JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants claimants. 2. This appeal is filed by the appellants-claimants against the judgment and award dated 24.07.2018 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Azamgarh in MACP No. 595 of 2010. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment and award dated 24th July, 2018 is wholly illegal and misconceived as such is liable to be set aside. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the deceased one Sant Lal Sharma was travelling along with one Ramkedar on a motorcycle bearing registration No. MH-04CS-0195 and on 02.12.2009 at about 11 P.M. when they were coming back after attending a marriage ceremony near village Nikaspur, Police Station Rajesultanpur, District Ambedkar Nagar, a jeep bearing registration No. U.P.-56B-3190 coming from other side in high speed has negligently dashed the motorcycle and on account of the said accident, both the motorcyclists sustained serious injuries and they died on the spot. 5. The claim petition is filed by the wife of the deceased Sant Lal Sharma and her five minor children claiming a compensation of Rs.25,00,000/-plus interest at the rate of 18%. 6. In the claim petition, the claimants claimed that on account of negligent and rash driving, the jeep has hitted the motorcycle and both the motorcycle rider sustained serious injuries and died on the spot. A first information report was lodged after last rites on the very next date i.e. 03.12.2009. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that admittedly in the first information report the number of offending vehicle was not mentioned, however, during the course of investigation, the involvement of the said offending jeep was found and accordingly police has submitted police report. 8. Based on the aforesaid police report, the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the claimants and dismissed the claim petition, hence the present appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the written statement of the owner of the jeep. 8. Based on the aforesaid police report, the Tribunal has rejected the claim of the claimants and dismissed the claim petition, hence the present appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the written statement of the owner of the jeep. The relevant contents of the written submission filed by the owner of the jeep before the Tribunal are quoted herein-below: ^^4- ;g fd eqdnek esa of.kZr ?kVuk ds le; ge Áfroknh ds mDr okgu pyk jgs ds ikl mDr okgu dks pykus gsrq oS/k ,oa ÁHkkoh MªkbZfoax ykblsUl Hkh FkkA 5- ;g fd eqdnek esa of.kZr ?kVuk esa ge Áfroknh ds mDr okgu ds pkyd dh dksbZ xyrh] rsth] ykijokgh o mis{kk ugha Fkh cfYd mijksDr ?kVuk Lo;a e`rd dh rsth] ykijokgh o mis{kk ds dkj.k gq;h gSA 6- ;g fd mijksDr ?kVuk ds le; ge Áfroknh dk mDr okgu Áfroknh uaŒ ¼2½ ds okjk.klh ls chek doj uksV la[;k 109000248362 }kjk fnukad 14-05-2009 ls 13-05-2010 rd ds fy, chfer Fkh ftlds dkj.k oknhx.k fdlh Hkh /kujkf'k dks bl U;k;ky; ds ek/;e ls ikus ds vf/kdkjh ik;s tkrs gSa rks mlds Hkqxrku dh rugk ftEesnkjh chek dEiuh Áfroknh uaŒ ¼2½ dh gS o gksxhA** 10. From bare perusal of the contents of the written submission filed by the owner of the jeep, it is crystal clear that the jeep in question was involved in the accident though the owner of the vehicle has stated that accident took place on account of negligence and wrong side movement of the motorcycle of the deceased on the middle of the road. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on the additional plea which was filed by the Insurance Company, a copy of which is enclosed along with memo of appeal. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred the content of paragraph no.31, 32, 34 of the additional plea filed by the Insurance Company, which are quoted herein below: "31. That the driver so called driver of vehicle JEEP No. U.P. 56 G/3190 has no effective & legal driving license at the time of accident. Hence O.P. No.2 will not be responsible for any damages claimed. 32. That the petitioner has not declared the 'Owner' Name of JEEP No. U.P. 56 G/3190 nor produce any R.C. Policy Permit Fitness. Hence in absence of these papers and owner's name Company will not be responsible for any claim. Hence O.P. No.2 will not be responsible for any damages claimed. 32. That the petitioner has not declared the 'Owner' Name of JEEP No. U.P. 56 G/3190 nor produce any R.C. Policy Permit Fitness. Hence in absence of these papers and owner's name Company will not be responsible for any claim. This claim is liable to be rejected. 34. That the said driver of JEEP No. U.P. 56 G/3190 was driving his vehicle carefully at right side and driver of motorcycle No. MH 04/CS/0195 was driving his motorcycle carelessly and negligently at middle of the road and invited the said accident. By the another vehicle said deceased was pillion rider on aforesaid motorcycle. There was sole negligence of motorcyclist. Deceased could not obtain any damages for negligence of motorcyclist from us. Hence O.P. No.2 will not be responsible for any damages claimed. All the version of this petition is false, groundless, face and perverse against natural law of justice. 13. From bare perusal of the aforesaid contents of the additional plea filed by the Insurance-Company before the Tribunal, this Court is of the opinion that neither the owner of the jeep nor the Insurance Company has disputed the involvement of the jeep in the said accident, whereas while passing the impugned order rejecting the claim of the claimants, the Tribunal has rejected the same based on the final report submitted by the police. 14. In my opinion, the Tribunal has clearly disregarded and disbelieved and failed to consider the contents of the written submission filed by owner of the vehicle or the additional plea filed by the Insurance company. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mangla Ram vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and Others (2018) 5 SCC 656 . The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the aforesaid appeal has settled/clarified the proper mode/manner of disposal of the appeal/issue. 16. Learned counsel has placed reliance on paragraph 22 to 25 of the aforesaid judgment which are quoted here-in-below; 22. The question is: whether this approach of the High Court can be sustained in law? The Hon'ble Apex Court while deciding the aforesaid appeal has settled/clarified the proper mode/manner of disposal of the appeal/issue. 16. Learned counsel has placed reliance on paragraph 22 to 25 of the aforesaid judgment which are quoted here-in-below; 22. The question is: whether this approach of the High Court can be sustained in law? While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla Devi (supra) noted the defence of the driver and conductor of the bus which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the police record indicating that the person standing at the rear side of the bus, suffered head injury when the bus was being reversed without blowing any horn. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paragraphs 1115, the Court observed thus: “11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant’s predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a postmortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 12. The deceased was a constable. Death took place near a police station. The postmortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. The postmortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the constable had taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus stand and near a police station. In such an event, the court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the first information report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant’s witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.” (emphasis supplied) The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi’s case (supra), this Court in Parmeswari (supra) noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated the testimony of the eyewitnesses in paragraphs 12 & 13 and observed thus: “12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court’s order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is “a device to grab money from the insurance company”. This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court’s order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is “a device to grab money from the insurance company”. This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted…….” 24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal and Ors., wherein it was contended by the vehicle owner that the criminal case in relation to the accident had ended in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under the IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in paragraph 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: “3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunals must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstances where it is fairly reasonable. The court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport must bring owner and driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice. Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard.” 19. In Dulcina Fernandes (supra), this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant’s eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi (supra). In paragraphs 8 & 9, of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shila Datta, has been adverted to as under: “8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted herein below: (SCC p. 518, para 10)” 10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. * * * (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. … (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.’ 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519) “10. … We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.’” In paragraph 10 of the reported decision [Dulcina Fernandes and Ors. (supra)], the Court opined that non-examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability. 17. From bare perusal of the observation/decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is clear that the expectation from the Tribunal is that the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability. 18. In view of the aforesaid, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the matter is relegated to the Tribunal with a direction to decide the claim petition afresh after due consideration of the evidence and the entire pleadings available on record. The Tribunal is directed to pass an appropriate orders in accordance with law within a period of three months after providing opportunity to all parties. 19. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.