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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 1877 (HP)

Bliss City Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Krishan Singh

2018-10-31

SURESHWAR THAKUR

body2018
JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. 1. The plaintiffs' case in brief is that the plaintiff is a company constituted under the Companies Act having its head office at SCO 215-216-7, Sector 34- A, Chandigarh. The plaintiff company passed a resolution of 25.12.2012, and, hence authorised its Director Sh. Satish Lal Arora to institute the instant civil suit before this Court, hence, Shri Satish Lal being an authorized person is competent to file the instant suit. It has been averred that the defendant along with other co-sharer is owner in possession of land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No. 1/1 min, Khasra No.227/164 situated in Mauza Kheel Jesli, Pargana Bharlali, District and Tehsil Solan, H.P. It is pleaded that as per jamabandi for the year 2005-2006, the defendant is owner in possession to the extent of 1/3rd of his share measuring about 2-18 bighas. It has been averred that the defendant was interested in selling his share, and, after negotiations and settlement the defendant entered into a formal agreement to sell qua the suit land with the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.50,75,000/-. It has been averred that it was agreed that the purchaser will be at liberty to get the land transferred in its own name or to some other company. It has been further averred that in pursuance to the agreement to sell of 10.02.2012, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.10,50,000/- to the defendant as earnest money, amount whereof duly acknowledged by the defendant. The aforesaid amounts were paid through two different cheques, respectively bearing cheque No.640703 of 10.02.2012 amounting to Rs. Nine Lakhs and cheque No. 640708 of 7.5.2012, amounting to Rs.1,50,000/-. It has been averred that the defendant has also obtained NOC from other co-sharers qua sale of land in favour of the plaintiff or to some other person. It has been averred that as per the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell entered into the plaintiff and the defendant, it was agreed that the balance amount would be paid by the plaintiff at the time of execution of sale deed. It is averred that since the plaintiff being the non agriculturist of the Himachal Pradesh, hence required to obtained necessary registration certificate and permissions under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act before execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff company applied for the requisite registration certificate. It is averred that since the plaintiff being the non agriculturist of the Himachal Pradesh, hence required to obtained necessary registration certificate and permissions under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act before execution of the sale deed. The plaintiff company applied for the requisite registration certificate. However, during the pendency of the same,, unfortunately the H.P. Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 2005 is repealed and hence the application of plaintiff company came to a stand still. The plaintiff company through its authorised person kept on visiting and inquiring about the fate of these pending applications and it was intimated that proposals for the new Act have been almost finalized and is likely to be enacted shortly. The plaintiff company remained under bonafide impression that the new Act would be enacted and requisite permission would be granted in favour of the plaintiff. It has been further averred that the time qua the execution of sale deed was fixed till 31.12.2012. However, owing to repealing of old Act, the plaintiff company could not get itself registered and as such requisite permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act was not issued to it, hence, the sale deed could not be executed. The plaintiff is keen to purchase the suit land, however, due to repealing of the Act, the necessary sanction could not be obtained. Under these compelling circumstances, it has become very difficult to the plaintiff to execute the sale deed and the plaintiff company is circumvented by adverse circumstances, as such, the agreement to sell requires its rectification for enlargement of time for getting the sale deed executed. It has been further averred that the plaintiff company has made many requests to the defendant for modification/rectification of the agreement, and, to enlarge the time for executing of the sale deed, but all in vain. However, the defendant is taking an undue advantage of the compelling circumstances of the plaintiff, and, is intending to grab plaintiffs money being paid as part of sale consideration. It has been averred that the plaintiff is ready and willing to complete transaction of purchase, however, due to the afore circumstances, the sale could not be executed. However, the defendant is taking an undue advantage of the compelling circumstances of the plaintiff, and, is intending to grab plaintiffs money being paid as part of sale consideration. It has been averred that the plaintiff is ready and willing to complete transaction of purchase, however, due to the afore circumstances, the sale could not be executed. Consequently, it has been prayed that a decree be passed for specific performance for rectification of agreement, directing the defendant to rectify the agreement of 10.02.2012 to enlarge the time for further period of three months from the date of enactment of new Act in place of repealed H.P Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 2005 and in the alternative a decree be passed for refund of an amount of Rs.10,50,000/-, amount whereof paid as earnest money to the defendant, along with interest @18% per annum. Hence the suit. 2. The sole defendant, contested the suit, and, filed written statement, wherein he has taken preliminary objections, inter alia, the suit being false, vexatious and being filed with ulterior motives to harass the defendant, cause of action, maintainability, etc. On merits, execution of agreement sell, of 10.02.2012 qua the suit land is admitted. It is also admitted that in pursuance to the agreement to sell of 10.02.2012, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.10,50,000/. It is also admitted that the defendant had obtained NOC from other co-sharer for selling the land in favour of the plaintiff. It is also submitted that in fact he also obtained the NOC from all the co-sharers regarding selling of his hare qua the above said land in favour of the plaintiff, however, the defendant has completed all formalities regarding transfer of the land in favour of the plaintiff within time, and, as per the terms of agreement to sell of 10.02.2012, the defendant had fully co-operated with the plaintiff for this purpose. It is further submitted that at the time of execution of the agreement, it was agreed by the plaintiff that it would pay the balance amount of sale consideration amount to Rs.40,25,000/- at the time of registration of sale deed i.e. on or before 31.12.2012. As per the terms and conditions set out in agreement in para NO.3, it was also decided that the plaintiff would obtain necessary permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, on or before 31.12.2012. As per the terms and conditions set out in agreement in para NO.3, it was also decided that the plaintiff would obtain necessary permission under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, on or before 31.12.2012. The time is the essence of the agreement for the purpose of making of payment to the seller. It is also submitted that it was also agreed that purchaser, who is non agriculturist, shall apply for grant of permission in its favour for getting the above said land transferred in its favour on or before 31.12.2012, and, the seller shall fully corporate with the purchaser in getting such permission and shall provide and make available all the document required for such purpose. It is further submitted that in para No.9 of the agreement to sell, it was also agreed that in case the seller backs out from this agreement in that event the purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement through the process of law or the seller shall be liable to pay the double of the received money to the purchaser, the option shall be that of the purchaser and further in para No.10 of the agreement it was agreed and decided that in case the purchaser backs out from this agreement in that event, amount paid to the seller, as, earnest money, shall be forfeited by the seller, and, the agreement to sell come to an end. The time is the essence of the agreement to sell. It has been pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff has alleged in paragraph No.7 of the plaint that the plaintiff applied for the requisite registration certificate, however, during the pendency of the same unfortunately the H.P. Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 2005 was repealed, and, on inquiry it was intimated that the proposal for new act have bee almost finalised and is likely to be enacted shortly. The aforesaid plea as raised in paragraph No.7 of the plaint by the plaintiff is alleged by the defendant to be totally false and vague and manipulated simply to obtain extension of time of agreement in the alternatively to obtain a decree for recovery of refund of money, however, nowhere the plaintiff company has any intention to get the land transferred in their name because as per the information collected from the office of District Revenue Officer, Solan, by the defendant, it came to his knowledge that no such application has been found to be filed by M/s Bliss City Developers Pvt. Ltd. In their office in the period commencing from February, 2012 to December, 2012 for the grant of permission to purchase land under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy and Lands Reforms Act, 1972. However, the plaintiff company even also nowhere applied regarding registration in the department of Town and Country Planning or HIMUDA regarding registration under the H.P. Apartment and Property Regulation Act, 2005. So, all the contents of the para regarding taking time and extension of agreement are totally false, and, the plaintiff company under the garb of the aforesaid false plea wants to refund of the earnest money along with interest, however, it is not entitled for the aforesaid relief, since the time was the essence of the contract. It has been pleaded that the plaintiff company is itself negligent and has no intention to purchase the property, hence, now by alleging the time consuming process for getting necessary sanction and due to repealing of the Act, same could not be obtained, hence seeking the rectification of the agreement or in the alternative seeking the refund of the earnest money along with interest. It has been pleaded that the time fixed for the execution and registration of the sale deed has already expired, and, the earnest money received towards sale consideration stands forfeited in favour of the defendant, as per condition No.10 of the agreement to sell, hence, the plaintiff company nowhere has any legal right for extension of time for getting the sale deed executed in its favour. In fact, the defendant is a bonafide and genuine person, who obtained all the necessary documents/papers with regard to the execution and registration of sale deed within the time but the plaintiff company itself failed to get the sale deed executed in its favour, even also to contact the defendant and now through this suit the plaintiff company is projecting false excuses. It has been averred that the plaintiff did not even take any single step to perform his part of obligation, rather it left the matter with the State by simply saying that the Act was repealed, if it has any intention to get the sale deed executed in its favour it has to prove as to what steps were taken for the transfer of the land. Owing to the failure of the plaintiff to execute the sale deed within the time prescribed the agreement to sell, the defendant was left with no other option to invoke the clause 10 of the agreement to same, and, the agreement to sell was terminated, fact whereof was also brought to the notice of the plaintiff. Hence, the defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. The plaintiffs herein filed replication to the written statement of the defendant, wherein, it denied the contents of the written statement and re-affirmed and re-asserted the averments, made in the plaint. 4. On the contentious pleadings of the parties, this Court on 20.11.2013, struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of decree for rectification and specific performance of agreement dated 10.02.2012, as prayed for vide prayer clause a? OPP 2. Whether in the alternative, the plaintiff is entitled for refund of advance sale consideration of Rs.10,50,000/- (Rupees Ten Lacs, Fifty Thousand only) along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum? OPP. 3. Whether the suit being totally false, vexatious, frivolous, malafide and having been filed with ulterior motives to harass and humiliate the defendant as alleged, is liable to be dismissed? OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff has no legal, valid enforceable and subsisting cause of action, and, the suit is liable to be dismissed under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and is guilty of concealment of material facts and if so, its effect? OPD. 6. OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff has no legal, valid enforceable and subsisting cause of action, and, the suit is liable to be dismissed under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC? OPD. 5. Whether the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands and is guilty of concealment of material facts and if so, its effect? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 7. Relief. 5. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under:- Issue No.1....... No. Issue No.2........No. Issue No.3........No. Issue No.4........No. Issue No.5....... No. Issue No.6........ No. 7. Relief.......... Suit of plaintiff is dismissed as per the operative portion of the judgment. Reasons for findings. Issues No.1 and 2. 6. Both the aforesaid issues are taken up together for discussion, as they are common in nature besides common evidence thereon, stands, hence adduced by the parties. 7. The apposite agreement to sell is embodied in Ex.PW2/A. In clause 3 whereof, which stands extracted hereinafter:- “3. That the purchaser has paid a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees nine lacs only) to the seller as earnest money through cheque No.640703 dated 10.2.2012 drawn on Allahabad Bank, Kharar Branch, District Mohali, Punjab, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by the seller. The purchaser shall pay a further sum of Rs.1,50,000/- (Rupees one lac fifty thousand only) to the seller on or before 7.4.2012 and the entire remaining amount of Rs.40,25,000/- (Rupees forty lacs twenty five thousand only) would be paid to the seller by the purchaser at the time of execution and registration of sale deed before the Sub Registrar, Solan which shall take place on or before 21.12.2012 during the period the purchaser shall obtain the necessary permission in its favour from the Government of Himachal Pradesh under Section 118 of the H.P. Tenancy & Land Reforms Act, 1972. The time is the essence of this agreement for the purpose of making the payment to the seller.” (a) a specific explicit recital is borne, vis-a-vis, the parties to the contract of sale hence obliging themselves, to, execute the registered deed of conveyance, vis-a-vis, the suit property, before the Sub Registrar concerned, on or before 31.12.2012, (b) and, also the plaintiff/purchaser being obliged thereunder, to, on or before the aforesaid period, obtain the requisite permission, from the authorities concerned, given the plaintiff being a non agriculturist within Himachal Pradesh. Furthermore, clauses 8, 9 and 10, borne in Ex.PW2/A, which stand extracted hereinafter:- “8. That the purchaser who is non agriculturist in the State of Himachal Pradesh shall apply to the State Govt. of H.P. for grant of permission in its favour for getting the above said land transferred in its favour on or before 31.12.2012 and the seller shall fully cooperate with the purchaser in getting such permission and shall execute, submit, provide and make available all the documents required for such purpose. 9. That in case the seller backs out from this agreement in that event the purchaser shall be entitled to enforce this agreement through the process of law by way of specific performance of the agreement and/or the seller shall be liable pay double of the received money to the purchaser. The option shall be that of the purchaser. 10. That in case the purchaser backs out from this agreement in that event the amount paid to the seller as earnest money or to be paid later on shall stand forfeited and this agreement shall come to an end. The option shall be that of the purchaser. 10. That in case the purchaser backs out from this agreement in that event the amount paid to the seller as earnest money or to be paid later on shall stand forfeited and this agreement shall come to an end. The time is the essence of this agreement.” (a) carry recitals, whereunder, a contractual obligation stands cast, upon, the defendant to ensure, his performing, his part, of, the apt contractual obligation, (b) and a right is reserved, vis-a-vis, the plaintiff, that in case the defendant fails to perform his part of obligation, it being entitled to enforce the agreement to sell, in, accordance with law, (c) or in the alternative the defendant/seller being amenable to pay double, the, earnest money paid to him by the plaintiff, in contemporaneity, to, the uncontroverted valid execution, of, EX.PW2/A. However, in clause 10 of Ex.PW2/A, a recital is borne qua, upon, the purchaser breaching his apposite contractual obligation, thereupon, the amount of earnest money paid, vis-avis, the defendant by the plaintiff, in, contemporaneity to the execution of EX.PW2/A, being liable for forfeiture by the defendant/seller, and, the agreement also coming to an end, besides it is mentioned with explicity therein qua the contractually prescribed time being the essence of the contract. 8. The execution of Ex.PW2/A occurred, on 10.02.2012, and, the prescribed time for, the, completest execution, of, the registered sale deed, visa- vis, the suit property, is, contractually agreed by the contesting parties, to, imperatively occur on or before 31.12.2012. However, before expiry of the afore period, the plaintiff, on 29.12.2012, rather instituted the instant suit before this Court, (i) wherein, it has espoused the relief for specific performance of contract of sale. It has also claimed therein, the, relief qua the time specified, in, the afore agreement to sell, being the essence of the contract, hence, being decreed to be rectified. Bearing in mind the afore extracted recitals borne in Ex.PW2/A, and, with the plaintiff instituting the suit, before the expiry of the apposite period, as, echoed with explicity in Ex.PW2/A, it is further enjoined to be determined, from the evidence, (ii) whether the plaintiff or the defendant, hence, derelicted in performing their respective part(s) of, the, apt contractual obligations, as, encumbered upon them, under Ex.PW2/A. 9. However, before making the afore strivings, it is also deemed imperative to bear in mind, the expostulation of law borne, in, a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in a case titled as Gomathinayagam Pillai and others vs. Palaniswami Nadar, reported in AIR 1967 SC 868 , (i) expostulation of law whereof appertains, to, a construction being meted, vis-a-vis, the recital(s) borne in the apt contract of sale, and, as, explicitly pronounce qua time being the essence of the contract, and, theirs being hence construable nor not, to be the essence of the contract, and, stand(s) carried in paragraph No.4 thereof, para whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “4. The facts which have a material bearing on the first question have already been set out. Section 55 of the Contract Act which deals with the consequences of failure to perform an executory contract at or before the stipulated time provides by the first paragraph: "When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promise if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract." It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in language which is unmistakable : it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the, essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, ILR 40 BOM 289: ( AIR 1915 PC 83 ) the Judicial Committee -of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying S. 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those which obtained under the law of England as regards contracts for sale of land. The Judicial Committee observed : "Under that law equity, which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time. . . . Their Lordships are of opinion that this is the doctrine which the section of the Indian Statute adopts and embodies in reference to sales of land. It may be stated concisely in the language used by Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas (1867) L. R. 3 Ch. 61:- "The construction is, and must be, in equity the same as in a Court of law. A Court of equity will indeed relieve against, and enforce, specific performance, notwithstanding a failure to keep the dates assigned by the contract, either for completion, or for the steps towards completion, if it can do justice between the parties, and if (as Lord Justice Turner said in Roberts v. Berry (1853) 3 De G. M. & G. 284), there is nothing in the 'express stipulations between the parties, the nature of the property, or the surrounding circumstances,' which would make it inequitable to interfere with and modify the legal right. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract. of the three grounds mentioned by Lord Justice Turner express stipulations' requires no comment. The 'nature of the property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. The 'surrounding circumstances' must depend on the facts of each particular case." Their Lordships will add to the statement just quoted these observations. The special jurisdiction of equity to disregard the letter of the contract in ascertaining what the parties to the contract are to be taken as having really and in substance intended as regards the time of its performance may be excluded by any plainly expressed stipulation. But to have this effect the language of the stipulation must show that the intention was to make the rights of the parties depend on the observance of the time limits prescribed in a fashion which is unmistakable. The language will have this effect if it plainly excludes the notion that these time limits were of merely secondary importance in the bargain, and that to disregard them would be to disregard nothing that lay as its foundation. "Prima facie, equity treats the importance of such time limits as being subordinate to the main purpose of the parties, and it will enjoin specific performance notwithstanding that from the point of view of a Court of Law the contract has not been literally performed by the plaintiff as regards the time limit specified." (p.870-871) The apt recital in a contract of sale, vis-a-vis, time being essence of the contract, and, upon breach thereof being made by the plaintiff, the latter being disentitled, to, claim the relief of specific performance, of contract of sale, (i) stands, propounded therein, to be, imperatively borne or stand couched, in, an unmistakable language, and, any inference(s), vis-a-vis, the afore factum, being derivable from the conduct, and, the circumstances prevailing thereat or before the contract. Furthermore, in paragraph No.5, of, Gomathinayagam Pillai case (supra), para whereof stands extracted hereinafter, it is also prescribed therein, that, the mere fixation of a period, within, which the contract is to be performed, rather not making, the stipulation qua the contractually prescribed time, rather, being the essence of the contract, rather obviously import thereof being garnered, from the afore twin conditions, being rather dis-proven, by, the plaintiff. Paragraph No.5 of the case supra, reads as under:- “5. The Trial Court relied upon three circumstances in support of its conclusion that time was of the essence of the contract of sale : (i) though no time was prescribed by the oral agreement, in the agreements writing dated April 4, 1959 and April 15, 1959 there were definite stipulations fixing dates for performance of the contract; (ii) that the second and the third agreements contained clauses which imposed penalties upon the party guilty of default; and (iii) that appellants 1 & 2 were in urgent need of money and it was to meet their pressing need that they desired to effect sale of the property. But the agreements dated April 4 and April 15 do not express in unmistakable language that time was to be of the essence and existence of the default clause will not necessarily evidence such intention. Fixation of the period, within which the contract is to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time of the essence of the contract. It is true that appellants 1 & 2 were badly in need of money, but they had secured Rs. 3006/- from the respondent and had presumably tided over their difficulties at least temporarily. There is no evidence that when the respondent did not advance the full consideration they made other arrangements for securing funds for their immediate needs. Intention to make time of the essence of the contract may be evidenced by either express stipulations or by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the ordinary presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulations as to time are not of the essence. In the present case there is no express stipulation, and the circumstances are not such as to indicate that it was the intention of the parties that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. It is true that even if time was not originally of the essence, the appellants could by notice served upon the respondent call upon him to take the conveyance within the time fixed and intimate that in default of compliance with the requisition the contract will be treated as cancelled. It is true that even if time was not originally of the essence, the appellants could by notice served upon the respondent call upon him to take the conveyance within the time fixed and intimate that in default of compliance with the requisition the contract will be treated as cancelled. As observed in Stickney v. Keeble, 1915 AC 386 where in a contract for the sale of land the time fixed for completion is not made of the essence of the contract, but the vendor has been guilty of unnecessary delay, the purchaser may serve upon the vendor a notice limiting a time at the expiration of which he will treat the contract as at an end. In the present case appellants 1 & 2 have served no such notice; by their letter dated July 30, 1959 they treated the contract as at an end. If the respondent was otherwise qualified to obtain a decree, for specific performance, his right could not be determined by the letter of appellants 1 & 2.” (p.871-872) 10. Nowat, the afore extracted apposite recitals borne in Ex.PW2/A, do, with, in, explicit and unmistakable language, make clear, open, and, candid bespeaking(s) qua time being the essence of the contract. However, if subsequent thereto, the, parties yet evinced conduct, (i) wherefrom it may be inferable, qua, the apt time standing impliedly extended or the party claiming the relief, of, specific performance not either intentionally and deliberately, rather breaching any part of the apt contractual obligation(s) cast upon him or it, (ii) thereupon, the relief of specific performance of contract, vis-a-vis, the hereat immovable property, being not permissible to be undenied, to the plaintiff. However, when as aforestated, the plaintiff is a non agriculturist within Himachal Pradesh, (iii) and, when it was contractually enjoined, to, within, the time prescribed therein, to, obtain the requisite statutory permission, from, the authorities concerned, (iv) yet when PW-2, the authorised Director of the plaintiff's company, in his cross-examination rather disclosing qua the requisite permission neither being applied for, nor obtained, and, when the afore omissions, are not, proven to occur on account, of, any dereliction on the part of the defendant, (v) thereupon, given the unmistakability, of, language, as, carried in the apt recital, recital whereof, hence, prescribes the time, where within the contract of sale, is enjoined to be performed, hence, is to be given, the, apt deepest reverence. Moreso, when concomitantly the plaintiff deliberately or intentionally omitted, to, perform the aforesaid apt obligation, and, also failed to obtain the requisite peremptory permission, vis-a-vis, the apt entity, than, the one qua which, it, had obtained, the, inapt registration certificate, certificate whereof borne in Ex.PW1/A, (vi) besides when the afore registration certificate, does not, per se authorise, the plaintiff to, a, seek declaratory relief, of, specific performance of contract of sale, borne in Ex.PW2/A. 11. Be that as it may, with the plaintiff seeking the relief of rectification of the apt portion, of, the contract of sale, borne in Ex.PW2/A, whereunder, time is prescribed to be the essence of the contract, also enables, this Court to foist an inference qua the plaintiff acquiescing qua time being the essence of the contract, (I) and, also its acquiescing qua the afore omission being both deliberate or intentional, (ii) hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief as prayed for, and, furthermore the, claim, for, forfeiture of the earnest money, reared by the seller, does not, suffer from any legal fallacy, emphasizingly, given the contractually prescribed time being the essence of the agreement. Consequently, both issues No.1 and 2 are answered in favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff. More so when no counterclaim, for compensation is reared by the defendant. Issue No.3 and 4. 12. No evidence exists on record to show that as to how the suit is totally false, vexatious, frivolous and having been filed with ulterior motives to harass and humiliate the defendant or that as to how the plaintiff has no legal, valid and enforceable cause of action, and, that as to how the suit is liable to be dismissed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC, hence, both the aforesaid issues are decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Issue Nos. 5 and 6: 13. There exists no evidence on record to show that as to how the plaintiffs have not come to this Court with clean hand, and, that as to how the suit is not maintainable in the present form, hence, issues No. 5 and 6 are decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Relief. 14. In sequel to findings on issues aforesaid, the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. No costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. All pending applications also stand disposed of.