JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. Appeal No. 15/2018 has been filed by the appellant- Revenue assailing judgment dated 07.08.2017 passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (for short ‘the Tribunal’) with the prayer to set aside the aforesaid judgment and order-in-original dated 14.10.2014 passed by the Commissioner, Central Excise, Jaipur (for short ‘the Adjudicating Authority’) be restored. 2. Aforesaid appeal was admitted by this Court vide order dated 14.02.2018 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the learned CESTAT was right in law in holding that the Cenvat Credit of Goods Transport Agency services for outward transportation of goods beyond the place of removal is eligible within the meaning of ‘input service’ as defined under Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004?” 3. The assessee has also filed Cross Objection No. 27/2018 raising the question of limitation, which remained unadjudicated by the Tribunal. The cross-objection filed by the assessee was also admitted by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 11.07.2018 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether the Tribunal was right in not considering or deciding the ground taken by the appellant in memo of appeal regarding limitation, as such order can be said to be complete to the extent of limitation only?” 4. The respondent-assessee is a registered manufacturer engaged in the manufacturing of Asbestos Cement Sheets, Asbestos Pressure Cement Pipe and Glass Fibre Reinforced Plastic Pipes falling under Chapter No. 68 and 70 respectively of the Schedule-I appended to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. During the course of audit of record of the respondent-assessee, it was noticed that it has availed CENVAT credit of service tax paid on outward transportation of goods i.e. from factory gate to buyer/consumer’s premises for the period from May, 2010 to December, 2012 amounting to Rs. 73,58,446/-. It appeared that those services were not covered under the definition of ‘input service’ under the provisions of Rule 2(l) and Rule 3 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (for short ‘the Rules of 2004’). Therefore, a show cause notice dated 03.07.2013 was issued to the respondent-assessee proposing recovery of the CENVAT Credit wrongly availed along with interest under Rule 14 and penalty under Rule 15(2) read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short ‘the Act’). Therefore, a show cause notice dated 03.07.2013 was issued to the respondent-assessee proposing recovery of the CENVAT Credit wrongly availed along with interest under Rule 14 and penalty under Rule 15(2) read with Section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short ‘the Act’). The Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 14.10.2014 passed original demand order, disallowing claim of CENVAT Credit of Rs. 73,58,446/- and charged interest and penalty thereon. The respondent-assessee, being aggrieved by the order, preferred appeal before the Tribunal, which vide judgment dated 07.08.2017 allowed the appeal and set aside the original demand order dated 14.10.2014. Hence, this appeal. 5. Mr. Siddharth Ranka, learned counsel for the appellant-revenue has submitted that the Tribunal has failed to take into consideration that the words, “clearance of final products from the place of removal” appearing in the definition of “input service” under Rule 2(l) of the Rules of 2004 prior to 01.03.2008 were amended by Notification No. 10/2008-CE(NT), dated 01.03.2008 by substituting the same with the words, “clearance of final products upto the place of removal”. Thus, if any ambiguity, which was there in respect of transportation charges upto the place of removal, the same has already been removed by the Government and therefore, transportation service taken upto the place of removal can only be covered under the definition of input service. The Tribunal has failed to notice this change in the definition while deciding the appeal of the assessee, while the impugned judgment has been given in the context of earlier definition of “input service”. Reference to definition of “place of removal” in Section 4(3)(c) of the Act of 1944 was also given. Since the present matter was covered by the aforesaid notification, the Tribunal was wholly unjustified in allowing the appeal filed by the assessee. Learned counsel submitted that review petition was filed by the Revenue, but the same was also dismissed. Learned counsel argued that since the question raised in the present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise Service Tax Vs. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 11261 of 2016 decided on 01.02.2018), not only original demand order is liable to be revived but penalty has to be imposed on the assessee and awarded to the Revenue. 6. Mr. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 11261 of 2016 decided on 01.02.2018), not only original demand order is liable to be revived but penalty has to be imposed on the assessee and awarded to the Revenue. 6. Mr. P.K. Kasliwal, learned counsel for the respondent-assessee submitted that similar question in respect to previous assessment yeas has been decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by this Court. The Revenue preferred SLP against the said decision of this Court. Therefore, hearing of the present matter may be deferred till the final decision of the Supreme Court, as according to learned counsel, the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Central Excise Service Tax Vs. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. (supra) has not noticed many important aspects, the matter therefore needs to be reconsidered. Moreover, learned counsel submitted that there is no dispute about the fact that the period of demand involved in the show cause notice is from May, 2010 to December, 2012 and the show cause notice was issued as late as on 03.07.2013. Therefore the demand for the period from May, 2010 to April, 2012 is hit by limitation under Section 11A of the Act especially when the extended period of more than one year and upto five years as provided in proviso to Section 11A of the Act is not available to the Department. So far as the question of penalty is concerned, learned counsel argued that since the Tribunal has decided the issue against the Revenue not only in this matter but also in the matter arising out of previous assessment year where main demand was set aside, the question of penalty would therefore not arise for consideration. Learned counsel argued that as per the law that was prevalent at the time when the Tribunal passed the impugned judgment, when the respondent-assessee was not required to satisfy the original demand and acted throughout under that impression, therefore there was no question of any penalty to be paid on that. 7. Mr. Siddharth Ranka, learned counsel for the appellant rejoined and submitted that the penalty is consequential as the issue raised in this matter is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. In case the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside and original demand is revived, the penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Authority is also liable to be restored. Siddharth Ranka, learned counsel for the appellant rejoined and submitted that the penalty is consequential as the issue raised in this matter is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court. In case the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside and original demand is revived, the penalty imposed by the Adjudicating Authority is also liable to be restored. On the question of limitation, learned counsel relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in M.M. Cylinders (P.) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Tirupathi, (2014) 46 GST 5 (SC); Pasupati Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh, (2015) 57 Taxmann.com 318 (SC); judgment of this Court in Vodafone Digilink Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur-II, 2013 (29) STR 229 (Raj.); judgment of Madras High Court in Days Inn Deccan Plaza Vs. Commr. Of S.T. (Appeals), Chennai-I, 2016 (45) S.T.R. 502 (Mad.); Mohan Breweries & Distilleries Ltd. Vs. Commr. Of C.Ex. Pondicherry, 2015 (325) E.L.T. 42 (Mad.), judgment of Gujarat High Court in Salasar Dyeing & Printing Mills (P) Ltd. Vs. C.C.E. & C., Surat-I, 2013 (290) E.LT. 322 (Guj.); Commissioner of C.Ex., Surat-I Vs. Neminath Fabrics Pvt. Ltd., 2010 (256) E.L.T. 369 (Guj.); judgment of Kerala High Court in Kuttukaran Trading Ventures Vs. C.C.E., Cus. & Service Tax, Cochin, 2014 (35) S.T.R. 481 (Ker.); judgment of Allahabad High Court in Commr. Of C.Ex. Cus. & ST, Noida Vs. Precision Pipes & Profiles Co. Ltd., 2014 (302) E.L.T. 184 (All.); Commr. Of Cus. & C.Ex. Ghaziabad Vs. Rathi Steel & Power Ltd., 2015 (321) E.L.T. 200 (All.). Learned counsel submitted that the submission of the respondent-assessee that the Supreme Court in Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. (supra) has not considered many aspects and the matter requires reconsideration, has to be rejected in view of the fact that the assessee in that case filed review petition, which was also dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated 24.04.2018. It is argued that the question of limitation would not affect the entire order as only small part of entire period under consideration is covered by the question of limitation. 8. It is argued that the question of limitation would not affect the entire order as only small part of entire period under consideration is covered by the question of limitation. 8. On hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the material on record, we find that in view of the amended definition of “input service” w.e.f. 01.03.2008 as also in the light of judgment of the Supreme Court in Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.(supra), judgment of the Tribunal cannot be sustained in law and the demand is liable to be revived. However, considering the totality of circumstances, entire matter deserves to be remanded back to the Tribunal to consider not only the question of penalty and limitation but also the original demand as the decision on the question of limitation may have the effect of diluting the same to some extent. Although it may be true that the question of limitation would not affect the entire period in the present matter but even then we do not deem it appropriate to decide the matter in piecemeal. In our considered view, the entire matter needs to be remanded back to the Tribunal. However, the Tribunal, if persuaded, may hold so by segregating said part which is hit by limitation from the remaining period for re-quantifying the main demand as also deciding question of penalty. 9. In view of above discussion, present appeal as well as cross objection deserve to succeed and are accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment dated 07.08.2017 passed by the Tribunal is setaside and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal, which shall consider the questions of penalty as also limitation and decide both the issues after hearing both the parties in accordance with law for re-quantification of the demand. We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on merits including on the question of penalty and limitation.