ORDER : W.P.(L) no. 3306 of 2012 has been filed by the petitioner-management for quashing and setting aside the award dated 28.02.2012 passed by the learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad (in short “CGIT”) in Reference Case no. 22 of 2009 whereby the respondent-workman has been ordered to be reinstated with 50% back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. 2. W.P.(L) No. 3307 of 2012 has been filed by the petitioner-management for quashing and setting aside the award dated 05.03.2012 passed by the learned CGIT, Dhanbad in Reference Case no. 57 of 2005 whereby the respondent-workman has been ordered to be reinstated with 50% back wages from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement. Factual matrix of W.P.(L) no. 3306 of 2012 3. The respondent-workman was working under the management of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. as Nitrogen Plant Operator. On 04/05.01.2007, the respondent-workman was issued a charge-sheet under Clause 19(16) of the Company’s Standing Order containing the charge that he absented himself from duty for more than 10 days. The respondent-workman was finally dismissed from service on 24.12.2007. An industrial dispute was raised against the said dismissal through the concerned Union. On failure of conciliation proceeding, the Central Government vide order dated 09.04.2009 referred the matter before the CGIT for adjudication with following terms of reference: “(i) Whether the action of the management of Sijua Colliery of M/s Tata Steel Limited in dismissing Shri Kamal Prasad Mehta, Nitrogen Plant Operator from the services of the company w.e.f 24.12.2007 is justified and legal? (ii) To what relief is the workman concerned entitled?” 4. Learned CGIT vide impugned award dated 28.02.2012 observed that the inquiry report with second show-cause notice was served to the respondent-workman on 15.12.2007 and thus he was provided only two days’ time to submit the reply which cannot be treated sufficient to submit suitable reply for such a harsh action. The learned CGIT further observed that the management could not prove that the second show-cause notice was given to the respondent-workman and thus it was held that the order passed by the petitioner-management was in violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the learned CGIT passed the award of reinstatement of the respondent-workman with 50 % back wages. 5. The learned CGIT further observed that the management could not prove that the second show-cause notice was given to the respondent-workman and thus it was held that the order passed by the petitioner-management was in violation of the principles of natural justice. Accordingly, the learned CGIT passed the award of reinstatement of the respondent-workman with 50 % back wages. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per own admission of the respondent-workman in his written statement that he had received the inquiry report and the second show-cause notice on 15.12.2007, the question of proving the service of second show-cause notice and the inquiry report at the instance of the petitioner-management does not arise. The observation to the said extent made in the impugned award is an error of record. The grievance of the respondent-workman was that he was provided only 48 hours for submitting reply to the second show-cause notice as against 15 days’ time specified in the law and procedure of the departmental inquiry, however there was no such rule applicable to the concerned colliery. It is further submitted that the respondent-workman wrongly asserted before the learned CGIT that the order of dismissal and the second show-cause notice were received by him simultaneously though the said fact was out rightly denied by the petitioner-management. Factual matrix of W.P.(L) no. 3307 of 2012 6. The respondent-workman was an employee under the management of Digwadih Colliery of M/s. Tata Steel Ltd. He absented himself from duty for 10 days without informing the competent authority and thus he was issued charge-sheet for the said misconduct under Clause 19(16) of the Company’s Standing Orders. The respondent- workman was finally dismissed from service w.e.f. 06.02.1998. The dispute was raised at the instance of the concerned Union and on failure of the conciliation proceeding, the Central Government, vide order dated 19.07.2005 referred the matter to the CGIT with following terms of the reference : “Whether the action of the management of Digwadih Colliery of M/s Tisco in dismissing Sri Gobardhan Manjhi UG Trammer w.e.f 02.02.1998 is justified? If not, to what relief is the concerned workman entitled?” 7. If not, to what relief is the concerned workman entitled?” 7. Learned CGIT in the impugned award has observed that no show-cause notice was served upon the respondent-workman before passing the order of dismissal and therefore, the petitioner-management failed to follow the principles of natural justice which was a mandatory requirement before passing the order affecting the right of the respondent-workman adversely. The learned tribunal accordingly passed the award of reinstatement of the respondent-workman in the services of the petitioner-management with 50% back wages. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent-workman was a habitual absentee as on earlier occasion also, he had suffered order of suspension five times for the said reason. It is further submitted that as per the Clause 19(16) of the Certified Standing Orders, unauthorized absence of a workman for more than 10 days amounts to misconduct. The respondent-workman did not submit his explanation after issuance of the charge-sheet against him and thus, the domestic inquiry proceeded ex-parte. The inquiry officer submitted the report holding the respondent-workman guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the Senior Divisional Manager of Jamadoba Group of Colliery (the disciplinary authority) passed the order dismissing the respondent-workman from service w.e.f. 06.02.1998. The respondent-workman challenged the order of dismissal after more than six years with no cogent explanation for committing such an inordinate delay. Neither the respondent-workman pleaded nor the learned tribunal recorded any finding as to what prejudice was caused to the respondent-workman by non-supply of the inquiry report. It is a settled law that non-supply of the copy of the inquiry report does not ipso facto vitiate the order of punishment in absence of any prejudice caused to the employee. Moreover, the learned CGIT should have considered the principle of “no work no pay” while determining the quantum of back wages. However, no such justification has been given in the impugned award. It is also submitted that if the learned CGIT had found any technical error while passing the order of dismissal, the matter should have been remitted to the petitioner-management for passing a fresh order. It is further submitted that the payment of the back wages does not follow the order of reinstatement in a routine manner, rather the fact as to whether the workman was gainfully employed during the intervening period is one of the prime considerations. It is further submitted that the payment of the back wages does not follow the order of reinstatement in a routine manner, rather the fact as to whether the workman was gainfully employed during the intervening period is one of the prime considerations. The impugned award does not discuss the said facts and thus the same cannot be sustained in law. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-workmen submits that the workmen were not provided the inquiry reports as well as second show cause notices, thus the orders of dismissal passed against them were in violation of the principles of natural justice. On duly appreciating the said facts, the learned CGIT has rightly passed the impugned awards of their reinstatement with 50% back wages. It is further submitted that even if the respondent-workmen absented for 10 days without any intimation, the quantum of punishment by passing the orders of dismissal is grossly disproportionate to the charge. Thus, the impugned awards need no interference. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on the record. By reasons of the impugned awards challenged in both the writ petitions, the orders of dismissal passed against the respondent-workmen were set aside by the learned CGIT on the ground that they were not provided with the second show-cause notices and the inquiry reports which is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner-management is that the concerned workmen failed to show before the learned CGIT as to what prejudice was caused to them due to non-supply of the inquiry reports and the second show-caused notices. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S.L Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 has held as under: “The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. Jagmohan reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 has held as under: “The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputed facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs. We do not agree with the contrary view taken by the Delhi High Court in the judgment under appeal.” 12. It may thus be construed that in the situation when only one conclusion is possible in a proceeding, the non-observance of the principles of natural justice is permissible, however if the possibilities are more than one, it is the duty of the disciplinary authority to provide an adequate opportunity to the delinquent employee to justify infliction of any lesser punishment. In the present case, for the alleged misconduct by the respondent-workmen, the dismissal from the services was not the only possible punishment and therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no prejudice was caused to the respondent-workmen by non-supply of the inquiry reports and the second show cause notices is fit to be rejected. 13. The next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if the learned CGIT found procedural irregularity in passing the order of dismissal against the respondent-workmen, the appropriate recourse was to remit the matter back to the petitioner-management for passing the fresh order after observing the principles of natural justice. In support of the said contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has put reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Y.S. Sadhu reported in (2008) 12 SCC 30 . The relevant part of the said judgment is quoted as under: “6. Similarly, in U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, it was noted as follows: (SCC pp. 275-76, paras 25-26) “25. The residual question is what would the appropriate direction in such a case be. The relevant part of the said judgment is quoted as under: “6. Similarly, in U.P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey, it was noted as follows: (SCC pp. 275-76, paras 25-26) “25. The residual question is what would the appropriate direction in such a case be. Stand of the employer is that it could have justified the order of termination by adducing any evidence even if it was held that there was some defect in the departmental proceedings. The solution is found in what was stated by this Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar. In para 31, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 758) ‘31. … in all cases where the enquiry officer’s report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If … the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short cuts. Since it is the courts/tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. Where after following the above procedure, the court/tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law.’ 26. In view of the above, we set aside the order of the learned Single Judge as affirmed by the Division Bench by the impugned judgment and direct that within a period of four months the enquiry shall be completed by starting from the stage of service of show-cause notice and consideration of the reply, if any, filed in accordance with the standing orders holding the field. Respondent 1 shall be reinstated to service but without any back wages and other service benefits and his reinstatement shall be solely for the purpose of completing the departmental proceedings. His entitlements, if any, would be adjudicated by the authorities depending upon the result of the disciplinary proceedings.” 14. Respondent 1 shall be reinstated to service but without any back wages and other service benefits and his reinstatement shall be solely for the purpose of completing the departmental proceedings. His entitlements, if any, would be adjudicated by the authorities depending upon the result of the disciplinary proceedings.” 14. It would thus be clear that if on an industrial adjudication, it is found that the inquiry report was not furnished to the delinquent employee/workman, the labour court/tribunal is required to cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the employee and to enquire as to what prejudice has been caused to him by not furnishing the same. If it is found that there has been violation of principles of natural justice, the proper recourse is to pass order for reinstatement of the concerned employee or the workman with liberty to the management to proceed with the inquiry by placing the concerned employee under suspension and to re-start the inquiry from the stage of furnishing of the inquiry report. Moreover, the question of entitlement of back wages and other consequential benefits from the date of dismissal of the employee to the date of his reinstatement should invariably be left to be decided by the disciplinary authority of the management in such a situation. In the factual context of the present case, it appears that though the learned CGIT found the orders of dismissal passed against the respondent-workmen to be vitiated by non-furnishing of the inquiry reports as well as the second show-cause notices, yet the matter was not remitted back to the disciplinary authority of the petitioner-management to pass fresh orders in compliance of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the learned CGIT has committed an error in not appreciating the law laid down by the Honb’le Apex Court as discussed here-in-above. 15. I also perused the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-workmen in the case of Sachchi Devi Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) JLJR 328 . 15. I also perused the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the respondent-workmen in the case of Sachchi Devi Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2011 (3) JLJR 328 . The learned Division Bench of this court after appreciating the factual context of the said case that the concerned employee had absented herself from work without prior permission due to the demise of her mother-in-law to attend her last rites and on performing the same, she returned to her duty immediately, it was held that nothing is reflected from the record that she was a habitual defaulter and thus, the order of termination was disproportionate and harsh. The employer however was given liberty, if found necessary, to issue proper show-cause notice to her to impose any minor punishment e.g. stoppage of payment for the period of absence. 16. Further, in the case of Employers in relation to the Management of Kustore Area of M/S Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, through Sri Anoop Kumar Sengupta Vs. Their Workman being represented by Sri N.G. Arun, the Secretary, Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh, Dhanbad reported in (2012) 3 JCR 33 (Jhr.), the fact was that the concerned workman had already crossed the age of superannuation and thus the learned tribunal held that he was entitled to get 75% back wages from the date of his dismissal till superannuation. The relevant part of the said judgment is quoted as under: “26. Admittedly, a copy of the enquiry report was not served on the concerned workman and he could not get any opportunity to file his reply. The concerned workman is an illiterate person and claimed to have put his L.T.I on the papers in course of the domestic enquiry. Learned Tribunal has taken into consideration those facts and circumstances while coming to the findings that there was violation of the principle of natural justice and that vitiates the order of punishment. 27. So far as challenge to the award of 75% of back wages in absence of any material or document on record showing that the concerned workman was not gainful employee is concerned, there is no such provision of law or settled formula providing that even for awarding some percentage of back wages, learned Tribunal has to see as to whether the concerned workman was gainfully employed. The decision of the Supreme Court, which has been cited on this point, does not indicate any such legal requirement for awarding back wages in percentage. That requirement has been said to be for awarding the full back wages.” 17. It would thus be evident that in the said case, since the workman had reached the age of superannuation, it was found appropriate to remand the matter to the management for fresh hearing. The fact of the present case being entirely different, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid case cannot be applied here. 18. In the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra and analogues cases reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 , as relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-workmen, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the earlier judgment rendered in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad Vs. B. Karunakar reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 wherein it was held that by reasons of 42nd amendment, the second right has been taken away from the charged officer, yet he has to receive the inquiry report which is an essential part of the first stage itself, and accordingly passed the order for release of the retiral benefits of the delinquent/charged officers considering the fact that 14 years had already elapsed since they attained the age of superannuation. Under the said background, it was found proper not to remit the case to the disciplinary authority to restart the proceeding against the delinquent officers. 19. In the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “35. The learned Single Judge agreed with the Tribunal that the action taken by the management to terminate the appellant’s service was per se illegal but set aside the award of back wages by making a cryptic observation that she had not proved the factum of non-employment during the intervening period. While doing so, the learned Single Judge not only overlooked the order passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.8404/2006, but also Rule 33 which prohibits an employee from taking employment elsewhere. While doing so, the learned Single Judge not only overlooked the order passed by the Division Bench in Writ Petition No.8404/2006, but also Rule 33 which prohibits an employee from taking employment elsewhere. Indeed, it was not even the pleaded case of the management that during the period of suspension, the appellant had left the Headquarter without prior approval of the Chief Executive Officer and thereby disentitling her from getting subsistence allowance or that during the intervening period she was gainfully employed elsewhere. 36. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed grave error by interfering with the order passed by the Tribunal for payment of back wages, ignoring that the charges levelled against the appellant were frivolous and the inquiry was held in gross violation of the rules of natural justice.” 20. However in the present case, the learned CGIT has not held that the charges levelled against the respondent-workmen were frivolous, rather by reasons of the impugned awards, the learned CGIT directed for their reinstatement on the sole ground of violation of principles of natural justice. Thus, the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B. Karunakar (supra) is not applicable in the fact situation of the present case. 21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present writ petitions are disposed of with a direction to the petitioner-management to reinstate the respondent-workmen with liberty to initiate fresh proceeding after providing sufficient opportunities of being heard. So far as the awards of the learned CGIT relating to grant of back wages to the respondent-workmen are concerned, the same are ordered to be kept in abeyance, which would be subject to the outcome of the proceedings to be held against the respondent-workmen who are at liberty to take plea of awarding lesser punishment considering the nature of the charges levelled against them. The impugned award dated 28.02.2012 passed in Reference Case no. 22 of 2009 in W.P.(L) no. 3306 of 2012 and the impugned award dated 05.03.2012 passed in Reference Case no. 57 of 2005 in W.P.(L) No. 3307 of 2012 are modified to aforesaid extent.