JUDGMENT : P. N. DESHMUKH, J. Rule, made returnable forthwith. By consent of learned counsel for parties, heard finally. 2. Prayer in this petition is for quashing of FIR No. 8/2017 registered by respondent no. 1 for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 376(2)(n), 417, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. It is the case of applicants that they are falsely involved by respondent no. 2 by suppressing material facts and even according to the report, co-accused Kushal Hatwar and respondent no. 2 had developed love relationship since 2013 and no offence as alleged can be made out against applicant. It is also submitted that report is lodged belatedly in the year 2017 of alleged incidents of 2013 and has thus prayed that application be allowed. 4. It appears to be the case of respondent no. 2 as revealed from report dated 5-10-2017 that her marriage was solemnized with one Pranav Thombre on 22-5-2017. Co-accused Kushal, who was residing as her neighbour, used to meet her since 2013 and, as such, they were acquainted with each other. It is also alleged that during that period, co-accused on the pretext of marrying respondent no. 2 developed physical relations with her and for this reason, respondent no. 2 had accompanied him at various places where they got indulged in physical relation, however, after he refused to marry respondent no. 2, complaint came to be lodged. 5. It is further case of respondent no. 2 that during her acquaintance with Kushal, he took her obscene video clips and photographs on his mobile phone and refused to delete the same in spite of respondent no. 2 requested to delete the same. Eventually, respondent no. 2 got married, while co-accused continued to harass her on this count. Respondent no. 2 as such on 8-9-2017 visited house of co-accused Kushal with a request to delete such clippings and photographs from his mobile phone, failing which, she would lodge report with the police. It is her further case that in this background, on 992017, when she was proceeding to lodge report to Police Station, Kanhan, accused Kushal along with co-accused Shubham Band conspired to bring respondent no. 2 in the office of accused Kushal on some pretext and accordingly after bringing her to his office, they forcibly attempted to administer poison to her. Respondent no. 2 in the office of accused Kushal on some pretext and accordingly after bringing her to his office, they forcibly attempted to administer poison to her. Respondent no. 2 was thus admitted in the hospital and on her discharge, lodged report upon which offences came to be registered as aforesaid. 6. During the course of submissions, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has pointed out affidavit-in-reply which reveals that on investigation, Investigating Officer has forwarded discharge form under Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking discharge of all the applicant nos. 1 to 6 as there is no evidence to file chargesheet against them. In paragraph no. 8 of affidavit-in-reply of respondent-State, it is clearly stated that the chargesheet is being forwarded against accused Kushal Hatwar, Shubham Band, Rahul Hatwar and Pranali Hatwar as there is evidence against these accused persons for the offence of attempt to commit murder of complainant/respondent no. 2. 7. In view of say of prosecution as aforesaid, as it is specifically stated that there is no evidence against any of the applicants establishing their role in the crime registered as aforesaid and as Investigating Officer has already sought their discharge in the present crime, question that would be required to be considered is as to whether facts of the present case justify warranting invoking jurisdiction under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure or not. For that reasons, we may gainfully refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ), which read thus : “108. For that reasons, we may gainfully refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ), which read thus : “108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code, which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if, they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by Police Officers under Section 151(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence, but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a Police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 8. Keeping in mind guidelines as aforesaid and contents of first information report, we are of the view that even if allegations in the first information report taken at their face value are accepted to be true and correct, they do not prima facie constitute commission of offence. We, therefore, find that present case would fall within clause (1) of the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Accordingly, the application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (i) insofar as it relates to applicant nos. 1 to 6 only. 9. The application is disposed of in above terms.