JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. S. L. Agrawal, counsel appearing for the petitioners. 2. Heard Mrs. Chandra Prabha, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent- State. 3. Counsel for the petitioners submits that most of the points which have been raised in this writ petition have been considered and decided in W.P.(C) No. 885 of 2014 by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 29.08.2014 and accordingly, on the last date of hearing itself, he has confined this writ petition on a point of law which was neither raised nor considered in W.P.(C) No. 885 of 2014. 4. Counsel for the petitioners accordingly submits that the only point which is being argued in this case is as follows:- “Whether impugned proceedings could have been initiated against the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 and penalty could be imposed under section 52 of The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 in absence of the company namely, Reliance Retail Limited ( petitioner no. 1 ) been made party in the proceeding and whether the amount of penalty could have been realized from the company ( petitioner no. 1 )?” 5. The counsel for the petitioners submits that the issue involved in this case is fully covered by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 (Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited and analogous cases) where similar provisions as that of section 66 of The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 which deals with “offences by companies” was under consideration. 6. Counsel for the petitioners submits that he has made specific statement at para no. 43 of the writ petition that the appellate tribunal as per the provisions of Section 70 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 has not been constituted and therefore, the petitioners do not have any alternative remedy apart from under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He submits that this statement of the petitioners has not been denied by the respondents in their counter-affidavit and the tribunal has not been constituted so far. He submits that appropriate orders may be passed in this writ petition confining it to the aforesaid issue which is not covered by the judgment passed in W.P.(C) No. 885 of 2014. 7. Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner no. 2 is an employee and petitioner no. He submits that appropriate orders may be passed in this writ petition confining it to the aforesaid issue which is not covered by the judgment passed in W.P.(C) No. 885 of 2014. 7. Counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner no. 2 is an employee and petitioner no. 3 is the store manager of Reliance Retail Limited ( petitioner no. 1). 8. Counsel for the petitioners further submits that a proceeding was initiated against petitioner nos. 2 and 3 by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under Section 3(zx) of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 read with Section 26, 27 and 51 of the aforesaid Act and in the said proceeding, the petitioner no. 1 was never made party. The notices were issued only to petitioner nos. 2 and 3. He submits that pursuant to the notice issued to the petitioner nos. 2 and 3, authorized signatory of the petitioner no. 1 appeared, although the petitioner no. 1 was never made accused in the case, but, the Deputy Commissioner refused to entertain the authorized signatory of petitioner no. 1 as petitioner no. 1 was not an accused in the matter. Further, the Deputy Commissioner has recorded that the accused persons i.e. petitioner nos. 2 and 3 having not appeared in the said proceedings in spite of notice having been served upon them, therefore, there was no option but to proceed ex-parte against petitioner nos. 2 and 3. 9. He submits that thereafter, vide impugned order dated 19.12.2013, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi was pleased to impose penalty of Rs. 5 lakhs under Section 52 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 for non-compliance of regulation 2.2.2.10 of the Food Safety and Standard (Packaging and Labelling) Regulation, 2011 on the ground that the report submitted by the Food Analyst that the Vanaspati purchased from the store of the accused is misbranded falls within the scope of Section 3(zx) of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. 10. The counsel further submits that although the petitioner no. 1 was not a party to the proceedings but a notice dated 03.01.2014 was issued to the establishment of the petitioners at Morabadi Ranchi for payment of the penalty amount which was duly paid by the petitioner no. 1. He submits that this amount should be refunded to the petitioner no. 1 as the amount could not be realized from petitioner no. 1. He submits that this amount should be refunded to the petitioner no. 1 as the amount could not be realized from petitioner no. 1 who is not a party to the impugned proceedings. 11. Counsel for the petitioners by referring to chapter 9 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 refers to Section 66 of the aforesaid Act which reads as follows: “66. Offences by companies.- (1) Where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that where a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch, the concerned Head or the person in-charge of such establishment, branch, unit nominated by the company as responsible for food safety shall be liable for contravention in respect of such establishment, branch or unit: Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other official shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director” in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. This clause provides for liabilities relating to offences by companies. (Notes on Clauses).” 12. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director” in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. This clause provides for liabilities relating to offences by companies. (Notes on Clauses).” 12. By referring to Sub-Section 1 of Section 66, the counsel submits that where an offence under this Act is committed by a company, every person who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of and was responsible to the company for conducting of the business of the company as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. He submits that all the licenses stand in the name of petitioner no. 1 and therefore, the offence, if any, was committed by the petitioner no. 1, but, the petitioner no. 1 was not made accused, therefore, no prosecution was maintainable against petitioner nos. 2 and 3 who are merely the employees/store keeper of the petitioner no. 1 in one of its establishments/stores situated at Morabadi, Ranchi. 13. Counsel for the petitioners refers to the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 and submits that similar provisions contained in Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was subject matter of consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. He submits that the provisions of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is pari materia to the provisions of Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and accordingly, the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment also applies to the Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. He has referred to paragraph nos. 42 to 59 of the aforesaid judgment. 14. By referring to paragraph no. 59 of the aforesaid judgment, counsel for the petitioners submits that after due analysis of provisions of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, impleadment of company as an accused is imperative and therefore, he submits that in absence of petitioner no. 1 having been made accused in the matter, the entire prosecution or penalty proceedings must fail. 15. 1 having been made accused in the matter, the entire prosecution or penalty proceedings must fail. 15. Counsel for the petitioners also submits that the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court as stated above also dealt with similar provisions under Section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 which also contained pari materia provisions. 16. Counsel for the respondent- State have opposed the prayer of the writ petitioner and have referred to paragraph no. 14 of the counter-affidavit wherein they have stated that the petitioner no. 2 and petitioner no. 3 have chosen not to appear in spite of service of notice. 17. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds that the proceeding under the provisions of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 was initiated against the petitioner no. 2 and 3 who are the employee and store keeper in the establishment of petitioner no. 1 situated at Morabadi, Ranchi. 18. Further it appears that on 28.01.2013, sample of Vanaspati was taken from the retail outlet at Morabadi and after its analysis, it was found that the sample is misbranded and does not conform to Regulation 2.2.2.10 of Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) Regulations, 2011. A notice was issued to the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 and in spite of receipt of notice, the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 did not appear before the authority. 19. It further appears from the records that the petitioner no. 1 had appeared before the authority through its authorized representative, but the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi did not acknowledge the appearance of the petitioner no. 1 through the authorized person, as petitioner no. 1 was never made an accused in the said case. Ultimately, the order dated 19.12.2013 was passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi imposing penalty of Rs. 5 Lakhs. 20. From the perusal of the writ petition it appears that a notice for realization of the amount was issued to the petitioner no. 1 by notice dated 03.01.2014 and from the perusal of the paragraph no. 41 of the writ petition, it appears that a specific statement has been made by the petitioners that the petitioners have already deposited the penalty amount of Rs. 5 Lakhs before the certificate officer. 21. Accordingly, it appears that although the notice was issued to petitioner no. 1 by notice dated 03.01.2014 and from the perusal of the paragraph no. 41 of the writ petition, it appears that a specific statement has been made by the petitioners that the petitioners have already deposited the penalty amount of Rs. 5 Lakhs before the certificate officer. 21. Accordingly, it appears that although the notice was issued to petitioner no. 1, but the amount was deposited by the petitioners i.e. petitioner nos. 1, 2 and 3. 22. This Court, by comparing the provisions of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 finds that the same are not in pari materia with each other particularly in view of the fact that Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 has a proviso which provides that where a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch, the concerned Head or the person in-charge of such establishment, branch, unit nominated by the company as responsible for food safety shall be liable for contravention in respect of such establishment, branch or unit. It also provides that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. 23. This Court finds that the proviso which has been given in Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 is totally absent in Section 141 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 as well as in Section 55 of Information Technology Act, 2000. 24. This Court further finds that as per Food Safety and Standards Rules 2.5 there is a specific provision for nomination by the company in the prescribed form which reads as follows: “2.5: Nomination by the company in the prescribed proforma 2.5.1: The company which is having different establishments or branches, units, any establishment or branch shall inform the Licensing authority in Form IX, the particulars relating to the concerned head or the person in-charge of such establishment, branch, unit, with due certification that the concerned person has been so nominated for the purposes of the section 66 of the Act and regulations made under Section 31 of the Act. 2.5.2: The Company shall also intimate to the Licensing Authority, as and when any change occurs in the nomination given in Rule 2.5.1 above forthwith, in Form IX.” 25. This Court also finds that there is a prescribed form for nomination of persons by a company in terms of Rule 2.5.1 read with first proviso to Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. 26. On the one hand, the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 did not appear before the Deputy Commissioner to put forth their defense and on the other hand, even in the writ petition or during the course of argument no such point has been raised that the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 could not have been made accused in the matter as they were not the persons in-charge of the establishment of the petitioner no. 1 at Morabadi. 27. This Court also finds that as the provisions of Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 are not pari materia with the provisions of section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as well as Section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 which was a subject matter of interpretation before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in aforesaid judgment relied upon by the petitioner, reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 , the ratio of the said judgment is not at all applicable to the provisions of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. There is a marked distinction between the provisions of Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which was subject matter of consideration in the judgment reported in (2012) 5 SCC 661 . 28. In order to demonstrate the distinction between section 141 of negotiable instruments Act, 1881 and Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the following comparative chart may be useful:- Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 141. 28. In order to demonstrate the distinction between section 141 of negotiable instruments Act, 1881 and Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, the following comparative chart may be useful:- Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 141. Offences by companies.- (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 66. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 66. Offences by companies.- (1) Where an offence under this Act which has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that where a company has different establishments or branches or different units in any establishment or branch, the concerned Head or the person in-charge of such establishment, branch, unit nominated by the company as responsible for food safety shall be liable for contravention in respect of such establishment, branch or unit: Provided further that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment provided in this Act, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other official shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,- (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (b) “director” in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. 29. Further section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 which was also the subject matter for consideration in the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the petition is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “85. 29. Further section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 which was also the subject matter for consideration in the aforesaid judgment relied upon by the petition is quoted herein below for ready reference:- “85. Offences by companies.- (1) Where a person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order may there under is a company, every person, who at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the company, shall be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,- (i) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and (ii) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.” 30. Thus this Court finds that the provisions of Section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are pari materia to each other but the provisions of Section 66 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 are not pari materia to the provisions of Section 85 of Information Technology Act, 2000 and Section 141 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Accordingly, the judgment relied upon by the petitioners has no applicability to the present case under Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. 31. Accordingly, the judgment relied upon by the petitioners has no applicability to the present case under Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006. 31. This Court further finds that the legislature while drafting Section 66 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 has taken special care to ensure that the persons who are responsible in the various establishments of the company should be independently liable under the Act for their acts and omissions which are violative of the provisions of the Act, rules and regulations framed under the Act. 32. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that even if the petitioner no. 1 was not made party in the impugned proceedings, the impugned proceedings was still sustainable and valid and the impugned order has been rightly passed. 33. Further, this Court finds that although the notice for payment was issued to the petitioner no. 1, but as per the statement made in the writ petition, it has been stated that it was the petitioners who made the payment and therefore, it appears that the payment was made on behalf of the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 as well. 34. Thus, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner no. 1 having not been made an accused in the case, does not have any bearing on the impugned proceedings and the impugned order and the payment which was made pursuant to the notice issued to the petitioner no. 1 was in fact made by the petitioners as per the statements made in the writ petition itself. Thus the issued raised by the counsel for the petitioners as mentioned above is decided against the petitioners. 35. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid findings, this Court does not find any merit in the arguments advanced by the counsel for the petitioners and accordingly, this writ petition is dismissed.