JUDGMENT : Siddhartha Varma, J. The petitioners were admitted as Asamis and their Pattas were cancelled on 2.5.2001. When the petitioners came to know about this order, they filed a Revision in the year 2015. This Revision was dismissed on 11.4.2018 saying that the Revision was filed beyond the limitation provided for filing a Revision. A further reason for dismissing the Revision was that an Asami Patta was for five years and, therefore, no notice was required before the cancellation of it. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that eviction, even of an Asami, could be done only after putting the Pattedar to notice. He submits that when there was no notice, eviction was bad. Learned counsel further submits that even a trespasser has to be evicted by following the due process of law as has been held by the Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by Legal Representative Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh & Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 620 . Learned counsel read out paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 and so they are being reproduced here as under : "(10) In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, ( AIR 1924 PC 144 at p. 147), the Privy Council observed: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." (11) In K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani, ILR (1954) Bom 950 at p. 957 = ( AIR 1954 Bom 358 at p. 360), Chagla, C.J. stated that the law in India was essentially different from the law in England. He observed: "Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. He observed: "Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. Under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has 'been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under s. 9 and claim possession against the true Owner." (12) In Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, ILR (1958) 2 All 394 at p. 404 = ( AIR 1959 All 1 at p.4) In Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy, ( AIR 1924 PC 144 at p. 147), the Privy Council observed: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." (11) In K.K. Verma v. Naraindas C. Malkani, ILR (1954) Bom 950 at p. 957 = ( AIR 1954 Bom 358 at p. 360), Chagla, C.J. stated that the law in India was essentially different from the law in England. He observed: "Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. Under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has 'been thrown out of possession cannot go to Court under s. 9 and claim possession against the true Owner." (12) In Yar Mohammad v. Lakshmi Das, ILR (1958) 2 All 394 at p. 404 = ( AIR 1959 All 1 at p.4), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed: "No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case (under. s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act). s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the: best of all titles. The restoration of possession in such a suit is, however, always subject to a regular title suit and the person who has the real title or even the better title cannot, therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession." The High Court further observed: "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual' possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause. As observed by Edge, C.J., in Wali Ahmed Khan v. Ayodhya Kundu, (1981 ILR 13 All 537 at p. 556: "The object of the section was to drive the person who wanted to eject a person into the proper court and to prevent them from going with a high hand and ejecting such persons." ....................... (15) In our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly stated by the Privy Council, by Chagla, C.J., and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the cases cited above. (16) For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the High Court erred in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs, judgment of the High Court set aside and the order of the Board of Revenue restored. 1959 All 1 at p.4), the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed: "No question of title either of the plaintiff or of the defendant can be raised or gone into in that case (under. s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the: best of all titles. s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act). The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed without proving any title on which he can fall back upon and the defendant cannot succeed even though he may be in a position to establish the: best of all titles. The restoration of possession in such a suit is, however, always subject to a regular title suit and the person who has the real title or even the better title cannot, therefore, be prejudiced in any way by a decree in such a suit. It will always be open to him to establish his title in a regular suit and to recover back possession." The High Court further observed: "Law respects possession even if there is no title to support it. It will not permit any person to take the law in his own hands and to dispossess a person in actual' possession without having recourse to a court. No person can be allowed to become a judge in his own cause. As observed by Edge, C.J., in Wali Ahmed Khan v. Ayodhya Kundu, (1981 ILR 13 All 537 at p. 556: "The object of the section was to drive the person who wanted to eject a person into the proper court and to prevent them from going with a high hand and ejecting such persons." ....................... (15) In our opinion, the law on this point has been correctly stated by the Privy Council, by Chagla, C.J., and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in the cases cited above. (16) For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the High Court erred in quashing the order of the Board of Revenue. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs, judgment of the High Court set aside and the order of the Board of Revenue restored." 3. Section 202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and section 131 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code') provide for a suit for eviction. Under such circumstances, a suit had to be filed. 4. Further learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, authorities ought to have considered if the benefits of the provisions of Section 76(1)(dd) of the Code could be extended to the petitioners. Under such circumstances, a suit had to be filed. 4. Further learned counsel for the petitioners submits that as per the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, authorities ought to have considered if the benefits of the provisions of Section 76(1)(dd) of the Code could be extended to the petitioners. This having not been done, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the orders impugned in this petition are bad in law and deserve to be set-aside. 5. Learned counsel further submitted that when a lease was being sought to be cancelled then definitely it meant that it was subsisting on that day. He submitted that a subsisting lease could only be cancelled by a notice as is provided under the Transfer of Property Act. In this regard he relied upon 1980 ALJ 627 (Abdul Salam Vs. Board of Revenue) and read out certain portion of paragraph 5 and so the same is being reproduced here as under : ".......... As regards the second argument that lease was for one year and the terms having expired this court should not grant any declaratory relief. The argument does not appear to be correct. The petitioners were granted patta which was in accordance with law. The effect of grant of patta was that they acquired rights to continue in possession over the land in dispute which could come to an end if the lease was determined in accordance with the procedure provided under the Gaon Sabha Manual and the Rules framed under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act or if a suit for their ejectment was filed. The respondents in fact did make an application for cancellation of the lease before Assistant Collector. It is the 'Correctness of the order passed by Additional Collector which is subject matter of challenge of this writ petition. It is therefore not easy to understand how can the petition be dismissed on the ground that the term of which lease was granted has expired. As observed above mere expiry of term of lease does not bring an end to the right of the petitioner unless it is determined in accordance with law. There being no determination only remedy of respondent was to file an application for cancellation and if it is found that cancellation is not in accordance with law the petition cannot be dismissed. ..........." 6. There being no determination only remedy of respondent was to file an application for cancellation and if it is found that cancellation is not in accordance with law the petition cannot be dismissed. ..........." 6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that since the lease was for a period of five years, the petitioners had to be evicted and, therefore, no indulgence be granted to them. Learned Standing Counsel also submits that even a notice before the eviction was not required. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that before any person is evicted from any land or property, a notice is a must. Even a trespasser has to be evicted by following due process of law as has been held by the Supreme Court in Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs. Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao reported in AIR 1989 SC 2097 . 8. Under such circumstances, the order dated 2.5.2001 passed by the Assistant Collector, Shamli and the order dated 11.4.2018 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Saharanpur Division, Saharanpur are quashed. The matter is remanded back to the Assistant Collector, Shamli for a fresh adjudication. If it is found that the petitioners are to be evicted, then due process of law shall be adopted. It is further directed that if the petitioners are found entitled for the benefits which flow from section 76(1)(dd) of the Code, the same shall be granted to them. 9. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.