JUDGMENT : Sudhir Agarwal, Om Prakash-VII, JJ. 1. Heard Sri I.K. Chaturvedi, learned counsel for petitioner and learned A.G.A. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed seeking writ of certiorari for quashing First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as 'F.I.R.') dated 14.12.2016 registered as case crime no. 0487 of 2016, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Daurala, district Meerut. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought directing respondent no. 2 not to arrest petitioner pursuant to aforesaid F.I.R. dated 14.12.2016. 3. Sri Chaturvedi, learned counsel for petitioner could not dispute that the allegations contained in F.I.R., if ex-facie are taken to be correct, make out offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC. 4. That being so scope of judicial review for quashing of F.I.R. being limited, it would not be justified to be exercised in this matter. 5. In the alternative he argued even if F.I.R. is not to be quashed and to that extent this writ petition is to be dismissed, still this Court can pass an interlocutory order protecting interest of petitioner by restraining respondents from arresting petitioner till investigation is going on and charge sheet or final report, as the case may be, is submitted before Court concerned. He submits, since there is no provision of anticipatory bail applicable State of U. P., therefore, writ petition only for the purpose of interlocutory order staying arrest of petitioner during investigation is maintainable. In support, he relied upon Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of Haryana 2017 (5) SCC 533 ; Hema Mishra Vs. State of U. P. and others 2014 (4) SCC 453 and Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U. P. and others 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC). 6. We have gone through the above authorities cited by learned counsel but find that they do not support the above contention advanced in this case. 7. In Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh (supra), matter came to be considered before the Court for quashing of F.I.R.. Here also apprehending arrest due to mere registration of a F.I.R., the matter was brought before this Court seeking quashing of F.I.R. This Court dismissed application and thereagainst matter was taken to Apex Court. A complaint was made that during investigation or inquiry, petitioner, Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh apprehend arrest by police authorities in an arbitrary manner. Here also apprehending arrest due to mere registration of a F.I.R., the matter was brought before this Court seeking quashing of F.I.R. This Court dismissed application and thereagainst matter was taken to Apex Court. A complaint was made that during investigation or inquiry, petitioner, Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh apprehend arrest by police authorities in an arbitrary manner. It is in this context Court reminded police authorities to follow dictum and directions laid down in Joginder Kumar Vs. State of U. P. 1994 Cri.L.J. 1981. The judgment further shows, when matter was pending before Supreme Court, police completed investigation and submitted charge sheet. Court then declined to interfere since charge sheet was submitted and permitted petitioner to approach court concerned by filing a bail application. Apex Court also reminded and approved a seven Judges' decision of this Court in Smt. Amarawati and another Vs. State of U. P., 2005 (1) AWC 416 . wherein an observation was made that absence of power of anticipatory bail in State of U.P. would not debar concerned Court/Magistrate to grant an interim bail if there is any likelihood of delay in disposal of bail application, finally. 8. We find that in an earlier case of Som Mittal Vs. Government of Karnataka, JT 2008(2) SC 41, which was a matter relating to anticipatory bail, one of the two Judges constituting Bench (Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) has referred to and approved seven Judges' decision of this Court in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) and observed that non availability of any provision relating to anticipatory bail in State of U.P. is causing extraordinary burden on High Court and a recommendation was made for reviving such a provision. 9. However, in none of the cases above, it has been said by Supreme Court or this Court, at any point of time, that once a charge sheet is submitted, still an accused is entitled to be released on bai on just asking, and courts below/concerned Magistrate should not apply its mind to the relevant facts and circumstances which would justify whether concerned person should be granted bail or should be detained in judicial custody. The decision in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) says otherwise. The decision in Smt. Amarawati and another (supra) says otherwise. That being so, expecting this Court to simply stay arrest, while directing or permitting the person concerned to approach court below by filing a bail application, and that too without applying mind to the relevant facts and circumstances in which bail can be granted, would amount to travesty of justice. It would be an order not in accordance with law. Such an order would clearly travel in the realm of non-application of mind. We are afraid, this Court cannot pass such an order particularly when it is declining to entertain writ petition being satisfied that a prima facie case of commission of cognizable offence has been found against accused resulting in filing of a charge sheet and now the matter must be examined by concerned Magistrate/court regarding bail etc. after considering the relevant facts and circumstances. 10. We may refer here one more aspect. The manner in which petitioner prays that his arrest should be stayed, at the best can be placed at par with anticipatory or interim bail. In fact while granting an order of stay of arrest court is supposed to examine those considerations which it is bound to take into account, when pass an order granting anticipatory bail. It is well settled that even an order of anticipatory bail cannot be passed on mere asking but has to satisfy consideration of various relevant aspects in this regard. Some of these aspects have been considered in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and others, 2011(1) SCC 694 and in paras 122 to 138 the relevant facts and circumstances which must be considered by Court before passing an order of anticipatory bail have been noticed in detail. Though these observations are not exhaustive but the aforesaid decision clearly lays down a law that even in passing an order on anticipatory bail, a bald, unreasoned and non-speaking order staying arrest or granting bail should not be passed as that would amount to a material illegality and irregularity and failure to exercise jurisdiction validly if relevant circumstances before passing such orders are not taken into account, weighed and assessed, and thereafter a decision is taken whether such an order would be justified or not. 11. 11. Now we may refer to other authorities cited by learned counsel for petitioner in support of his submissions that even if this Court declines to grant any relief for quashing of F.I.R., still as an interim protection, his arrest must be stayed. 12. In Ram Kishan Fauji (Supra), a reference was made by Chief Secretary, State of Haryana under Section 8 (1) of Haryana Lokayukta Act, 2002 to Lokayukta, Haryana to enquire into certain aspects of bribe, unauthorised and illegal acts of appellant. Lokayukta issued notice under Section 14 of the said Act to appellant Ram Kishan Fauji. After considering material available before Lokayukta, he recommended for registration of F.I.R. for the offence punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and directed for investigation by a senior competent officer of impeccable integrity. Ram Kishan Fauji filed Writ Petition no. 4554 of 2014 in Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging order of Lokayukta and also sought a writ of mandamus restraining State of Haryana from initiating any consequential proceedings pursuant to letters/orders of Lokayukta. Learned Single Judge quashed the order of Lokayukta wherein Letters Patent Appeal was filed, Division Bench stayed judgment of learned Single Judge. The stay order was subsequently confirmed on 12.5.2016. It is this order of Division Bench which was challenged in Supreme Court wherein an issue was raised whether Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable since writ petition was filed before learned Single Judge seeking quashing of the proceedings, criminal in nature. Considering this aspect of the matter, Court in para 61 of judgment observed that it is the nature of subject of controversy or nature of proceedings which will have to be seen to determine whether jurisdiction sought to be invoked before Single Judge is civil or criminal. It is in this context, Court refers to the factum that provision of anticipatory bail has been deleted by State Amendment in State of U. P. and this amendment has been upheld in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab (1994) SCC 569. We do not find that mere reference to State Amendment in Cr.P.C. in U.P., can be read as if Court has held, as a proposition of law, that on mere asking arrest must be stayed when in a writ petition prayer for quashing F.I.R. is not accepted by Court. State of Punjab (1994) SCC 569. We do not find that mere reference to State Amendment in Cr.P.C. in U.P., can be read as if Court has held, as a proposition of law, that on mere asking arrest must be stayed when in a writ petition prayer for quashing F.I.R. is not accepted by Court. We may also observe that ultimately in Ram Kishan Fauji (Supra), Court held that Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable. 13. In the second case relied upon by learned counsel for petitioner i.e. Hema Mishra (Supra), Hema Mishra filed Writ Petition before this Court praying for writ of certiorari for quashing F.I.R. and a mandamus was also sought directing Police to defer her arrest till collection of credible evidence sufficient for filing charge sheet. This Court dismissed Writ Petition with respect to prayer for quashing of F.I.R. but provided interim protection to Hema Mishra by observing that if she surrenders and moves application for bail, same shall be considered/decided by Courts below expeditiously. Not satisfied with the above order, Hema Mishra brought the matter to Supreme Court in Appeal and contended that High Court has wrongly refused to grant anticipatory bail to her and also failed to exercise certiorari jurisdiction by not quashing F.I.R.. Supreme Court examined the above issue in broader sense, looking to the facts that provision of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. was deleted by local amendment of the State Legislature. It refers to the observation made by Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh (Supra) that claim for pre-arrest protection is neither a statutory nor a right guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 or 21 of Constitution of India but then referred to observations made in para 368 (17) of judgment that it cannot be said that High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Article 226 of Constitution and pass orders either way but the power should be exercised sparingly and that too only in rare and appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. Judicial discipline and comity of Courts require that High Courts should refrain from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in all matters. Hon'ble K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. in its judgment in para 21 said as under : “21. Judicial discipline and comity of Courts require that High Courts should refrain from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in all matters. Hon'ble K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. in its judgment in para 21 said as under : “21. I may, however, point out that there is unanimity in the view that in-spite of the fact that Section 438 has been specifically omitted and made inapplicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, still a party aggrieved can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being extraordinary jurisdiction and the vastness of the powers naturally impose considerable responsibility in its application. All the same, the High Court has got the power and sometimes duty in appropriate cases to grant reliefs, though it is not possible to pinpoint what are the appropriate cases, which have to be left to the wisdom of the Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 14. However, Hon'ble K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. then considered the question whether High Court dismissing Writ Petition under Article 226 while examining challenge for quashing F.I.R. or charge sheet, still can grant further relief against arrest for a specific period or till completion of Trial. In this regard His Lordship referred to the judgment in State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 AIR (SC) 12 and then said : “The language of Article 226 does not permit such an action and once the Court finds no merits in the challenge, writ petition will have to be dismissed and the question of granting further relief after dismissal of the writ, does not arise. Consequently, once a writ is dismissed, all the interim reliefs granted would also go.” (Emphasis added) 15. In the concurrent judgment given by Hon. A. K. Sikri, J., (another Member in Bench) His Lordship also made similar observations in para 26 and said as under : “I would like to remark that in the absence of any provisions like Section 438 Cr.P.C. applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh, there is a tendency on the part of the accused persons, against whom FIR is lodged and/or charge-sheet is filed in the Court, to file Writ Petition for quashing of those proceedings so that they are able to get protection against the arrest in the interregnum which is the primary motive for filing such petitions. It is for this reason that invariably after the lodging of the FIR, a Writ Petition under Article 226 is filed with the main prayer to quash those proceedings and to claim interim relief against pre-arrest in the meantime or till the completion of the trial. However, the considerations which have to weigh with the High Court to decide as to whether such proceedings are to be quashed or not are entirely different than that of granting interim protection against the arrest. Since the grounds on which such an FIR or charge-sheet can be quashed are limited, once the Writ Petition challenging the validity of the FIR or charge-sheet is dismissed, the grant of relief, incidental in nature, against arrest would obviously not arise, even when a justifiable case for grant of anticipatory bail is made out.” (Emphasis added) 16. Thus Court clearly said that Article 226 confers wide powers but that does not mean that such powers would be converted into Section 438 Cr.P.C.. This power has to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law and not by issuing indiscriminate order against pre-arrest. Observation of Hon'ble A. K. Sikri, J., as contained in paras 35 and 36 in Hema Mishra (Supra) are also reproduced as under : “35. It is pertinent to mention that though the High Courts have very wide powers under Article 226, the very vastness of the powers imposes on it the responsibility to use them with circumspection and in accordance with the judicial consideration and well-established principles, so much so that while entertaining writ petitions for granting interim protection from arrest, the Court would not go on to the extent of including the provision of anticipatory bail as a blanket provision. 36. Thus, such a power has to be exercised very cautiously keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions of Article 226 are a devise to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The powers are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law by the authorities indiscriminately making pre-arrest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. The powers are, therefore, to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of process of law by the authorities indiscriminately making pre-arrest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposed to balance the two interests. On the one hand, the Court is to ensure that such a power under Article 226 is not to be exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438 Cr.P.C. proceedings, keeping in mind that when this provision is specifically omitted in the State of Uttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to as back door entry via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the High Court finds that in a given case if the protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount to gross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is again clarified that this power has to be exercised sparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified.” (Emphasis added) 17. In view of the above judgments as well as arguments advanced, we do not find any reason to interfere with the F.I.R. and there is no averment that police is not following law or is going to make any arbitrary and illegal arrest of petitioner. No case of gross miscarriage is pleaded or demonstrated. Hence protection under Article 226 as prayed cannot be directed. 18. In the result, there is no ground to quash F.I.R. and this Court also finds that no interim order staying arrest of petitioner is justified. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.