JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashwani Kumar Mishra, J.—This writ petition is directed against an order dated 3rd April, 2017 passed by respondent No. 3, contained in Annexure-27 to the writ petition, whereby petitioner’s services have been terminated from the North Central Zone Cultural Centre at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘NCZCC’). This order has been passed by the Director, NCZCC, based upon an enquiry report dated 19.12.2016, which is also assailed in this petition. Prayer is made to direct the respondents to treat the petitioner in service and to release his salary with all consequential benefits. 2. Facts, giving rise to filing of this petition is therefore noticed first. The writ petitioner was appointed as a Class-III employee in NCZCC in 1997 and was continuing as such without any complaint. He was transferred from Allahabad to Ballia under an order of the then Director on 8.6.2016. This order was challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 30758 of 2016, on the ground that the Centre at Ballia to which petitioner was transferred was not under control of NCZCC. An interim order came to be passed on 12.7.2016 staying the transfer order dated 8.6.2016. Petitioner thereafter moved an application before the Director on 12.7.2016 for allowing him to continue at Allahabad. This letter of petitioner recites that he was on medical leave from 9.6.2016 to 29.6.2016 and a certificate of fitness was issued to him on 30th June, 2016, alongwith which the petitioner offered his joining. As per the petitioner he was allowed to work at Allahabad till 4th of July, 2016 and it was only upon meeting the Director on 4th of July, 2016 that petitioner was told to join at Ballia. 3. The Director upon receiving the petitioner’s letter together with the certified copy of the interim order of this Court wrote a letter to the Chief Medical Officer, Allahabad, dated 21.7.2016, for getting the petitioner medically examined. Request, accordingly, was made to the Chief Medical Officer to constitute a medical board and examine as to whether petitioner was at all suffering from tension and depression, as is alleged by him? The medical board was also required to examine as to whether the petitioner was fit to be retained in Government service, as he was suffering from serious mental disease. 4. Accordingly a medical board was constituted to examine the petitioner. The medical board was also required to examine as to whether the petitioner was fit to be retained in Government service, as he was suffering from serious mental disease. 4. Accordingly a medical board was constituted to examine the petitioner. Its report dated 8.8.2016 has been brought on record, as per which petitioner was not found to be suffering from any mental disorder/disease. The petitioner has also brought on record his application dated 9.6.2016, whereby leave on medical ground was sought by him. This letter is annexed at page 99 of the writ petition, which mentions that on account of tension and depression the petitioner’s condition has become serious and as per the medical opinion of the doctor at Moti Lal Nehru Divisional Hospital, Allahabad, he has been prescribed certain medicines and advised 10 days rest. This letter has also been annexed alongwith the counter-affidavit, which contains an endorsement of the Director for it to be put on file. There is no decision taken upon this letter, at that stage, to get the petitioner examined medically nor any doubt appear to have been raised on the plea of illness set up by the petitioner. It is only after the order of transfer has been stayed by this Court on 11.7.2016 that the Director has proceeded to direct constitution of a medical board. 5. After the report was submitted by the medical board on 8.8.2016, a show-cause notice dated 30.8.2016 was issued to the petitioner on the ground that he has submitted a false plea of illness before the authorities for securing medical leave to defy the order of transfer, which is a serious offence. The notice further records that petitioner is a work shirker, and therefore, he should reply as to why disciplinary action be not initiated against him. This notice was responded by the petitioner on 12.9.2016. Petitioner has explained in detail about the fact that he was not well on 7th June, 2016 and had availed casual leave on 8th June, 2016, and that after he was examined by the doctor on 9th June, 2016, he was advised rest, and consequently an application was moved for grant of leave. After considering such reply, the Director proceeded to place the petitioner under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. After considering such reply, the Director proceeded to place the petitioner under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. A charge-sheet was also served upon the petitioner on account of submitting false medical leave which rendered petitioner’s integrity doubtful. One Smt. Kalpana Sahai, Programme Officer was appointed as the enquiry officer. 6. Petitioner on 5th December, 2016 questioned the appointment of enquiry officer, on the ground that she had been working as Programme Assistant, Grade-2, which was a post subordinate to the post occupied by petitioner i.e. Assistant Programme Officer. It was alleged that respondent No. 4 had resigned from the post and thereafter accepted a contractual appointment in NCZCC. Contention was that enquiry officer was not a regular employee/officer of the Centre and being a contractual employee, ought not to be appointed as enquiry officer, particularly when she had worked under the petitioner earlier. Petitioner also questioned the bona fide of disciplinary action initiated against him in the matter. The organZational structure etc. was also highlighted to substantiate such plea. 7. While objection of petitioner against appointment of enquiry officer remained pending, a fresh notice was sent to the petitioner by the enquiry officer on 6.12.2016, granting a final opportunity to him to submit reply within 03 days, failing which the enquiry was to proceed. A memo dated 6/7th December, 2016, issued to petitioner has also been brought on record, which records the displeasure of Director on account of challenge raised to the appointment of enquiry officer. Petitioner’s contention that departmental enquiry has been initiated as a means of retribution, due to grant of interim protection by the High Court was also treated to be an act of insubordination on part of the petitioner. Order was passed to initiate further action on such charges also. A subsequent memo was thus issued on 13.12.2016 informing that in case no reply is submitted by the petitioner by 14th December, 2016 then it would be treated that petitioner has nothing to say in the matter. Petitioner submitted a reply to this letter on 14th December, 2016 itself, praying that as he has already raised an objection in the matter, which is yet to be decided by the Director, the proceedings of enquiry be deferred. The reply to the charge memo has also been submitted by the petitioner, which is contained in Annexure-24 to the writ petition. The reply to the charge memo has also been submitted by the petitioner, which is contained in Annexure-24 to the writ petition. This reply contains an elaborate defence of the petitioner to the charges levelled against him. A subsequent order appears to have been passed on 15th December, 2016 holding that the petitioner is trying to circumvent the proceedings and undermine the enquiry process. This letter further records that petitioner should not write directly to the Director, as he is under suspension. Petitioner has also submitted a letter on 20th December, 2016 objecting to the letter of the Director by submitting that he is being harassed and victimZed only because the transfer order could not be implemented against the wishes of Director. Petitioner alleges that thereafter neither any date, time or place was fixed for holding the enquiry nor any enquiry was actually conducted and straightway an order of dismissal from service has been passed against him by the Director on 3.4.2017. Petitioner further contends that the order of dismissal refers to an enquiry report, which was never served upon him nor he was given any opportunity to submit a reply to it. The order of dismissal, therefore, has been assailed on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner lacked good faith and is mala fide. Submission is that there existed no allegation of misconduct nor petitioner’s integrity was ever doubted in the past, and at the fag end of his career he has been harassed and victimZed on the whims of the then Director, who felt infuriated at the turn of events. The then Director has also been impleaded personally as a party. Allegations of mala fide have been levelled against the Director and the enquiry officer. 8. A composite counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of NCZCC, its the then Director and the enquiry officer, who are also made parties in their personal capacity. In para-46 of the counter-affidavit, the respondents have stated as under : “46. ...... It was also the duty of the respondent to get the status of the mental health of the petitioner confirmed by an independent and competent body once the petitioner had himself submitted in writing that he had become a psychiatric patient, as no duty of responsibility can be given to a mentally unsound person. ...... It was also the duty of the respondent to get the status of the mental health of the petitioner confirmed by an independent and competent body once the petitioner had himself submitted in writing that he had become a psychiatric patient, as no duty of responsibility can be given to a mentally unsound person. The report of the medical board is in favour of the petitioner and as such the allegation of mala fide against the respondent No. 3 itself becomes false and fabricated.” In para-54 of the counter-affidavit, it is stated that the enquiry was conducted on 19th December, 2016 and its report was also submitted to the administrative officer on the same day. Other averments in the writ petition have also been denied. An objection is also taken to the maintainability of writ petition against NCZCC. 9. I have heard Sri Anoop Trivedi assisted by Sri Saksham Srivastava for the petitioner, Sri P.N. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Jagdev Singh for the NCZCC and the private respondents and Sri Gyan Prakash Singh for the Union of India. 10. Issue relating to maintainability of the writ petition against NCZCC has been decided by this Court in Writ Petition No. 24972 of 1991 (Paras Nath Pandey v. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre, Allahabad) on 22.11.2000 in following words : “The unrebutted averments in the writ petition and the supplementary-affidavit with reference to the structuring of the centre as well as its constitution, nature of financial supervision and control of the central Government leave no room for one to doubt that the respondent NCZCC is an instrumentality of central Government. Entire funds come from the Central Government. The Constitution of the Executive Body shows that Central Government has pervading control on the activity of the Centre. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981 SC 487, there can be no doubt that NCZCC is an authority under Article 12, Constitution of India. Preliminary objection on the point is decided against the respondent and it is held that writ petition is maintainable against NCZCC.” Although the writ was held to be maintainable against NCZCC but ultimately relief was denied to the petitioner on merits. Preliminary objection on the point is decided against the respondent and it is held that writ petition is maintainable against NCZCC.” Although the writ was held to be maintainable against NCZCC but ultimately relief was denied to the petitioner on merits. A special appeal No. 798 of 2000 was then filed by Paras Nath Pandey against the Director, NCZCC, which came to be allowed on 1st December, 2008. The Division Bench judgment is in Paras Nath Pandey v. Director, North Central Zone, Cultural Centre, Allahabad, 2009(1) ESC 155. This judgment was assailed by NCZCC before the Apex Court and the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 6061 of 2009 was also dismissed on 23rd March, 2009. The finding of the learned Single Judge that a writ petition would lie against NCZCC, therefore, has attained finality. Upon confronted with this situation, Sri P.N. Saxena, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submits that as the issue relating to maintainability of writ against NCZCC has already been adjudged against the respondents, he does not propose to press his objection to the maintainability of writ petition. The maintainability issue, accordingly, stands answered. 11. So far as the facts recorded in this order are concerned, no serious issue is raised. Learned Senior Counsel, however, submits that proceedings were undertaken against the petitioner in due discharge of official functions by the concerned respondents and that orders were not passed on account of any malice. 12. Admittedly the petitioner had rendered long and satisfactory service to NCZCC, and no disciplinary action was ever taken against him. It was only with the passing of transfer order that discord has surfaced between the parties. Petitioner was transferred on 8.6.2016 to Ballia. He was on leave from 7.6.2016 itself. His application for grant of leave on medical grounds dated 9.6.2016 has been brought on record, as per which he was advised to take ten days rest. The Director’s endorsement on this application dated 10.6.2016 is on record. No doubts appear to have been raised with regard to petitioner’s illness. Even later in point of time, no doubts were expressed on the bona fide of petitioner’s leave application. It appears that petitioner questioned his transfer to Ballia on the ground that Bhojpuri Cultural Centre, Ballia, to which he was transferred on 8.6.2016 was not a part of NCZCC, and therefore, Director had no jurisdiction to transfer him. Even later in point of time, no doubts were expressed on the bona fide of petitioner’s leave application. It appears that petitioner questioned his transfer to Ballia on the ground that Bhojpuri Cultural Centre, Ballia, to which he was transferred on 8.6.2016 was not a part of NCZCC, and therefore, Director had no jurisdiction to transfer him. Upon a challenge made to the order of transfer in Writ Petition No. 30758 of 2016, this Court passed following orders of stay in favour of petitioner on 11.7.2016 : “Heard Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Anant Kumar Tiwari, learned Central Government Standing Counsel who has filed his Appearance today on behalf of the respondents. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 8.6.2016 whereby he has been transferred from North Central Zone, Cultural Centre (NCZCC), Allahabad to Bhojpuri Cultural Centre (BCC), Shaheed Park, Ballia. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner does not hold a transferrable post and secondly the BCC has been taken over by the State Government with the concurence of the Central Government through its letter dated 18.5.2012, Annexure-4 to the writ petition and the consequential Gazette Notification dated 22.5.2012, Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that now the BCC is to be managed by a Committee headed by the District Magistrate, Ballia and the NCZCC has no concern with it. The second leg of the submission is that the BCC is a private trust in which an employee of the Central Government cannot be posted. The matter requires consideration. Sri Anant Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents prays for and is granted one month for filing counter-affidavit. List on 22.8.2016 showing the name of Sri Anant Kumar Tiwari as counsel for the petitioner. Till the next date of listing, the impugned order of transfer dated 8.6.2016 shall remain stayed.” 13. Petitioner thereafter has offered his joining on 12.7.2016. Sri Anant Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondents prays for and is granted one month for filing counter-affidavit. List on 22.8.2016 showing the name of Sri Anant Kumar Tiwari as counsel for the petitioner. Till the next date of listing, the impugned order of transfer dated 8.6.2016 shall remain stayed.” 13. Petitioner thereafter has offered his joining on 12.7.2016. It is thereafter that a communication was sent on 21st December, 2016 to the Chief Medical Officer, Allahabad, which reads as under : ^^mRrj e/; jsyos lkaLd`frd dsUnz esa dk;Zjr Jh d`".kkuUn ik.Ms us Lo;a fy[k dj fn;k gS fd oks ruko ,oa volkn (Depression) tSlh ekufld chekfj;ksa ls xzflr gSaA mudh mez 56 o"kZ gSA vr,o fuosnu gS fd Jh ik.Ms dk Qqy esfMdy cksMZ djkus dk d"V djsa vkSj crk;saA 1- fd D;k budh ;g mfDr fd ;g ruko ,oa volkn ls ihfM+r gS] lgh gS\ 2- budh Lo;a dh LohdkjksfDr ds n`f"Vxr] fd ;s ruko ,oa volkn (Depression) tSlh xEHkhj ekufld chekfj;ksa ls ihfM+r gSa] vkSj budh 56 o"kZ dh vk;q ds n`f"Vxr D;k ;s ljdkjh lsok ds ;ksX; jg x, gS\ layXud&Jh ik.Ms dk i= fnukad 9-06-2016^^ 14. Petitioner had sought leave on 9.6.2016 and his application reads as under : ^^xr nks fnuksa ls ruko o fMisz'ku dh otg ls vkt fnukad 9&6&2016 le; 08-00 fLFkfr xEHkhj gks tkus ds dkj.k foo'k gksdj lehiorhZ fpfdRlk dsUnz esa MkW0 ls ijke'kZ fy;k] ftlesa MkW0 us dqN nokbZ;k o 10 fnu dk jsLV ysus dks dgkA vr% fuosnu gS fd MkW0 ds ijke'kZ ds vuqlkj eq>s 10 fnu dk esfMdy vodk'k nsus dh d`ik djsaA mid`r gwWxkA layXud& fpfdRldh; ijke'kZ dh Nk;kizfrA^^ 15. Once the order of transfer had already been stayed by this Court and the petitioner had joined, there apparently was no reason to direct constitution of a medical board when no such board was constituted while petitioner was on medical leave. The tone and tenor of the letter dated 21.7.2016 clearly suggests annoyance on part of the then Director, inasmuch as he wanted the opinion of the medical board on the question as to whether the petitioner is capable of being retained in employment. Such an issue had not arisen earlier. Direction issued to examine as to whether petitioner was fit to be retained in service went beyond the scope of enquiry by the medical board. 16. Such an issue had not arisen earlier. Direction issued to examine as to whether petitioner was fit to be retained in service went beyond the scope of enquiry by the medical board. 16. After the medical board found the petitioner to be fit to continue in service and not suffering from any serious infirmity, the Director has initiated disciplinary action against the petitioner. The manner in which proceedings have been drawn thereafter against the petitioner resulting in passing of the order of dismissal clearly lends credence to the petitioner’s argument that the Director was infuriated at petitioner succeeding in getting an interim protection from this Court and thereby not joining at Ballia, despite an order of the Director. The main charge levelled against the petitioner in disciplinary proceedings is that petitioner had obtained medical leave by misrepresenting facts, which renders his integrity doubtful. He has also been accused of misutilZing provisions relating to grant of medical leave etc. 17. Respondent No. 4 was appointed as the enquiry officer. The petitioner questioned the appointment of enquiry officer on the ground that she had been his junior but the same was not considered. However, a memo was issued to petitioner on 13th December, 2016 requiring him to submit reply by the next day i.e. 14.12.2016. Petitioner, however, pressed his plea of objection against the appointment of enquiry officer. This was met with yet another memo issued to petitioner by the Director on 15th December, 2016, which reads as under : “Your representation dated 5.12.2016 regarding enquiry against you was disposed of vide memo No. 986/Dir./NCZCC/E-2016 dated 7.12.2016 which was received by you on 8.12.2016 at 1.25 p.m. You were also directed in that memo to cooperate with the enquiry process. However, it is most regretfully noted that you are writing directly to the Director repeatedly, instead of submitting your defense to the enquiry officer. It is clearly an attempt at circumventing & undermining the enquiry process. Your latest reply to the memo dated 7.12.2016 is seen as further attempt at circumventing & undermining the enquiry process as well as creating an alibi which may be eventually be misused by you in different for a. You are once again directed not to write directly to the Director while you are under suspension and the enquiry is under process against you. Failure to comply with these directions may result in further disciplinary action against you.” 18. Thereafter neither any date, time and place was fixed for holding of enquiry nor records reveal as to when the enquiry itself was conducted. As per the counter-affidavit the enquiry was conducted on 19th December, 2016 and a report was also prepared and served upon the administrative officer of NCZCC on 19th December, 2016 itself. The petitioner has neither been served with the enquiry report nor he has been given an opportunity to defend himself. However, respondents proceeded to dismiss the petitioner on the basis of findings returned in the enquiry, behind his back. 19. The manner in which disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and concluded, resulting in passing of the impugned order of dismissal leaves much to be desired. The very initiation of disciplinary action is found to be actuated by malice apparent on face of the record. Although no doubt was expressed upon genuineness of petitioner’s medical leave application but after the petitioner joined alongwith interim order passed by this Court against the order of transfer, the Director has proceeded in a vindictive manner by ordering constitution of a medical board not only to verify petitioner’s illness but also to examine as to whether petitioner was fit to be retained in service. The tone and tenor of the letter dated 21st July, 2016 would go to show that respondents were questioning the petitioner’s ability to continue in the employment itself. The rationale to initiate disciplinary action as well as its fairness both are suspect. The manner in which entire disciplinary action has been undertaken and an order of dismissal has been passed would clearly go to show that action of respondents was actuated with bias and malice. 20. In State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna and others, 2001 (2) SCC 330 , the Apex Court observed as under in paragraphs 2 and 5 : “2. The concept of fairness in administrative action has been the subject-matter of considerable judicial debate but there is total unanimity on the basic element of the concept to the effect that the same is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each matter pending scrutiny before the Court and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved therefor. The concept of fairness in administrative action has been the subject-matter of considerable judicial debate but there is total unanimity on the basic element of the concept to the effect that the same is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each matter pending scrutiny before the Court and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved therefor. As a matter of fact, fairness is synonymous with reasonableness: And on the issue of ascertainment of meaning of reasonableness, common English parlance referred to as what is in contemplation of an ordinary man of prudence similarly placed— it is the appreciation of this common man’s perception in its proper perspective which would prompt the Court to determine the situation as to whether the same is otherwise reasonable or not. 5. Whereas fairness is synonymous with reasonableness — bias stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word “malice” which in common acceptation means and implies “spite” or “ill will”. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice and is now well-settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent evidence available on record to come to the conclusion as to whether in fact, there was existing a bias or a mala fide move which results in the miscarriage of justice (see in this context Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant [ (2001) 1 SCC 182 : JT 2000 Supp (2) SC 206]). In almost all legal inquiries, “intention as distinguished from motive is the all-important factor” and in common parlance a malicious act stands equated with an intentional act without just cause or excuse. In the case of Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275 : (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)] the Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463] as below: “For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. In the case of Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens [(1955) 1 QB 275 : (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)] the Court of Appeal has stated upon reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463] as below: “For this purpose maliciously means no more than knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye [(1853) 2 E&B 216 : 22 LJQB 463] where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and servant by harbouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted his master during his period of service, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 1 C&P 673 : 4 B&C 247. 'Intentionally’ refers to the doing of the act; it does not mean that the defendant meant to be spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in defamation, malice in fact has to be proved.” 21. Once the very initiation of proceedings is found to be actuated by malice, all subsequent proceedings would be open to challenge on the ground of malice in law and infact. In the facts of the present case, I am inclined to hold that very initiation of disciplinary proceedings in the instant case against petitioner as well as all subsequent action including order of dismissal is a malicious act as it was not initiated with just cause or excuse. Impugned action therefore is unsustainable in law. 22. Writ petition, accordingly, succeeds and is allowed. Order impugned dated 3.4.2017 stands quashed. Ordinarily this Court would have directed disciplinary proceedings to be continued from the stage it had gone bad, but such a course is not followed in the facts of the present case. On the basis of materials produced, this Court finds substance in the contention of petitioner that initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was a result of annoyance on part of the Director only because his order of transfer was not carried out and protection was granted by the Writ Court against it. On the basis of materials produced, this Court finds substance in the contention of petitioner that initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was a result of annoyance on part of the Director only because his order of transfer was not carried out and protection was granted by the Writ Court against it. There was no other allegation ever levelled against the petitioner in his long service, nor any such material has been brought on record. The petitioner has been harassed and victimZed sufficiently on account of the action of respondents, and therefore, it would be unjust to allow the respondents to continue with the enquiry any further. Even otherwise, the charges levelled are not serious enough so as to warrant any disciplinary action. Petitioner would therefore be entitled to reinstatement alongwith continuity of service and all service benefits. This Court would have proceeded to impose exemplary cost on the private respondents, but in view of the fair stand taken by Sri P.N. Saxena on behalf of private respondents, the Court refrains from doing so. In the facts and circumstances, however, a token cost of Rs. 1/- is imposed against the respondents in disapproval of their action.