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2018 DIGILAW 1968 (MAD)

Vimala Saroja v. Ponniah (Died)

2018-06-26

M.SUNDAR

body2018
JUDGMENT : M. SUNDAR, J. 1. This litigation commenced two decades and two years ago when one Ponniah chose to file a suit in O.S.No.68 of 1996 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirunelveli. 'Subordinate Judge's Court, Tirunelveli', shall hereinafter be referred to as 'Trial Court' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity. 2. In this suit, defendants 2 to 5 are Ponniah's siblings. Defendant No.1 is one Vimala Saroja. Defendants 6, 7 and 8 are three different Banks. 3. Ponniah and Defendants 2 to 5 had a sibling by name Joseph, who died on 16.02.1995. Vimala Saroja, who has been arrayed as Defendant No.1 in this suit, had married Joseph on 10.05.1985. In this suit, it is the case of Ponniah and Defendants 2 to 5 that they are the legal heirs of Joseph and Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph on 10.05.1985 is not valid. On this basis, Ponniah and his aforesaid siblings in this suit, sought for a declaration that they are the legal heirs of Late Joseph and also for a declaration of title over certain schedules of properties. Declaration of title over certain properties set out in the schedule to the plaint is predicated on the ground that Ponniah and his aforesaid siblings alone are Joseph's legal heirs, as Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph on 10.05.1985 is not valid. 4. When things stood above, Vimala Saroja along with one Anitha Valarmathi, who according to Vimala Saroja is her foster daughter, filed a petition in the trial Court on 19.11.1998. This petition is O.P.No.129 of 1998 and in this petition, the petitioners sought for a probate of a Will dated 14.11.1994 said to have been executed by Late Joseph. In this petition for probate, the aforesaid Ponniah and his siblings were arrayed as defendants 1 to 5 in the probate petition. Respondents 1 to 5 in the probate petition i.e, siblings of Joseph, contested the Will and therefore, the Original Petition was converted into a suit. The suit was assigned the number O.S.No.272 of 2001 on the file of the trial Court. 5. As would be evident from the narrative thus far, the aforesaid two suits have a common factual matrix and prayers sought for therein and possible verdicts are inseparably dovetailed. Therefore, there was joint trial. The suit was assigned the number O.S.No.272 of 2001 on the file of the trial Court. 5. As would be evident from the narrative thus far, the aforesaid two suits have a common factual matrix and prayers sought for therein and possible verdicts are inseparably dovetailed. Therefore, there was joint trial. In the joint trial, Vimala Saroja and her foster daughter were treated as plaintiffs and Ponniah and his siblings were treated as Defendants. After full contest and trial, the trial court passed a common judgment dated 18.03.2003 in both the suits. In and by this common judgment, the trial Court decreed Ponniah's suit O.S.No.68 of 1996 and dismissed Vimala Saroja's suit i.e., O.S.No.272 of 2001. 6. In the joint trial, attestors of the aforesaid testament were examined as PW1 and PW2. Vimala Saroja was examined as PW3 and one P.Subramanian, Advocate in whose Chambers the aforesaid testament/Will is said to have been executed, was examined as PW4. On the side of the defendants, Ponniah's son one Gunapal was examined as the lone witness i.e, DW1. On the side of the plaintiffs, two documents, namely aforesaid testament/Will dated 14.11.1994 and a letter were marked as Exs.A1 and A2. On the side of the defendants, four documents were marked. While Exs.B1 and B2 are a legal notice dated 18.03.1995 sent by Ponniah to Vimala Saroja and acknowledgement for the same, Ex.B3 is an order dated 17.07.1987 made by Madras High Court in M.C.No.14 of 1985. Ex.B4 is a Revenue receipt pertaining to plaint schedule properties. 7. After the aforesaid common judgment and decree dated 18.03.2003 made by the trial Court, Vimala Saroja carried the matter by way of a regular first appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC" for brevity). As the common judgment disposed of two suits, two separate regular first appeals were filed and they are A.S.No.126 of 2003 and A.S.No.127 of 2003. A.S.No.126 of 2003 is one assailing the decree in aforesaid O.S.No.68 of 1996 (Ponniah's suit). A.S.No.127 of 2007 is directed against dismissal of O.S.No.272 of 2001 (Vimala Saroja's suit). 8. Both the regular first appeals were heard together and after full contest and elaborate hearing, the first appellate Court dismissed both the appeals vide common judgment and decree dated 28.07.2005. A.S.No.126 of 2003 is one assailing the decree in aforesaid O.S.No.68 of 1996 (Ponniah's suit). A.S.No.127 of 2007 is directed against dismissal of O.S.No.272 of 2001 (Vimala Saroja's suit). 8. Both the regular first appeals were heard together and after full contest and elaborate hearing, the first appellate Court dismissed both the appeals vide common judgment and decree dated 28.07.2005. The first appellate Court is 'First Additional District Court, Tirunelveli', which shall hereinafter be referred to as 'first appellate Court' for the sake of convenience and clarity. 9. In the common judgments of the trial court and first appellate Court, the aforesaid Will/testament of Late Joseph dated 14.11.1994 was disbelieved concurrently and both the courts concurrently held that Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph on 10.05.1985 is not valid. 10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid common judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, Vimala Saroja has preferred the instant two second appeals, which were admitted by this Court on 19.02.2008. At the time of admission, these two second appeals were admitted on a common lone question of law, which reads as follows: (i) Whether the judgment and decree of the court below are erroneous on account of the failure to consider the provisions of the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 and the jurisdiction of the Probate Court, in their proper perspective? 11. A decade later, these second appeals are now before this Court for final disposal. 12. When the matter was taken up for final disposal, Mr. V. Meenakshi Sundaram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of appellant Vimala Saroja, circulated two proposed additional questions and the same read as follows: "(A) Whether the Courts below are correct in not evaluating the evidence of PW1 and PW2 (Attestors of the Will dated 14.11.1994) in terms of Section 68 of Indian Evidence Act and Section 63 of Indian Succession Act to decide the validity of the Will dated 14.11.1994 (Ex.A1)? (B) Whether the Courts below are correct in relying upon Ex.B3 (xerox copy of the order dated 17.07.1987 in M.C.No.14 of 1985 on the file of this Hon'ble Court) in contra to Section 41 r/w.76 and 77 of Indian Evidence Act, while deciding the legality of marriage between appellate and Late D. Joseph?" 13. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid questions qualify as substantial questions of law and they arise from the factual matrix of this case. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid questions qualify as substantial questions of law and they arise from the factual matrix of this case. Learned counsel requested this Court to formulate the aforesaid two questions as additional substantial questions of law along with the aforementioned lone common substantial question of law on which this second appeal was admitted. 14. Ms. Lita Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for Ponniah and his siblings submitted that the appellant has to argue this second appeal only on the aforesaid lone common substantial question of law (on which these two second appeals were admitted on 19.02.2008) and that the appellant cannot now, at this belated point of time, a decade later, ask for additional substantial questions of law to be framed/formulated. It was the emphatic submission of learned counsel that the appellant has to stand or fall on the aforesaid lone common question of law on which the second appeal was admitted. It was also her further submission that the aforesaid lone common substantial question of law does not stand a moment's scrutiny and has to be answered against the appellant. This submission will be examined in the later portion of this judgment. 15. As far as the additional questions protaganised as additional substantial questions of law by appellant are concerned, this Court is unable to accept the submission that an appellant has to argue a second appeal only on the substantial questions of law on which it was admitted and that the appellant does not have the right to seek additional questions of law to be framed/formulated later. The reason is straight and simple. Proviso to Section 100 CPC gives the appellant the right to seek formulation of additional substantial questions of law at the hearing. As mentioned supra, this second appeal is now listed for hearing i.e., final disposal. In this regard, it would be appropriate to extract proviso to Section 100 CPC. This Court does so and the same reads as follows: "Provided that noting in the sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." 16. This Court does so and the same reads as follows: "Provided that noting in the sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question." 16. The language in which the proviso to Section 100 CPC is couched is very clear that the appellant is entitled to urge the Court to formulate substantial questions of law at the hearing. Therefore, the appellant is perfectly entitled to seek formulation of additional substantial questions of law when the matter is taken up for final hearing. When appellant seeks to do so, for additional substantial questions of law to be formulated, two determinants are imperative. One is, the appellant should be able to convince the Court that the question proposed qualifies as a substantial question of law arising out of the factual matrix of the case and second aspect is, if the Court is convinced and the Court is accedes to such request from an appellant, should record the reason for so formulating additional substantial questions of law. Therefore, the Court proceeds to examine the two questions propounded and protaganised as additional substantial questions of law by the learned counsel for the appellant. 17. As far as question (A) or in other words, the first additional question proposed is concerned, a bare perusal of the same will demonstrate that it does not qualify as a substantial question of law. The reason is, what is substantial question of law, more so in contradistinction to mere question of law, has been explained in celebrated decision of the Supreme Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta, (1962) AIR SC 1314 way back in 1962, and the same continues to be good law until this day. In very simple terms, a substantial question of law should be one that is debatable and it should arise from the facts of the case, besides being one that will conclusively decide the rights and liabilities of the adversaries/parties to the lis. 18. In this background when additional question No.2 i.e., Question No.(B) circulated by the appellant is examined, this Court is of the view that it does qualify as a substantial question of law. 18. In this background when additional question No.2 i.e., Question No.(B) circulated by the appellant is examined, this Court is of the view that it does qualify as a substantial question of law. The reason is, Ex.B3 is very crucial to decide whether Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph is valid. Ex.B3 is a confirmation of decree nisi made by the Madras High Court in M.C.No.14 of 1985 on 17.07.1987. There is no dispute on facts that Vimala Saroja was originally married to one James. There were divorce proceedings between the two, which culminated in a decree of divorce i.e., decree dated 01.04.1985 made in IDOP No.85 of 1984. This decree nisi of divorce was made by the regular District Court (not by the Family Court). There is no dispute between the parties on this aspect of the matter. As mentioned above, marriage between Vimala Saroja and Jospeh was on 10.05.1985, roughly a month and 10 days later. Vide Ex.B3, the aforesaid decree nisi was confirmed by the High Court only on 17.07.1987. As per law that existed at that point of time, Vimala Saroja could not have contracted a valid marriage within 6 months from the date of confirmation of decree nisi. In this case, date of confirmation of decree nisi vide Ex.P3 was on 17.07.1987, which means Vimala Saroja could not have contracted a valid marriage before 17.01.1988. As validity of marriage of Vimala Saroja to Joseph on 10.05.1985 is extremely crucial and critical in deciding the core issue in this lis, Ex.B3 assumes enormous significance. Therefore, the aforesaid question of law touching upon Ex.B3 arises. The issue as to how an order of the High Court, to be precise, a photo copy of an order of the High Court should be construed, touches upon evidentiary value of such a document which according to learned counsel for the appellant requires a debate and therefore, it qualifies as substantial question of law. As would be evident from the narration of the facts thus far, it will be clear that Ex.B3 is so crucial for resolving/deciding the lis and therefore, the second proposed additional substantial question of law certainly arises from the factual matrix of this case. In this view of the matter, this Court formulates the aforesaid second substantial question of law as Substantial question of law No.2. In this view of the matter, this Court formulates the aforesaid second substantial question of law as Substantial question of law No.2. In effect, these two second appeals will now be heard on the aforesaid two common substantial questions of law i.e., lone substantial question of law on which these second appeals were admitted on 19.02.2008 and this additional substantial question of law, which has been formulated now in this judgment. 19. Let us now examine first substantial question of law i.e, the lone substantial question on which the second appeal was admitted on 19.02.2008. With regard to the amendment to the Indian Divorce Act being Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, there is no dispute that this amending Act came into effect on 03.10.2001. What is of relevance for this case is, owing to the aforesaid amending Act, Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act stood amended resulting in amendment to Section 57 of Indian Divorce Act. Post amendment, it was not necessary to get a decree nisi confirmed by a two judge Bench of the High Court. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant pressed into service two judgments, being Asis, (2006) 2 CTC 32 (Full bench of Bombay High Court) and another Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Joseph Stanislaus, (2015) 4 LW 97 . 20. Per contra, learned counsel for Ponniah and his siblings pressed into service Battie, 1916 AIR Madras 847(2), J.J. Turner Vs. A.E.Turner, 1921 AIR Calcutta 517, Pinto's case (Maria Sera Pinto Vs. Milton Dias, (2001) 1 BLR 56) decided by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and Rosy Kurian's Case (Rosy Kurian Kannanaikal Vs. Joseph Verghese Cheeran, (2004) 3 KarLJ 75 ). 21. Asis case is for the principle that the procedure of confirmation of a judgment of lower court under the Indian Divorce Act by the High Court will give way to the procedure under the Family Courts Act. In other words, Asis case is for the principle that dissolution of marriage decree passed by the Family Court need not be confirmed by the High Court and that such Family Court decrees will only be subject to appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 22. In other words, Asis case is for the principle that dissolution of marriage decree passed by the Family Court need not be confirmed by the High Court and that such Family Court decrees will only be subject to appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. 22. Joseph Stanislaus case is for the principle that confirmation by the Bench of High Court (confirmation of dissolution of marriage decree made by a District court) is not necessary post amendment to Divorce Act. 23. Battie's case was prior to amendment to Divorce Act and the Court in this case declared the second marriage to be null and void in view of Section 57 of the Divorce Act. The principle that the first marriage is still in force for those six months was laid down in Battie's case. 24. J.J.Turner case is again one where the second marriage was held to be void as six months had not elapsed from the date of confirmation of dissolution of the first marriage. This judgment was again rendered in the light of Section 57 prior to amendment. 25. Pinto's case is one that turns on a judgment rendered by a Full Bench of Bombay High Court in Romila Jaidev Shroff, (2000) 4 BCR 122 (F.B.) In Romila Jaidev Shroff case, the Bombay High Court held that Family Courts Act would override all other laws in force including the Letters Patent. In Pinto's case, it was clarified that all decree nisi prior to Romila Jaidev Shroff case shall be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with Section 16 and any pending case prior to decree nisi stage shall stand transferred to Family Court. It was also held that those cases which were transferred to the Family court with effect from 5.5.2000 need no confirmation by the High Court. 26. Rosy Kurian's case is one where a five Judges Bench of Karnataka High Court held that in the light of the amendment, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to only matters pending in the High Court and therefore, its application will be only to matters pending in the High Court. 27. The cases that have been pressed into service have been set out only for the purpose of completing the narration of facts. 27. The cases that have been pressed into service have been set out only for the purpose of completing the narration of facts. Otherwise there is no dispute before me that there is no direct case law with regard to retrospectivity of the aforesaid amendment to Indian Divorce Act and its impact on a marriage that was contracted in violation of Section 57 of the old Act. Therefore, in the light of the undisputed facts before me as between the counsel, it may not be necessary to embark upon a discussion with regard to aforesaid case laws. 28. Every statute is prospective and it operates retrospectively only when it is so specifically provided in the statute. Therefore, there is no difficulty in assuming the position that Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 that came into effect on 03.10.2001 is prospective and does not impact the facts of this case. 29. In the light of the narrative thus far, this court has no hesitation in answering the first substantial question of law in favour of respondents and against the appellant by holding that the courts below had not erred with regard to their approach qua Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 and the jurisdiction of the Probate Courts. In other words, the first substantial question of law is answered in favour of respondents and against the appellant. 30. This takes us to the next substantial question of law which turns on Ex.B3. Learned counsel for appellant submits that Ex.B3 is a photocopy and it was marked subject to objection. It is his specific case that Ex.B3 was not appreciated by the Courts below in view of the bar in the Indian Evidence Act, particularly Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is also the specific say of the learned counsel for appellant that if that is so appreciated in the light of the aforesaid provisions of the Evidence Act, Ex.B3 would not have been looked into and if Ex.B3 is eliminated from the facts of this case, Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph on 10.05.1985 will automatically become valid. Section 41 of the Evidence Act deals with relevance of certain judgments in probate etc.., jurisdiction and the same reads as follows: "41. Section 41 of the Evidence Act deals with relevance of certain judgments in probate etc.., jurisdiction and the same reads as follows: "41. Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.-A final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court, in the exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction, which confers upon or takes away from any person any legal character, or which declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or to be entitled to any specific thing, not as against any specified person but absolutely, is relevant when the existence of any such legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is relevant; Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof- that any legal character which it confers accrued at the time when such judgment, order or decree came into operation; that any legal character, to which it declares any such person to be entitled, accrued to that person at the time when such judgment, order or decree declares it to have accrued to that person; that any legal character which it takes away from any such person ceased at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declared that it had ceased or should cease; and that anything to which it declares any person to be so entitled was the property of that person at the time from which such judgment, order or decree declares that it had been or should be his property." 31. While Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with Certified copies of public documents, Section 77 deals with proof of documents by production of certified copies. Court deems it appropriate to extract both Section 76 and Section 77 and the same reads as follows: "76. While Section 76 of the Indian Evidence Act deals with Certified copies of public documents, Section 77 deals with proof of documents by production of certified copies. Court deems it appropriate to extract both Section 76 and Section 77 and the same reads as follows: "76. Certified copies of public documents.-Every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof, as the case may be, and such certificate shall be dated and subscribed by such officer with his name and his official title, and shall be sealed, whenever such officer is authorized by law to make use of a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies." "77. Proof of documents by production of certified copies.-Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies." 32. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.B3, being a document that qualifies under Section 41 of the Evidence Act, only a certified copy of the order of the Madras High Court dated 17.07.1987 should have been marked. There is no difficulty in accepting the submission that Ex.B3 qualifies under Section 41. There is no doubt that Ex.B3 is a public document within the meaning of Section 74 of Indian Evidence Act. Section 76 provides for issuance of certified copies of public documents and Section 77 is a provision by which certified copies can be produced in proof of such public documents. This scheme of the Act by itself will not take away the right of a party to produce secondary evidence i.e., photocopy of the public document. The provision in Indian Evidence Act, which enables a litigant to lead secondary evidence is Section 63 and the same reads as follows: "63. This scheme of the Act by itself will not take away the right of a party to produce secondary evidence i.e., photocopy of the public document. The provision in Indian Evidence Act, which enables a litigant to lead secondary evidence is Section 63 and the same reads as follows: "63. Secondary evidence.-Secondary evidence means and include- (1)Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained; (2)Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3)Copies made from or compared with the original; (4)Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them; (5)Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. " 33. In the light of Section 63 of Indian Evidence Act, this Court has no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that merely because a document qualifies as document of relevance under Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act, a photo copy of the same cannot be construed as indispensable. The document that has been marked as Ex.B3 is an order of the Madras High Court. If orders of a Court, particularly orders of a High Court can be marked as an exhibit in the trial Court, only by production of certified copies, that will cause a piquant situation. Be that as it may, it is not necessary to examine that situation, because there is nothing that stops leading any secondary evidence in this case as it is nobody's case that the document or for that matter the photocopy is not authentic. It is not the case of the appellant that Ex.B3 is manufactured or forged or Ex.B3 is a gotten up document. All that the appellant is arguing is that if Ex.B3 is not allowed to be marked and if the appellant's objection for marking a photo copy is sustained, there would have been no Ex.B3 in this case and therefore, Vimala Saroja's marriage to Joseph on 10.05.1985 would have automatically got validated. 34. This is unacceptable owing to the aforesaid provision for leading secondary evidence. This Court is unable to accept this submission for one more reason. It is not disputed that the decree nisi dissolving the marriage of Vimala Saroja to James was passed by a District Court on 01.04.1985. That Decree nisi was not marked in the Courts below. 34. This is unacceptable owing to the aforesaid provision for leading secondary evidence. This Court is unable to accept this submission for one more reason. It is not disputed that the decree nisi dissolving the marriage of Vimala Saroja to James was passed by a District Court on 01.04.1985. That Decree nisi was not marked in the Courts below. When the decree nisi is not disputed, it is common knowledge that any decree nisi passed by the District Court would certainly contain a clause that it is necessary to have the same confirmed by an appropriate Court. Therefore, Vimala Saroja cannot be heard to contend that she was not aware that the decree nisi passed by the District Court needs to be confirmed by the High Court as per the existing provision on that day. 35. Further more, it is very fundamental that ignorance of law cannot be a basis to avoid any bar or rigor in law and this principle also comes in the way for the appellant. Therefore, looking at it from any point of view, one has to answer both the aforesaid substantial questions of law against the appellant and in favour of the respondents. In other words, it is answered that the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 has no impact on the facts of this case and therefore, there was no error on the part of Courts below in terms of failure to consider the provisions of the said amending Act. Equally, in the light of there being no legal bar for leading secondary evidence qua a document which qualifies under Section 41 of the Evidence Act, the second substantial question of law also is answered against the appellant by saying that the Courts below were perfectly correct in relying upon Ex.B3 and it is not contrary to Section 41 read with Sections 76 and 77 of the Indian Evidence Act. 36. Though this Court has answered both the substantial questions of law against the appellant, for the purpose of making this order comprehensive, it may be necessary to extract how the Courts below dealt with Ex.B3. An extract of portion of Paragraph 15 of the first appellate Court judgment is relevant and the same reads as follows: XXX XXX XXX 37. Ms. An extract of portion of Paragraph 15 of the first appellate Court judgment is relevant and the same reads as follows: XXX XXX XXX 37. Ms. Lita Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for Ponniah and his siblings placed before me an unreported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in Civil Appeal No.231 of 2015 (Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi and Others). Learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to Paragraphs 15 and 16, which read as follows: "15.In S.R. Tiwari V. Union of India, after referring to the decisions of this Court, starting with Rajinder Kumar Kindra Vs. Delhi Administration, Through Secretary (Labour) and others, it was held at Paragraph 30: "30.The findings of fact recorded by a Court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence or no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra V. Delhi Admn, (1984) 4 SCC 635 , Kuldeep Singh V. Commr. Of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 , Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao V. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 and Babu V. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 )" This Court has also dealt with other aspects of perversity. 16. We do not propose to discuss other judgments, though there is plethora of settled case law on this issue. Suffice to say that the approach made by the High Court has been wholly wrong, if not, perverse. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial Court and first appellate Court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. It should not have interfered with concurrent findings of the trial Court and first appellate Court on a pure question of fact. Their inference on facts is certainly reasonable. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under law. Therefore, we have no hesitation to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court as confirmed by the appellate Court." 38. Relying on Paragraphs 15 and 16, learned counsel submitted that a Court sitting in second appeal should not interfere in the concurrent findings of fact when they are pure question of facts. Learned counsel added that the appellant should be able to show that the findings of fact are so perverse that it warrants interference under Section 100 CPC. There is no difficulty in accepting this principle. The scope and provisions of Section 100 CPC are certainly very narrow and it turns on substantial questions of law. The Court will certainly be very slow to interfere with concurrent findings of facts. In the instant case, a perusal of the judgment of the Courts below would reveal that on a cogent and correct appreciation of oral and documentary evidence placed before it, both the Courts below returned a concurrent finding that the Will as well as marriage between Vimala Saroja and Joseph are invalid. 39. At this juncture, Mr.Meenakshi Sundaram, learned counsel for appellant contended that the validity of the marriage and the veracity of the Will are not interdependent. Even if the marriage is invalid, the appellant may still be entitled to the benefit of the Will was his submission. Technically, the argument is right, but it does not help the appellant. The reason is as stated supra, the Courts below have not held against the appellant only with regard to the validity of appellant's marriage with Joseph, but Courts below have also independently analysed cogently the oral and documentary evidence placed before it and returned concurrent findings of fact that the Will/Testament cannot be believed. In other words, by concurrent findings and on careful appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the testament i.e, Will of Late Joseph dated 14.11.1994, which was propounded by Vimala Saroja was disbelieved. In other words, by concurrent findings and on careful appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the testament i.e, Will of Late Joseph dated 14.11.1994, which was propounded by Vimala Saroja was disbelieved. Therefore, as findings of fact have been returned with regard to Will also and as both the Courts below have concurrently disbelieved the Will, the argument of validity of marriage and veracity of Will being independent of each other does not help the appellant. 40. This takes us to the Contempt Petition being Contempt Petition No.143 of 2018, which has also been listed along with these second appeals. This contempt petition has been filed by Vimala Saroja alleging violation of an interim order dated 19.02.2008. Learned counsel for the appellant, who is the respondent in the Contempt petition, submitted that he will get instruction and file an affidavit in the contempt petition separately. There is also no disagreement before this Court that the Contempt petition can proceed independently even after these second appeals are disposed of. In this view of the matter, if these second appeals are kept pending for the purpose of affidavit from the respondents in the contempt petition, it may cause further delay. The second appeals are more than a decade old and the litigation itself is more than two decades old. Normally a contempt petition cannot be decided summarily when the respondent's counsel before this Court seeks time to get instructions and file an affidavit explaining the conduct of the respondents. 41. In the light of the aforesaid obtaining position, Contempt Petition shall be listed separately. These second appeals alone will be disposed of by this common judgment. In the light of the contempt petition, Mr.Meenakshi Sundaram, learned counsel placed before this Court a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Raghavendra Swamy Mutt Vs. Uttaradi Mutt, (2016) 4 LW 111 ) and submitted that in a second appeal, interim order cannot be passed by a Court until a second appeal is admitted. In the light of the contempt petition being posted separately it is not necessary to go into that aspect of the matter in this judgment. Learned counsel for Banks stated that they are only formal parties and they have no effective submission to make and obviously they will be bound by the ultimate verdict of this Court. 42. In the light of the contempt petition being posted separately it is not necessary to go into that aspect of the matter in this judgment. Learned counsel for Banks stated that they are only formal parties and they have no effective submission to make and obviously they will be bound by the ultimate verdict of this Court. 42. In the light of the narrative supra, both the second appeals are dismissed as both the substantial questions of law have been answered against the appellant and in favour of the contesting respondents. No costs. 43. Registry shall list Contempt Petition (MD)No.143 of 2008 separately in its usual course.