JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Jay Prakash Jha, Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Shadab Bin Haque and Mr. Sambit Nayak, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned G.A. appearing on behalf of the respondents-state assisted by Mr. C.S. Singh, Advocate 3. Heard Mr. Ashok Kumar, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 5 (a). 4. Heard Mr. Mahesh Kumar Sinha, counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 5 (b). 5. Nobody appears on behalf of respondent no. 6. 6. Counsel for petitioners submits that in spite of service of notice upon respondent no. 6, she has chosen not to appear. 7. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:- “For quashing the order dated 29.04.2002 and 5.12.2002 passed by the respondent no. 2 in S.A.R. Revision No. 231/97 analogously passed with Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 568/96 and 331/97 as contained in Annexure 12 the order dated 09.05.1997 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in S.AR. Appeal No. 32-R 15/95-96 and other analogous cases (Annexure-11) and the order dated 20.02.1996 passed by the Special Officer in S.A.R. Case No. 18/85 and other analogous cases (Annexure-10) whereby and whereunder the said Revenue Authorities passed orders of restoration of lands in favour of respondent no. 5, by the effect of which the petitioners are to be evicted from the lands in their peaceful possession, in a proceeding under Section 71-A of the C.N.T. Act.” 8. Counsel for the petitioners submits as under:- (a) As per revisional survey, the lands under khewat No. 10/6 appertaining to Khata No. 316, bearing plot no. 962 and 964 comprising an area of 30 decimal and 339 decimal (total 3.69 acres) respectively in village Hinoo was recorded in the name of Mahaliya Pahan and Goshla Pahan the nature of land being Bakastt Bhuinhari. (b) In the year 1937, i.e. on 01.10.1937 a Hukumnama was granted by said two persons in favour of Chedi Khansama with a chaparbandi right. He was granted rent receipts from the ex-landlord. (c) After the death of Chhedi Khansama name of his son Badal Khan was entered in the revenue records in the Circle Office. (b) In the year 1937, i.e. on 01.10.1937 a Hukumnama was granted by said two persons in favour of Chedi Khansama with a chaparbandi right. He was granted rent receipts from the ex-landlord. (c) After the death of Chhedi Khansama name of his son Badal Khan was entered in the revenue records in the Circle Office. Thereafter said Badal Khan sold portions of the land to different persons by different registered sale deeds including the petitioners and the property was also mutated in their names whose details are as follows:- S. No. Sale-deed dated Mutation Case No. Petitioner No. 1 09.09.1985 346/1986-87 Petitioner No. 2 07.08.1985 387/1986-87 Petitioner No. 3 17.10.1985 342/1986-87 Petitioner No. 4 11.07.1986 345/1986-87 Petitioner No. 5 25.02.1986 592/1986-87 Petitioner No. 6 03.02.1990 409/1989-90 Petitioner No. 7 29.07.1985 448/1986-87 (d) Counsel for the petitioners submits that this writ petition is confined only to the properties which are covered under the aforesaid sale deeds and petitioners are not concerned with rest of the property which may be involved in the impugned proceedings. (e) In the year 1985 one Gajle Pahan, initiated a proceeding under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 (herein after referred to as the Act of 1908) which was numbered as S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985. (f) An application for intervention by way of objection was filed on 18.04.1991 by one Sukra Pahan claiming to be the descendant of the recorded tenant and submitted that the property involved in this case should be restored in his favour instead of the original applicant. His application for intervention was rejected by S.A.R. Court against which he had filed appeal before the Appellate Authority. (g) As there was order of stay by the appellate authority, the Special Officer, S.A.R. Ranchi passed order for restoration of land in favour of Gajle Pahan vide order dated 26.05.1987. (h) Counsel submits that in S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985-86, the S.A.R. Officer impleaded various persons who had purchased the property as party in the proceeding and accordingly six separate cases over and above S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985-86 were registered vide S.A.R. Case No. 84/1990, S.A.R. Case No. 85/1990, S.A.R. Case No. 86/1990, S.A.R. Case No. 87/1990, S.A.R. Case No. 88/1990, S.A.R. Case No. 89/1990 and notices were issued to the parties. (i) Thereafter the matter was taken up by the Appellate authority and the appeal filed by Sukra Pahan, which was numbered as S.A.R. Appeal No. 54-R 15/1991-92, was allowed vide order dated 07.12.1994 and it was observed by the appellate authority that said Sukra Pahan was a necessary party in the proceedings. (j) Ultimately the orders passed in the aforesaid S.A.R. Cases were set-aside and the matter was remanded back to the S.A.R. Officer for passing fresh order. (k) Counsel for the petitioners submits that various parties had filed their respective show cause replies and raised various questions including the point of limitation and also the point that the land involved in the proceedings was not used for agricultural purpose. (l) The S.A.R. Officer passed common order dated 20.02.1996 for all the cases and found that the property involved in this case was “Bakast Bhuinhari” land and there was nothing on record to show that there was construction over the property prior to 1969. Accordingly he allowed the application for restoration. (m) Against this order of the S.A.R. Officer, appeal was filed and the appellate authority decided the case vide order dated 09.05.1997. Counsel for the petitioners have specifically referred to various issues which were framed by the appellate authority which is contained in paragraph no. 8 of the order passed by the appellate authority which reads as follows:- (i) What is the nature of land? Whether the lands are bakast bhuinhari or bakast bhuinhari pahnai? (ii) Whether the vendor of the appellants was in possession of the lands and whether his claim on the basis of sada Hukumnama is genuine? (iii) Whether the lands are chhaparbandi in nature? (iv) Whether the appellants have acquired title by adverse possession? (v) Whether Gajle Pahan has got any right over the lands in question? (n) Counsel submits that while examining these issues the Appellate authority had suo moto called for the records of register II of Mouza Hundru amended in town Anchal and found that there is entry of this khata and the Appellate Authority while considering this entry has clearly recorded that from the perusal of this entry in the Register II it appears that the name of Chhedi Khansama was mutated vide Mutation Case No. 15-R 28/1970-71 dated 12.05.1970 and thereafter there is reference of case no. 1765 R 27/1977-78 by which the name of Badal Khan appears to have mutated. However as some of the corresponding records were not available at the circle officer, held that there is no documentary evidence viz. rent receipts, certified copy of the mutation, mutation register, mutation records etc to show that the land in question was mutated in the name of either chedi khansama or his son badal khan, and no paper about mutation by doranda municipalty has been filed, held that the story of settlement and possession of chedi khansama in the year 1937 as concocted one. (o) Counsel submits that there is clear finding recorded in the order of the appellate authority that from perusal of entry made in register II it appears that the land of Chhedi Khansama was mutated vide Mutation Case No. 15 R 28/1970-71 dated 12.05.1970 and thereafter there is record of case no. 1765 R 27/1977-78 by which name of Badan Khan appears to have mutated. Counsel for the petitioners submits that the application for restoration has been annexed along with writ petition at Annexure-6. Gajle Pahan has not mentioned the date on which he was dispossessed from the property. The appellate court inspite of having found aforesaid entries made in the Register II maintained in the circle office, ignored this aspect of the matter while deciding the case and referred the land having been transferred to the present petitioners in the year 1980s and held that as the land in question were transferred in 1980, twelve years have not elapsed since the date of transfer of land in question prior to amendment of section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 in the year 1986, the appellate authority held that the application for restoration of land was not barred by limitation. The appellate authority was of the considered view that the period of limitation of 12 years would apply only if 12 years would have elapsed prior to amendment in section 71 A of the said Act in the year 1986 when the bhuinhari land which are governed by section 48 of the aforesaid Act was included in section 71 A of chota nagpur tenancy act, 1908. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners and other persons. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners and other persons. (p) Against the appellate order, the legal heirs of Gajle Pahan as well as petitioners and other persons have filed various revision cases before the revisional authority which was decided by common order dated 29.04.2002. Counsel submits that the revisional authority while passing the impugned order dated 05.12.2002 has held that the claim of the Gajle Pahan on the property was not correct and accordingly the claim of the Bhutan Orain was also not correct. So far as claim of the petitioners are concerned, it clearly held that there is violation of Section 46 read with Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and land ought to have been returned to Sukra Pahan. (q) Counsel for the petitioners submits that while deciding the revision application, revisional authority has not considered the point of limitation and has erred in law in not considering the findings based on record by the appellate authority which the appellate authority had himself called for and has recorded that in the mutation proceeding the property was mutated in favour of vendor of the petitioners in the year 1970 and then in the year 1978. (r) Counsel submits that so far as mutation case is concerned, it is the evidence regarding the possession of the property and on the basis of mutation having been done, it can be said that the private respondents herein were at least dispossessed from the property in the year 1970. (s) He submits that in the application for restoration, there is no date mentioned regarding dispossession and accordingly the date of dispossession was also to be governed on the basis of evidence and the materials available on record. He submits that the point regarding the mutation over the property is undisputed fact and accordingly the date of dispossession can be taken from the year 1970. (t) He submit that in this view of the matter the application for restoration was filed in the year 1985 which was beyond 12 years and accordingly as per Section 48(4) of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act 1908, application filed by the original applicant for restoration of land was barred by limitation. He submits that as per revisional order, Gajle Pahan who had filed the application for restoration had no right over the property and respondent no. He submits that as per revisional order, Gajle Pahan who had filed the application for restoration had no right over the property and respondent no. 6, who is legal heirs of Gajle Pahan, has neither filed any writ petition against that order nor is appearing before this court in this writ petition in spite of service of notice. He submits that from the records of the case it appears that Sukra Pahan has not led any evidence separately so as to disclose his date of dispossession and accordingly the year of 1970 ought to have been taken into consideration by the authorities as the date of dispossession of Sukra Pahan. (u) Counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the respondents herein have changed their faith to Christianity and therefore they are not entitled for restoration of land. However, on query of the court, he could not substantiate that this point was ever taken by them before the authorities and submitted that this point has been raised for the first time in rejoinder to the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. Counsel for the petitioners submits that oral evidence must be taken care of, but he has not annexed any oral evidence in the writ records. (v) Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment reported in (2004) 8 SCC 340 in the case of Situ Sahu and Others vs. State of Jharkhand and Others and submits that even if the transfer is in violation of the provisions of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 then also the period of limitation has to be taken care of. The Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to the provisions of Section 71 A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 has held that the application for restoration under Section 71 A has to be filed within reasonable time from the date of dispossession. He submits that the instant case is governed by Section 48 of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and prior to the amendment in Section 71 A of the Chotangpur Tenancy Act, 1908 in the year 1986, not only application for restoration of land was filed, but the period of 12 years from the date of dispossession had also elapsed prior to 1985. He submits that provisions of Section 71 A has no applicability in this case and accordingly the extended period of 30 years will not be applicable. He submits that provisions of Section 71 A has no applicability in this case and accordingly the extended period of 30 years will not be applicable. He submits that the learned courts below have rightly taken the period of limitation as 12 years and not 30 years. 9. Counsel appearing on behalf of private respondent no. 5(b) on the other hand submits that the original application was filed by Gajle Pahan in the year 1985 and thereafter only one case was registered which was numbered as S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985-86 and when the matter was remanded back as per the order of the appellate court number of persons were included in the proceeding and various case nos. as stated above mentioned by the petitioners were initiated. Accordingly, he submits that the date of initiation of proceeding so far as other cases are concerned should be treated from the date as mentioned in the proceeding itself and application for restoration cannot be recorded as 12.04.1985. However, during the course of argument, counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondent agreed that application for restoration which was filed in the instant case is of the year 1985 which was filed by Gajle Pahan and Sukra Pahan tried to become a part of the proceeding later in the year 1991. He filed his objection in this S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985. Sukra Pahan has himself not filed any separate case. Counsel appearing on behalf of private respondent submits that the entry regarding mutation which has been found in Register II has got no value and the same cannot be construed as the date of dispossession. He has relied upon a judgment passed by this court reported in 1987 PLJR 1050 in the case of Jadunandan Yadav vs. Ram Pati Yadav and submits that rent receipts issued are not perfect proof of title and possession. He submits that the authorities below have held that the private respondents herein was dispossessed in the year 1980 and onwards and therefore provisions of Section 71 A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act comes into play. He submits that the authorities below have held that the private respondents herein was dispossessed in the year 1980 and onwards and therefore provisions of Section 71 A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act comes into play. As Section 71A was amended in the year 1986 and 12 years had not elapsed from 1980 till the amendment in the year 1986, accordingly extended period of 30 years at least should be taken into consideration and the Section 71 A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act will govern the parties involved in this case. 10. He further submits that as per the judgment reported in (2001) 1 JCR 156 , Sada Hukumnama cannot be recognized either for the purpose of title or for the purpose of possession and accordingly the claim of the petitioners that the property was settled in favour of Chedi Khansama in the year 1937 cannot be acknowledged and this court cannot consider the Sada Hukumnama at all for the purpose of arriving at any finding in connection with the title and possession of the property. He submits that the Sada Hukumnama of the year 1937 was forged and fabricated document, against the provision of law and therefore same is against the statute. Under the said circumstance, no reliance can be placed by the petitioners on the Sada Hukumnama of the year 1937. 11. Counsel appearing on behalf of the State has referred to the various judgments reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 397 Bandhana Munda alias Bandhana Uraon and Others vs. Bighlaha Pahan and Others and AIR 1983 Patna 151 in the case of Amarendra Nath Dutta and Others vs. State and 1994 (1) PLJR 91 in case of Jageshwar Teli vs. State of Bihar, 1968 PLJR 3 and submits that the petitioners have lost in all the three courts and therefore no interference in called for by this court. He has also submitted that there is finding that the petitioners came in possession of the property in the year 1980 and as 12 years had not elapsed in the year 1986 therefore period of limitation cannot be governed by taking recourse of Section 48(4) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. He submits that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders. Accordingly no interference is called for in the impugned orders and the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 12. He submits that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders. Accordingly no interference is called for in the impugned orders and the writ petition is fit to be dismissed. 12. Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 5 (a) Mr. Ashok Kumar referred to paragraph nos. 11,12 and 13 of the appellate court's order placed reliance on the judgment passed by this court reported in 2004 (2) JLJR 169 in the case of Moti Rai Devi vs. State of Bihar and Others. He refers to paragraph no. 11 and submits that period of limitation in this case would be at least 30 years and would be governed by Section 71 A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and period of limitation of 12 years as per section 48(4) of the aforesaid Act will not apply. 13. After hearing counsel for the parties and after considering the materials available on record this court finds as follows:- (a) Admittedly property involved in this case is Bakast Bhuinhari and application for restoration of the property was filed by the Gajle Pahan on 12.04.1985. (b) From perusal of the application for restoration as annexed in the Annexure-6 of the writ petition this court finds that Gajle Pahan had not mentioned the date of his dispossession from the property and in the column regarding date of dispossession he has mentioned that the date of dispossession is not known to him. Further against the column regarding the mode of dispossession he has mentioned that his ancestors were dispossessed from the property by fraudulent method. (c) However, the case was numbered as S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985. Sukra Pahan had filed his intervention/objection on 18.04.1991 (Annexure-7) and stated that Gajle Pahan is an stranger and Sukra Pahan is the descendant of the original owner of the property and the property belongs to Mahaliya Pahan. In this application nothing has been mentioned about date and manner of dispossession. (d) The objection of Sukra Pahan was rejected by an order passed in S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985 against which Sukra Pahan had filed his independent appeal and before the appellate authority could decide the matter, the order was passed by the S.A.R. Court vide order dated 17.12.1991. Thereafter the appellate authority had remanded back the matter which ultimately resulted in the order dated 20.02.1996 (Annexure-10) passed by the Special Officer, Ranchi. Thereafter the appellate authority had remanded back the matter which ultimately resulted in the order dated 20.02.1996 (Annexure-10) passed by the Special Officer, Ranchi. (e) The proceeding which was initiated was numbered as S.A.R. Case No. 18/1985, but subsequently bifurcated into total 8 proceedings as large number of persons were involved in the proceeding. However, the genesis of the all the proceedings is the original application for restoration which was filed by Gajle Pahan on 12.04.1985. (f) A fresh order which was passed on remand is dated 20.02.1996 did not deal with the point of limitation at all. It recorded a finding that the property was the property was initially mutated in the name of Chedi Khansama and upon his death it was mutated in the name of Badal khan but the sale purchase of the property had taken place after the year 1974. The authority held that there was no construction over the property prior to 1969 as no such documents were produced to show that there was any construction prior to 1969. Accordingly the authority directed for restoration of land to Sukra Pahan (the intervenor). (g) Against this order, appeal was filed by various persons including the petitioners and were disposed of by common order dated 9.05.1997. (h) The appellate authority framed various issued as quoted above, and dismissed the appeal by detailed order dated 09.05.1997. The appellate authority examined the point of limitation and while examining the point of limitation, the appellate authority called for the records from Circle Office including Register II and found that the name of Chedi Khansama was mutated vide mutation case No. 15 R 78/1970-71 dated 12.05.1970 and subsequently there is also a case bearing no. 1765 R/27/1977-78 in the name of Badal Khan i.e. son of the Chedi Khansama. The appellate authority had also called for the various records of mutation case but he has recorded that records of the mutation case were not available in the circle office. (i) Upon perusal of the appellate order, this court does not find any finding in the appellate order expressing any doubt regarding the correctness of the entry made in register II vide Mutation Case No. 15 R/1970-77 dated 12.05.1970 and another Reference Case No. 17 65 R 27/1977-78. (i) Upon perusal of the appellate order, this court does not find any finding in the appellate order expressing any doubt regarding the correctness of the entry made in register II vide Mutation Case No. 15 R/1970-77 dated 12.05.1970 and another Reference Case No. 17 65 R 27/1977-78. Moreover the land was transferred by badal khansama in favour of others including the petitioners by registered deeds of the year 1980 and onwards and the same was also mutated in the name of the petitioners as detailed in paragraph 8(c) above. However, the appellate authority held that the land in question was transferred in 1980s therefore 12 years had not elapsed since the date of transfer and hence held that the case was not barred by limitation. This court finds that the appellate authority could not have based his findings regarding period of dispossession of the recorded tenant on the sale deeds executed by Badal Khan in the year 1980 in favour of the petitioners as admittedly Badal Khan is not the recorded tenant. The revisional authority also while considering the matter committed serious error of law in considering the point of limitation/period of dispossession of the recorded tenant and ignored the aforesaid mutation entries made in the register II in the year 1970 and 1978. This court finds that this error in the approach of the authority is so glaring and perverse that this court is inclined to exercise powers under Article 226 of the constitution of India although the petitioners have lost before all the three authorities. This court finds that judgment relied upon by the respondent state reported in 1997 (1) PLJR 397 Bandhana Munda alias Bandhana Uraon and Others vs. Bighlaha Pahan and Others and AIR 1983 Patna 151 in the case of Amarendra Nath Dutta and Others vs. State and 1994 (1) PLJR 91 in the case of Jageshwar Teli vs. State of Bihar, 1968 PLJR 3 on the point of scope of experience of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case where the approach of the authorities as stated above is apparently erroneous in law and orders are perverse. This court further finds that the appellate authority has totally ignored the aforesaid entries made in register II in the name of Chhedi Khansama vide Mutation Case No. 15-R 28/1970-71 dated 12.05.1970 and in the name of Badal Khan in case no. 1765 R 27/1977-78 on irrelevant ground that records and orders were not available in circle office. This court is of the considered view that the entry made in the mutation register indicates dispossession of the private respondents herein from the property even if Hukumnama of the year 1937 (which is the basis of claim of possession by Chedi Khansama and his son Badal Khan) is not taken into consideration, the same being an unregistered document. But so far as entry regarding mutation of land made in Register II in the year 1970 is concerned, same ought to have been taken into consideration by the authorities to come to a finding in connection with the date of dispossession of the private respondent even if the mutation records etc. were not available in the circle. Admittedly Sukra Pahan who has been ultimately held to be the descendant of the recorded tenant had not filed any application for restoration of land, rather he intervened in an application filed by Gazle Pahan wherein no date of dispossession has been mentioned by indicating the same as unknown to the applicant. Further it has been mentioned in the application that the ancestors of the applicant were disposed by practicing fraud. Admittedly in the instant case the petitioners were in possession by virtue of sale deed executed by Badal Khan and not by the recorded tenant or their descendants including the applicant. Under the said circumstance, entry made in Register II which is a revenue record of the year 1970 could not have been ignored by the appellate authority while coming to a conclusion regarding dispossession from the property particularly when the said records were called for by the appellate authority suo-moto in order to verify the entries made in Register II and there is no finding that the register II has been forged. (j) So far as judgment relied upon by the private respondent reported in 1987 PLJR 1050 in the case of Jadunandan Yadav vs. Ram Pati Yadav is concerned, this court finds that in that case while issuing rent receipts there was caution indicating (without prejudice) therefore it appears that in that case, rent receipts itself was issued with a caveat and with some reservation by the State. In such circumstances, the Court rightly held that the same cannot be a proof of title or possession. In the instant case, entry made in the year 1970 in Register II is not under cloud and it was the appellate authority who suo moto called for the records and examined the records including the entries made in Register II in the record of rights. He found that in the year 1970, as per register II, the land stood mutated in the name of Chhedi Khansama and subsequently it was mutated in the name of his son namely Badal Khan, and, other persons including the petitioners have purchased the property from Badal Khan in the year 1980 and onwards. Thus this court finds that the year 1980 could not be treated as year of dispossession of recorded tenant i.e. Sukra Pahan. So far as recorded tenant is concerned they were certainly dispossessed earlier as the sale deeds were not executed by the recorded tenant but by Badal Khan in whose name the property was already mutated. Even as per the application for mutation, the ancestors of the applicant were disposed from the property. This aspect of the matter has neither been considered by the appellate authority nor by the revisional authority. This court finds that private respondents having been dispossessed from the property in 1970 and application for restoration was filed in the year 1985, thus 12 years had elapsed prior to filing of the application for restoration and accordingly the application for restoration of land was barred under the provisions of Section 48(4) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. This court finds that private respondents having been dispossessed from the property in 1970 and application for restoration was filed in the year 1985, thus 12 years had elapsed prior to filing of the application for restoration and accordingly the application for restoration of land was barred under the provisions of Section 48(4) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. Chotanagpur Tenancy Act was amended in the year 1986 and by way of amendment, nature of property involved in this case were included under Section 71 A. This court finds that in the judgment reported in 1992 BLJR 986 in the case of Bukan Ansari and Others vs. State of Bihar and Others, it has clearly held that provisions of Section 71 A would come into operation in connection with such property where 12 years of dispossession had not elapsed in the year 1986 when Section 71 A was amended. This court fully agrees with the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioners that 12 years having been elapsed not only prior to 1986, but also prior to date of filing of application for restoration in the year 1985, therefore the application for restoration was to be examined in the light of limitation prescribed in Section 48(4) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. Accordingly, this court find that the application for restoration which was filed in the year 1985 by Gajle Pahan, which is the genesis of the entire proceeding, was itself is barred by limitation in the year 1985, as private respondent herein were dispossessed from the property at least in the year 1970. This court finds that this aspect of the matter has neither been considered by the S.A.R. Officer, nor has been considered by the appellate authority nor has been considered by the revisional authority, accordingly, the impugned orders are perverse and are fit to be set-aside. (k) So far as point regarding claim of the petitioner regarding construction over the property prior to 1969 is concerned, this court does not find any material to come to any contrary finding on this point. (k) So far as point regarding claim of the petitioner regarding construction over the property prior to 1969 is concerned, this court does not find any material to come to any contrary finding on this point. (l) So far as point regarding change of faith of the private respondent is concerned, this point having been taken by the petitioners for the first time at the stage of filing rejoinder to the counter affidavit in the writ proceedings, this court is not inclined to entertain said point as the same is mixed question of facts and law which cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in the writ proceedings and that too by filing rejoinder to the counter affidavit. 14. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, the impugned orders are hereby set-aside being perverse on the point of limitation in connection with filing of application for restoration of land within the stipulated time frame as provided under section 48(4) of the aforesaid Act. 15. Accordingly, the impugned orders dated 29.04.2002 and 5.12.2002 passed by the respondent no. 2 in S.A.R. Revision No. 231/97 analogously passed with Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 568/96 and 331/97 as contained in Annexure 12; the order dated 09.05.1997 passed by the Deputy Commissioner in S.AR. Appeal No. 32-R 15/95-96 and other analogous cases (Annexure-11) and the order dated 20.02.1996 passed by the Special Officer in S.A.R. Case No. 18/85 and other analogous cases are hereby set aside only to the extent it relates to the petitioners and this writ petition is allowed only to the extent it relates to the petitioners and aforesaid sale deeds involved in this case. 16. Pending I.A. No. 1156 of 2008 and I.A. No. 4524 of 2013 stands disposed off.