JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. 1. The plaintiffs' case in brief is that the defendant is owner of seven plots of land measuring 9 bighas 9 biswas comprised in Khasra No.346, 347, 397, 828/399/1, 829/399/2, 400 and 409, situated, at Mauja Sheel, Tehsil and District Solan, H.P. The defendant also alleged to own Khasra No.398, measuring 16 biswas in Mauja Sheel. It has been pleaded that the deceased defendant Shayam Dutt agreed to sell above mentioned 8 plots of land, measuring 10 bighas, 5 biswas to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rs.51,60,000/- . The agreement of sale was duly executed and signed by the parties on 19th October, 2005 incorporating the terms and conditions mutually agreed by the parties. It has been pleaded that defendant on 25th September, 2005 agreed to sell the land mentioned above alongwith some other land for a total consideration of Rs.52,00,000/- only to the plaintiff but the plaintiff later on, realizing that the defendant had no authority on behalf of his nephew Shri Chander Dutt to sell his land, therefore, asked the defendant to enter into an agreement to sale for the land owned and possessed by him. On 25th September, 2005, in pursuance to the agreement to sale, defendant received from the plaintiff a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- on as advance towards the sale consideration which at that time was agreed to be Rs.52,00,000/-. Defendant duly executed the receipt acknowledging his receiving a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- from the plaintiff in the presence of the witness. However, later on the defendant agreed to sell the aforesaid land to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.51,60,000/- only excluding the area of 7 biswas belonging to his nephew Shri Chander Dutt as well as 1 bighas 18 biswas which was Shamlat land. It has been pleaded that the defendant on day of executing and signing the agreement of sale of 19th October, 2005, received a further sum of Rs.10,00,000/- only, through cheque No.171668 of 10th October, 2005, drawn at the Bhagat Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd., Solan towards the agreed sale consideration which was duly encashed by the defendant. The defendant in the said agreement of sale also acknowledged his having already received a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- earlier to the date of agreement of the agreement to sell. The defendant in the said agreement of sale also acknowledged his having already received a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- earlier to the date of agreement of the agreement to sell. Thus, out of total sale consideration of Rs.51,60,000/-, defendants has received from the plaintiff a sum of Rs.12,00,000/- towards the sale consideration. The balance amount of sale consideration i.e. Rs.39,60,000/- was agreed to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiff at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed before the Sub Registrar. It has been pleaded that in pursuance to the agreement to sell, the plaintiff was put in possession of the land agreed to be sold with a right to develop the said land and change nature thereof. It is averred though at the time of execution of the agreement to sell, the defendant agreed to execute and get registered the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a period of six months but for the reasons best known to him, the defendant neither executed sale deed nor got the same registered. The defendant had been putting off the plaintiff on one pretext or the other, who had been making repeated request to the defendant to complete the transaction of sale by receiving the balance amount of sale consideration. The time was not intended to be the essence of the contract. The plaintiff was and has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract to pay the balance amount of sale consideration but the defendant had been putting off the matter on one pretext or the other and failed to abide by the terms of the agreement to sell. It has been pleaded that in the month of March, 2008, the plaintiff came to know that the defendant has started negotiating for the sale of the land agreed to be sold to the plaintiff, hence, the plaintiff requested the defendant to complete the sale transaction but the defendant did not accede to the request of the plaintiff. The plaintiff under compelling circumstances was constrained to issue a legal notice dated 24th March, 2008 to the defendant calling upon him to receive the balance amount of sale consideration and execute the the registered deed of conveyance on or before 28th April, 2008. The plaintiff under compelling circumstances was constrained to issue a legal notice dated 24th March, 2008 to the defendant calling upon him to receive the balance amount of sale consideration and execute the the registered deed of conveyance on or before 28th April, 2008. It has been pleaded that the plaintiff was present on 28th April, 2008 in the office of Sub Registrar, Solan along with the balance amount of sale consideration but the defendant did not turn up for the reasons best known to him. The defendant instead of comply with the request made by plaintiff through notice of 24th March, 2008, sent a reply taking a false and baseless stand dying the very execution of a agreement of sale. The intention of the defendant seem to have become dishonest and the defendant is trying to sell the property agreed to be sold through the agreement to sell of 19th October, 2005 to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, who had always been ready and will to perform his part of the contract has been deceived by the defendant, who has retained the amount of advance and has backed out of the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell without any justifiable cause. Cause of action stated to have arisen to the plaintiff on 25th September, 2005 when the defendant has received a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- as advance by agreement to sell the suit land to the plaintiff, thereafter alleged to arose on 19th October, 2005, when the formal agreement to sell was duly executed and defendant received a further sum of Rs.10,00,000/- as part of the sale consideration. Further the cause of action, thereafter arose one each date of demand made by the plaintiff to the defendant and the failure on the part of the defendant to comply with the request of the plaintiff to complete the transaction of sale. The cause of action further arose tot he plaintiff on 24th March, 2008, when the legal notice was got served upon the defendant, and, cause of action further arose on 28th April, 2008, the date fixed by the plaintiff for execution and registration of the sale deed as per legal notice, and, it is still continuing hence the suit is within the period of limitation. 2. 2. The sole defendant, contested the suit, and, filed written statement, wherein he has taken preliminary objections, inter alia, that in face the alleged agreement of 19.10.2005 was not a legal agreement since the same was not executed between the parties in a lawful manner, as, the defendant who is an illiterate person was made to sign the said agreement by the plaintiff on an understanding that the sale consideration would be as per the market value prevailing at the time of sale but the plaintiff had filled up amount of consideration as per his sweet will and that the suit is maintainable in the present form as the time was an essence of the agreement and since the plaintiff has failed to get the sale deed executed within the prescribed period, therefore, he has got no cause of action and the suit deserves to be dismissed. 3. On merits, the execution of agreement not denied. However, it is submitted that the defendant being an illiterate person was not knowing regarding the amount mentioned in the agreement by way of sale consideration, however, the replying defendant offered the plaintiff that if he desired, he could have taken back the earnest money paid by him to the defendant or to get the sale deed registered strictly as per the agreement i.e. within six months from the date of execution of the agreement which is clearly mentioned in clause-9 of the agreement. It has been submitted that the plaintiff, who is basically a property dealer was never interested to purchase the land for himself. He had executed the agreement with intention that as and when he gets more consideration from some person, he will get the sale deed registered in the name of that person and this way, he would be able to earn handsome amount out of that sale consideration, but since the plaintiff was not able to get any such better buyer and he had no money with him to pay by way of sale consideration to the defendant, he could not come forward to get the sale registered. It is denied that the plaintiff making any request to the defendant for execution of the registered sale deed, rather on the other hand, it is the defendant who has been making requests to the plaintiff to fulfill his part of the contract by making the balance payment of sale consideration and to get the sale deed executed within the prescribed period as mentioned in the agreement to sell. It is also denied that the defendant had been putting off the matter on one pretext or the other rather it is submitted that the defendant was always ready and willing to fulfill the contract as per the agreement. The defendant remained making request to the plaintiff to perform his part of contract but the plaintiff was never ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he failed to perform his part of contract resulting in the forfeiture of the agreement as well as the earnest money. It is also denied that the plaintiff was put in possession the suit land. The defendant has never parted with the possession of the suit land and the suit land is in the ownership and possession of the defendant. It is denied that in the month of March, 2008, the defendant had started negotiation for the sale of the suit land and that the plaintiff requested the defendant to complete the sale transaction and the defendant did not accede to the request of the plaintiff. It is submitted that the defendant was surprised to receive a notice of 24.3.2008 issued on behalf of the plaintiff calling upon him to get the sale deed executed in his favour, but since the agreement itself become non-executable in the eyes of law after expiry of six months from the date of its execution, therefore, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to ask the defendant or execution of the sale deed. It is submitted that the agreement came to an end after completion of six months from the date of its agreement and thereafter, there was no agreement or relationship of any kind including proposed purchaser and proposed seller inter se the parties at contest, and, as per the terms and conditions of the agreement, the earnest money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant automatically stood forfeited and the defendant has got no right whatsoever to demand either the earnest money or to ask the defendant for the execution of sale deed qua the suit land. With the afore averments, the defendant prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. On the contentious pleadings of the parties, this Court on 31.08.2009 struck the following issues inter-se the parties at contest:- 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of specific performance, as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the agreement was executed in the manner as alleged by the defendant in paras 5 and 8 of the written statement, if so its effect? OPD. 4. Whether the time was the essence of the agreement, and, if it is proved so whether the agreement dated 19.10.2005 has become redundant after the expiry of the time fixed for its execution? OPD. 5. Whether no cause of action arises in favour of the plaintiff to file the present suit? OPD. 6. Whether the suit is not maintainable due to wrong valuation and wrong valuation of the court fee? OPD. 7. Relief. 5. For the reasons to be recorded hereinafter, my findings on the aforesaid issues are as under:- Issue No.1....... No. Issue No.2........No. Issue No.3........Redundant Issue No.4........Yes. Issue No.5....... Yes. Issue No.6........ No. 7. Relief.......... Suit of the plaintiff is dismissed as per the operative portion of the judgment. Reasons for findings. Issues No.1, 2 and3. 6. All the aforesaid issues are taken up together for discussion, as they are common in nature besides common evidence thereon, stands, hence adduced by the parties. 7. The apposite agreement to sell is embodied in Ex.PW2/B. In clauses 9 & 10 thereof, clauses whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “9. Reasons for findings. Issues No.1, 2 and3. 6. All the aforesaid issues are taken up together for discussion, as they are common in nature besides common evidence thereon, stands, hence adduced by the parties. 7. The apposite agreement to sell is embodied in Ex.PW2/B. In clauses 9 & 10 thereof, clauses whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “9. That the purchaser shall pay the balance amount to the seller within six months from today and shall get the sale deed executed and registered his favour or in favour of his nominee. In case the purchaser fails to make the balance payment to the seller and also fails to get the sale deed executed and registered in his favour, in that event the earnest money paid today to the seller shall stand forfeited and this agreement shall come to an end. 10. That in case the seller backs out from the agreement as detailed above in all respects, i.e., if he fails to execute and get the sale deed registered in favour of the purchaser or his nominee, in that event the purchaser shall be entitled to get the sale deed registered in his favour through the court of law and/or the seller shall be liable to pay three times of the earnest money to the purchaser. The option shall be that of the purchaser.” (a) a specific explicit covenant is borne therein, vis-avis, the plaintiff standing obliged, to, vis-a-vis, the seller hence pay balance amount of sale consideration, within, six months from the date of execution of Ex.PW2/B; (b) AND, thereupon, the defendant/seller being obliged to execute the registered deed of conveyance, vis-a-vis, the suit property; (c) upon, failure of the purchaser to make the payment, of, the balance sale consideration to the seller/defendant, within, the afore period, and, upon, failure of the plaintiff, to, execute the registered of conveyance, thereupon, the seller/defendant being entitled to forfeit, the, earnest money paid to him, and, in sequel, the contract of sale, ipso facto, hence, standing terminated or, it, coming to an end; (d) upon the seller reneging, from, the afore contractual obligation(s), thereupon, the purchaser being bestowed with an entitlement, to, obtain the registration of the sale deed, through, process of law, or the seller being contractually obliged, to, pay three times, of, the earnest money, to, the purchaser. The bestowal of the afore contractual discretion/options, upon, the plaintiff/purchaser, rather accruing, upon, apt breaches being committed by the seller, hence for, their apt recoursing(s) by him. 8. The execution of Ex.PW2/B, occurred on 19th October, 2005, (i) and, an incisive perusal, of, the afore extracted clauses, borne therein, unravel qua upon failure of the purchaser, to, liquidate the balance sale consideration to the seller, within, six months, from, the date of execution of Ex.PW2/B, (ii) and, his concomitant failure to get the sale deed executed, and, registered, vis-a-vis, the suit property, thereupon, it being covenanted therein, qua, the apt agreement ipso facto, rather coming to an end. The afore extracted clauses, prima facie beget a conclusion qua hence rather time being, the, essence of the contract. However. the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, has, contended with much vigour, while making much dependence, upon, Ex.PW2/F, exhibit whereof, comprises, a, reply meted by the defendant, to the plaintiff's notice, borne in Ex. PW2/E, issued upon him on 24th March, 2008, (iii) to contend that even if, the aforesaid notice stood belatedly issued, since the expiry of the period prescribed in the agreement to sell, where within, the registered deed of conveyance rather stood enjoined to be executed by the plaintiff, vis-a-vis, the suit property, with the defendant/seller, (iv) yet with clause No. (2) of Ex.PW2/F also containing, a, recital (a) qua the defendant/seller immediately subsequent, to the execution of Ex.PW2/B, offering to return, the, earnest money to the plaintiff, given, the total sale consideration qua the suit property, being a gross undervaluation, and, (b) his also voicing therein, through, his counsel, that the agreement not coming into existence, and, thereupon, the question of performance of contract, not, arising, (c) obviously facilitate him, to, rear a contention, that, the defendant/seller merely for inadequacy, and, insufficiency, of, sale consideration, hence, being unwilling to execute, and, register the deed of conveyance, vis-a-vis, the suit property, (d) and, also hence, the afore recital borne in Ex.PW 2/F, being connotative, of, implied extension of time, as, stands recited with explicitly, in Ex.PW2/B. The further sequel qua the contractually fixed time of six months, since, the drawing of the agreement, being not, the, essence of the contract, and, rather the defendant/seller, being, estopped to contend, that, time being the essence of the contract of sale. 9. 9. Bearing in mind the afore extracted recitals borne in Ex.PW2/A, (a) it is enjoined to be determined whether the recitals borne in the reply to notice, reply whereof, stands, embodied in Ex.PW2/F, (b) and, with the plaintiff instituting the instant suit, belatedly, since the drawing, of, the, agreement to sell, and, with specific afore echoing(s) rather occurring therein qua, upon, expiry of six months, since the drawing of Ex.PW2/A, (c) AND his not prima facie making any endeavour, with, the afore span, for insisting upon the defendant, to, execute the registered deed of conveyance, vis-a-vis, the suit khasra numbers, rather his belatedly since the drawing of the agreement, hence, in the year 2008, under, notice borne in Ex.PW2/E, rather, entailing upon the defendant/seller to execute the registered deed of conveyance, an adjudication, is, enjoined to be meted, whether time being the essence, of, the apt agreement to sell. 10. However, before making the afore strivings, it is also deemed imperative to bear in mind, the expostulation of law borne, in, a verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in a case titled as Gomathinayagam Pillai and others vs. Palaniswami Nadar, reported in AIR 1967 SC 868 , (i) expostulation of law whereof appertains, to, a construction being meted, vis-a-vis, the recital(s) borne in the apt contract of sale, and, as, explicitly pronounce qua time being the essence of the contract, and, theirs being hence construable nor not, to be the essence of the contract, and, stands carried in paragraph No.4 thereof, para whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “4. The facts which have a material bearing on the first question have already been set out. The facts which have a material bearing on the first question have already been set out. Section 55 of the Contract Act which deals with the consequences of failure to perform an executory contract at or before the stipulated time provides by the first paragraph: "When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promise if the intention of the parties was that time should be of the essence of the contract." It is not merely because of specification of time at or before which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to be done and default in compliance therewith, that the other party may avoid the contract. Such an option arises only if it is intended by the parties that time is of the essence of the contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in writing, must be in language which is unmistakable : it may also be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to be sold, conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at or before the contract. Specific performance of a contract will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the, essence of the contract. Mere incorporation in the written agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of default does not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence. In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, ILR 40 BOM 289: ( AIR 1915 PC 83 ) the Judicial Committee -of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying S. 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those which obtained under the law of England as regards contracts for sale of land. In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji Dhunjibhai, ILR 40 BOM 289: ( AIR 1915 PC 83 ) the Judicial Committee -of the Privy Council observed that the principle underlying S. 55 of the Contract Act did not differ from those which obtained under the law of England as regards contracts for sale of land. The Judicial Committee observed : "Under that law equity, which governs the rights of the parties in cases of specific performance of contracts to sell real estate, looks not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement in order to ascertain whether the parties, notwithstanding that they named a specific time within which completion was to take place, really and in substance intended more than that it should take place within a reasonable time. . . . Their Lordships are of opinion that this is the doctrine which the section of the Indian Statute adopts and embodies in reference to sales of land. It may be stated concisely in the language used by Lord Cairns in Tilley v. Thomas (1867) L. R. 3 Ch. 61:- "The construction is, and must be, in equity the same as in a Court of law. A Court of equity will indeed relieve against, and enforce, specific performance, notwithstanding a failure to keep the dates assigned by the contract, either for completion, or for the steps towards completion, if it can do justice between the parties, and if (as Lord Justice Turner said in Roberts v. Berry (1853) 3 De G. M. & G. 284), there is nothing in the 'express stipulations between the parties, the nature of the property, or the surrounding circumstances,' which would make it inequitable to interfere with and modify the legal right. This is what is meant, and all that is meant, when it is said that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract. of the three grounds mentioned by Lord Justice Turner express stipulations' requires no comment. The 'nature of the property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. The 'surrounding circumstances' must depend on the facts of each particular case." Their Lordships will add to the statement just quoted these observations. of the three grounds mentioned by Lord Justice Turner express stipulations' requires no comment. The 'nature of the property' is illustrated by the case of reversions, mines, or trades. The 'surrounding circumstances' must depend on the facts of each particular case." Their Lordships will add to the statement just quoted these observations. The special jurisdiction of equity to disregard the letter of the contract in ascertaining what the parties to the contract are to be taken as having really and in substance intended as regards the time of its performance may be excluded by any plainly expressed stipulation. But to have this effect the language of the stipulation must show that the intention was to make the rights of the parties depend on the observance of the time limits prescribed in a fashion which is unmistakable. The language will have this effect if it plainly excludes the notion that these time limits were of merely secondary importance in the bargain, and that to disregard them would be to disregard nothing that lay as its foundation. "Prima facie, equity treats the importance of such time limits as being subordinate to the main purpose of the parties, and it will enjoin specific performance notwithstanding that from the point of view of a Court of Law the contract has not been literally performed by the plaintiff as regards the time limit specified." (p.870-871) The apt recital in a contract of sale, vis-a-vis, time being essence of the contract, and, upon breach thereof being made by the plaintiff, the latter being disentitled, to, claim the relief of specific performance, of contract of sale, (i) stands, propounded therein, to be, imperatively borne or stand couched in an unmistakable language, and, any inference(s), vis-a-vis, the afore factum, being derivable from the conduct, and, the circumstances prevailing thereat or before the contract. Furthermore, in paragraph No.5, of, Gomathinayagam Pillai case (supra), para whereof stands extracted hereinafter, it is also prescribed therein, that, the mere fixation of a period, within, which the contract is to be performed, rather not making, the stipulation qua the contractually prescribed time, rather, being the essence of the contract, rather obviously import thereof being garnered, from the afore twin conditions, being rather dis-proven/proven, by, the plaintiff. Paragraph No.5 of the case supra, reads as under:- “5. Paragraph No.5 of the case supra, reads as under:- “5. The Trial Court relied upon three circumstances in support of its conclusion that time was of the essence of the contract of sale : (i) though no time was prescribed by the oral agreement, in the agreements writing dated April 4, 1959 and April 15, 1959 there were definite stipulations fixing dates for performance of the contract; (ii) that the second and the third agreements contained clauses which imposed penalties upon the party guilty of default; and (iii) that appellants 1 & 2 were in urgent need of money and it was to meet their pressing need that they desired to effect sale of the property. But the agreements dated April 4 and April 15 do not express in unmistakable language that time was to be of the essence and existence of the default clause will not necessarily evidence such intention. Fixation of the period, within which the contract is to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time of the essence of the contract. It is true that appellants 1 & 2 were badly in need of money, but they had secured Rs. 3006/- from the respondent and had presumably tided over their difficulties at least temporarily. There is no evidence that when the respondent did not advance the full consideration they made other arrangements for securing funds for their immediate needs. Intention to make time of the essence of the contract may be evidenced by either express stipulations or by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the ordinary presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulations as to time are not of the essence. In the present case there is no express stipulation, and the circumstances are not such as to indicate that it was the intention of the parties that time was intended to be of the essence of the contract. It is true that even if time was not originally of the essence, the appellants could by notice served upon the respondent call upon him to take the conveyance within the time fixed and intimate that in default of compliance with the requisition the contract will be treated as cancelled. It is true that even if time was not originally of the essence, the appellants could by notice served upon the respondent call upon him to take the conveyance within the time fixed and intimate that in default of compliance with the requisition the contract will be treated as cancelled. As observed in Stickney v. Keeble, 1915 AC 386 where in a contract for the sale of land the time fixed for completion is not made of the essence of the contract, but the vendor has been guilty of unnecessary delay, the purchaser may serve upon the vendor a notice limiting a time at the expiration of which he will treat the contract as at an end. In the present case appellants 1 & 2 have served no such notice; by their letter dated July 30, 1959 they treated the contract as at an end. If the respondent was otherwise qualified to obtain a decree, for specific performance, his right could not be determined by the letter of appellants 1 & 2.” (p.871-872) 11. Furthermore, the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in, a judgment rendered in a case titled, as, Chand Rani (dead) by LRs. v. Smt. Kamal Rani (dead) by LRs., reported in AIR 1993 SC 1742 , has, vis-a-vis, the afore trite conundrum, also, settled the clear expostulation of law, hence, bearing consonance with the verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Gomathinayagam Pillai's case (supra). However, in supplement, to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in, Gomathinayagam Pillai case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, in, Chand Rani's case (supra) had enjoined qua apt discernments rather being made by courts of law, not only, vis-a-vis, the apt time being essence, of, the contract, but also vis-a-vis, the plaintiff being ready and willing, to, perform his/her part of contractual obligation. In Chand Rani's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, upon, a, conjoint application, of, the aforesaid principles, vis-a-vis, the facts, and, evidence prevailing thereat, (i) had, hence, concluded that both, time being, the, essence of the contract, and, with there being unreadiness, and, unwillingness, of the breaching/derelicting plaintiff, to perform her part of contractual obligation(s), hence, within, the covenanted period/time, (ii) thereupon, the fixation of time qua sale being readable, rather as time being, the essence of contract. Upon the afore submission addressed before this Court, by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, hence, the expostulation of law, borne in the judgments (supra) rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, warrant(s) application. 12. Nowat, the afore extracted apposite recitals borne in Ex.PW2/B, do, with, in, explicit, and, unmistakable language, make clear, open, and, candid bespeaking(s) qua time being the essence of the contract. However, if subsequent thereto, the, parties yet evinced conduct, (i) wherefrom it may be inferable, qua, the apt time standing impliedly extended or the party claiming the relief, of, specific performance, not, either intentionally and deliberately, rather breaching any part of the apt contractual obligation(s), cast upon him or it, (ii) thereupon, the relief of specific performance of contract, vis-a-vis, the hereat immovable property, being not permissible, rather to be undenied, to the plaintiff. However, even though, the counsel for the plaintiff, has, vigorously assayed to make a vehement contention before this Court, (i) that, with the defendant in his reply to the legal notice issued, upon, him, reply whereof stands borne in Ex.PW2/F, hence making clear bespeaking(s) qua, his, in sequel to the drawing of Ex.PW2/B, rather his making, an, offer to the plaintiff, for the apt refund to him, of, the amount paid to him, as earnest money, and, also his making a complete denial, of, the execution of the agreement to sell, borne in Ex.PW2/B, (ii) however, his further espousal qua thereupon the defendant/seller, openly breaching the contractual obligation(s), as, encumbered upon him, and, also hence his being estopped to contend, that, time being the essence of the contract, yet, cannot be availed by him. The reason, for, forming the aforesaid conclusion, arises, from the factum (a) that in consonance with the verdict pronounced by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Chand Rani's case (supra), it, was rather incumbent, upon, the plaintiff to show his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the apt contractual obligation(s), within, the time fixed therein. The reason, for, forming the aforesaid conclusion, arises, from the factum (a) that in consonance with the verdict pronounced by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Chand Rani's case (supra), it, was rather incumbent, upon, the plaintiff to show his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the apt contractual obligation(s), within, the time fixed therein. (b) Even if, the counsel for the plaintiff contends that any conclusion qua unmistakability, of, couching, of, language, vis-a-vis, the period, within span whereof, the registered deed of conveyance, vis-a-vis, the suit khasra number, is to occur, enjoins also eruption, of, evidence (c) in consonance with the verdict(supra), rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chand Rani's case, (d) vis-a-vis, the conduct of the buyer, and, of the purchaser, and, the circumstances prevailing in simultaneity, vis-a-vis, the contractually specified time or subsequent thereto, (e) also being the relevant, and, material parameter, for determining, whether there is, hence deemed, implied extension of time, (f) and, hence, the parties being barred to insist, upon, the relevant deference being meted qua any clause existing in the contract, of, sale, where within, even in unmistakable language, a, specific time is prescribed, and, for further determining qua, hence time being the essence of the contract. However, the aforesaid submission, cannot be accepted by this Court, (a) as the defendant's written statement to the plaint, is contrary to the echoing(s), hence, occurring in the apt reply, to the notice, reply whereof, is, borne in Ex.PW2/F, (b) and, vigour thereto stands garnered by the factum, of the plaintiff, in his cross-examination, rather making a clear admission qua his omitting, to, within six months, prescribed in the contract to sell, make any endeavour to perform his part of the contractual obligation, (c) sequel whereof being qua the plaintiff, not within, the time prescribed in the contract of sale, evincing rather his readiness and willingness to perform, his part of the contractual obligation, (d) rather his belatedly therefrom hence after three years expiring, since, the drawing of Ex.PW2/B, his making endeavours, upon, the defendant to execute the registered deed of conveyance, vis-avis, the suit khasra numbers. The afore belated endeavour of the plaintiff, when stand construed, with his omission, to, within the time prescribed, in, the contract of sale, make endeavours to get the sale deed executed, vis-a-vis, the suit khasra numbers, (e) begets an inevitable conclusion qua the plaintiff being estopped to contend, that, there was any implied or deemed extension of time, given, the afore echoings standing borne in the defendant's reply to the notice, as, embodied in Ex.PW2/F, (f) conspicuously when the defendant's written statement to the plaint rather constitutes, the, material document, besides when the contract of sale is proven to be validly executed, and, also when, the, afore deposition, borne, in the cross- examination, of, the plaintiff, wherein, he candidly echos qua his, not, within the period of six months, since the drawing, of, the, agreement to sell, hence making any endeavour, for, executing the registered deed of conveyance, qua the suit land, (g) thereupon, the attending circumstances, existing, in, contemporaneity to the termination of Ex.PW2/B, and/or, prevailing, in, spontaneity thereto, do not marshal any affirmative conclusion, vis-a-vis, the plaintiff, qua his evincing any conduct, wherefrom it being garnerable qua his being ready and willing, to, perform his part of the apt contractual obligation. The further corollary is (h) that when in Chand Rani's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court, upon, a conjoint construction, of, the afore prime parameters, for, hence determining, whether, time being essence of the contract, had, concluded that the evident factum of unreadiness or unwillingness of the plaintiff, to perform his part of contractual obligation, (i) hence, fostering a conclusion qua his being disentitled to the relief, of specific performance, also when time prescribed in the contract of sale, is, given its being concluded to be construable to be essence of the contract, (j) thereupon, hence no waiver and estoppel can be fastened, upon, the defendant, merely, upon, afore recitals, occurring in the reply to the notice, as, embodied in Ex.PW2/F, reiteratedly when rather the plaintiff was enjoined, to, lend affirmative proof, qua, the afore twin parameters. 13. For the foregoing reasons this Court is constrained to hold with formadibility that the time, is, the essence, of, the contract of sale, borne in Ex.PW2/B, hence, issues No.1, 2 and 4 are answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. Issue No.3. 14. 13. For the foregoing reasons this Court is constrained to hold with formadibility that the time, is, the essence, of, the contract of sale, borne in Ex.PW2/B, hence, issues No.1, 2 and 4 are answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. Issue No.3. 14. In view of findings upon afore issues No. 1, 2 and 4, issue No.3 has become redundant and decided accordingly. Issue No. 5: 15. In view of findings upon issues No.1, 2 and 3 above, the plaintiff has no cause of action, hence, the issue No.5 is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Issue No.6. 16. There exists no evidence on record to show that as to how the plaintiff's suit is not maintainable, hence, issue No. 6 are decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Relief. 17. In sequel to findings on issues aforesaid, the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. No costs. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly. All pending applications also stand disposed of.