent no. 4 as stated in Annexure A of the reply filed by the respondent, the present petitioners are not entitled for the benefit. Thus, there is no deliberate breach of the order passed by this Court. It is also submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that there is no need of further clarification in the order passed by this Court dated 23rd August 2002 in CWJC No. 1048 of 1994(R). Nonetheless a Review application shall be preferred so that care may be taken for the present petitioners who have already entered into full and final settlement by receiving sizeable amount before the Writ Petition was decided by this Court. In view of these facts, it cannot be said that there was willful disobedience of the order passed by this Court.” 17. A Bench of this Court, while passing the aforesaid order, took into consideration that there was full and final settlement between the petitioner-Management and the concerned workmen by receiving sizeable amount and, thus, observed that there was no wilful disobedience of the order passed by the Court and, accordingly, the said contempt case was disposed of. 18. The issue in the said contempt case was as to whether the petitioner-Management had committed wilful disobedience of the order of the Court and on prima facie consideration of the fact that the matter was settled between the parties, the contempt proceeding was dropped. The validity of the settlement was not in question in the contempt proceeding and, thus, it cannot be said that the order passed in the said contempt case would prevent the workmen from filing suitable applications before a fact finding Court to determine the claim. The scope in a contempt proceeding vis-à-vis determination of monetary benefits under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 are completely different. The High Court exercises power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India while initiating a contempt proceeding for wilful disobedience of its order so as to suitably punish the contemner, whereas the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 is in the form of determination/computation of monetary claim made by the workman. 19. The High Court exercises power under Article 215 of the Constitution of India while initiating a contempt proceeding for wilful disobedience of its order so as to suitably punish the contemner, whereas the proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 is in the form of determination/computation of monetary claim made by the workman. 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Niaz Mohammad & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in (1994) 6 SCC 332 has held as under: “9. Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) defines “civil contempt” to mean “wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court …”. Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour such order or direction has been made can move the court for initiating proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure. The party in whose favour an order has been passed, is entitled to the benefit of such order. The court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not having complied with and carried out the direction of the court, has to take into consideration all facts and circumstances of a particular case. That is why the framers of the Act while defining civil contempt, have said that it must be wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. The civil court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof. The civil court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was wilful. Once a decree has been passed it is the duty of the court to execute the decree whatever may be consequence thereof. But while examining the grievance of the person who has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to initiate the proceeding for contempt for disobedience of its order, before any such contemner is held guilty and punished, the court has to record a finding that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, brought to the notice of the court, the court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but such disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it was not possible for the contemner to comply with the order, the court may not punish the alleged contemner. 10. In the present case, there is no specific direction in the aforesaid judgment of this Court dated 2-6-1988 in the connected writ petition, to pay any particular amount to the instructors. This Court has simply decided the question as to whether they are entitled to the scale of pay which has been given to squad teachers. Having decided that question in favour of the instructors, this Court directed that arrears be paid to the instructors w.e.f. their respective dates of appointments, treating them on a par with the squad teachers. This direction will involve payment of about 28 crores of rupees was neither known to the Court nor to the parties to that proceeding. As such, this Court is now entitled to examine the question as to whether in the special facts and circumstances of the present case, the respondents should be punished for having committed contempt of this Court. In the case of Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal this Court said: (SCC p. 281) “Nor is a person to be punished for contempt of court for disobeying an order of court except when the disobedience is established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof being similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding. In the case of Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal this Court said: (SCC p. 281) “Nor is a person to be punished for contempt of court for disobeying an order of court except when the disobedience is established beyond reasonable doubt, the standard of proof being similar, even if not the same, as in a criminal proceeding. Where the person alleged to be in contempt is able to place before the court sufficient material to conclude that it is impossible to obey the order, the court will not be justified in punishing the alleged contemner.” 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has held that any person aggrieved by the non-compliance of the order of the Court may seek initiation of contempt proceeding against the contemner, however, the same is to be exercised sparingly. Mere disobedience is not sufficient to take action for contempt unless the disobedience is proved as wilful. The contempt proceeding is not an execution proceeding for executing the order. The Court while considering the issue as to whether the alleged contemner should be punished for not complying the order or carrying out the direction of the Court has to take into consideration all the facts and circumstances of a particular case and to find out as to whether the said disobedience of the direction of a writ Court was wilful and intentional. On the contrary, the Court in an execution proceeding has no concern with the question as to whether there is wilful disobedience of any judgment or decree. Once the decree is passed, it is the duty of the Court to execute the same irrespective of the consequence thereof. Thus, the argument of learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the learned court below had no jurisdiction to entertain the applications filed by the respondents-workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 in view of the order passed in the contempt proceeding has no substance. 21. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has given much stress on the word “settlement” to make out a case. 21. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner has given much stress on the word “settlement” to make out a case. The word “settlement” has been defined under Section 2(p) of the Act, 1947, which means that a settlement arrived at in course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereof in such manner as prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to an officer authorized in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the Conciliation Officer. Rule 61 of Bihar Industrial Disputes Rules, 1961 (in short ‘the Rules, 1961’) framed under the Act, 1947 prescribes detailed procedure for arriving at a settlement between the employer and the workmen. The object of introducing such a provision is to prevent any fraud, coercion or undue influence while entering into the settlement so as to protect the interest of the poor workmen. Undoubtedly, the purported settlement claimed by the petitioner with 71 workmen does not come within the ambit of the definition explained in Section 2(p) ‘Definition of Settlement’ of the Act, 1947 or conform to the procedure prescribed under Rule 61 of the Rules, 1961. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Oswal Agro Furnace Ltd. (Supra.) has held as under: “15. A settlement within the meaning of Section 2(p) read with sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act undoubtedly binds the workmen but the question which would arise is, would it mean that thereby the provisions contained in Sections 25-N and 25-O are not required to be complied with? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. A settlement can be arrived at between the employer and workmen in case of an industrial dispute. An industrial dispute may arise as regards the validity of a retrenchment or a closure or otherwise. Such a settlement, however, as regards retrenchment or closure can be arrived at provided such retrenchment or closure has been effected in accordance with law. Requirements of issuance of a notice in terms of Sections 25-N and 25-O, as the case may be, and/or a decision thereupon by the appropriate Government are clearly suggestive of the fact that thereby a public policy has been laid down. Requirements of issuance of a notice in terms of Sections 25-N and 25-O, as the case may be, and/or a decision thereupon by the appropriate Government are clearly suggestive of the fact that thereby a public policy has been laid down. The State Government before granting or refusing such permission is not only required to comply with the principles of natural justice by giving an opportunity of hearing both to the employer and the workmen but also is required to assign reasons in support thereof and is also required to pass an order having regard to the several factors laid down therein. One of the factors besides others which is required to be taken into consideration by the appropriate Government before grant or refusal of such permission is the interest of the workmen. The aforementioned provisions being imperative in character would prevail over the right of the parties to arrive at a settlement. Such a settlement must conform to the statutory conditions laying down a public policy. A contract which may otherwise be valid, however, must satisfy the tests of public policy not only in terms of the aforementioned provisions but also in terms of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act.” 23. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the learned court below has come to a finding that neither the settlement was made in Form-H nor the attested copy of the same was sent to the Labour Commissioner and the Secretary, Department of Labour, Government of Jharkhand, as required in terms with Rule 61(4) of the Rules, 1961. The learned court below has also observed that the petitioner-Management has taken the signature/thumb impression of the workmen on different dates on the printed vouchers by making note on the backside of the said vouchers that the workmen have received such amount. It has further been observed that all the vouchers were prepared in English, final note has been made on the backside of the voucher by the official/staff of the petitioner-Management in English and, thereafter, below the said note, the signatures or LTI/RTI of the workmen have been taken. Thus, it appears that most of the workmen are illiterate and not conversant with English language. Thus, it appears that most of the workmen are illiterate and not conversant with English language. No evidence has been led by the petitioner-Management that the contents of the said vouchers and the notes made on the backside of the same have been read over and explained to the said workmen. 24. Moreover, several other ambiguities appear from the face of the said vouchers. Ext. M/6, which is a voucher in relation to a workman, namely, Kati Singh, Mazdoor, which was prepared in Hindi, would show that the said workman did not understand the difference between the gratuity and the payment in lieu of retrenchment as after the word “gratuity”, a word “Chhatni” has been written on the said voucher. As per the Labour Court, all these ambiguities create enough doubt on the nature of the settlement claimed by the petitioner-Management. It has been held by the learned court below that the statutory requirement of settlement as provided under the Act, 1947 and the Rules, 1961 has not been fulfilled and, therefore, the same is void having no effect. However, since the payment of the amount has been admitted by the concerned workmen, the amount paid to them can be adjusted at the time of final payment of dues. 25. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner-Management has tried to persuade this court that the settlement arrived at between the petitioner-Management and 61 workmen should not be taken as a settlement in terms with Section 18(1) of the Act, 1947, rather it was a settlement to end the dispute in totality. It has further been submitted that the learned Labour Court misconstrued the nature of the said settlement and thus arrived at an erroneous conclusion. I do not find any substance in the said argument. 26. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Joshi (Supra.) has held that if the statute provides for doing a particular act in a specified manner, it is required to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. Thus, the contention of the petitioner-Management that there had been settlement with 71 workmen starting from 1988 to 1994 cannot be accepted. Thus, the contention of the petitioner-Management that there had been settlement with 71 workmen starting from 1988 to 1994 cannot be accepted. Had this been the position, the petitioner-Management would have brought the said fact to the notice of this Court while adjudicating CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R), which was finally disposed of vide order dated 23rd August, 2002 in favour of 101 workmen. Moreover, the petitioner-Management being aggrieved with the order of the learned Single Judge preferred L.P.A. No.577 of 2002, which was dismissed by the learned Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 30th April, 2003. On perusal of the order dated 30th April, 2003, it would appear that all possible pleas were taken by the petitioner-Management before the learned Division Bench, yet curiously enough, the fact regarding purported settlement with 71 workmen was again not brought to the notice of the learned Division Bench. Similar was the position in Civil Appeal No.4466 of 2004 preferred by the petitioner-Management before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The order dated 27th October, 2005 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court would also suggest that no such factual plea was taken by the petitioner-Management at that stage also. Thus, on dismissal of Civil Appeal No.4466 of 2004 preferred by the petitioner, the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) attained finality wherein the petitioner-Management was clearly directed to pay the consequential benefits including monetary benefits to 101 workmen to which they are entitled under the law. 27. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner-Management has further contended that the claim of the concerned workmen suffers from delay and laches, as the same has been agitated after long gap of 20 years. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents-workmen has submitted that there is no limitation prescribed for recovery of money due from the employer under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, as the said proceeding is in the nature of execution. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 , has held as under: “19. We have already noticed that in enacting Section 33-C the legislature has deliberately omitted some words which occurred in Section 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. 28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. P.S. Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743 , has held as under: “19. We have already noticed that in enacting Section 33-C the legislature has deliberately omitted some words which occurred in Section 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. It is remarkable that similar words of limitation have been used in Section 33-C(1) because Section 33-C(1) deals with cases where any money is due under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A. It is thus clear that claims made under Section 33-C(1), by itself can be only claims referable to the settlement, award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A. These words of limitations are not to be found in Section 33-C(2) and to that extent, the scope of Section 33-C(2) is undoubtedly wider than that of Section 33-C(1). It is true that even in respect of the larger class of cases which fall under Section 33-C(2), after the determination is made by the Labour Court the execution goes back again to Section 33-C(1). That is why Section 33-C(2) expressly provides that the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). It is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall under Section 33-C(2). There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33-C(1) fall under Section 33-C(2) and in that sense, Section 33-C(2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding; but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A, may also be competent under Section 33-C(2) and that may illustrate its wider scope. We would, however, like to indicate some of the claims which would not fall under Section 33-C(2), because they formed the subject-matter of the appeals which have been grouped together for our decision along with the appeals with which we are dealing at present. If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33-C(2). If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make a claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under Section 33-C(2). His demotion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed or demoted him, a claim that the dismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a pre-existing contract, cannot be made under Section 33-C(2). If a settlement has been duly reached between the employer and his employees and it falls under Section 18(2) or (3) of the Act and is governed by Section 19(2), it would not be open to an employee, notwithstanding the said settlement, to claim the benefit as though the said settlement had come to an end. If the settlement exists and continues to be operative, no claim can be made under Section 33-C(2) inconsistent with the said settlement. If the settlement is intended to be terminated, proper steps may have to be taken in that behalf and a dispute that may arise thereafter may to be dealt with according to the other procedure prescribed by the Act. Thus, our conclusion is that the scope of Section 33-C(2) is wider than Section 33-C(1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it, though for obvious reasons, we do not propose to decide or indicate what additional cases would fall under Section 33-C(2) which may not fall under Section 33-C(1). In this connection, we may incidentally state that the observations made by this Court in the case of Punjab National Bank Ltd. that Section 33-C is a provision in the nature of execution should not be interpreted to mean that the scope of Section 33-C(2) is exactly the same as Section 33-C(1) (p. 238).” In the case of Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, reported in AIR 1964 SC 752 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “12. Prima facie, there is some force in this argument. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva, reported in AIR 1964 SC 752 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “12. Prima facie, there is some force in this argument. It does appear to be somewhat anomalous that a claim which would be rejected as barred by time if made under the Payment of Wages Act, should be entertained under Section 33-C(2) of the Act; but does this apparent anomaly justify the introduction of consideration of limitation in proceedings under Section 33-C(2)? Mr Kolah suggests that it would be open to this Court to treat laches on the part of the employees as a relevant factor even in dealing with cases under Section 33-C(2) and he has relied on the fact that this Court has on several occasions discouraged belated claims in the matter of bonus. In appreciating the validity of this argument, we do not propose to consider whether the jurisdiction conferred on the authority under the Payment of Wages Act is exclusive in the sense that a claim for wages cannot be made by an industrial employee in a civil court within 3 years as permitted by Article 102; that is a question which may have to be decided on the merits when it directly arises. For the purpose of the present appeal, the only point which we have to consider is: does the fact that for recovery of wages limitation has been prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act, justify the introduction of considerations of limitation in regard to proceedings taken under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. 13. In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in mind that though the legislature knew how the problem of recovery of wages had been tackled by the Payment of Wages Act and how limitation had been prescribed in that behalf, it has omitted to make any provision for limitation in enacting Section 33-C(2). The failure of the legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot in our opinion, be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the circumstances would be legitimate to infer that legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under Section 33-C(2). The failure of the legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot in our opinion, be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the circumstances would be legitimate to infer that legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under Section 33-C(2). It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of Section 33-C(2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the said provision. Besides even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution within 12 years, provided, of course it is kept alive by taking steps in aid of execution from time to time as required by Article 182 of the Limitation Act; so that the test of one year or six months, limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. It seems to us that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce and such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The words of Section 33-C(2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without any considerations of limitation. Mr Kolah no doubt emphasised the fact that such belated claims made on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience to the employer, but that is a consideration which the legislature may take into account, and if the legislature feels that fair play and justice require that some limitation should be prescribed, it may proceed to do so. In the absence of any provision, however, the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under Section 33-C(2).” 29. In the aforesaid cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while promulgating Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, the legislature deliberately did not provide any limitation. In the absence of any provision, however, the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under Section 33-C(2).” 29. In the aforesaid cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while promulgating Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, the legislature deliberately did not provide any limitation. It may have been thought appropriate that the workmen may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be proper to put the restrictions of limitation in respect of claims which they are required to make under the said provision. The words mentioned in Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without considering the issue of delay. Thus, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that since the cases under section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 were filed after 20 years, the learned Labour Court should not have entertained the same, has no leg to stand. Moreover, the learned Labour Court after going through the evidence led in the said proceeding has observed that the long judicial battle fought by the workmen attained finality on 27th October, 2005 after disposal of Civil Appeal No.4466 of 2004. Only after disposal of the contempt case in the year 2009, the respondents-workmen were compelled to take legal recourse of computation of dues by filing applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 in the year 2010. On the contrary, the petitioner-Management was duty bound to execute the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R), however, it failed to do so and, thus, it cannot derive benefits of its own wrong. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad has rightly held that the dues of the respondents-workmen should be calculated on the same principle/formula, which was applied by the petitioner-Management while making payment to the said 30 workmen who were involved in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003. 31. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I am of the view that the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad has rightly held that the dues of the respondents-workmen should be calculated on the same principle/formula, which was applied by the petitioner-Management while making payment to the said 30 workmen who were involved in Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003. 31. In course of the argument, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, however submits that Execution Case no.97 of 2016 has been filed for execution of the impugned judgment dated 10th December, 2015 passed in M. J. Case No.29 of 2010, wherein out of 61 workmen, 46 have been paid their dues. The payment to some of the workmen could not be made as it was informed that they have died during the pendency of the execution case and the petitioner-Management was awaiting appropriate substitution of heirs/legal representatives of the deceased workmen in the said execution case. 32. So far as the order for payment of interest and other amount over and above the payment made to the 30 workmen as directed vide impugned judgment dated 10th December, 2015 is concerned, the petitioner-Management has challenged the same contending that the said direction is dehors the order passed by this Court in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). None of the 30 workmen who were paid wages and other benefits in relation to Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 were given interest on the due amount paid to them by the petitioner-Management. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner-Management that if at all it is presumed that the case of 61 workmen is at par with the set of 30 workmen who preferred Cont. Case (Civil) No.811 of 2003 before this Court and were paid compensation during the said proceeding, the rest 61 workmen would also get consequential benefits only up to July, 2006 to maintain parity with the amount of compensation paid to the set of 30 workmen. However, if the payment to 61 workmen is made in terms with the impugned judgment dated 10th December, 2015, they would be entitled to get the payment for further period, which would not be justified in any manner, as the said benefit cannot be extended to them for their own laches since they were not prompt enough to pursue the matter before the appropriate forum. 33. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P & Another Versus Brijpal Singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 , while considering the scope of Labour Court in dealing with the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947, has held as under: “10. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33-C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer. This Court further held as follows: (SCC p. 150, para 4). “It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject-matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act.” 11. In the case of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 241-42, paras 12-13) “12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. In the case of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 241-42, paras 12-13) “12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen’s entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court’s power under Section 33-C(2) like that of the executing court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. 13. In these matters, the claim of the respondent workmen who were all daily-rated/casual workers, to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workers, had not been earlier settled by adjudication or recognition by the employer without which the stage for computation of that benefit could not reach. The workmen’s claim of doing the same kind of work and their entitlement to be paid wages at the same rate as the regular workmen on the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ being disputed, without an adjudication of their dispute resulting in acceptance of their claim to this effect, there could be no occasion for computation of the benefit on that basis to attract Section 33-C(2). The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. The mere fact that some other workmen are alleged to have made a similar claim by filing writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution is indicative of the need for adjudication of the claim of entitlement to the benefit before computation of such a benefit could be sought. Respondents’ claim is not based on a prior adjudication made in the writ petitions filed by some other workmen upholding a similar claim which could be relied on as an adjudication ensuring to the benefit of these respondents as well. The writ petitions by some other workmen to which some reference was casually made, particulars of which are not available in these matters, have, therefore, no relevance for the present purpose. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court as well as the High Court were in error in treating as maintainable the applications made under Section 33-C(2) of the Act by these respondents.” 12. In the case of State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 77-78, paras 7-8). “7. When a reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate the question not only as to whether the termination of a workman is justified or not but to grant appropriate relief, it would consist of examination of the question whether the reinstatement should be with full or partial back wages or none. Such a question is one of fact depending upon the evidence to be produced before the Tribunal. If after the termination of the employment, the workman is gainfully employed elsewhere it is one of the factors to be considered in determining whether or not reinstatement should be with full back wages or with continuity of employment. Such questions can be appropriately examined only in a reference. When a reference is made under Section 10 of the Act, all incidental questions arising thereto can be determined by the Tribunal and in this particular case, a specific question has been referred to the Tribunal as to the nature of relief to be granted to the workmen. 8. Such questions can be appropriately examined only in a reference. When a reference is made under Section 10 of the Act, all incidental questions arising thereto can be determined by the Tribunal and in this particular case, a specific question has been referred to the Tribunal as to the nature of relief to be granted to the workmen. 8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a pre-existing right. The difference between a pre-existing right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33-C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages.” 34. It would, thus, emerge from the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that a proceeding under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 should be treated as an execution proceeding for computing any claim of the workman in terms of money when there is a pre-existing right already adjudicated on the complaint under Section 33-A or on a reference under Section 10 of the Act, 1947. No additional claim can be determined under the said proceeding. In the present case, learned Labour Court while deciding the monetary claim of the respondents-workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 has travelled beyond the entitlement of the workmen as determined in CWJC no.1408 of 1994(R), which is not permissible under the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947. 35. The learned Labour Court while awarding interest has observed that in spite of having full knowledge about the specific order passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R) to the effect that all 101 workmen including the respondents-workmen were entitled for all the dues, the petitioner-Management neither reinstated them nor paid their genuine and bona fide dues, rather continued to take legal recourse available under the law. 36. I am of the view that there had been a genuine dispute between the petitioner-Management and the respondents-workmen with regard to the fact as to whether the settlement arrived at between the parties should be considered as full and final settlement of their claim. It is not the case of the respondents-workmen that they were not paid any amount earlier, rather what emerges is that they had taken some amount on the pretext of settlement. It is not the case of the respondents-workmen that they were not paid any amount earlier, rather what emerges is that they had taken some amount on the pretext of settlement. Moreover, the workmen were also not prompt enough in agitating their grievance which may be one of the reasons for the delay in execution of the order passed in CWJC No.1408 of 1994(R). 37. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment dated 10th December, 2015 passed by the Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J. Case No.29 of 2010, M.J. Case No.70 of 2010 and M.J. Case No.134 of 2010 is modified to the following extent: (i) The respondents-workmen are entitled for the due wages, allowances and other monetary benefits including increment and other benefits arising out of pay revision from time to time on the same principle/formula upon which the petitioner-Management has calculated and paid the dues to the set of 30 workmen concerned with Cont. Case (civil) No.811 of 2003; (ii) The respondents-workmen are, however, not entitled to any interest upon the said payment; (iii) The cost of litigation @ Rs.2,000/- per workman as awarded by the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad is also directed to be paid to the respondents-workmen under the head- Miscellaneous Amount; (iv) The amount already paid by the petitioner-Management to the concerned workmen at the time of alleged settlement shall be deducted while making rest payment; and (v) The Executing Court, which is in seisin of Execution Case No.97 of 2016, is directed to execute the order of the learned Labour Court, Dhanbad subject to the aforesaid modification. 38. These writ petitions are, accordingly, disposed of. 39. In view of the order passed in these writ petitions, I.A. No.2857 of 2017 in W.P.(L) No.301 of 2016 also stands disposed of. Petition disposed of.