Patel Unity Joint Venture (Pujv) v. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited
2018-06-05
MOHAMMAD YAQOOB MIR, S.R.SEN
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Mohammad Yaqoob Mir, J. Delay of 38 days in filing the cross objection(appeal) is sought to be condoned, whereas, as per office report, delay is of 332 days. 2. Precise factual background for effectual adjudication of this application shall be advantageous to be noticed: I. Petitioner, M/S Patel Unity Joint Venture (PUJV), has been awarded Package II (Civil Works for Tenga Dam, River diversion, Tenga Intake and Head Race Tunnel) and Package III (Civil works of Head Race Tunnel, Surge Shaft, Pressure Tunnels, Power House and Tail Race Tunnels) in connection with Kameng Hydro Electric Project being executed in Arunachal Pradesh. II. A dispute arose and referred to the Arbitral Tribunal culminated in passing of arbitral award in favour of the petitioner. Aggrieved whereof, respondent-North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited, filed an application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act (AC Act) for setting aside the Arbitral Award before the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong. Application stand rejected vide order dated 21.04.2016, the award as such upheld. III. The petitioner too had a grievance against para 27 of the order passed by Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial) but did not opt to file appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act under the belief that in the National interest dam is to be built, therefore, respondent would not file the appeal but the respondent filed the appeal titled "North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd v. M/S Patel Unity Joint Venture (PUJV)" after the prescribed period of limitation. The application seeking condonation of 32 days delay registered as MC(ARB.A) No.4 of 2016 has been allowed by this Court vide order dated 3rd May, 2017. IV. After allowing the said application, Appeal filed under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was diarized and notice was issued on 19th May, 2017. It is thereafter petitioner herein (respondent therein) decided to file the cross objections, which, in terms of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, were to be filed within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of the day fixed for hearing the appeal or within such further time as the Appellate Authority would find fit to allow. Petitioner has filed application for condonation of delay for filing cross objection on 29.06.2017, therefore, delay is of 10 days only.
Petitioner has filed application for condonation of delay for filing cross objection on 29.06.2017, therefore, delay is of 10 days only. V. If the date for computation of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of order of the Civil Court dated 21.04.2016, then the delay is of 322 days. 3. Two important aspects, i.e. applicability of the Limitation Act and the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure, have already been settled by this Court in the order dated 03.05.2017 while disposing of MC(ARB.A) No.4 of 2016 titled "North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd v. M/S Patel Unity Joint Venture (PUJV)" as was filed by the respondent herein for condoning the delay in preferring the appeal against the same order of the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), Shillong. In the said order, while referring to various judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court and by the Bombay High Court, it has been concluded that the period of limitation for filing the appeal before the High Court against an order passed under Section 34 of the AC Act, setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award, is governed by clause (a) of Article 116 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It has been further referred in the order that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department" has held that there is no specific exclusion of the Code of Civil in its applicability, to the proceedings arising out of the AC Act, before a civil Court. 4. Further support to the said position can be had from the judgment rendered by the High Court of Delhi in the case of "Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited v. Applied Electronics Ltd" FAO (OS) 138 of 2013 decided on 28.07.2014, reported in AIR 2014 Delhi 182. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, relied on the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court reported in (2004) 3 SCC 250, and quoted paras 15 and 19 of the said judgment, which are advantageous to be quoted here-under: "15. Right to prefer cross objection partakes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one party may rest contended by his partial success with a view to giving a quietus to the litigation.
Right to prefer cross objection partakes of the right to prefer an appeal. When the impugned decree or order is partly in favour of one party and partly in favour of the other, one party may rest contended by his partial success with a view to giving a quietus to the litigation. However, he may like to exercise his right of appeal if he finds that the other party was not interested in burying the hatchet and proposed to keep the (sic) alive by pursuing the same before the appellate forum. He too may in such circumstances exercise his right to file appeal by taking cross objection. Thus taking any cross objection to the decree or order impugned is the exercise of right of appeal though such right is exercised in the form of taking cross objection. The substantive right is the right of appeal; the form of cross objection is a matter of procedure. 19. in Superintending Engineer and Ors. V.B. Subba Reddy (supra) a two Judges Bench of this Court observed (vide para 24) "if there is no right of cross - objection given under Section 39 of the Act, it cannot be read into Section 41 of the Act. Filing of cross objection is not procedural in nature. Section 41 of the Act merely prescribes that the procedure of the code would be applicable to the appeal under Section 39 of the Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that cross objection by the respondent was not maintainable..." Such observation is not correct and proceeds on certain wrong premises. Firstly, form of cross objection is procedural and is only a manner of exercising right of appeal which is substantive, as we have already stated.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that cross objection by the respondent was not maintainable..." Such observation is not correct and proceeds on certain wrong premises. Firstly, form of cross objection is procedural and is only a manner of exercising right of appeal which is substantive, as we have already stated. Secondly, it is not merely the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure which has been made applicable to proceedings under the Arbitration Act by Section 41(a) of the Act; the entire body of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has been made applicable to all proceedings before the Court and to all appeals under the Arbitration Act, 1940, the provision is general and wide in its applicability which cannot be curtailed; that only exception being where (sic) provisions of the Arbitration Act and/or of rules made there under may be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1909 in which case the applicability of the latter shall stand excluded but only to the extent of inconsistency. We may hasten to add that to the extent of our disagreement with the law laid down in B. Subba Reddy s case, the proposition appears to have been rather widely stated in that case. In fact the question before the Court in B. Subba Reddy s case was whether cross objection seeking the relief of award of interest at a higher rate was maintainable though such an order did not fall within the purview of Section 39(1) of the Act." 5. Paras 14 and 15 of the judgment rendered by Division Bench of Delhi High Court are also relevant to be quoted: "14. With reference to applicability of the Civil Procedure Code under Section 37 of the said Act, the learned counsel for the applicant has cited the case as ITI v. Siemens Ltd., AIR 2002 SC 2308 . Relevant para(s) are reproduced below:- 9. But Mr. Parsaran contended that the said order is based on an earlier reported judgment of this Court in the case of Shyam Sunder Agarwal & Co. v. Union of India (1996) 1 SCR 245 . According to Mr. Parsaran, the Court in the case of Nirma Ltd. (supra) has erroneously founded its conclusion on the said judgment in Shyam Sunder Agarwal s case.
v. Union of India (1996) 1 SCR 245 . According to Mr. Parsaran, the Court in the case of Nirma Ltd. (supra) has erroneously founded its conclusion on the said judgment in Shyam Sunder Agarwal s case. Learned counsel argued that the case of Shyam Sunder Agarwal (supra) arose under the Arbitration Act, 1940 which Act had made the provisions of the Code specifically applicable to proceedings arising under the said Act in the civil court whereas in the present Act such provision making the Code applicable is not found. Therefore, there is a substantial difference in law between the cases of Shyam Sunder Agarwal (supra) and Nirma Ltd. (supra). Therefore, the order of this Court in Nirma Ltd. (supra) is not a good law, hence, requires reconsideration. 10. We do not agree with this submission of the learned counsel. It is true in the present Act application of the Code is not specifically provided for but what is to be noted is: Is there an express prohibition against the application of the Code to a proceeding arising out of the Act before a civil court We find no such specific exclusion of the Code in the present Act. When there is no express exclusion, we cannot by inference hold that the Code is not applicable. 15. It was also contended by the applicant that in a recent case reported as Satpal P. Malhotra and Ors. v. Puneet Malhotra and Ors. Arbitration Appeal No. 12 of 2010 decided on 14.6.2013 the Bombay High Court has followed the decision in MCD v. International Security Intelligence Agency Ltd. (supra) and ruled that there is no bar to applying the Civil Procedure Code in proceedings of the Court under Section 37 of the said Act in the following terms:- 90. In my view, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would apply to the arbitration proceedings filed in court to the extent, it is not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. There is no bar under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act from applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the arbitration proceedings filed in court. section 19 of the Arbitration Act provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
There is no bar under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act from applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the arbitration proceedings filed in court. section 19 of the Arbitration Act provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The said provision does not apply to the proceedings filed in court including arbitration application filed under Section 34 or even appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. I am thus not inclined to accept the submission of Mr. D'vitre, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants that right of filing cross objections also must be provided under section 37 of the Act and not having provided, cross objections would not be maintainable. In my view, section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has to be read with the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in this case in particular Order 41, Rule 22 thereof. If arbitration appeal filed by the appellants in this court itself would not have been maintainable, cross objections filed by the respondents also in that event would not be maintainable. On perusal of Order 41, Rule 22 Sub Rule 4, it is clear that if original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, in such an event, cross objections filed by the respondents would nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the court thinks fit." 6. Instant application, in essence, seeks condonation of delay in filing the appeal (cross objections). The period of limitation for filing cross objections, in terms of Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is one month from the date of service of notice for hearing of the appeal which, in the appeal filed by the respondent after condonation of delay, has been issued on 19.05.2017 whereas the present petitioner has filed the application seeking condonation of delay on 29th June, 2017. That being so, there is delay of only ten (10) days. 7. It is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that there is no explanation for huge delay of 332 days.
That being so, there is delay of only ten (10) days. 7. It is the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that there is no explanation for huge delay of 332 days. The petitioner cannot take refuge under Order 41, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to claim that he could file cross objections within one month from the date notice was issued in the appeal of the respondent. The petitioner was conscious and aware that along with application seeking condonation of delay, memo of appeal has been filed. Once the application seeking condonation was filed, the petitioner too should have taken steps for filing the appeal (cross objection). Such a contention is without substance because the petitioner has tendered an explanation that he was not inclined to prefer any appeal as he was under bona fide belief that in the public interest i.e. for the execution of dam of national importance, respondent will not file appeal but the respondent after due deliberations and after hesitation decided to file appeal beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Until condonation and then until service of notice in the appeal, the petitioner could not file the cross objection. He invoked the right under Order 41, Rule 22 CPC i.e. to file cross objections which he could do only when the service of notice in the main appeal was effected upon him. Admittedly, notice in the appeal after condonation of delay has been issued on 19th May, 2017, so formally appeal was registered and it is only after its registration and issuance of notice for its hearing, petitioner got a cause for filing the cross objection. 8. Even otherwise, when against the order of Additional Deputy Commissioner (Judicial), appeal of the respondent has been entertained after condonation of delay, it would be in the better interests of both the parties and for avoiding protraction of the proceedings to hear also the cross objections, in the final analysis there will be adjudication on merits. 9. True it is that law of limitation has to be applied harshly when complete indolence is attributable to the seeker thereof. It is also equally true that the words "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal or cross objection well within time have to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice.
9. True it is that law of limitation has to be applied harshly when complete indolence is attributable to the seeker thereof. It is also equally true that the words "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal or cross objection well within time have to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice. When substantial justice and technical justice are pitted against each other, then former has a preference. No straight jacket formula is to be applied for condoning or not condoning the delay. Every case has its own peculiar facts and features and it is in the same background "sufficient cause" has to be given liberal construction or strict construction. 10. Petitioner cannot be blamed for his delayed action when he is specific in his pleadings to allege that he was under bona fide belief and sure that in the larger interests of construction of dam of national importance, the respondent will not file the appeal which belief was proved to be correct because the respondent filed the appeal after the prescribed period of limitation. 11. By allowing application of the petitioner, the worst that will happen is that the cross objection too will be decided on its merits along with the appeal of the respondent as has already been entertained for hearing after the delay having been condoned. 12. Regarding applicability of the Limitation Act as well as Code of Civil Procedure, in-keeping with the spirit of Sections 19 and 43 of the AC Act, 1996, which have been specifically referred to in the two judgments, one rendered by this Court in MC(Arb.A) No. 4 of 2016 dated 3rd May, 2017 arising out of the same lis and another in the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court in "Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Applied Electronics Ltd." as referred to above, there is no scope for taking a contrary view. 13. Viewed thus, the delay in filing the cross objection having been explained satisfactorily, therefore, application is allowed, delay condoned. Memo of appeal (cross objection) as filed along with the application be diarized and listed along with the appeal of the respondent titled "North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd. v. M/S Patel Unity Joint Venture (PUJV)" which has already been directed to be listed on 09-07-2018. 14. MC(ARB.A) No.3/2017 seeking condonation is disposed of as above.