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2018 DIGILAW 1984 (HP)

Changer Vidut Kranti Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2018-11-15

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of present petition filed under S. 482 CrPC, prayer ahs been made on behalf of the petitioners-accused for quashing of complaint bearing No. 64-III/2017, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh titled Labour Inspector vs. M/S Changer Vidut Kranti Pvt. Ltd. and another, on the ground that as per S.106 of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter, ‘Act’), no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act, after expiry of three months from the date of alleged offence. 2. In nutshell, case of the petitioners, as has been projected in the petition at hand is that the Labour Inspector, Department of Labour and Employment, Himachal Pradesh had inspected the premises of the petitioners on 3.2.2017, where after, he having noticed certain discrepancies, proposed to register a case under various provisions of the Act, however, the fact remains that, on the basis of aforesaid inspection carried out by the Labour Inspector, Department of Labour and Employment, Himachal Pradesh, case in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Baijnath, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, came to be registered/lodged on 22.5.2017, i.e. after expiry of three months from the date of inspection. 3. Mr. R.L. Verma, learned counsel representing the petitioners, while inviting attention of this Court to the provisions of S.106 of the Act, vehemently argued that no court can take cognizance of any offence, punishable under this Act, unless complaint thereof is made within three months from the date when alleged commission came to the knowledge of the Labour Inspector. S. 106 is reproduced herein below: “106. Limitation of prosecutions. No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act unless complaint thereof made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector: Provided that where the offence consists of disobeying a written order made by an Inspector, complaint thereof may be made within six months of the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. 2*[Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,-- (a) in the case of continuing offence, the period of limitation shall be computed with reference to every point of time during which the offence continues; (b) where for the performance of any act time is granted or extended on an application made by the occupier or manager of a factory, the period of limitation shall be computed from the date on which the time so granted or extended expired.” 4. No doubt, careful perusal of the aforesaid provision of law clearly suggests that no court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act, unless complaint is made within three months from the date, on which commission of alleged offence came into the knowledge of the Inspector. 5. In the case at hand, careful perusal of reply having been filed by the respondents suggests that the inspection of the premises of petitioners was conducted on 3.2.2017, but thereafter case for prosecution sanction was sent to the Labour Commissioner-cum-Chief Inspector Factories on 13.2.2017 by respondent No.3 and prosecution sanction was received by Labour Inspector, Palampur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh on 11.5.2017 and thereafter, case was filed before the learned Court below on 22.5.2017. 6. Mr. Sanjeev Sood, learned Additional Advocate General, while inviting attention of this Court to the provisions of Section 470(3) CrPC, strenuously argued that the time spent in procuring prosecution sanction from the competent authority is/was required to be excluded while computing limitation and as such, case filed by the Labour Officer against the petitioners is well within limitation, as such, present petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. At this stage, it would be profitable to take note of provisions of S.470 CrPC, which provide as under: “Exclusion of time in certain cases 1. In computing the period of limitation, the time during which any person has been prosecuting with due diligence another prosecution, whether in a Court of first instance or in a Court of appeal or revision, against the offender, shall be excluded: Provided that no such exclusion shall be made unless the prosecution relates to the same facts and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. 2. 2. Where the institution of the prosecution in respect of an offence has been stayed by an injunction or order, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of the continuance of the injunction or order, the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded. 3. Where notice of prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded.” 8. Careful perusal of aforesaid provisions of S.470)3) CrPC, clearly suggests that where notice of prosecution for an offence is given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then, in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. 9. In the case at hand, learned counsel representing the petitioner was unable to dispute that the concerned Labour Inspector after having inspected the premises on 3.2.2017, had sent the case for prosecution sanction to Labour Commissioner-cum- Chief Inspector Factories on 13.2.2017, rather, material placed on record by the respondents suggests that respondent No.3, after having received report from respondent No.4, forwarded the case to the Labour Commissioner-cum-Chief Inspector Factories, on 13.2.2017, for prosecution sanction and sanction was received on 11.5.2017, where after, case came to be filed before the learned trial Court on 22.5.2017. 10. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as provisions of law extracted above, there is no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. Interim directions, if any, are vacated. Record of the court below, if received, be sent back forthwith.