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2018 DIGILAW 1870 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand v. Shiv Narayan Singh, S/o Late Ramroop Singh

2018-08-16

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, D.N.PATEL

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JUDGMENT : 1. The appellants before us are the State and one of its officers questioning the legality of the judgment of a learned Single Judge decided on 05th October, 2012 directing certain steps to be taken by the State Excise Authorities which might end up in refund of certain sum of money already deposited by the respondent-writ petitioner as excise duty. 2. The respondent-writ petitioner is a wholesale licensee of India Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL). There is dispute on rate of State excise to be levied on the product with which the respondent-writ petitioner deals and admitted position is that there was lowering of duty with effect from 01st July, 2004. The respondent-writ petitioner claims refund of duty which was paid in respect of the stock held by him till the closing hours of 30th June, 2004. 3. Relying on a judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. Ranchi Vrs. The State of Jharkhand and Others [W.P.(C) No. 2812 of 2006] decided on 13th November, 2006, the learned Single Judge held and directed:- “I have heard the counsel for the parties and gone through the relevant materials on record. It appears that the excise duty on beer and IMFL was reduced w.e.f 1.07.2004. Petitioner has annexed documents contained in Annexure-5 showing the verification and inspection of balance stocks of the aforesaid excisable articles remaining in possession of the petitioner after sales hours on 30.6.2004. Petitioner, in the facts and circumstances has sought for refund of excess of the excise duty paid by the petitioner on the aforesaid articles in view of the reduction made in the excise duty pursuant to the Government decision, as contained in Annexure-2 and 2/1 dated 30.06.2004. The contention of the respondents is refuted by the petitioner by submitting that he is seeking refund of only the difference of the excise duty upon such reduction made effective from 1.7.2004 on the balance stocks available with him as on 30.6.2004 after sale hours and not on any stocks which were available with the petitioner on any subsequent date. According to the petitioner, he is holding whole sale license of the said articles continuously from the period in question. According to the petitioner, he is holding whole sale license of the said articles continuously from the period in question. As per the submission of the petitioner any sale of such article after 1.7.2004 has been done only with the permission of the Excise Officials to the licensed retail vendors only against the passes issued by the respondent no.4, Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Dhanbad. All such sale are duly entered in prescribed register in Form 88. In these circumstances, keeping in regard the decision rendered by this Court in W.P.C No. 2812 of 2006 and other cases, respondents are directed to refund the difference amount of excise duty on the stocks of the petitioner as were available on 30.6.2004 after due verification and keeping into regard the documents, which have been relied by the petitioner of such inspection pursuant to the reduction of the excise duty on such articles w.e.f 30.6.2004 or adjust the same against future payment to be made by the petitioner towards excise duty on import fee under the Excise Act and the Rules, thereof, Let the aforesaid exercise be carried out within 3 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The writ petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.” 4. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel for the State seeks to distinguish ratio of the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. (supra) on the ground that the writ petitioner therein had come to this Court in the capacity of distributor and in the instant case, the respondent-writ petitioner is a wholesaler. 5. The stand taken by the State before us is that the respondent- writ petitioner is not entitled to refund on the principle of unjust enrichment relying on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & others Vrs. Union of India & others reported in (1997) 5 SCC 536 . 6. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the writ-petitioner on the other hand submits that the stock on which the refund claimed remained within the premises of the writ petitioner and there was no question of recovery of entire duty element from the consumer. In the judgment under appeal, however, we find that no final direction has been issued. 6. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the writ-petitioner on the other hand submits that the stock on which the refund claimed remained within the premises of the writ petitioner and there was no question of recovery of entire duty element from the consumer. In the judgment under appeal, however, we find that no final direction has been issued. The direction has elements of remand order and liberty has been reserved for the excise authorities to make verification of the records while adjudging the claims of the writ petition. The point on which the appellants sought to distinguish the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. (supra) from the facts of this case has been taken into account by the learned First Court while issuing the direction. 7. In such circumstances, we do not want to invalidate judgment under appeal. But, considering the submission of the State founded on the principle of unjust enrichment, we modify the judgment under appeal and direct the excise authorities to examine the refund claim upon considering the aspect of unjust enrichment in the light of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. (supra), along with the decision in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd. (supra), as has already been directed by the learned First Court. 8. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. 9. Let this exercise be completed by the authority as directed by the learned First Court within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order.