ORDER : 1. Petitioner instituted an election petition challenging the election of respondent No. 1, under Section 43 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Act, 1994 (for short, ‘Act of 1994), read with Rule 80 of the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj (Election) Rules, 1994 (for short, ‘Rules of 1994’), before the District and Session Judge, Alwar, which in turn in transferred to the Court of Senior Civil Judge Laxmangarh, Alwar, wherein vide its order dated 15th October, 2016, the election petition was dismissed in view of an application instituted by the returned candidate under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, holding that the election petition was filed beyond the statutory period of limitation of 30 days. Hence, the petitioner has instituted the present writ application, praying for the following reliefs: “(i) Quash and set aside the order dated 15.10.2016 passed by Miss Jaimala Panigar, RJA, Senior Civil Judge Laxmangarh, Alwar in Election Petition No. 1/2015 passed by; or (ii) And the election petition be restored to its original number and be decided after taking evidence as per law; or (iii) And the election of respondent No. 1 be declared null and void as she was not qualified the contest the election as per law; or (iv) And pass such any other order as may be deemed just and proper by this Hon’ble Court in facts and circumstances of case and in favour of humble petitioner; or (v) And costs of the writ petition be awarded in favour of the humble petitioner from the respondents.” 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterating the pleaded facts and grounds of the writ application emphatically argued that the election petition was instituted by the petitioner assailing legality and validity of the election of respondent No. 1, well within statutory period of limitation of 30 days, as provided under Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994. It is pleaded case of the petitioner that result of the election involved herein, was declared on 18th January, 2015, and the election petition was filed on 18th February, 2015. According to learned counsel 17th February, 2015, was a public holiday on account of “Maha Shivratri”. Thus, excluding the date of declaration of the result i.e. 18th January, 2015 and 17th February, 2015, being public holiday; the election petition instituted on 18th February, 2015, was well within the period of limitation of 30 days. According to learned counsel 17th February, 2015, was a public holiday on account of “Maha Shivratri”. Thus, excluding the date of declaration of the result i.e. 18th January, 2015 and 17th February, 2015, being public holiday; the election petition instituted on 18th February, 2015, was well within the period of limitation of 30 days. Hence, the impugned order dated 15th October, 2016, dismissing the election petition of the petitioner for the same was not instituted within the statutory period of limiataion of 30 days; is absolutely, illegal and invalid. In support of the stand, learned counsel has relied upon the opinion of the Apex Court of the land in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee Vs. Dinanath Sharma: AIR 2001 SC 36 , and opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court, in somewhat identical factual matrix, in the case of Mojiram Meena Vs. Mukesh Kumar Meena & Ors.: SBCWP No. 4682/2017, decided on 25th April, 2017. 3. In response to the notice on the writ application, respondent No. 1, the returned candidate, has filed her counter-affidavit supporting the impugned order dated 15th October, 2016, and relying upon the opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Dropadi Vs. Civil Judge (Sr. Div) Gangapur City: AIR 2002 (Raj.) 385. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, vehemently argued that computing period of 30 days from 18th January, 2015; the limitation period expired on 16th February, 2015. According to learned counsel, the date of declaration of result i.e. 18th January, 2015, is not required to be excluded. Hence, the election petition instituted was clearly beyond the statutory period of limitation. 5. Referring to pleading of the petitioner under paragraph 9(B), learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, asserted that according to the petitioner the election petition was filed on 17th February, 2015. Thus, the factual matrix as detailed out in the election petition and arguments put-forth are contradictory, and therefore, the writ application merits rejection on that count alone. 6. No other point was raised by either of the counsel for the parties for consideration of this Court. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the relevant materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 8. 6. No other point was raised by either of the counsel for the parties for consideration of this Court. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the relevant materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 8. Indisputably, the result of the election involved herein for the post of “Sarpanch”, was declared on 18th January, 2015. Election Petition assailing the legality and validity of the election of the respondent No. 1, was instituted by the petitioner under Section 43 of the Act of 1994 and Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994, in the Court of District and Session Judge, Alwar, on 18th February, 2015. It is also not disputed that 17th February, 2015, was a public holiday on account of “Maha Shivratri”. Thus, fact remains that the election petition was instituted on 18th February, 2015. The controversy raised in the instant writ application may not detain this Court for long in view of the factual matrix and opinion of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mojiram Meena (supra), which dealt with somewhat identical issue, observing thus: “Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994 insofar as relevant is produced hereinbelow:- “80. Manner of challenging an election under the Act.- An election under the Act or under the Rules may be called in question by any candidate at such election by presenting a petition to the District Judge having jurisdiction within thirty days from the date on which the result of such election is declared, on any one or more of the following grounds. Sections 4, 10 and 11 of the Act of 1955 read as under:- “Section 4. Application:- Unless otherwise expressly provided or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this Act shall apply - i. to this Act, ii. to all Rajasthan law 1[in force in the pre-reorganisation State of Rajasthan] made after the commencement of this Act, iii. to all Central Acts adapted to Rajasthan From time to time, by the Rajasthan State Legislature, iv. to all Rajasthan law 1[in force in the pre-reorganisation State of Rajasthan] made after the commencement of this Act, iii. to all Central Acts adapted to Rajasthan From time to time, by the Rajasthan State Legislature, iv. Where any such law or Act confers upon any authority a power to make rules, regulations or bye-laws, to such rules, regulations or bye-laws, v. so far as may be, to all Rajasthan laws [in force in the pre-reorganisation State of Rajasthan] Pertaining to Lists II and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution made before the commencement of this Act and to any rules, regulations of bye-laws thereunder, [and] [(vi) to all Rajasthan laws and to Rules, regulations and bye-laws thereunder made on or after the first day of November, 1956].” “Section 10:- Commencement and termination of time:- In any Rajasthan law, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from” and, for the purpose of including the 1st in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”.” Section 11. Computation of Time:- Where, by any Rajasthan law, any Act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken in any Court or office on a certain day or within a prescribed period then, if the Court or office is closed on that day or the last day of the prescribed period, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the next day afterwards on which the Court or office is open. It is indeed true that Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994 provides for a special limitation for filing of election petitions laying a challenge to elections on a post under the Panchayat Raj Institutions. The post of Sarpanch to which the returned-candidate was elected is one such post. Period of limitation for such a petition is admittedly 30 days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election. The preamble to the Act of 1955 states that it provides for and facilitates the interpretation of Rajasthan laws enacted at any time whether prior or subsequent and makes others provisions relating thereto. Period of limitation for such a petition is admittedly 30 days from the date of the declaration of the result of the election. The preamble to the Act of 1955 states that it provides for and facilitates the interpretation of Rajasthan laws enacted at any time whether prior or subsequent and makes others provisions relating thereto. The Act of 1994 as also the election rule of the same year are such Rajasthan laws. In interpretating Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994, Section 10 and 11 of the Act of 1955 will perforce attract. Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994 provides that an election petition be filed within 30 days FROM the date of declaration of result. The word FROM in the said rule would require because of Section 10 of the Act of 1955 exclusion of the date of the declaration of result of the election to the post of Sarpanch while computing 30 days for filing the election petition. So excluded, 18.01.2015 when the result of election to the post of Sarpanch was declared cannot be reckoned for while computing the 30 days limitation. Resultantly the limitation for filing the election petition in the instant case expired on 17.02.2015. That was however a public holiday for reason of “Mahashivratri”. Under Section 11 of the Act of 1955 the limitation in the circumstances would extend to 18.02.2015 the following working day when the election petition was filed. The election petition could thus not be rejected for being outside limitation under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC as urged by counsel for the returned-candidate. The Trial Court under the impugned order dated 22.02.2017 has taken a correct view in rejecting the returned candidate’s application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The Apex Court in the case of K. Venkateswara Rao and anr. vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and Ors. [ AIR 1969 (SC) 872 ], has held that even though the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to election petitions under the Representation of People Act, 1951 which is a complete and self contained code and has its special limitation provisions Section 9 and 10 of the Act of General Clauses Act, 1897 providing for computation of time would apply to such petitions. It would be appropriate to note that Section 10 and 11 of the Act of 1955 are provisions pari materia to Section 9 and 10 of the Act of 1897. The principle enunciated by the Apex Court in the case of K. Venkateswara Rao and anr. vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi and Ors. (supra) would thus apply on all fours to the computation of time under Rule 80 of the Rules of 1994 with reference to Section 10 and 11 of the Act of 1955 for the purpose of filing of election petition. Consequently, I am of the considered view that the there is nothing illegal or perverse vitiating the impugned order dated 22.02.2017. The petitions are without force. Accordingly dismissed. A copy of this order be placed in connected matter.” 9. A glance of the reasons recorded by the Coordinate Bench for exclusion of the date of declaration of the result of the election as per requirement of Section 10 of the Act of 1955, for under-lying logic to do so; would reflect that the reasons are based on sound legal reasonings. Further, the Larger Bench of the Apex Court of the land in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee (supra), dealing with the issue of days included or excluded referring to Halsbury Laws of England, 37th Edition, Volume 3, in the backdrop of provisions of Representation of the People Act, 1951, held thus: “9. So there cannot be any dispute to the proposition that Section 9 of the General Clause Act would apply in computing the period of limitation under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951. However, the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant in this case is that even if it is held that Section 9 has an application to a petition filed under Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, it could be applied only in appropriate cases and is not to be applied university. The contention of the appellant is that in view of the specific language employed in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, the words “within” and “from” used therein would indicate that Section 9 has no application. The contention of the appellant is that in view of the specific language employed in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951, the words “within” and “from” used therein would indicate that Section 9 has no application. It was also urged that the legislative mandate is that the election petition should be filed within 45 days from the date of election of the returned candidate and not earlier than the said date or after 45 days of the said date. On these premises, it was argued that Section 9 has no application in the instant case. 10. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 gives statutory recognition to the well-established principle applicable to the construction of statutes that ordinarily in computing the period of time preserved, the rule observed is to exclude the first and include the last day. 11. In Halsbury Laws of England, 37th Edition, Volume 3 page 92, it is stated as follows: Days included or excluded.-- When a period of time running from a given day or even to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed as contract, and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as “from such a day” or “until such a day” are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. 12. Section 9 says that in any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any period of time, to use the word “to”. The principle is that when a period is delimited by statute or rule, which has both a beginning and an end and the word “from” is used indicating the beginning, the opening day is to be excluded and if the last day is to be excluded the word “to” is to be used. In order to exclude the first day of the period the crucial thing to be noted is whether the period of limitation is delimited by a series of days or by any fixed period. This is intended to obviate the difficulties or inconvenience that may be caused to some parties. For instance, if a policy of insurance has to be good for one day from the 1st January, it might be valid only for a few hours after its execution and the party or the beneficiary in the insurance policy would not get reasonable time to lay claim, unless the 1st January is excluded from the period of computation. 13. It was argued that the language used in Section 81(1) that “within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate” expresses a different intention and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act has no application. We do not find any force in this contention. In order to apply Section 9, the first condition to be fulfilled is whether a prescribed period of fixed “from” a particular point. When the period is marked by terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, the canon of interpretation envisaged and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 require to exclude the first day. The words “from” and “within” used in Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 do not express any contrary intention. 14. By Section 81(1), the legislation fixes the period for filing election petition and at the same time states that no elector or candidate shall file election petition before the date of election of the returnable candidates and if there are more than one returned candidates at the election and dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates. The learned senior Counsel for the appellant contended that if the date of election of the candidate is excluded from computing the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of limitation would be extended by one day and, therefore, it is against the mandate of the statute. The learned senior Counsel for the appellant contended that if the date of election of the candidate is excluded from computing the period of limitation of 45 days, the period of limitation would be extended by one day and, therefore, it is against the mandate of the statute. It was also contended that the filing of the application on the date of election of the returned candidate cannot be considered as a valid presentation of petition as envisaged in the section. We do not think that any such interpretation is possible by a conjoint reading of Section 81(1) of the R.P. Act, 1951 and Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The first day for the period of limitation is required to be excluded for the convenience of the parties and if the declaration of the result is delayed or is done late in the night, the candidate or elector would hardly get any time for presentation of the election petition. Law comes to the rescue of such parties to give full forty-five days period for filing the election petition. Nevertheless, any petition presented on the date of election of the returned candidate would be certainly within the period of limitation as it is a presentation on the date of election of the returned candidate.” 10. In the factual matrix of the case at hand and in view of the settled legal position on the issue, in view of declaration of law made by Apex Court of the land in the case of Tarun Prasad Chatterjee (supra) and the view of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mojiram Meena (supra); this Court is not inclined to take a view contrary. 11. For the reasons and discussion aforesaid, the writ application instituted by the petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed. 12. In the result, the impugned order dated 15th October, 2016, is quashed. The election petition instituted by the petitioner before the Court below shall stand restored. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 4th October, 2018. 13. For the reasons and discussion aforesaid, the writ application instituted by the petitioner succeeds and is hereby allowed. 12. In the result, the impugned order dated 15th October, 2016, is quashed. The election petition instituted by the petitioner before the Court below shall stand restored. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 4th October, 2018. 13. For the election involved herein dates back to the year 2015, and the tenure is likely to be concluded in the near future; the Court below is directed to expedite the proceedings and conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible; preferably, within three months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented. 14. No Costs.