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Allahabad High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 196 (ALL)

QUDSIYA SAIDULLAH v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-01-24

ASHOK KUMAR, TARUN AGARWALA

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Tarun Agarwala, J.—Qudsiya Saidullah has filed three writ petitions, which have been clubbed and are being decided together. In Writ Petition No. 61799 of 2011, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs : “I. to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to renew lease of Nazul Plot No. 58 ½ B, Civil Station, Allahabad (measuring over two Acres)= 29 Kanpur Road=39 P.D.Tandon Road, Allahabad or to grant free hold rights therein to the extent of her ¼ share as mentioned in settlement deed dated 8.3.2011 (Annexure-10) and the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 4.4.2011 (Annexure-11); II. to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondent U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow to delete name of Waqf Mohammad Husain, 29 Kanpur Road, Allahabad from their record; III. to issue ad interim mandamus commanding the respondents to renew lease of Nazul Plot No. 58 1/2B, Civil Station, Allahabad (measuring over two Acres)=29 Kanpur Road =39 P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad or to grant free hold rights therein to the extent of her ¼ share as mentioned in settlement deed dated 8.3.2011 (Annexure-10) and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 4.4.2011 (Annexure 11); IV. to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondent U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow to delete name of Waqf Mohammad Husain, 29 Kanpur Road=39 P.D. Tandon Road Allahabad from their record; V. to issue any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deed fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, so as to meet the ends of justice. VI. to award cost of petition to the petitioner.” 2. The petitioner then filed Writ Petition No. 31845 of 2012 praying for the following reliefs: “i. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, calling for record of the case, quashing impugned order/notice of respondent Collector Allahabad dated 12.6.2012 (Annexure-22). ii. to issue a writ order of direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents 1 to 6 not to enforce impugned order dated 12.6.2012 against the petitioners on any ground and in any manner whatsoever. iii. ii. to issue a writ order of direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents 1 to 6 not to enforce impugned order dated 12.6.2012 against the petitioners on any ground and in any manner whatsoever. iii. To issue ad interim mandamus, staying effect and operation of impugned order of respondent No. 2 dated 12.6.2012 (Annexure-22) and not to dispossess the petitioners from Nazul Plot No. 58 1/2B, Civil Station, Allahabad bearing Municipal No. 29, Kanpur Road, Allahabad-39, P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad. iv. To issue any other suitable writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deed fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case; v. To award cost of petition to the petitioners.” 3. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed Writ Petition No. 31014 of 2016 praying for the following reliefs: “ii. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondents not to acquire the property of petitioner bearing Nazul Plot No. 58 ½ B (Area 2 Acre), Civil Lines, Allahabad presently bearing Municipal No. 29 Kanpur Road/39 P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad, without first following procedure prescribed by law. iii. To issue ad interim mandamus, commanding the respondents not to interfere with the actual physical possession of petitioner in respect of Nazul Plot No. 58 1/2B (Area 2 Acres), Civil Lines, Allahabad presently bearing Municipal No. 29 Kanpur Road/39 P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad, without first following procedure prescribed by law. iv. To direct respondent No. 2 and 4 to forthwith reconstruct boundary wall of the bungalow of petitioner and remove Hoarding/Board installed in the compound of said Bungalow of the petitioner. v. Grant such other and further relief to which petitioner may be found entitled in law. vi. Award cost of petition to the petitioner. vii. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, calling for record of the case, quashing order of respondent No. 2 dated 7.6.2016 (Annexure 9 to the writ petition). viii. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus, commanding the respondent Collector, Allahabad to forthwith either renew lease of Nazul plot No. 58 ½ B, Civil Station Allahabad, now bearing 29 Kanpur Road/39 P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad or grant free hold rights to the Waqf Alal Aulad created by Syed Mahmood Jahan Begum wife of Barrister Mohammad Husain on 29.11.1966.” 4. The facts enumerated in all the three writ petitions are that the land in question is a Nazul Land being Plot No. 58 ½, Civil Station bearing Municipal No. 29, Kanpur Road, Allahabad, which is now renumbered as 39 P.D. Tandon Road, Allahabad. The first lessee was Edward Walter Chandler to whom a lease was executed on 19.12.1912 for a period of 30 years with a stipulation that the lease could be renewed twice each for a period of 30 years. Subsequently, the lease was executed on 22.5.1936 in favour of Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum, the widow of Barrister, Mohammad Hussain. On 14.3.1953 and 17.10.1957, the said lessee sold portions of the property to Sri Gyanendra Kumar and to Sri B. B. Ganguly, respectively after taking previous permission from the State through the Collector. 5. On 9th of November, 1966, Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum created a Wakf Ala Aulad for the benefit of the family members with regard to the rental income received from the bungalow in question. She became the Mutawalli of the Waqf and, on 29th March, 1968 Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum, the lessee died. Upon her death, her step brother S. A. Jawwad became the Mutawalli. At this stage, the petitioner requested to stay in a portion of the house, which was granted. In the writ petition, it is contended that S. A. Jawwad applied for free hold rights on 19.9.1994 and on 16th July, 2001, the lease of 90 years expired. 6. The petitioner contended that vide judgement dated 7.9.2004 in First Appeal No. 311 of 1996, the High Court held that a Waqf could be created in respect of a lease property. The said judgement was challenged in Civil Appeal No. 87 of 2005 in which a compromise was arrived at on 8th March, 2011 on the basis of which, the civil appeal was disposed of by an order dated 4.4.2011. It was contended that Mohammad Gulrez Akhtar being the present Mutawalli filed Writ Petition No. 57895 of 2011 for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to grant free hold rights. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 8th March, 2016 directing the District Magistrate to decide the application of Gulrez Akhtar for grant of free hold rights. It was submitted that the application of Gulrez Akhtar was rejected by the District Magistrate by an order dated 7th June, 2016. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 8th March, 2016 directing the District Magistrate to decide the application of Gulrez Akhtar for grant of free hold rights. It was submitted that the application of Gulrez Akhtar was rejected by the District Magistrate by an order dated 7th June, 2016. 7. In the light of these aforesaid facts, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 61799 of 2011 praying that a writ of mandamus be issued to the Collector to renew the lease of the Nazul Land in question or grant freehold rights to the extent of her 1/4th share as indicated in the settlement deed dated 8th March, 2011. Subsequently, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 31845 of 2012 praying that the notice of the Collector dated 12th June, 2012 issued by the Collector should be quashed by which the petitioner was directed to ensure that the plot is vacated on the ground that the lease had expired. The petitioner thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 31014 of 2016 praying for the quashing of the order dated 7th June, 2016 by which the application for free hold rights has been rejected by the Collector and further prayed that the respondents should be restrained from acquiring the property or from interfering in the physical possession of the land in question. 8. The petitioner apparently has not narrated the full facts in the three writ petitions and therefore, one has to fall back on the facts which have been given by the learned Single Judge of this Court while deciding the First Appeal No. 311 of 1996, S.A. Jawwad and another v. Smt. Qudesiya Saidullah and another, i.e., the petitioner. In this appeal, the missing links can be found, namely, that on the request of the then Mutawalli S.A. Jawwad, the petitioner was allowed to stay in the bungalow in question. Subsequently, she got an allotment in her favour from the Rent Control Eviction Officer on 2nd of September, 1969. Since the petitioner did not pay the rent, the then Mutawalli S.A. Jawwad filed Suit No. 96 of 1970 for ejectment of the petitioner and for recovery of the rent and for damages. 9. Subsequently, she got an allotment in her favour from the Rent Control Eviction Officer on 2nd of September, 1969. Since the petitioner did not pay the rent, the then Mutawalli S.A. Jawwad filed Suit No. 96 of 1970 for ejectment of the petitioner and for recovery of the rent and for damages. 9. As a counter blast, the petitioner filed Civil Suit No. 55 of 1971, as power of attorney holder of Smt. Maqsood Jahan Begum (the sister of the original lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum) for possession of premises and for a decree of mesne profit, namely, the collection of rent from the tenant by the Mutwalli. It was alleged by the petitioner that there was no valid waqf, and that the Mutwalli, without any authority of law was illegally letting out the property on rent. The trial Court decreed Suit No. 55 of 1971 and dismissed Suit No. 96 of 1970. While decreeing the suit, the trial Court held that Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum was the lessee of the Nazul Land for a fixed term and such fixed term lease could not be a subject-matter of waqf and therefore, the waqf created by Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum was a void document as it did not have a permanent character. This suit was decreed on the strength of the stand taken by the petitioner that no valid waqf could be created on a lease land by Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum and that Smt. Maqsood Jahan Begum, being her sister, was entitled to a share of the rent collected from the tenants. 10. In First Appeal No. 311 of 1996 filed by the then Mutawalli S. A. Jawwad, the High Court while allowing the first appeal took a view that a Waqf could be created but the plaintiff was estopped from challenging the validity of the waqf deed as she was a beneficiary and was receiving the profits. The High Court held that the suit for possession filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. The appeal was allowed and the judgement of the trial Court was set aside and the suit was dismissed with costs throughout. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was admitted and converted into a Civil Appeal No. 87 of 2005. The appeal was allowed and the judgement of the trial Court was set aside and the suit was dismissed with costs throughout. Thereafter, the petitioner filed Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court which was admitted and converted into a Civil Appeal No. 87 of 2005. During its pendency, a compromise was arrived at between the petitioner, the then Mutawalli and other beneficiaries wherein it was decided that the said premises, namely, the bungalow would be sold off within six months and the proceeds would be distributed between the beneficiaries in which the petitioner was entitled to 25 percent of the sale proceeds. The Civil Appeal was accordingly, disposed of in terms of the compromise deed by the Supreme Court by an order dated 4th April, 2011. 11. A perusal of the compromise deed clearly indicates that the bungalow was required to be sold and the proceeds was required to be distributed between the beneficiaries. The land in question was not to be sold as it was a Nazul land and the State Government was the lessor. 12. In the light of the aforesaid facts, the Court has perused the contents of all the writ petitions and finds that the status of the petitioner has nowhere been stated with any clarity, namely, as to whether the petitioner has filed the writ petition as a tenant or as a owner or as a lessee or as a beneficiary or as a power of attorney holder Smt. Maqsood Jahan Begum. In fact, the petitioner in the writ petition has tried to confuse the issue by creating a myth that the property is a waqf property and that a waqf property cannot be acquired or taken over by the State without hearing the Sunni Waqf Board and that it can only be acquired if proceedings are initiated under the Acquisition Act. We, however, find from the written submissions filed by the petitioner in which the petitioner has categorically stated that she is a tenant in the premises in question and also claimed to be a beneficiary in terms of the compromise that was filed before the Supreme Court. 13. The petitioner has thus prayed for a variety of reliefs but has basically contended that the action of the respondents in taking possession without initiating any acquisition proceeding is wholly illegal. 13. The petitioner has thus prayed for a variety of reliefs but has basically contended that the action of the respondents in taking possession without initiating any acquisition proceeding is wholly illegal. Even though the lease deed may have expired, the State cannot take possession unless they acquire the property under the Acquisition Act. Further, the property in question is a waqf property and therefore the State cannot acquire without hearing the Waqf Board in view of Section 90 of the Waqf Act, 1995. The petitioner further contended that she is a beneficiary under the waqf and therefore, the State cannot take possession. 14. It was also urged that the purpose of taking possession namely for parking of the vehicles for the advocates and litigants coming to the High Court was not a public purpose. It was also contended that the original lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum was allowed to sell a portion of the land to Sri Gyanendra Kumar and to Sri B.B. Ganguli, and therefore, the petitioner’s application for renewal should be considered. It was contended that the action of the State is trying to re-enter on the land was discriminatory. 15. The Collector in his counter-affidavit contended that in 1953 and 1957 due permission was granted by the then Collector to the erstwhile lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum to sell a portion of the land in favour of Sri Gyanendra Kumar and Sri B.B. Ganguli. It was further contended that Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum died issueless on 29th March, 1968 and her family members namely, one brother Sayed Ahmed Rafiq and sister Smt. Rasid Jahan Begum are residing in Pakistan and another sister Smt. Maqsood Jahan Begum is residing in Canada. The petitioner Qudsiya Saidullah being the daughter of Maqsood Jahan Begum is also a permanent resident of Canada and is not in physical possession of the property in question. 16. The Collector further submitted that the Registrar General submitted a proposal in the year 2004 for transfer of the Nazul Plot in favour of the High Court since it was adjoining the High Court premises. 16. The Collector further submitted that the Registrar General submitted a proposal in the year 2004 for transfer of the Nazul Plot in favour of the High Court since it was adjoining the High Court premises. Subsequently, on 28th September, 2011, the Registrar General submitted a proposal for transfer of the land to the High Court for the purpose of construction of a multi level parking on which application, the State Government sought legal opinion and thereafter, the State Government by an order dated 9th May, 2012 directed the District Magistrate to issue notice to the occupants to vacate the premises as the term of the lease deed had expired. Based on this Government Order, the Collector issued a notice dated 12th June, 2012 directing the petitioner to vacate the premises in question and give possession to the State Government. 17. The Collector has further pointed out that the term of the lease has expired in the year 2001 and that there is no valid application on behalf of the petitioner for renewal of the lease or for grant of freehold rights. It was also stated that under the original terms of the lease deed it was categorically mentioned that after expiration of the lease period, the lessee was required to take away the structure or that the State may take the structure after giving due notice and upon payment of the value of the structure. It was contended that the Nazul Land vests in the State Government for which no acquisition proceeding under any Acquisition Act was required and that after the expiry of the lease, the land reverts back to the State Government. It was also pointed out that on the basis of a proposal made by the High Court on 28th September, 2011, the State Government by a Government Order dated 29.11.2016 allotted the land to the High Court free of cost for construction of a multi level parking pursuant to which, the Collector issued a formal order dated 4.1.2017 allotting the land to the High Court. The Collector thus contended that the petitioner, being a rank outsider, has no right to apply for renewal of the lease or apply for grant of freehold rights. It was further contended that the petitioner has not challenged the allotment order allocating the land to the High Court. The Collector thus contended that the petitioner, being a rank outsider, has no right to apply for renewal of the lease or apply for grant of freehold rights. It was further contended that the petitioner has not challenged the allotment order allocating the land to the High Court. The Collector thus contended that the writ petitions was devoid of any merit and were liable to be dismissed. 18. The Sunni Waqf Board contend that the petitioner is blowing hot and cold in the same breath. On one hand, the petitioner alleges that the land is a waqf property and, on the other hand, the petitioner disputes it. It was contended that the waqf was created on lease land and that the lease had expired and consequently, the nature of the waqf was symbolic in nature. 19. The Mutwalli, Gulrez has filed a counter-affidavit contending that the petitioner is only a tenant and had not paid the rent since 1969. The petitioner was neither a beneficiary nor an owner and that she is a permanent citizen of Canada. The petitioner herself has disputed the creation of the waqf and therefore, cannot be allowed to take advantage or contend that the property is a waqf property. It was also contended that respondent No. 6 being Mutwalli had applied for freehold rights, which application was rejected by the State Government. It has also come on record that after the rejection of the application, Gulrez, the Mutwalli, filed Writ petition No. 59298 of 2016 praying not only for the quashing of the order dated 7th June, 2016 by which his application for grant of freehold rights was rejected but also prayed for renewal of the lease or for grant of freehold rights. The said writ petition was dismissed on merits by a judgement dated 17.12.2016. A categorical finding was given by the High Court that the respondent No. 6 could not prove his possession on the property. We also find a review application was filed which was also dismissed by an order dated 1st September, 2017. 20. The said writ petition was dismissed on merits by a judgement dated 17.12.2016. A categorical finding was given by the High Court that the respondent No. 6 could not prove his possession on the property. We also find a review application was filed which was also dismissed by an order dated 1st September, 2017. 20. We have heard Sri S.S. Rathore and Sri Yogesh Agrawal, the learned counsels for the petitioner, Sri Neeraj Tripathi, the learned Additional Advocate General for the State-respondents, Sri Punit Kumar Gupta, the learned counsel for the U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board and Sri Syed Irfan Ali, the learned counsel for the Mutwalli and other beneficiaries, namely, respondent Nos. 6 to 9. 21. From the pleadings, it is apparently clear that the petitioner claims herself to be a tenant as well as a beneficiary under the settlement. She is not the owner of the property nor is the lessee. The lessee was Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum and upon her death the rights of the lessee, if any, devolved upon her brothers and sisters. According to the counter-affidavit of the State Government, one brother and sister of the lessee are permanent residing in Pakistan and the third sibling that is the sister is a permanent resident of Canada. The petitioner is the daughter of the third sister, who is residing permanently in Canada. The petitioner is thus, not the lessee nor any succession certificate has been filed in any proceedings, which could show that the petitioner is an heir and claimant of lease hold rights of the original lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum. Thus, the prayer made by the petitioner that the State authorities should be directed to renew the lease in her favour cannot be granted as she is not the original lessee. Further, the lease was for a fixed period of 30 years, which was renewable twice under the terms and conditions for 30 years each. The period of 90 years has expired in 2001. There is no valid application for renewal of the lease by the petitioner. Further, only a fresh lease, if any, could be executed. The lease cannot be renewed any further after expiry of 90 years since there is no stipulation contained in the lease deed for extension of the lease period after 90 years. There is no valid application for renewal of the lease by the petitioner. Further, only a fresh lease, if any, could be executed. The lease cannot be renewed any further after expiry of 90 years since there is no stipulation contained in the lease deed for extension of the lease period after 90 years. Thus, the prayer of the petitioner for a mandamus commanding the respondents to renew the lease cannot be granted. 22. The petitioner claims that the land is a Waqf property and relies upon the judgment of the High Court passed in First Appeal No. 311 of 1996. This plea of the petitioner is patently misconceived and erroneous. The land in question is a nazul land. A lease was executed by the State Government in favour of Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum, which period has expired on 16th July, 2001. Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum executed a registered Waqf deed for distribution of the rental income derived from the bungalow in question. The lessor of the land was the State Government, the lessee was Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum, who constructed a bungalow on the land in question. The Waqf was for distribution of the rental income which accrued from renting out the bungalow. When the petitioner failed to pay the rent to the then Mutwalli, a suit for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent and damages was filed. The petitioner contested and contended that no valid waqf was created. The trial Court decreed her suit holding that no valid waqf was created but the first appellate Court i.e., the High Court reversed this finding holding that a waqf could be created on a lease land. The petitioner carried the matter to the Supreme Court where a compromise was arrived at between the beneficiaries. In this compromise, it was agreed between the beneficiaries to sell the bungalow and distribute the proceeds. The petitioner under the compromise was entitled to 25% of the proceeds. Thus, it is apparently clear that the land in question is a nazul land of which the State Government is the lessor. The land is not a waqf property. The waqf was created by the lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum for distribution of the rental income derived from letting out the bungalow. 23. In this regard, this Court in Mst. Peeran w/o Abdul Razzaq v. Haji Mohammad Ishaq and others, AIR 1966 Alld. The land is not a waqf property. The waqf was created by the lessee Smt. Mahmood Jahan Begum for distribution of the rental income derived from letting out the bungalow. 23. In this regard, this Court in Mst. Peeran w/o Abdul Razzaq v. Haji Mohammad Ishaq and others, AIR 1966 Alld. 201, has held that under the Mohammedan law every kind of property is capable of being dedicated but such dedication must yield permanent benefit. The Court held that a waqf cannot be created on a lease which is for a fixed term, inasmuch as after the expiry of the term the land would be resumed by the State. The said decision is wholly applicable in the instant case and it proves that the waqf, which was created by the lessee was not of the land but with regard to the distribution of the rental income earned while letting out the structure. 24. The State is not a party in the compromise. The compromise is only between the beneficiaries. The petitioner was only entitled to 25% of the proceeds from the sale of the structure. In this light, the prayer made by the petitioner that the respondents should be directed to grant free hold rights in respect to her 1/4th share in terms of the settlement deed is patently misconceived. The petitioner does not have any right on the land in question. She was only entitled to the proceeds when the structure was sold. Further, there is no valid application on the part of the petitioner requesting the State authorities to grant free hold rights either as a lessee or as a rank outsider. The prayer made by the petitioner in this regard is, therefore, patently misconceived. 25. The contention of the petitioner that the State can only acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act is patently misconceived. The land is a nazul land which belongs to the State Government. Nazul land vests in the State Government for which no acquisition proceedings is required. This has also been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Madan Lal Ahuja v. State of U.P. and others, 2017(2) ADJ 97 . The lease deed clearly contained a stipulation that after expiry of the lease, the lessee could take away the structure or the State may give notice and take the structure upon payment of the value of the structure. The lease deed clearly contained a stipulation that after expiry of the lease, the lessee could take away the structure or the State may give notice and take the structure upon payment of the value of the structure. The lease deed indicate that the land vests with the State Government. Admittedly, the lease was executed under the Government Grants Act, 1895. If the land is required by the State Government for its own purpose or for any public purpose, it has the right to give one months notice in writing to the lessee to remove any structure standing on the plot and take possession thereof on expiry of the stipulated period. The right of re-entry and the power to resume the land exists under the Government Grants Act as has been held by the Supreme Court in Azim Ahmad Kazmi and others v. State of U.P. and another, 2012 (7) SCC 278 . Thus, issuance of notice by the Collector dated 12th June, 2012 directing the petitioners to vacate the premises since the lease has expired was a valid notice in law, which requires no interference nor anything illegal has been pointed out. The prayer for quashing the notice dated 12th June, 2012 is therefore misconceived and cannot be accepted. 26. The prayer that the petitioner should not be dispossessed is based on misconception of law. Nothing has been brought on record to indicate that the petitioner is in physical possession. The petitioner is a permanent resident of Canada and is residing there. The petitioner is also not the lessee. The petitioner had filed Suit No. 55 of 1971 for possession which was dismissed with cost by the High Court in First Appeal No. 311 of 1996. Thus it can safely be said that the petitioner was never in possession since 1971 onwards. The petitioner is at best a beneficiary, entitled to 25% of the proceeds as and when the structure is sold as per the settlement. Beyond that the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. The relief that the petitioner should not be dispossessed is patently erroneous. The prayer that the respondents should not interfere in the possession of the petitioner on the land in question is also misconceived. 27. We find that the Mutwalli had filed an application for grant of free hold rights of the land in question. The relief that the petitioner should not be dispossessed is patently erroneous. The prayer that the respondents should not interfere in the possession of the petitioner on the land in question is also misconceived. 27. We find that the Mutwalli had filed an application for grant of free hold rights of the land in question. The said application was rejected by the Collector by an order dated 7th June, 2016. The said Mutwalli Gulrej filed Writ Petition No. 59298 of 2016, which was dismissed by a judgment dated 17th December, 2016. A review application was filed, which was dismissed by an order dated 1st September, 2017. The petitioner has also prayed for quashing of the said order dated 7th June, 2016. The prayer made by the petitioner is patently erroneous, inasmuch as the said order was passed on the application of the Mutwalli. The petitioner, being a rank outsider could not challenge the said order. In any case, the order passed by the Collector dated 7th June, 2016 has already been affirmed by another Division Bench of this Court and we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the said Division Bench. We also find that subsequently, the State Government by a Government Order dated 29th November, 2016 has allotted the nazul land in question to the High Court for multi level parking purposes pursuant to which, the Collector has issued a formal order dated 4th January, 2017 allotting the land to the High Court. These orders have not been challenged by the petitioner, even though the same has been brought on record by the respondents in their counter-affidavits. 28. In the light of the aforesaid, the reliefs claimed by the petitioner in all the three writ petitions are devoid of merit. The claim made by the petitioner cannot be substantiated. The writ petitions fail and are dismissed. Interim order, if any, is vacated. Registry is directed to place a copy of this order before the Registrar General for necessary information and action within a week.