JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTHA CHATTOPADHYAY, J. 1. Doubting the correctness of the judgment dated 18.07.2016 passed by the trial court in G.A. No. 422 of 2015 and C.S. No. 301 of 2009, the defendant/appellant has preferred this appeal. 2. The appellant ventilated his grievances contending inter alia, that the learned Judge failed to appreciate the position of law so far as section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as N.I. Act) is concerned. He also triggered at the issue that the cheques issued by him was for getting certain amount of shares of Cherry Hills Estates Pvt. Ltd. and it was not at all a legally enforceable debt, which is the prime consideration of a proceeding under section 138 of N.I. Act. He has made a forceful submission that the learned Judge also relied on ‘account confirmation statement’ pertaining to the year ended on March 31, 2015 for which the cheques were issued that were ultimately dishonoured. 3. As against this, the plaintiff/respondent submitted that the learned trial court has considered all the material aspects in its proper perspectives and there is hardly any scope to interfere. Therefore, at this stage, we are called upon to answer on the following points :- (a) Was there any unequivocal admission by the defendant/appellant regarding claim? (b) Whether issuance of cheques tant amounts to admission of a legally enforceable debt which has been reflected in the ‘account confirmation statement’ showing a balance of Rs.22,45,000/-and Rs.23,77,000/-? 4. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the factual aspect of the case is required to be recapitulated. Shorn of unnecessary details, the plaintiff’s case in a encapsulated form is that in the year of 1996, the defendant/appellant approached him for financial help and on the basis of the assurance given by the defendant/appellant to pay the dues, the plaintiff had accommodated a loan to the tune of Rs.50,40,000/-. The defendant/appellant accepted the said amount and he has also paid the dues from time to time to the tune of Rs.13,85,137/-. After 28.12.2002 the defendant stopped payment. The plaintiff further averred that in discharge of liability, the defendant had issued two cheques amounting to Rs.22,45,000/- and Rs.15,10,000/-. The defendant/appellant requested the plaintiff not to present the cheques because there was insufficiency of fund at that time. He assured that he would take steps for repayment. After 28.12.2002 the defendant stopped payment. The plaintiff further averred that in discharge of liability, the defendant had issued two cheques amounting to Rs.22,45,000/- and Rs.15,10,000/-. The defendant/appellant requested the plaintiff not to present the cheques because there was insufficiency of fund at that time. He assured that he would take steps for repayment. Since the defendant did not keep his commitment, the plaintiff had to present those cheques before the bank authority, which ultimately bounced. In such circumstances, he had lodged a complaint under section 138 of N.I. Act and at the same time, filed the suit for recovery of the same. 5. Learned trial court has decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff/respondent mainly relying on the issuance of cheques for which a case under section 138 of N.I. Act was filed. Learned trial court has also relied on the ‘account confirmation statement’ which bears the signature of the defendant/appellant. 6. At the time of hearing, both parties have cited decisions in favour of their respective contentions. The respondent relied on the decision reported in AIR 2017 (Cal) 182 in connection with W. Newman & Company Limited Vs. Apollo Zipper India Limited and Ors. of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of one of us (Biswanath Somadder, J.); an unreported decision in connection with APO 264 of 1999, The Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Mideast Integrated Steels Ltd.; a decision reported in (2015) 3 WBLR (Cal) 979 in connection with Tara Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors passed by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of one of us (Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J.); a decision reported in (2015) 8 SCC 428 in connection with Raveesh Chand Jain Vs. Raj Rani Jain; an unreported decision of Delhi High Court in connection with RFA No.12 of 2011, Assocham Vs. Y.N.Bhargava; a decision reported in AIR 2000 Delhi 349 in connection with Parivar Seva Sansthan Vs. Dr. (Mrs.) Veena Kalra & Ors. and an unreported decision of a Division Bench in connection with APOT No.665 of 2014, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Utkarsh Tubes & Pipes Ltd. On the other hand, the appellant relied on a decision reported in 2017 (4) CHN (Cal) 100 in connection with Economic Transport Organisation Ltd. Vs. Poddar Projects Limited and Ors. (Mrs.) Veena Kalra & Ors. and an unreported decision of a Division Bench in connection with APOT No.665 of 2014, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs. Utkarsh Tubes & Pipes Ltd. On the other hand, the appellant relied on a decision reported in 2017 (4) CHN (Cal) 100 in connection with Economic Transport Organisation Ltd. Vs. Poddar Projects Limited and Ors. passed by a Division Bench of this Court, consisting of one of us (Biswanath Somadder, J.); a decision reported in A.I.R. 2009 SC 2463 in connection with Seth Ramdayal Jat Vs. Laxmi Prasad; a decision reported in AIR 2005 SC 2765 in connection with Charanjit Lal Mehra and Ors. Vs. Smt. Kamal Saroj Mahajan and Anr., a decision reported in 2008 (2) CHN 868 in connection with Indian Bank Vs. S.N. Engineers and Suppliers and Anr.; a decision reported in AIR 2015 Cal 368 , passed by one of us (Biswanath Somadder, J.) in connection with Sanatan Bahadur Vs. Paschim Banga Gramin Bank and Ors. and an unreported decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in connection with Uttam Singh Dugal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank of India. 7. It appears from the record that by filing affidavit, the defendant/appellant challenged the dues and by referring to the relevant part of the order of the learned Magistrate, had contended that the plaintiff/respondent– as complainant – failed to establish that there was any legally enforceable debt In the said affidavit, the defendant/appellant challenged all the claims of the plaintiff/respondent. So it is quite clear there was no unequivocal admission, which is the prime factor for granting a relief under Order XII Rule 6 of C.P.C. In such circumstances, I would like to quote Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C. which reads as under :- “Judgment on admissions. – (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.” 7. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.” 7. On a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision we think it is crystal clear that the said Rule confers a wide discretion upon the Court to pass a judgment at any stage of the proceeding on the basis of admission of facts made in the plaint or otherwise without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties (emphasis supplied). In innumerable decisions, this issue was decided and the word “otherwise” signifies wide discretion. However, that discretion has to be exercised judiciously and not capriciously. 8. After considering the judgments relied on by the respective parties in connection with Order XII Rule 6, it appears to us that when and where a claim is admitted unequivocally, the Court has jurisdiction to pass such a decree on an admitted claim only. In the instant case, by filing an affidavit-in-opposition, the defendant/appellant challenged all the allegations levelled against him. The object of the Rule is to enable a party to obtain a speedy judgment, at least to the extent – which, according to the admission of the defendant – the plaintiff is entitled to. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments dealing with Order XII Rule 6 vouches for the same. At the same time, we are not oblivious to the fact that if a statement is made to a party and such a statement is brought before the Court showing it as an admission of liability in an application filed under Order XII Rule 6 and the rival side has sufficient scope to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, we cannot say that the trial court will be helpless in refusing to pass a decree. The word “otherwise” as used in Order XII Rule 6(1) has given a wide scope. It appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial court was basically swayed by the cheques which were dishonoured. Learned trial court came to a finding that the acquittal was on technical ground and so the trial court held that it was not an “honourable acquittal”. As the cheques were issued, it was presumed that those were issued to repay the debt. 9. Learned trial court came to a finding that the acquittal was on technical ground and so the trial court held that it was not an “honourable acquittal”. As the cheques were issued, it was presumed that those were issued to repay the debt. 9. But the concept of section 138 of N.I. Act is quite different. N. I. Act is a special statute. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent relied on Sanatan Bahadur (supra), where the Court held that mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service. The Court, in that judgment, has succinctly described the expressions, “honourable acquittal”, “acquitted of blame” and “fully exonerated” with reasons that these are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code but are coined by judicial pronouncements. Ultimately the Court held that “honourable acquittal” – a coined judicial expression – connotes only of such acquittal which is not shrouded by a flawed prosecution case presented before a Court that inevitably disables a trial judge from fully considering or appreciating such evidence which is vital for prosecution. Therefore, this decision will not help the present respondent in any way. Criminal proceeding under section 138 of N.I. Act is based on a complaint case and there is no scope of investigation by police. Question of flawed prosecution, as such, does not arise. The scope under section 138 of N.I. Act pre-supposes that when a cheque is issued, certainly it is for discharging a liability or a debt. The complainant has to show with evidence before the criminal Court, prima facie, that the cheques are issued to discharge such liability and if it is shown as such, only then the duty is cast upon the accused to rebut the said presumption that it is not for any legally enforceable debt. From the order sheet of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, vide order dated 28.08.2009, it appears that the complainant had been examined and cross-examined in full. Thereafter, he (the present respondent) filed an application to produce certain documents to justify his claim that the cheques were issued to discharge legally enforceable debt. The complainant also filed another application for producing the correct postal receipt which was not found at the time of filing of the case. Thereafter, he (the present respondent) filed an application to produce certain documents to justify his claim that the cheques were issued to discharge legally enforceable debt. The complainant also filed another application for producing the correct postal receipt which was not found at the time of filing of the case. The learned Magistrate after hearing both sides made a threadbare discussion and held :- “Upon careful perusal of the particular space of cross-examination of P.W. 1 I find that the complainant wants to re-examine himself as he answered he has filed all documents barring one loan confirmation signed by accused. Complainant wants to produce that loan confirmation document since he has answered in that fashion. But nowhere in the complaint or in the affidavit in chief he has stated that he has such documents in his custody. I do not want to scan the entire evidence of P.W. 1 along with complaint because trial is going on and it would be unfair to disclose the view of this court on point of adjudication/determination before conclusion of the trial. It appears from the record that cross-examination of P.W. 1 is concluded. Cross-examination was done on the affidavit-in-chief read with complaint and also on the documents relied on and filed by the complainant. In the name of reexamination complainant wants to introduce some new facts supported by document which in my opinion, is not permissible in law…” 10. This finding of the learned trial court was challenged before this Hon’ble Court. But the present complainant/respondent did not succeed in the revisional application. Therefore, the finding of the learned Magistrate stands. Question of flawed prosecution, as observed earlier, does not arise because investigating agency is not here and the entire responsibility was on the complainant to show that the cheques were issued in relation to any debt. Learned trial court had given him opportunity to adduce further evidence on 01.08.2009. 11. After nearly 4 years, ultimately on 20.09.2013, the learned Magistrate presumed that the complainant has lost his interest or does not want to proceed further and so he invoked section 256 of Cr.P.C. and acquitted the accused/appellant. That apart, the decision of Sanatan Bahadur was rendered by the Court sitting in its writ jurisdiction. It is not applicable in this case because there is no question of flawed prosecution. The complainant/respondent is the architect of his own misfortune. That apart, the decision of Sanatan Bahadur was rendered by the Court sitting in its writ jurisdiction. It is not applicable in this case because there is no question of flawed prosecution. The complainant/respondent is the architect of his own misfortune. The order of the learned Magistrate still holds good. 12. Now, we are to discuss about account confirmation statement, upon which, the learned trial court relied on. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the cheques were issued to the respondent for delivering shares of Cherry Hills Estates Pvt. Ltd. but ultimately those shares were not given to him. Therefore, disputed question of fact is also here and for which, in our considered view, Order XII Rule 6 cannot be applied. 13. It was also argued by the appellant that under Rule 6 of Chapter XIII-A of the Original Side Rules of this Court, upon an application of the plaintiff made under Rule 3 for final judgment for recovery of the suit premises on the ground that there is no defence against the claim of plaintiff, the Judge may unless the defendant by affidavit or otherwise as the Judge may direct for the purpose of satisfying himself that the defendant has a good defence to the claim on merits or disclose such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend – make an order refusing leave to defend and forthwith pronounce judgment in favour of the plaintiff. This is the finding in connection with the decision of W. Newman & Company Limited Vs. Apollo Zipper India Limited and Ors. wherein speaking for the Bench one of us (Biswanath Somadder, J.), held that the scheme of said Rule makes it clear that it is an exception to the general procedure to allow a defendant to defend himself against a plaintiff’s claim. As such, the matter of granting leave or refusal of granting relief to defend should be decided first and that too, supported with cogent reasons, before the Court proceeds to pronounce the judgment on the merits of the case in an application under Chapter XIII-A of the Original Side Rules. As such, the matter of granting leave or refusal of granting relief to defend should be decided first and that too, supported with cogent reasons, before the Court proceeds to pronounce the judgment on the merits of the case in an application under Chapter XIII-A of the Original Side Rules. The ratio laid down in the said judgment is such that without coming to any clear finding as to why the Court was satisfied that the defendant had no good defence to plaintiff’s claim on its merit, a summary judgment cannot be pronounced. An absence of any clear finding to that effect is a vital omission. The trial Court in that matter had decided the issue in favour of the plaintiff. The Division Bench had further held, quite rightly, that such omission may destroy a valuable right of a defendant to adequately defend himself, causing prejudice to him. Simply by observing to the effect that the defence is sham or frivolous or bogus or moonshine or unconvincing is not enough. The Court has to be satisfied itself and such finding must be supported by cogent reasons. The same view can be applied in the instant matter also. 14. Learned trial court actually lost sight of everything relevant. The Court was of the view that since account confirmation statement bears the signature of the defendant/appellant, it presumed that the due is admitted. If we accept this finding of the learned trial court then we would miss the woods for the trees. The impugned judgment suffers from serious illegality and we have no option left except to set aside the said finding of the learned trial court. Accordingly, the instant appeal succeeds. The trial court is hereby directed to give opportunity to the respective parties to adduce their evidence in these perspectives and thereafter the learned trial court will come to a decision in accordance with law. In view of the above, nothing further remains to be decided in respect of the Cross Objection, being O.C.O.T 4 of 2017, which stands disposed of accordingly. 15. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Biswanath Somadder, J. - I agree with the conclusion