ORDER 1. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. 2. The appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave to appeal against the judgment and order dated 20.03.2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Confirmation Case No. 3 of 2013 and Criminal Appeal No. 501/2013 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court confirmed and allowed Criminal Confirmation Case No. 3 of 2013 and dismissed the Criminal Appeal No. 501 of 2013 confirming the capital punishment awarded by the Trial Court. 3. The prosecution story in this case is that one Prabha Meshram made an oral report on 18.12.2005 with the Police Station Kamleshwar against the appellant and his accomplice namely, Amarsing, stating that she resides with her daughter namely, Kanchan aged about 19 years, son Atul and insane husband Shyamrao. On the same date at about 03:00 to 3:30 a.m.(night) when they were asleep, they heard some chaos and on opening the window found that the appellant was abusing, threatening villagers and creating terror in the village. She closed the window. After sometime, she heard shouts to open the door. The appellant gave kick blows to the door. She opened the window and found that the appellant was standing outside with knife in his hand. According to the prosecution, the appellant demanded water and she gave him water. Again the appellant gave kick blows to the door and she opened the door. On opening the door, the appellant along with another person namely, Amarsing, entered the house. On point of knife, the appellant and his accomplice threatened her husband Shyamrao and son to sleep. Upon this, suspecting danger to the modesty of her daughter namely, Kanchan, she gestured her to run. Kanchan ran away from the house. The appellant and co-accused Amarsing ran after Kanchan. Kanchan concealed herself in the house of her brother-in-law, Bhimrao Meshram. The appellant and co-accused Amarsing entered the house of Bhimrao by breaking the door and further assaulted Bhimrao and his wife, took Kanchan with them towards the land owned by one Sanjay Mankar. In the following morning, blood stained clothes of Kanchan were found lying in the field of Sanjay Mankar, on whose field the incident took place. The appellant and co-accused Amarsing entered the house of Bhimrao by breaking the door and further assaulted Bhimrao and his wife, took Kanchan with them towards the land owned by one Sanjay Mankar. In the following morning, blood stained clothes of Kanchan were found lying in the field of Sanjay Mankar, on whose field the incident took place. On visiting the said field, Prabha Meshram observed clothes of Kanchan and after proceeding further in the field of Deshpande, found dead body of Kanchan (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') lying on the shrub of Shivdhura of the field. The dead body was nude with injuries on cheek, chest and head. On the basis of the information given by the mother of the deceased the investigating agency registered crime for the offence punishable under Sections 302, 376(2)(g), 364, 366, 506 Part-III, 457 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC') as well as under sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. Upon completion of the investigation, charge sheet came to be filed against six accused persons. The Trial Court, at the time of framing the charges, out of six accused persons, discharged accused no. 2 to 5 and against the appellant and his accomplice, Amarsing/accused no.6, framed the charges for the offences as mentioned above. 4. The prosecution in order to prove its case beyond shadow of reasonable doubt examined 19 witnesses. Out of 19 prosecution witnesses, PW-1/Prabha Meshram (mother of the deceased), PW-2/Atul Meshram (brother of the deceased), PW-9/Bhimrao Meshram (brother-in-law of the complainant), PW-13, PW-14 and PW-16 were the eyewitnesses. The Trial Court relying upon the testimony of the alleged eyewitnesses and in view of the complete chain of circumstantial evidence and having in mind the autopsy report, given by the PW-8/Dr. Anindaya Mukherjee, convicted and sentenced the appellant and co-accused/Amarsing with the capital punishment. Being aggrieved the appellant and co-accused/Amarsing carried the matter in appeal before the High Court. At the same time, the Trial Court made a death reference for confirmation on the file of the High Court. The High Court heard the reference and appeal simultaneously and the Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment and order confirmed the conviction of both the accused. At the same time, the Trial Court made a death reference for confirmation on the file of the High Court. The High Court heard the reference and appeal simultaneously and the Division Bench of the High Court vide impugned judgment and order confirmed the conviction of both the accused. However, insofar as sentence is concerned, the High Court has upheld/confirmed the death sentence of the appellant but commuted the death sentence of the co-accused to life imprisonment with a cap of 30 years. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant only and co-accused/Amarsing is not before us. 5. Insofar as the conviction of the appellant is concerned, after going through the record and perusing the judgment of the Trial Court as well as of the High Court, we are of the opinion that the conviction is rightly recorded for the offences under Sections 302, 376(2) (g), 364, 366, 506 Part-III, 457 read with Section 34 IPC as well as under sections 4 and 25 of the Arms Act. In fact, after some arguments, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant also gave up the arguments on the conviction of the appellant herein. In any case, as mentioned above, this Court is also satisfied that the conviction is appropriately recorded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court and we do not see any blemish with the impugned judgment insofar as that aspect is concerned. 6. With this we advert to the issue of sentence. As it is clear from the facts noted above, two co-accused persons had jointly committed the offence in question. Both were awarded death sentence by the Trial Court. However, the High Court, in the impugned judgment, has commuted the death sentence of the co-accused to that of life imprisonment with the clarification that it would be 30 years imprisonment without remission, before he could be considered for premature release. We find that the circumstances in which the crime was committed showed culpability of both the accused in equal measure. Once the death sentence of the co-accused has been commuted and converted to life imprisonment, for the reasons given in support of the view taken by the High Court, the appellant should also have been meted out with the same treatment. The appellant had already suffered 12 years and 11 months incarceration. Once the death sentence of the co-accused has been commuted and converted to life imprisonment, for the reasons given in support of the view taken by the High Court, the appellant should also have been meted out with the same treatment. The appellant had already suffered 12 years and 11 months incarceration. We may also place on record that on the last date of hearing we had requested the learned counsel for the State to find out the conduct of the appellant in jail in all these years. He also makes a statement at Bar that the appellant had depicted a satisfactory conduct in all these years. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the death sentence given to the appellant should also be commuted to the sentence of life imprisonment for 30 (thirty) years imprisonment without remission, before he can be considered for premature release. That would meet the ends of justice. We order accordingly. 7. The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.