JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner has confined its prayer to the extent of quashing the letter dated 18/19.01.2018 (Annexure-3 to I.A. No. 1148/2018) issued under the signature of the General Manager (MM), Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (BCCL), Dhanbad (the respondent No.3) whereby the business dealing of the petitioner with the respondent-BCCL has been banned for three years. 2. The factual matrix of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that a Global Tender was invited by the respondent-BCCL for “Supply of 2 road-headers of 80-100 TPH capacity with gate end box along with spare parts for 2nd and 3rd years of operation vide NIT No. BCCL/Pur/610278/Road Header/Global/06/07-08/167. M/S Jiamusi Coal Mining Machinery Company Ltd., Beijing (China) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Principal’) being eligible, submitted its bid vide bid No. BCCL/Tender/Road Header/08-09/001 dated 28.07.2008 for effecting the supply and installation which was finally awarded to it. As per the terms and conditions of the contract, the Principal had to deposit the Performance Bank Guarantee of Rs.2,29,39,021/- out of which the Principal deposited bank guarantee of Rs.1,62,18,635/- and the petitioner deposited the part bank guarantee of Rs.67,20,386/-. The Principal supplied the road headers to the respondent-BCCL which as per the claim of the respondent-BCCL, did not match with the specification of the purchase order and as such the information to that effect was given to the Principal. The Principal vide its letter dated 11.04.2012, wrote to the Chief Manager (MM), O/o the respondent No.4 that the height of the road header has increased due to additional condition imposed by the Directorate General of Mines Safety during the course of issuing “Field Trial approval”. However, it was agreed that if the machine is sent to China at its workshop at the cost of the respondent-BCCL, the said defect would be rectified. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 vide letter No. BCCL/Pur/610278/Road Header/07-08/12-13/688 dated 21.05.2012, communicated the Principal that the proposal for modification of the machines in China was not accepted and additional conditions were stipulated for acceptance of the machine out of which the primary conditions were to successfully drive the machines for 600 mtr. each and to complete the testing of the equipments, DGMS field trial approval and final acceptance of the equipments along with accessories by the Project Officer and Technical Head of the Area. each and to complete the testing of the equipments, DGMS field trial approval and final acceptance of the equipments along with accessories by the Project Officer and Technical Head of the Area. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner under Clause 4.7 of the CIL Purchase Manual alleging that even after submitting the written affidavit dated 14.07.2012 accepting the conditions, the same were not complied and thus the petitioner being the authorized agent of the Principal committed breach of the contract. In the meantime, the entire business dealing with the petitioner was suspended for a period of six months. The petitioner submitted reply to the show cause notice on 09.03.2017. However, the respondent No.3 passed the impugned order dated 18/19.01.2018 whereby the respondent-BCCL decided to impose ban on the business dealing of the petitioner with the BCCL for a period of 3 years in view of para 4.7.7(iv)(vi)ix and (xiii) as well as para 4.7.10 of the Purchase Manual. 3. The learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the show cause notice issued to the petitioner did not mention any deficiency on the part of the petitioner, rather the breach of the condition of the agreement was levelled against the Principal only. The petitioner was the authorized agent of the Principal and as per the supply order it was entitled to agency commission @ 8% of FOB value. The petitioner, being an agent of the Principal, was responsible for after-sale service and since the sale itself was not completed there was no question for providing after sale service. It is further submitted that there had been no deficiency on the part of the services of the petitioner as the machine supplied by the Principal achieved the desired drivage of 600 meters. It is also submitted that the respondent authorities failed to observe the minimum requirements of fairness and principles of natural justice in the matter as no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner prior to encashment of the Bank Guarantee or with respect to the suspension of entire business dealing with the petitioner which was serious adverse civil consequence. The biasness of the respondent authorities against the petitioner is also evident from the fact that they did not initiate any proceeding against the Principal, rather proceeded against the petitioner for no fault on its part. The biasness of the respondent authorities against the petitioner is also evident from the fact that they did not initiate any proceeding against the Principal, rather proceeded against the petitioner for no fault on its part. It is further submitted that the show cause notice was replied by the petitioner explaining it role as an agent, however the said reply was totally ignored by the respondent-BCCL. 4. Per-contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-BCCL submits that the Road Headers were to be dispatched only after obtaining approval of the machine drawing with hydraulic roof bolt attachment by the respondent-BCCL, but the Principal dispatched the Road Headers without obtaining approval of the machine drawing with hydraulic roof bolt attachment by the respondent-BCCL thereby violating the terms of the supply order. The overall height of both the Road Headers were higher than the height mentioned in the supply order as well as in the inspection report which was wilful suppression of the actual fact as well as furnishing of wrong information. The petitioner is not just the commission agent of the Principal, rather it is the authorized agent of the Principal to promote the sale of its product in the territory of India. Since the machine was not available up to 85% of the work, it has to be treated as deficiency in after sale service. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. Since the impugned order has been passed against the petitioner in exercise of the power provided in the Purchase Manual of Coal India Limited, the relevant part of the said Manual is required to be gone through so as to look into the extent of the said power. 6. Para 4.7 of the said Manual deals with the penal action against the suppliers. Para 4.7.1 empowers the authority that in case of any breach of the conditions stipulated in the general terms and conditions of the supply contract, if the competent authority finds that it would not be in the interest of the company to continue with the business pending full investigation/examination, it may suspend the business dealing with the firm for a period not exceeding six month unless the same is withdrawn earlier. Further, Para 4.7.5 provides that if after full investigation, the fact and evidence justify any penal action against the firm as detailed at para 4.7.7, such action should be taken. 7. Para 4.7.7 of the Purchase Manual of Coal India Limited provides for banning of business under certain circumstances. Few instances as given in sub-para (iv), (vi), (ix) and (xiii) are as follows:- “iv. Willful suppression of facts or furnishing or wrong information or manipulated or forged documents by the firm or using any other illegal/unfair means. vi. Supplying defective materials and failure to replace the defective materials even after reasonable extension is given to the firm for rectification/replacement of the defective materials or carrying out defective/poor quality job, not conforming to specifications of the contract and failure to rectify it within the stipulated time. ix. Continued and repeated failure to meet contractual obligations. xiii. Any other misdeed which may cause financial loss or commercial disadvantage to the Company.” 8. Para 4.7.9 deals with the period of ban which provides that the said period should be minimum three years and to be decided based on the gravity of the offence and the quantum of loss suffered by the CIL or its subsidiary companies. So far as the role of the petitioner in contract between the respondent-BCCL and the Principal is concerned, on perusal of the record, it appears that the Principal while filling up the tender, has specifically mentioned in Clause 5 that the petitioner will provide “the after sale service”. Further, it has been mentioned in Clause 15 that the Commission of Indian Agency @ 8% of FOB value to be paid in equivalent Indian Rupees to the petitioner as its agent and the said term was also agreed in the Supply Order. 9. The aforesaid conditions clearly reflect that the responsibility of the petitioner under the contract was for providing “after sale service”. Moreover, in the present case, the purchase was still not completed due to the defects in the machineries supplied by the Principal and thus there was no question of providing any after sale service for which the petitioner would be penalized. 10. Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines the term ‘agent’ as a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third person. 10. Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines the term ‘agent’ as a person employed to do any act for another, or to represent another in dealings with third person. Further, Section 186 of the Contract Act, 1872 provides that the authority of an agent may be expressed or implied. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed as an authorized agent of the Principal to the extent of providing after sales service and thus it cannot be made liable for the other acts of the Principal particularly when the machinery supplied by the Principal was itself defective. It is not the case of the respondent-BCCL that the tender was awarded to the Principal through the petitioner, rather it is evident from the record that the Principal applied for the tender and the respondent-BCCL issued the Supply Order directly to the Principal and during the transaction, the only role of the petitioner was to give after sale service for which the agency commission @ 8% of FOB value of machine for imported spares was agreed to be paid to the petitioner. 11. So far as passing of the impugned order is concerned, the respondent No.3 has specifically mentioned that the act of the Principal not only tantamounts to be against the ethics of business, but also a case of forgery. However merely because the petitioner is an authorized agent of the Principal, it has been made equally liable for the act of the Principal which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Contract Act, 1972 as the nature of agency created between the Principal and the petitioner was limited to the extent of providing after sale and service. 12. In the case of Kulja Industries Ltd. Vs. Western Telecom Project BSNL reported in (2014) 14 SCC 731 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “17. That apart, the power to blacklist a contractor whether the contract be for supply of material or equipment or for the execution of any other work whatsoever is in our opinion inherent in the party allotting the contract. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. There is no need for any such power being specifically conferred by statute or reserved by contractor. That is because “blacklisting” simply signifies a business decision by which the party affected by the breach decides not to enter into any contractual relationship with the party committing the breach. Between two private parties the right to take any such decision is absolute and untrammelled by any constraints whatsoever. The freedom to contract or not to contract is unqualified in the case of private parties. But any such decision is subject to judicial review when the same is taken by the State or any of its instrumentalities. This implies that any such decision will be open to scrutiny not only on the touchstone of the principles of natural justice but also on the doctrine of proportionality. A fair hearing to the party being blacklisted thus becomes an essential precondition for a proper exercise of the power and a valid order of blacklisting made pursuant thereto. The order itself being reasonable, fair and proportionate to the gravity of the offence is similarly examinable by a writ court. 18. The legal position on the subject is settled by a long line of decisions rendered by this Court starting with Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. where this Court declared that blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains and that the authority passing any such order was required to give a fair hearing before passing an order blacklisting a certain entity. This Court observed: (SCC p. 75, para 20) “20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” Subsequent decisions of this Court in Southern Painters v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd.; Patel Engg. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” Subsequent decisions of this Court in Southern Painters v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd.; Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India; B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd.; Joseph Vilangandan v. Executive Engineer (PWD) among others have followed the ratio of that decision and applied the principle of audi alteram partem to the process that may eventually culminate in the blacklisting of a contractor.” 19. Even the second facet of the scrutiny which the blacklisting order must suffer is no longer res integra. The decisions of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar; E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N.; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Dwarka Das Marfatia and Sons v. Port of Bombay have ruled against arbitrariness and discrimination in every matter that is subject to judicial review before a writ court exercising powers under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. 20. It is also well settled that even though the right of the writ petitioner is in the nature of a contractual right, the manner, the method and the motive behind the decision of the authority whether or not to enter into a contract is subject to judicial review on the touchstone of fairness, relevance, natural justice, non-discrimination, equality and proportionality. All these considerations that go to determine whether the action is sustainable in law have been sanctified by judicial pronouncements of this Court and are of seminal importance in a system that is committed to the rule of law. We do not consider it necessary to burden this judgment by a copious reference to the decisions on the subject. A reference to the following passage from the decision of this Court in Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corpn. should, in our view, suffice: (SCC pp. 760-61, para 12) “12. It is well settled that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. 760-61, para 12) “12. It is well settled that every action of the State or an instrumentality of the State in exercise of its executive power, must be informed by reason. In appropriate cases, actions uninformed by reason may be questioned as arbitrary in proceedings under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Reliance in this connection may be placed on the observations of this Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar. … In case any right conferred on the citizens which is sought to be interfered, such action is subject to Article 14 of the Constitution, and must be reasonable and can be taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. Where there is arbitrariness in State action of this type of entering or not entering into contracts, Article 14 springs up and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the State executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, in such monopoly or semi-monopoly dealings, it should meet the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. If a governmental action even in the matters of entering or not entering into contracts, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, the same would be unreasonable. … It appears to us that rule of reason and rule against arbitrariness and discrimination, rules of fair play and natural justice are part of the rule of law applicable in situation or action by State instrumentality in dealing with citizens in a situation like the present one. Even though the rights of the citizens are in the nature of contractual rights, the manner, the method and motive of a decision of entering or not entering into a contract, are subject to judicial review on the touchstone of relevance and reasonableness, fair play, natural justice, equality and non-discrimination in the type of the transactions and nature of the dealing as in the present case.” 13. In the case of Gorkha Security Services Vs. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be preceded by a show-cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded and does not even demand much amplification. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “16. It is a common case of the parties that the blacklisting has to be preceded by a show-cause notice. Law in this regard is firmly grounded and does not even demand much amplification. The necessity of compliance with the principles of natural justice by giving the opportunity to the person against whom action of blacklisting is sought to be taken has a valid and solid rationale behind it. With blacklisting, many civil and/or evil consequences follow. It is described as “civil death” of a person who is foisted with the order of blacklisting. Such an order is stigmatic in nature and debars such a person from participating in government tenders which means precluding him from the award of government contracts. 17. Way back in the year 1975, this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., highlighted the necessity of giving an opportunity to such a person by serving a show-cause notice thereby giving him opportunity to meet the allegations which were in the mind of the authority contemplating blacklisting of such a person. This is clear from the reading of paras 12 and 20 of the said judgment. Necessitating this requirement, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 74-75) “12. Under Article 298 of the Constitution the executive power of the Union and the State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the making of contracts for any purpose. The State can carry on executive function by making a law or without making a law. The exercise of such powers and functions in trade by the State is subject to Part III of the Constitution. Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. Equality of opportunity should apply to matters of public contracts. The State has the right to trade. The State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. The State has the right to trade. The State has there the duty to observe equality. An ordinary individual can choose not to deal with any person. The Government cannot choose to exclude persons by discrimination. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. A person who is on the approved list is unable to enter into advantageous relations with the Government because of the order of blacklisting. A person who has been dealing with the Government in the matter of sale and purchase of materials has a legitimate interest or expectation. When the State acts to the prejudice of a person it has to be supported by legality. 20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 18. Again, in Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar the aforesaid principle was reiterated in the following manner: (SCC p. 230, para 4) “4. Indisputably, no notice had been given to the appellant of the proposal of blacklisting the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the State Government that there was no requirement in the rule of giving any prior notice before blacklisting any person. Insofar as the contention that there is no requirement specifically of giving any notice is concerned, the respondent is right. But it is an implied principle of the rule of law that any order having civil consequence should be passed only after following the principles of natural justice. It has to be realised that blacklisting any person in respect of business ventures has civil consequence for the future business of the person concerned in any event. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. Even if the rules do not express so, it is an elementary principle of natural justice that parties affected by any order should have right of being heard and making representations against the order. In that view of the matter, the last portion of the order insofar as it directs blacklisting of the appellant in respect of future contracts, cannot be sustained in law. In the premises, that portion of the order directing that the appellant be placed in the blacklist in respect of future contracts under the Collector is set aside. So far as the cancellation of the bid of the appellant is concerned, that is not affected. This order will, however, not prevent the State Government or the appropriate authorities from taking any future steps for blacklisting the appellant if the Government is so entitled to do in accordance with law i.e. after giving the appellant due notice and an opportunity of making representation. After hearing the appellant, the State Government will be at liberty to pass any order in accordance with law indicating the reasons therefor. We, however, make it quite clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made against the appellant. The appeal is thus disposed of.” 19. Recently, in Patel Engg. Ltd. v. Union of India speaking through one of us (Justice Chelameswar, J.) this Court emphatically reiterated the principle by explaining the same in the following manner: (SCC pp. 262-63, paras 13-15) “13. The concept of ‘blacklisting’ is explained by this Court in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B. as under: (SCC p. 75, para 20) ‘20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains.’ 14. The nature of the authority of the State to blacklist the persons was considered by this Court in the abovementioned case and took note of the constitutional provision (Article 298), which authorises both the Union of India and the States to make contracts for any purpose and to carry on any trade or business. It also authorises the acquisition, holding and disposal of property. This Court also took note of the fact that the right to make a contract includes the right not to make a contract. It also authorises the acquisition, holding and disposal of property. This Court also took note of the fact that the right to make a contract includes the right not to make a contract. By definition, the said right is inherent in every person capable of entering into a contract. However, such a right either to enter or not to enter into a contract with any person is subject to a constitutional obligation to obey the command of Article 14. Though nobody has any right to compel the State to enter into a contract, everybody has a right to be treated equally when the State seeks to establish contractual relationships. The effect of excluding a person from entering into a contractual relationship with the State would be to deprive such person to be treated equally with those, who are also engaged in similar activity. 15. It follows from the above judgment in Erusian Equipment case that the decision of the State or its instrumentalities not to deal with certain persons or class of persons on account of the undesirability of entering into the contractual relationship with such persons is called blacklisting. The State can decline to enter into a contractual relationship with a person or a class of persons for a legitimate purpose. The authority of the State to blacklist a person is a necessary concomitant to the executive power of the State to carry on the trade or the business and making of contracts for any purpose, etc. There need not be any statutory grant of such power. The only legal limitation upon the exercise of such an authority is that the State is to act fairly and rationally without in any way being arbitrary—thereby such a decision can be taken for some legitimate purpose. What is the legitimate purpose that is sought to be achieved by the State in a given case can vary depending upon various factors.” 20. Thus, there is no dispute about the requirement of serving show-cause notice. We may also hasten to add that once the show-cause notice is given and opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice is afforded, it is not even necessary to give an oral hearing. The High Court has rightly repudiated the appellant’s attempt in finding foul with the impugned order on this ground. Such a contention was specifically repelled in Patel Engg.” 14. The High Court has rightly repudiated the appellant’s attempt in finding foul with the impugned order on this ground. Such a contention was specifically repelled in Patel Engg.” 14. In the aforesaid judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when a contract is entered between two private parties, in case of any breach by one party, the other party has every right to blacklist the defaulter and such right is unqualified. However, in a situation where an order of blacklisting has been passed by the State or its instrumentalities, such order is within the realm of power of judicial review of the writ Court and the same has to be tested in the touchstone of the principles of natural justice, doctrine of proportionality, reasonableness and fairness. The order of blacklisting has the effect of depriving a person of equality of opportunity in the matter of public contract. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the government/government agencies for the purposes of gains. Thus, before taking such a harsh decision, the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist. Issuance of show cause notice must not be a mere formality, rather the same should specifically mention the grounds according to which the department necessitates the action and also the proposed action so that the person aggrieved may explain the circumstances properly. 15. In the case of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Tax Department, Works Contract & Leasing, Kota Vs. M/S Shukla & Brothers reported in (2010) 4 SCC 785 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “13. The principle of natural justice has twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is likely to be adversely affected by the action of the authorities should be given notice to show cause thereof and granted an opportunity of hearing and secondly, the orders so passed by the authorities should give reason for arriving at any conclusion showing proper application of mind. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. Violation of either of them could in the given facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate the order itself. Such rule being applicable to the administrative authorities certainly requires that the judgment of the Court should meet with this requirement with higher degree of satisfaction. The order of an administrative authority may not provide reasons like a judgment but the order must be supported by the reasons of rationality. The distinction between passing of an order by an administrative or quasi-judicial authority has practically extinguished and both are required to pass reasoned orders. In the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. [ AIR 1976 SC 1785 ], the Supreme Court held as under:- “6. ......If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. .....” 16. In the present case, the respondent No.3 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner alleging that overall height of both the Road Headers was higher than the height mentioned in the supply order as well as in the inspection report which is wilful suppression of facts/furnishing of wrong information and also the breach of the contract. It was further alleged that the Principal failed to comply the written affidavit submitted by it on 14.07.2012. Thus, all the allegations were pointing towards the default of the Principal. No specific allegation was levelled against the petitioner. It was further alleged that the Principal failed to comply the written affidavit submitted by it on 14.07.2012. Thus, all the allegations were pointing towards the default of the Principal. No specific allegation was levelled against the petitioner. The petitioner in its reply, apart from other defence, has clearly stated that it has specific duties and responsibilities as laid down in the contract. However, the respondent No.3 while passing the impugned order has not stated any reason so as to take the said penal action against the petitioner and thus the same is also in violation of the principle of audi alteram partem. 17. For the reasons aforesaid, the present writ petition is allowed in part and the impugned order dated 18/19.01.2018 (Annexure-IA/3 to I.A. No. 1148 of 2018) passed by the respondent No.3 whereby the business dealing of the petitioner with the BCCL has been banned for a period of three years, is hereby quashed and set aside. So far as the other issues arising out of the present tender are concerned, the same are left open to be taken up by the parties before the appropriate forum in accordance with law.