Minu Devi wife of late Suresh Ram v. State of Jharkhand
2018-08-23
SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The petitioner is aggrieved of order dated 29.03.2017 by which her application for compassionate appointment has been rejected on the ground that she does not possess the minimum qualification under Resolution dated 02.09.2011 of the Finance Department. 2. Plea urged on behalf of the petitioner is that it is the date of death of her husband which shall be the reckoning date on which her eligibility for appointment on Group-D post has to be examined. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on decisions in “Kaushlendra Kumar Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others” reported in 2017 (2) JBCJ 361(HC) and “N. T. Devin Katti and Others Vs. Karnataka Public Service Commission and Others” reported in (1990) 3 SCC 157 . 3. Petitioner’s husband who was working as Sweeper in Police Training Centre/College, Hazaribagh died in harness on 22.08.2011. She asserts that she has submitted an application for her appointment on compassionate grounds in May, 2012. However, when no decision was taken on her application, compelled, she came to this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3465 of 2016. The writ petition stood disposed of by an order dated 15.07.2016 with a direction to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, F.T.C-respondent no. 3 to decide her claim on merits within 12 weeks. In purported compliance of the writ Court’s order, in the meeting of the District Compassionate Committee held on 07.03.2017 petitioner’s claim for compassionate appointment was considered, however, it was rejected on the ground that she does not possess the minimum qualification of Class-X pass. 4. Stand taken by the respondent-State is that an applicant must possess the qualification which is necessary at the time of consideration, that is, under Resolution dated 02.09.2011 for appointment on a Class-D post. In support of the aforesaid stand, Mr. Chanchal Jain, the learned State counsel refers to decisions in “MGB Gramin Bank Vs. Chakrawarti Singh” reported in (2014)13 SCC 583 and in “Canara Bank and Another Vs. M. Mahesh Kumar” reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 . 5. From the facts disclosed in the present proceeding it cannot be disputed that on the date of death of her husband the petitioner had requisite qualification, that is, Class-VIII pass which was the minimum qualification for appointment on a Group-D post; petitioner’s husband has died on 22.08.2011.
M. Mahesh Kumar” reported in (2015) 7 SCC 412 . 5. From the facts disclosed in the present proceeding it cannot be disputed that on the date of death of her husband the petitioner had requisite qualification, that is, Class-VIII pass which was the minimum qualification for appointment on a Group-D post; petitioner’s husband has died on 22.08.2011. Scheme for compassionate appointment formulated by way of a policy of the employer is a welfare scheme intended at extending a helping hand to the family in financial distress. Being in the nature of beneficial rules; it partakes the character of service rule, the provisions under the scheme for compassionate appointment are required to be construed liberally and, if necessary, relaxed in favour of the beneficiary. It is really not understandable why the employer which itself has floated a scheme for the benefit of the family of its ex-employee denies benefits under the scheme on a technical ground. Approach of the employer should be to give and not to deny. A pedantic approach in a matter like this must be avoided. It is in this context the Supreme Court has interpreted the schemes for compassionate appointment to the extent that if on the date of consideration an employee has attained the minimum qualification compassionate appointment to the dependant of a deceased employee should not be denied. In the context of the contention raised by the learned State counsel that it is the scheme which was prevalent on the date of consideration under which an application for compassionate appointment should be decided, it is pertinent to indicate that by now it is no longer an issue for debate that, if the rules do not prohibit and the subsequent scheme does not bring about fundamental changes in the scheme itself, it is the scheme which extends more benefits to the family of a deceased employee that shall be made applicable. However, the issue involved here is entirely different. The judgments in “Canara Bank” and MGB Gramin Bank” have been rendered in the context of peculiar facts of the case. The judgment in “N.T. Devin Katti” supports the plea urged on behalf of the petitioner that, it is the date of death on which her eligibility has to be examined. 6. Another aspect of the matter is that on the date of consideration a new scheme for compassionate appointment was in vogue.
The judgment in “N.T. Devin Katti” supports the plea urged on behalf of the petitioner that, it is the date of death on which her eligibility has to be examined. 6. Another aspect of the matter is that on the date of consideration a new scheme for compassionate appointment was in vogue. This is contained in latter dated 01.12.2015. Clause 9 of this scheme reads as under: ^^9- vuqdEik ds vk/kkj ij fu;qfDr gsrq vgZrk D;k gksxh\ vuqdEik ds vk/kkj ij fu;qfDr ds fy, vkosnd dks& ¼d½ e`r ljdkjh lsod ds vkfJr ifjokj ds Hkj.k iks"k.k dk lQyrkiwoZd ogu djus laca/kh ?kks"k.kk djuk gksxkA ¼?kks"k.kk i= dk izk:i layXu½ ¼[k½ ngst ugha ysus@nsus rFkk ljdkjh lsok esa fu;qfDr ls lacaf/kr vU; 'krsZa iwjh djuh gksxhA ¼x½ 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk ,oa vgZrk & vkosnd dh 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk ,oa vgZrk izLrkfor in dh fu;qfDr fu;ekoyh esa fofgr izko/kku ds vuqlkj gksxhA fdUrq vU; okaNuh; vgZrk iwjh ugh djus okys vH;fFkZ;ksa dh fu;qfDr izLrkfor in ij bl 'krZ ds lkFk dh tk;sxh] fd lsok vof/k esa okaNuh; vgZrk izkIr fd;s fcuk mudh lsok dh laiqf"V ugha gksxhA ijUrq vkosnd] ;fn ikxy@fnokfy;k ?kksf"kr gks ;k laKs; vijk/k ds fy, U;wure 6 ekg dk dkjkokl dkV pqdk gks ;k ftl ij U;k;ky; esa ,slk eqdnek fopkjk/khu gks ftlesa e`R;q naM ;k 6 ekl ;k blls vf/kd vof/k ds dkjkokl dk n.M vf/kjksfir fd;k tk ldrk gS] rks ml vkosnd dk vuqdEik ds vk/kkj ij fu;qfDr gsrq nkok vuqekU; ugha gksxkA^^ 7. Proviso to sub-clause (c) to clause 9 provides that an applicant who does not fulfill “other requisite qualifications” shall be appointed with a condition that his services shall not be confirmed if during the service tenure he does not acquire the requisite qualifications. For appointment on a Group-D post the only qualification which is required of an applicant is the educational qualification. Mr. Chanchal Jain, the learned State counsel, however, submits that the expression “other requisite qualifications” indicates that this proviso is intended to extend benefits only to such candidates who under the rules are required to possess certain other qualifications also, besides the educational qualification. However, I find that no such indication is incorporated in the rules, rather the expression in sub-clause (c) is “educational eligibility and qualification”. It is well-settled that “proviso” to the main provision restricts its operation.
However, I find that no such indication is incorporated in the rules, rather the expression in sub-clause (c) is “educational eligibility and qualification”. It is well-settled that “proviso” to the main provision restricts its operation. Moreover, in the context of appointment on a Group-D post except physical fitness and minimum educational qualification no other qualification is prescribed under the rules. The power to relax under proviso to sub-clause (c) to clause 9 has not been exercised by the respondents and no reason has been disclosed in the counter-affidavit why this relaxation cannot be extended to the petitioner. At this stage, however, I must indicate that this is not the reason why the impugned order dated 29.03.2017 warrants interference of this Court rather, the reason is that at the relevant time the petitioner possessed the requisite minimum educational qualification for appointment on a Group-D post. It also needs to be recorded that no other reason for not appointing the petitioner on a Group-D post is reflected either in the impugned order dated 29.03.2017 or pleaded in the counter-affidavit. 8. In the aforesaid facts and for the reasons indicated hereinabove, the impugned order dated 29.03.2017 is quashed. 9. The writ petition stands allowed. Subject to her physical fitness, as required under the rules, the respondent no. 3 shall ensure that the petitioner is offered appointment on a suitable Group-D post, within 6 weeks.