Shantaram Bhiva Patil (d) By Lr. v. Harishchandra Rambhau Patil(d) By Lrs
2018-11-15
INDIRA BANERJEE, R.BANUMATHI
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal No. 498 of 1992 in and by which the High Court affirmed the judgment of the First Appellate Court thereby dismissing the suit for specific performance filed by the appellant-plaintiff and directing the appellant-plaintiff to refund the earnest money. The unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant before us. 2. The suit property was originally owned by the respondent(s) and he agreed to sell the suit property to the appellant by virtue of an agreement to sell dated 03.04.1973 for consideration of Rs. 3225/- and the appellant made the payment of advance of Rs. 3200/- and only the balance amount of Rs. 25/- was remained to be paid. As per the stipulation in the Agreement that the respondent(s) has to obtain necessary permission under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 and execute the sale deed. As per the said clause, if the permission for sale is not obtained then the respondent(s) had to return earnest money of Rs. 2400/- and thereafter transaction between them shall be deemed to have been completed. The relevant clause in the agreement of sale (Exhibit 51) reads as under: "If permission for sale is not received then I will return earnest amount of Rs. 2400/- to him and thereafter the transaction between us shall be deemed to have been completed". The possession of the suit land was also given to the appellant-plaintiff on the date of Agreement to Sell. 3. The appellant-plaintiff had filed the suit for specific performance based on agreement of sale. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 10.09.1981 decreed the suit in favour of the appellant and held that the appellant has paid the consideration of Rs. 3200/- to the respondent and that the appellant was put in possession on the date of Agreement. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 10.09.1981 held that there was no necessity to obtain any permission under the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. The Trial Court held in favour of the appellant insofar as the readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract and decreed the suit. 4. In appeal filed by the respondent(s), the First Appellate Court set aside the decree of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal.
The Trial Court held in favour of the appellant insofar as the readiness and willingness to perform the part of the contract and decreed the suit. 4. In appeal filed by the respondent(s), the First Appellate Court set aside the decree of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 were applicable to the agreement of sale. The First Appellate Court further held that the respondent(s)-defendant(s) had applied for permission under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 and that the permission had been refused by the authorities and, therefore, as per the terms of agreement, the agreement could not be enforced. The First Appellate Court further held that once the appellant had admitted that the permission has been refused by the competent authority under the Act, the question of passing a decree with condition that permission may be obtained before the execution of the sale deed does not arise. On those findings, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and allowed the appeal and held that the appellant is only entitled for a decree of recovery of earnest money of Rs. 3200/- from the respondent(s). The First Appellate Court also directed the appellant to hand over possession to the respondent(s)-defendant(s). By the impugned judgment, the High Court has affirmed the judgment of the First Appellate Court. 5. We have heard Mr. Amol Chitale, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mrs. Astha Deep, learned counsel appearing for the respondent and perused the impugned judgment and the materials on record. 6. It is an admitted position between the parties that there was stipulation in the agreement that respondent/defendant(s) has to obtain permission from the competent authority under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947. As pointed out by the High Court, the appellant has clearly admitted that as per the stipulation in the agreement that the provisions of the said Act are applicable. It has also come on record that the respondent/defendant(s) had in fact made an application to seek permission which was marked as Exhibit 50.
As pointed out by the High Court, the appellant has clearly admitted that as per the stipulation in the agreement that the provisions of the said Act are applicable. It has also come on record that the respondent/defendant(s) had in fact made an application to seek permission which was marked as Exhibit 50. The First Appellate Court and the High Court rightly recorded concurrent findings of fact that it was necessary to obtain statutory permission under the provisions of the said Act which the parties have consciously incorporated as term in the Agreement. It has also come on record that the defendant(s) had in fact applied for permission under the Act which was not granted by the competent authorities. Therefore, as per the stipulation in the Agreement, the agreement of sale could not be performed and as per the stipulation the defendant has to return the earnest amount paid to him. 7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that subsequently an amendment has come into force on 20th August, 1977 as per which the obtaining permission under the said Act is not necessitated. The amendment has come into force only on 20th August, 1977; whereas the agreement of sale in present case is dated 03.04.1973. The said amendment cannot be given retrospective effect in the absence of special indication thereof. That apart, both the First Appellate Court and the High Court have recorded concurrent findings of fact that in view of the refusal by the competent authorities to grant permission under Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 the appellant cannot insist for performance of the agreement of sale. We do not find any serious infirmity warranting interference with the impugned order. In the result, the appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.