JUDGMENT Hon’ble Irshad Ali, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has accepted notice on behalf the respondent No. 1. 3. Sri Rajiv Singh Chauhan, learned counsel has accepted notice on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 4. 4. Learned Standing counsel has produced the instruction received from the respondent, wherein the ground taken in the impugned order rejecting the claim of the petitioner for the grant of appointment on compassionate ground has been supported. There is nothing otherwise except the ground taken in passing of the impugned order. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the mother of the petitioner Late Laxmi Srivastava was posted as Headmaster in a Primary School run and managed by the Board of Basic Education, who died while in service on 13.5.2017. The petitioner is a divorced lady, who was divorced vide judgment and decree dated 8.3.2013 and since then she was residing alongwith her mother and was totally dependent upon her income. 6. As per the Government order and circular issued by the respondent-department, the petitioner applied for consideration of grant of appointment on compassionate ground. Due to non passing of the order, she filed a writ petition before this Court which was numbered as Writ Petition No. 2777 (S/S) of 2018 (Noopur Srivastava v. State of U.P. and others), which was finally disposed of with the direction to the respondents vide judgment and order dated 31.1.2018 for consideration of her claim and to pass appropriate order. In compliance of the order of this Court, the impugned order dated 11.7.2018 has been passed, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 7. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the definition of ‘dependent’ has been given under Rule 2(c) of U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servant Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 1974 Rules) and his submission is that there is no exclusion of a divorced daughter in the definition provided under the rules. 7. Assailing the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the definition of ‘dependent’ has been given under Rule 2(c) of U.P. Recruitment of Dependants of Government Servant Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 1974 Rules) and his submission is that there is no exclusion of a divorced daughter in the definition provided under the rules. In support of his submission, he has relied upon a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Kusum Devi (Smt.) v. State of U.P. and others; (2001) 3 UPLBEC 2431 , which is brought on record as Annexure-9 to the writ petition inasmuch as Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Jayanti Devi, wherein the ratio of the judgment of the learned Single Judge was followed holding that a divorced lady is also included under the definition of daughter. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also invited attention of this Court on the interpretation of the word ‘includes’, which is as under: “1. Includes — Interpretation of.—The words “includes” is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be constructed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things, which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word “include” is also susceptible of other construction.” 9. On the other hand, learned Standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that a divorced lady is not included in the definition given under the 1974 Rules, therefore, he relied upon a judgment in the case of Gudiya Awasthy v. State of U.P. and others passed in Writ Petition No. 2707 (S/S) of 2004 decided on 4.7.2011. 10. Having heard the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record as well as the law report relied upon. 11. On perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the sole ground for rejection of claim of the petitioner for the grant of compassionate appointment is that she is a divorced daughter and does not come under the ambit of definition under Section 2 of 1974 Rules. 11. On perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the sole ground for rejection of claim of the petitioner for the grant of compassionate appointment is that she is a divorced daughter and does not come under the ambit of definition under Section 2 of 1974 Rules. Definition provided of the word ‘family’ under the aforesaid Rules is being quoted below: “(c) “family” shall include the following relations of the deceased Government servant; (i)wife or husband; (ii)sons/adopted sons; (iii)unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted daughters, widowed daughters and widowed daughters-in-law (iv)unmarried brothers, unmarried sisters and widowed mother dependent on the deceased Government servant, if the deceased Government servant was unmarried; (v) aforementioned relations of such missing Government servant who has been declared as “dead” by the competent Court; provided that if a person belonging to any of the above mentioned relations of the deceased Government servant is not available or is found to be physically and mentally unfit and thus ineligible for employment in Government service, then only in such situation the word “family” shall also include grandsons and the unmarried grand daughters of the deceased Government servant dependent on him.” 12. Although on bare reading of the provisions contained under the definition, it is not provided that divorced daughter is included in the definition clause even though in view of the judgment rendered in the case of Kusum Devi (Supra) holding that divorced daughter cannot be excluded from the definition of family appears to be correct view. The similar view was followed by the Division Bench in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Jayanti Devi. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment rendered in the case of Kusum Devi (Supra) are being quoted below: “10. A divorced daughter, if dependent upon her father, cannot be excluded and has to be included within the meaning of the word ‘family’ since such a ‘divorced daughter’, if dependent upon her father, has to be treated at par with an unmarried daughter or widowed daughter as all of them continue to be the liability of their father as member of the family of their ‘father’. 11. It is to be noted that a widowed daughter normally continues to receive support and other benefits from the family of her husband. Her relationship with the family of her husband does not automatically come to an end. 11. It is to be noted that a widowed daughter normally continues to receive support and other benefits from the family of her husband. Her relationship with the family of her husband does not automatically come to an end. In contrast, a divorced daughter snaps all her relationship with her husband and his family and loses status of a married woman. There is no logic to exclude a divorced daughter dependent upon her father from the definition of the word ‘family’ under the Rules.” 13. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Jayanti Devi has thoroughly considered the definition clause as well as the judgments rendered in this regard by this Court on the point involved herein and after recording cogent reasons has arrived on the following conclusion: “Once such is the situation that exclusion of married daughters from the ambit of the expression ‘family’ in Rule 2(c) of 1974 Rules has been held to be illegal and unconstitutional, then the net effect of the same is that daughters in any format, married, unmarried or divorced daughter, who were dependant on their deceased father, all stand on one common platform. In such a situation and in this background, once based on general discrimination exclusion of married daughters from the ambit of expression ‘family’ in Rule 2(c) has been held to be illegal and unconstitutional and wherein a divorced daughter has been staying with her father, in such a situation and in this background, once directives have been issued for providing her compassionate appointment then such action cannot be faulted. In view of this, Special Appeal sans merit and is dismissed.” 14. In view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of State of U.P. and others v. Jayanti Devi, the reliance placed by the learned Standing Counsel on the judgment of Gudiya Awasthy (Supra) has no more res integra to be taken into consideration. 15. Purpose of appointment on compassionate ground is to meet out the immediate hardship, which occurred in the family due to death of the bread earner. It is often seen that the authorities who have been empowered to act upon the Rules and Act applicable in regard to the appointment on compassionate ground delay the matter for a long period and they frustrate the purpose of appointment on compassionate ground. It is often seen that the authorities who have been empowered to act upon the Rules and Act applicable in regard to the appointment on compassionate ground delay the matter for a long period and they frustrate the purpose of appointment on compassionate ground. This practice of the officers and authorities should be taken care in consideration of appointment on compassionate ground. In case, the controversy in this regard is set at rest, then it is expected from the officers to follow and act in accordance with that. 16. In view of the above, this Court is of the view that there is no hesitation to hold that a divorced daughter is included under the definition of daughter, therefore, the impugned order is per se illegal and is liable to be set aside. 17. Accordingly, the impugned order is hereby set aside. 18. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondent No. 3 is directed to grant appointment to the petitioner on compassionate ground within a period of two weeks from the date of production of certified copy of this order and after appointment, she is entitled to get salary regularly.