JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - The petitioner has been convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- as compensation to the complainant-respondent within a period of 30 days from the date of passing of the order for an offence having been committed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short the ''Act'') by the learned trial Magistrate on 27.02.2017/04.03.2017, which conviction and sentence was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, on 24.11.2017, constraining him to file the present petition. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the relations inter se respondent and petitioner were very good. The petitioner was in dire need of money and approached respondent and borrowed a sum of Rs.1,30,000/- and in discharge of the aforesaid liability issued one cheque bearing No.0387354 dated 15.07.2013 for an amount of Rs.1,30,000/- drawn at The Jogindra Central Co-operative Bank, Nalagarh Branch,District Solan. The cheque on presentation was returned unpaid vide memo dated 27.07.2009 with the remarks "payment stopped by drawer". The respondent thereafter got issued a statutory notice, however, despite receipt thereof, the petitioner neither responded nor paid the aforesaid amount, constraining the respondent to file a complaint under Section 138 of the Act. 3. On the basis of the oral evidence adduced by the respondent, the Court took cognizance and summoned the petitioner. 4. The respondent in order to substantiate his case examined himself, whereas, the petitioner after being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not lead any evidence and only tendered the documents Ex. D1 copy of the statement of the respondent and Ex. D2 copy of notice. 5. As observed earlier, the learned trial Magistrate after hearing the parties and perusing the evidence on record, convicted the petitioner as aforesaid, and the appeal filed against the said conviction and sentence, also came to be dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge. 6. It is vehemently argued by Shri Ajay Chandel, Advocate, Legal Aid Counsel, for the petitioner that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are perverse and, therefore, deserve to be set aside. Whereas, Shri Ramakant Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Basant Thakur, Advocate, for the respondent, would support the judgments by contending that the same being in accordance with law call for no interference. 7. Whereas, Shri Ramakant Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Basant Thakur, Advocate, for the respondent, would support the judgments by contending that the same being in accordance with law call for no interference. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 8. However, before I deal with the contentions put-forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be necessary to delineate the scope and power of this Court while dealing with revision petition of the instant kind. 9. In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another , (1973) AIR SC 799, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 10. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu , (1979) AIR SC 663, the Hon''ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram , (1973) AIR SC 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that "judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system". 11. In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad , (1986) AIR SC 1436, the Hon''ble Apex Court observed that High Court "committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence" as in its revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact". 12. In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh , (1986) AIR SC 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following terms: "It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." 13. In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR SC 26, Hon''ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. 14. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu , (1993) AIR SC 1126 = II (1992) CCR 458 (SC), the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. 15. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR SC 26 the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint." 16. In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another , (1997) AIR SC 2485 = II (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1962) AIR SC 1788; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh , (1968) AIR SC 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu , (1975) AIR SC 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh , (1981) AIR SC 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when "there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice". 17. 17. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri , (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 18. In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao , (2000) 10 SCC 338 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment." 19. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law and restricted scope of revisional jurisdiction, I have proceeded to analyze in brief the evidence available on record. 20. The respondent appeared as CW-1 and tendered his evidence by way of an affidavit Ex.CW-1/A reiterating the averments made in the complaint. The respondent was cross-examined by learned counsel for the petitioner and he denied that the cheque amount was towards some committee comprising of 14 persons in which every member after collecting the amount from remaining members was obliged to deposit the same in the committee and it was in lieu of this that the cheque had been issued to the committee by the petitioner as security. 21. 21. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence that has come on record, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are in any manner perverse and, even otherwise, it was for the petitioner to have rebut the presumption as attached to the Negotiable Instruments Act. 22. The petitioner cannot now question his liability before this Court and having failed to do so, he is bound to suffer the consequences thereof. 23. Having said so, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.