JUDGMENT : SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA, J. 1. Brief facts which are required to be considered are that the petitioner was appointed as a Conductor with the respondent-Corporation on 20.03.1986. On 15.05.2002, the services of the petitioner were terminated on the basis of 14 charge-sheets pending against him and an application was moved for approval of the order of termination under Sec. 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur vide its order dt. 13/12/2010 dismissed the application under Sec. 32(2) (b) of the Act of 1947 whereafter the matter travelled at prelitigation stage before the Rajasthan High Court Legal Services Authority and at the said pre-litigation stage, on 19/11/2011 both the parties entered into conciliation and in terms thereto, a decision was taken for reinstating the petitioner sans back wages with notional financial benefits and continuity of service. His pay was to be fixed as per the present pay-scale and his status was to remain as it was existed at the time of termination. 2. Accordingly, orders were passed by the respondent-corporation reinstating the petitioner on 06/01/2012. The petitioner accordingly joined his duties. 3. The dispute has arisen on account of issuing an order dt. 10/09/2014 under the signatures of the Chief Manager, Vidhyadhar Nagar Depot of the respondent-Corporation at Jaipur whereby all the charge-sheets, which were referred in the original order of termination, have been revived and an enquiry officer has been appointed in all the cases to conduct enquiry against the petitioner. The charges levelled in the said charge-sheets relate to the period from 1990 to 2001. Sixteen cases have been mentioned therein. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the said order as well as the subsequent appointment of the enquiry officer on several grounds. 5. The first submission of counsel for the petitioner is that since the petitioner had entered into a compromise with the respondents leaving all his back wages and actual claims for the intervening period from 2002 upto 2011 and since there was no such clause in the compromise of reviving of the remaining departmental enquiries/charge-sheets, the respondents had no authority in law to re-initiate the departmental proceedings after a period of almost 24 years. It is submitted that the order dt. 15/05/2002 contained the charges as part of the order of termination. The learned Industrial Tribunal had examined the order dt. It is submitted that the order dt. 15/05/2002 contained the charges as part of the order of termination. The learned Industrial Tribunal had examined the order dt. 15/05/2002 and found it to be illegal and accordingly the application moved by the respondent-corporation for approval of the termination under Sec. 33(2)(b) of the Act of 1947 was rejected. No leave was granted by the learned Industrial Tribunal to re-initiate the proceedings for the several charges levelled in the order dt. 15/05/2002. Thus, all the allegations, which find place in the order dt. 15/05/2002, stand merged with the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and with the order passed by the Legal Services Authority of compromise. In the circumstances, the order impugned dt. 10/09/2014 has been passed without authority of law and is arbitrary and unjustified. 6. The second limb of arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to belated initiation of the departmental enquiry. It is submitted that if the respondents had intention to initiate departmental enquiry separately for each charge, it was for them to have conducted the enquiry at that relevant time itself. The charges are with relation to 14 to 24 years back. He relied on the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court in the case of The State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh and Another, AIR 1990 SC 1308 ; State of Punjab and Ors. vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 ; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Radhakishan, AIR 1998 SC 1833 ; M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., P.V. Mahadevan vs. MB., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, AIR 2006 SC 207 ; Jagdev Kumar vs. The State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2000(4) (4 of 6) WLC (Raj.) 61; Ghan Shyam Sharma vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur & Ars., 2009(2) RLW 1078 (Raj.) and in the case of Abdul Hafeej vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors. (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 6284/2002), decided by this Court vide judgment dt. 08.02.2016 to submit that the charges in the charge-sheet, if individually examined, deserve to be quashed on the ground of highly belated. 7. (SB Civil Writ Petition No. 6284/2002), decided by this Court vide judgment dt. 08.02.2016 to submit that the charges in the charge-sheet, if individually examined, deserve to be quashed on the ground of highly belated. 7. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that while it is true that the compromise order does not allow the respondent-corporation to continue with the pending enquiry, however, at the same time he submits that the compromise order is completely silent on this aspect and thus, the respondent corporation had right to continue with the charge-sheets already issued. It is also his submission that this Court would not interfere with the charge-sheets at this stage and relies on the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others vs. Prabhash Chandra Mishra, 2012(11) SCC 565 to submit that writ application does not lie against the charge-sheet or show cause notice as no cause of action arises at that stage. 8. Having heard counsel for both the sides, this Court finds that the petitioner was reinstated in service on the basis of an order passed by the Legal Services Authority keeping in view the spirit of Lok Adalat while deciding the matter at pre-litigation stage. 9. The order passed earlier for termination included the allegation of several charge-sheets having been issued against the petitioner which were fourteen in number. The same chargesheets have been mentioned to some extent in the order impugned and have been revived. Once a competent Court has already examined the order dt. 15.05.2002 of termination which was passed on the charges and charge-sheets and the approval application was rejected, in the opinion of this Court, the action of the respondents of reviving the charge-sheets vide order impugned dt. 10.09.2014 and re-initiating enquiry is an arbitrary action and is thus vitiated in law and it has to be set aside. No authority was existing with the Chief Manager, Vidhyadhar Nagar Depot of the respondent-corporation to initiate enquiry with regard to the charge-sheets already included in the earlier order of 15.05.2002. 10. Having already entered into a compromise with the purpose to reinstate the petitioner, a contrary stand could not have been taken with the purpose to put the order passed by the Legal Services Authority at naught. Such action is nothing but an exploitation and harassment to a workman. 10. Having already entered into a compromise with the purpose to reinstate the petitioner, a contrary stand could not have been taken with the purpose to put the order passed by the Legal Services Authority at naught. Such action is nothing but an exploitation and harassment to a workman. It is also noted that the charges relate to the period from 14 to 24 years back and no purpose would be served to re-examine the said charges after such a long period. 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents with regard to this Court not to interfere at the stage of chargesheet is noted. In ordinary course, writ applications would not lie against a singular charge-sheet or show cause notice as at that stage it cannot be said to be an adverse order. However, taking into consideration that in the present case, the charge-sheets relate to the allegations which were part of the order of termination dt. 15.05.2002, which has already been set aside and the petitioner has been reinstated, the respondents cannot be allowed to re-initiate enquiry on the said charges. Thus viewed, the proceedings initiated by the respondents vide order impugned dt. 10.09.2014 are quashed and set aside. Any further proceedings thereto on the said basis are also quashed and set aside. 12. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.