JUDGMENT Sandeep Mehta, J. Through this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners being the legal representatives of late Shri Maganlal Nagda and the defendants before the court below, have approached this Court for assailing the order dated 9.2.2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Udaipur in Civil Original Case No.14/2017 whereby, the application filed by the petitioners under Order 8 Rule 1 and Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Section 151 C.P.C., was dismissed. 2. Brief facts relevant and essential for disposal of the writ petition are noted hereinbelow. 3. The respondent Shoorveer Singh Choudhary filed a suit against Shri Maganlal and other defendants for specific performance of contract, declaration, injunction and in the alternative, mandatory injunction. It was stated in the plaint that Shri Maganlal sold agricultural land located in the village Girwa to the plaintiff in the year 1997 for a consideration of Rs. 55 lacs, out of which, he received a sum of Rs. 11 lacs at the inception and a further sum of Rs. 90,000/- in cash at a subsequent date. The original agreement was oral and a written agreement was then executed on 27.3.1997. Looking to some dispute in the family, the parties agreed that the sale deed would be registered after settlement of the family dispute. The defendant Maganlal filed a written-statement on 25.3.2006 claiming that the agreement was forged and that he has not received any consideration. He further claimed that his grandson has joined hands with the other defendants and the plaintiffs and got signed some documents without apprising him the consequence thereof. He further claimed that the property in question was not his self-acquired property but was rather ancestral property of Shri Pithaji. He also claimed that in the year 1978, the property had been bequeathed to two sons whose names were entered in the revenue record and that Maganlal did not have physical possession of the property with him. Reference was also made to a family settlement dated 28.7.1993 under which, Dinesh, Karan and Mahesh acquired rights over the land in question. The other defendants also filed their own written statements. The petitioners herein and Smt.Padubai, claiming that their rights were adversely affected by the subject matter of the suit, filed applications dated 9.10.2006 for being impleaded as party defendants in the suit. The other defendants also filed their own written statements. The petitioners herein and Smt.Padubai, claiming that their rights were adversely affected by the subject matter of the suit, filed applications dated 9.10.2006 for being impleaded as party defendants in the suit. The trial court rejected these applications filed under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C. by order dated 4.4.2007. The petitioners as well as Smt.Padubai, filed separate writ petitions against the order dismissing their applications. During pendency of the writ petitions, Shri Maganlal expired on 28.1.2008 and thus, the writ petitions were dismissed by this Court by order dated 16.8.2011 as having rendered infructuous. The plaintiff Shoorveer Singh moved an application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. for bringing on record, the legal representatives of Maganlal. Smt.Padubai filed reply to the application stating that Shri Maganlal had executed a Will in favour of the petitioners herein. The trial court, however, allowed the application filed by the plaintiff under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. while discarding the objections raised by the petitioners in their reply and took the legal representatives of Late Maganlal on record under Order 22 Rule 2 C.P.C. The petitioners claimed that once, the application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. had been accepted, it was obligatory and mandatory for the trial court to have posted the matter for filing of written statement by the legal heirs of Late Maganlal under Order 22 Rule 4(2) C.P.C. but instead of doing so, the trial court posted the matter for arguments on the applications under Order 8 Rule 9 C.P.C. The order dated 20.9.2008 passed by the trial court, whereby the application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. filed by the plaintiff was allowed, was challenged by the petitioners by filing Writ Petition No.8349/2008 which too, was dismissed by this Court. The petitioners claim that during pendency of the writ petition, the stay order was operating on the proceedings of the suit. After rejection of the writ petition, the trial court proceeded with the suit. The petitioners claiming that as they had been taken on record in the capacity of legal heirs of Late Maganlal, trial court ought to have posted the file for receiving their written statement but rather than doing so, the trial court posted the matter for admission/denial and for framing of issues. The petitioners claiming that as they had been taken on record in the capacity of legal heirs of Late Maganlal, trial court ought to have posted the file for receiving their written statement but rather than doing so, the trial court posted the matter for admission/denial and for framing of issues. By order dated 28.10.2013, the trial court directed that the matter be posted for evidence of plaintiff. The plaintiff filed his affidavit and an application under Order 14 Rule 5 C.P.C. At that stage i.e. on 4.2.2014, they filed a joint written statement alongwith an application under Order 8 Rule 1 and Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Section 151 C.P.C. supported by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, requesting the trial court to condone the delay and take their written statement on record. The plaintiff filed reply to the applications opposing the same. The trial court rejected the applications filed by the petitioners by order dated 9.2.2018 which is assailed by the petitioners in this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Shri Akshay Nagori learned counsel representing the petitioners vehemently and fervently urges that the petitioners have a right to file separate reply to the suit as per Order 22 Rule 4(2) C.P.C. As per him, it was the obligation of the trial court to have provided this opportunity to the petitioners. He further urges that as per Order 8 Rule 1 C.P.C., the defendant can only file written statement within the stipulated period from the date of service of summons and that, since the trial court failed to provide opportunity to the petitioners to file their own written statement after being taken on record in the capacity of the legal representatives of Late Maganlal, manifestly, the bogey of delay cannot operate against the right of the petitioners to defend themselves. He places reliance on the Supreme Court decisions in the case of Sumtibai and Others. Vs. Paras Finance Co, (2007) AIR SC 3166 and Vidyawati Vs. Man Mohan & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 431 and urges that the legal representatives have a semblence of title and are not mere busy bodies or interlopers and thus, they are entitled to file defence by way of additional written statement and that they cannot be disallowed to file additional written statement merely because some application was rejected earlier. Man Mohan & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 431 and urges that the legal representatives have a semblence of title and are not mere busy bodies or interlopers and thus, they are entitled to file defence by way of additional written statement and that they cannot be disallowed to file additional written statement merely because some application was rejected earlier. He thus implored the Court to exercise its supervisory writ jurisdiction and quash the impugned order as being grossly illegal, arbitrary and perverse. 5. Per contra, Shri Prashant Tatia learned counsel representing the respondent Shoorveer Singh vehemently and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by Shri Nagori. He contended that the legal representatives just stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile defendant, who had already filed detailed written statement to the suit long back. He relies upon Supreme Court decision in the case of Venkatappa @ Moode (D) By LRs. Vs. M.Abdul Jabbar & Ors, (2006) 2 WLC(SC)CVL 148 and urges that the legal representatives of the defendant are bound by the pleadings set up by him and they cannot be allowed to putforth a new case. He contended that the so-called right of the petitioners to defend the suit in their own individual capacities as title holders of the property in question stood rejected with the dismissal of their application for impleadment and the writ petitions filed thereagainst. He further submits that the plea that the trial court was under an obligation to provide opportunity of filing reply to the application under Order 22 Rule 4 C.P.C. is also totally frivolous for the reason that no such request was ever made by the petitioners for almost six years after they had been impleaded as legal representatives of Late Maganlal. He contends that the sole objective of the petitioners by way of the questioned application is to delay the suit and thus, this Court should not feel persuaded to exercise its supervisory writ jurisdiction so as to interfere in the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the trial court in the impugned order. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record. 7. It is admitted that the application filed by the petitioners seeking impleadment in the suit in their own individual capacity was rejected by the trial court way-back in the year 2008. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material available on record. 7. It is admitted that the application filed by the petitioners seeking impleadment in the suit in their own individual capacity was rejected by the trial court way-back in the year 2008. The writ petition filed by the petitioners for challenging the said order too was dismissed albeit as infructuous. As a matter of fact, if the petitioners were serious in being impleaded as defendants in the suit as in their individual capacity as title holder, they were required to pursue the writ petition to its logical conclusion rather than getting the same dismissed as infructuous. Once the order passed by the trial court refusing to implead the petitioners as defendants in the suit in their individual capacity was affirmed by this Court in the high prerogative writ jurisdiction, there cannot be any two views about the proposition that the petitioners can only be allowed to contest the suit in the capacity of legal representatives of Late Maganlal and nothing more than that. 8. Since the petitioners have been bound down by the findings recorded in the previous orders to contest the suit, not in their individual capacity by claiming title and simply as the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, manifestly, the ratio of the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision in the case of Sumtibai relied upon by Shri Nagori does not come to aid of the petitioners. Rather the view taken by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatappa @ Moode relied upon by Shri Tatia is squarely applicable to the case at hand. Law is well settled that the legal representatives of a deceased defendant stepped into his shoes, cannot putforth a new case in the case of Vidyawati relied upon by Shri Tatia. The Hon'ble Apex Court considered an identical situation in detail and held that legal representative of deceased defendant is entitled to all the defences which were available to the deceased but if such legal representative intends to make any personal or independent defence dehors the defence available to the deceased, he/she must get impleaded in his/her individual capacity or retain the right to file independent suit asserting his/her own right. In this background and manifestly, since the application for impleadment by the petitioners in their individual capacity stood rejected right upto the High Court, manifestly, they had no individual right to file a distinct reply in the suit and have to adopt the pleadings of the reply filed by Late Maganlal. 9. Finding no illegality, perversity or error apparent on the face of record in the impugned order dated 9.2.2018 passed by the trial court, I am not inclined to interfere therein while exercising this Court's supervisory writ jurisdiction. 10. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed as being devoid of merit.