JUDGMENT : 1. Liberty is granted to the writ petitioner to add the Union of India, service through the Secretary of the appropriate Ministry pertaining to Petroleum products by whatever name called, service at the Branch Secretariat, Union Ministry of Law, Justice, Company and Legal Affairs, at 11, Strand Road through the learned Central Government advocate/Joint Secretary of such Ministry as added party respondent No. 5. 2. The learned advocate on record of the writ petitioner is directed to effect amendment in the cause title of the writ petition herein and now. The necessary changes/amendments to the file and register and all cause papers shall be made by the learned advocate on record of the writ petitioner after approaching the department at a mutually convenient time. Such amendment/correction to the file and register and cause papers shall be carried out within a period of three weeks from the server copy being made available. (ii) Liberty is also given to the petitioner to use a supplementary affidavit bringing on record a copy of the letter dated June 19, 2017 disclosed by the writ petitioner today and alleged to have been sent by the learned advocate acting on behalf of the competent authority Mr. Malay Kumar Maity. (iii) Copies of the amended parts of the writ petition especially the cause title at pages 3 and 4 shall be served once again on each of the respondents. A copy of the amended writ petition shall be served on the added respondent. The copies of the supplementary affidavit shall be served on each of the respondents including the added respondent. Such service shall be completed within two weeks from the date of effecting amendment as aforesaid. 3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that despite the statutory prohibition under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 7 sub-Section (1) Clause (i) of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User Inland) Act, 1962 (Act No.50 of 1962) a pipeline has not only been laid but in fact three pipelines have been laid by the respondent corporation under the land, which is appurtenant to his Kutcha dwelling house. Section 7(i) reads as follows: 7. Section 7(i) reads as follows: 7. Central Government or State Government or corporation to lay pipelines.- (1) Where the right of user in any land has vested in the Central Government or in any State Government or Corporation under section 6- (i) it shall be lawful for any person authorised by the Central Government or such State Government or corporation, as the case may be, and his servants and workmen to enter upon the land and lay pipelines or to do any other act necessary for the laying of pipelines: Provided that no pipeline shall be laid under – (a) any land which, immediately before the date of the notification under sub-Section (1) of Section 3, was used for residential purposes; (b) any land on which there stands any permanent structure which was in existence immediately before the said date; (c) any land which is appurtenant to a dwelling house or (d) any land at a depth which is less than one metre from the surface;” 4. It is his further case that he is a day labour and that he has been paid Rs. 2,616/- way back in 1998 for acquisition of the rights of user of his land. The writ petition also discloses that by salami tactics, first the Respondent No.1 acquired the land for laying pipelines under it, though the lands were appurtenant to his dwelling house, wholly without jurisdiction and thereafter said that the portion of the pipelines has made the said Kutcha structure unsafe and that for this reason it would demolish Kutcha structure. However, the learned advocate appearing for the respondents correctly points out that the writ petitioner has admitted that the cause of action arose for the first time in 1997 and thereafter in 1998 when the paltry amount was paid, and that the writ petitioner did not avail of the statutory remedy for disputing the compensation paid to him, for more than 19 years. The Learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent No.1 and the competent authority also submits that the writ petitioner he has been suffering the illegality and acts without jurisdiction at least last 19 years and has not come to court. It is also the case of the learned advocate for the respondents that mere representation will not stop limitation from running. The Learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent No.1 and the competent authority also submits that the writ petitioner he has been suffering the illegality and acts without jurisdiction at least last 19 years and has not come to court. It is also the case of the learned advocate for the respondents that mere representation will not stop limitation from running. He submits that had this been a civil case where the statute of limitation is applicable mere representation would not have enlarged the period of limitation or given rise to a fresh period of limitation. Therefore it cannot be an explanation of the delay in filing the writ petition. The representation was made and replied to in 2017 which was far beyond the period of limitation from the original causes of action urged (paltry compensation and acquisition of right of user and laying of pipeline, without jurisdiction) and, therefore, it would not give rise to a fresh period of limitation and thus cannot be an explanation for the delay. It is his further case that the so-called dwelling house of the writ petitioner is nothing but a cattle-shed. He submits that ultimately the writ petitioner’s prayer for enhancement of compensation is not only bared by 19 years of limitation which ought to be held be a period of unexplained delay but further that this court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite the effective statutory remedy which is granted by Section 10 sub-Section 2 of the Petroleum and Minerals Pipelines (Acquisition of Right of User in Land) Act, 1962. He submits that the said provision not only provides the appropriate statutory forum but also has the power to go into the question of facts on which the petitioner is now seeking enhancement of the compensation. 5. The learned advocate for the respondent also draws the attention of the Court to Sections 13 and 14 of the said Act. 6. The contents of Sections 13 and 14 are quoted below : 13. Protection of action taken in good faith – (1) No suit, proceeding or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or notification made or issued there under. Protection of action taken in good faith – (1) No suit, proceeding or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or notification made or issued there under. (2) No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government, the competent authority or any State Government, or corporation for any damage, loss or injury caused or likely to be caused by anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or any rule or notification made or issued there under. 14. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts – Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the competent authority is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or proposed to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. 7. On the face of it Section 13 sub-Section (2) on which reliance is placed by the learned advocate for the respondent relates to immunity granted in respect of suit or other legal proceeding which phrase will have to be read ejusdem genesis and is in respect of bona fide acts on the part of any person pursuant to the Act of 1962. Section 2 grants immunity to the authorities and the governments and the corporations concerned, but for that the person concerned, who seeks immunity, is required to show that the action complained of was taken in good faith. In the instant case, prima facie it is apparent that when a statutory authority exercising powers purportedly under Section 7 of the said Act not only violates the provisions of the Act under which he purports to act but ignores it and acts wholly without jurisdiction by laying pipelines under the land appurtenant to a dwelling house, the authorities cannot say that they did it on good faith. The fact that there is a dwelling house on the said land is too glaring a physical fact to enable the authorities to allege that they did it in good faith. 8. The fact that there is a dwelling house on the said land is too glaring a physical fact to enable the authorities to allege that they did it in good faith. 8. The authorities and its officers concerned committed acts, prima facie, without jurisdiction and knowing it to be so. 9. In order to accept the submission made by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents rather ingenuously, I will have to hold that even when an act is wholly without jurisdiction, the writ court should not interfere but allow the authorities to get away with it under a clause in the statute granting immunity from civil suits and other legal proceedings only in respect of acts in good faith, which prima facie this is not. 10. I am not inclined to accept such an interpretation of Section 13 as would emasculate the writ court at the threshold. So far as Section 14 is concerned by now it is well settled that the bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not a bar to judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India especially when it is doing its Constitutional duty to keep arrogant statutory authorities within the purview of their statutory power and when there is no bar under the Constitution of India to judicially review the acts undertaken purportedly under the said Act of 1962. It is not in dispute that if the land does appertain to a dwelling house, Section 7 of the Act of 1962 does not allow the respondent Corporation to acquire the right of user and lay a pipeline under that land. 11. Since as of today the writ petitioner is on oath and respondents are not, I have to proceed on the basis of the premises that there is a kutcha dwelling house and the land in question appertains thereto under which the respondent Corporation has laid pipelines wholly without jurisdiction. Therefore, prima facie, it is procedurally ultra vires. 12. 11. Since as of today the writ petitioner is on oath and respondents are not, I have to proceed on the basis of the premises that there is a kutcha dwelling house and the land in question appertains thereto under which the respondent Corporation has laid pipelines wholly without jurisdiction. Therefore, prima facie, it is procedurally ultra vires. 12. So far as, the question of delay is concerned it is true that the court of equity shall give aid to the vigilant but it is difficult for me to perceive of a situation where an authority or “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India can be allowed to say that delay, for however long a time, would convert an act wholly without jurisdiction and a nullity, into a lawful act. The acts complained to be wholly without jurisdiction in a manner which violates prima facie the fundamental rights of the petitioner, a daily labour, under Article 19(1)g read with Article 21 of the Constitution as also Article 14 thereof have to be inquired into before taking a decision finally. 13. The acts of the Respondents as complained of, comprise first attempting to acquire the right of user of the lands of the petitioner on which he has a dwelling house, secondly paying him only Rs.2,616 to first take the right of user of his land, which contains a dwelling house, though kutcha, and then, wholly without jurisdiction, laying pipelines under the said land appertaining to a dwelling house, and then alleging that due to the operation of the pipelines the kutcha structure has become unsafe and then by threatening to demolish the kutch structure thus rendering him homeless and relegate him to finding on the daily wages of a daily labour and a princely compensation of Rs.2,616 paid in 1998, presumably require him to build or acquire a shelter in any civilized part of West Bengal. Had the writ petitioner known that this was the intention of the oil company, he would certainly have challenged the acquisition itself in a Court of law. Despite the aforesaid, the learned Advocate for the respondents seeks to set up delay and alternative remedy as grounds for not entertaining the writ petition. 14. By now it is well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. Despite the aforesaid, the learned Advocate for the respondents seeks to set up delay and alternative remedy as grounds for not entertaining the writ petition. 14. By now it is well settled that an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar. In case the writ petitioner can show that there is gross violation of his fundamental rights or the basic principles of natural justice, or acts wholly without jurisdiction on the face of the records, among a few other exceptions, the writ court is not powerless to interfere merely because of alternative statutory remedy. I rely upon the judgment reported in the case of Registrar of Trademarks—v—Whirlpool Corporation reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 15. In fact, since the question relating to lack of jurisdiction is dependent upon a question of fact as to whether or not there was a dwelling house on the land under which the pipelines were laid, at the time when the pipelines were proposed to be laid and in fact laid, I had invited the learned Advocate for the Respondent to consider whether the matter ought to be heard further before affidavits had been exchanged. 16. However, the Learned Advocate for the Respondents continued to insist with unfailing humility that he be heard to oppose the writ petition on all grounds before calling for affidavits including on grounds which could not be decided without first having the Respondents deny on oath statements made on oath. Hence I heard him in extenso. However, I cannot persuade myself to agree with the learned Advocate for the Respondents that I should ignore a statement made on oath by the petitioner that there is a dwelling house on the land in question under which the pipelines were laid, which dwelling house is now being threatened to be demolished by the Respondent authorities, merely because the Learned Advocate says there is no dwelling house, before filing an Affidavit-in-Opposition though he intends to file it. 17. Since the liberty to file supplementary affidavit has already been given, the writ petitioner has ample opportunity to explain the question of delay in making this application. 18. 17. Since the liberty to file supplementary affidavit has already been given, the writ petitioner has ample opportunity to explain the question of delay in making this application. 18. The Respondents shall file their affidavit-in-opposition to be filed within six weeks from date of service of copy of the amended parts of the writ petition on them and in case of the added respondent, within six weeks from the date of service of the copy of the amended writ petition itself; reply; if any, be filed three weeks thereafter. 19. I find that the petitioner has made out a strong prima facie case on records and the preponderance of balance of convenience is in favour of the writ petitioner and the orders prayed for being passed. There is great urgency in the matter since demolition is threatened and the learned Advocate for the Respondent No.1 is not in a position to assure that there will be no demolition during the pendency of the interim order, but he submits orally, without any document that even if there is demolition of the kutcha structure, the writ petitioner will not be homeless but he has a two storied pucca structure nearby. Since demolition has been threatened, if the interim order as passed is not granted, it would amount to refusal of the writ petition on the first day and so it is a rare case where such an interim relief has been granted on the above tentative findings and to preserve the status quo of the said lands. 20. Therefore, I find it a fit and proper case to pass an interim order. There shall be an interim order to the effect that the respondents and/or not their men, agents, servants, staff, employees and/or anyone claiming there under shall not demolish the dwelling house of the petitioner on the lands in question and neither shall they or any of them so use the lands in question and/or act as would affect the said kutcha dwelling house to the prejudice of the writ petitioner or affect his peaceful possession thereof. If necessary, the petitioner may apply to the police authorities under the Howrah Police Commissioner ate and the concerned police station to prevent the respondent Indian Oil Corporation and/or its personnel from entering upon the said land, and if such request is made, the Commissioner of Police, Howrah, shall ensure that the respondent Indian Oil Corporation and/or its personnel and/or anyone claiming there under shall not to have access to the premises without the leave of the writ petitioner. It is of course, needless to mention that the writ petitioner shall not unreasonably refuse to grant such leave to have access to his land to the respondent No.1 and/or its personnel for the essential purposes of maintaining and operating the pipelines under his land which are in question herein. The interim order shall continue till disposal of the writ petition. 21. Let the matter appear in the list ten weeks hence from the date of effect the service of the notice. I hastily point out that all points including delay and alternative remedy as raised by the learned Advocate for the Respondent No.1 are kept open for being decided finally at the time of final hearing of the writ petition and the above findings are tentative and only prima facie.