JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. The present petition is filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, for the purpose of challenging the legality and validity of an award dated 5.1.2008 published on 15.1.2008, passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference (LCB) No.15 of 2001, by declaring it to be illegal and thereby sought a consequential relief of reinstatement with continuity of service with full back wages from the date of termination till reinstatement. 2. This petition is filed by the petitioner mainly, on the premise that he was appointed by respondent No.1 i.e. National Thermal Power Corporation Limited as an IIT Trainee by an order dated 18.12.1995 and the petitioner was confirmed as an IIT Junior Operator vide order dated 9th March, 1998. 3. It is the case of the petitioner that, the wife of the petitioner was suffering from serious ailment and on account of her health issue, she was admitted in Bhailal Amin Hospital, without taking prior permission of the doctor concerned. It is the case of the petitioner that it may be true that an employee is required to take treatment in NTPC Hospital, however, for that purpose, the petitioner went to the said hospital on 13th December, 1999 where, the concerned Medical Officer - Dr.Murthy was on duty and instead of taking treatment to the wife of the petitioner, she was looking after her son and it was noticed by the petitioner that in such a careless and negligent approach of Dr.Murthy, the petitioner's wife was profusely bleeding and she required urgent attention by the competent doctor and therefore, she was straightway admitted in Bhailal Amin Hospital. However, the doctors, who were to consider reimbursement, considered the case ruthlessly. Thereafter, the charge sheet was issued on 20th December, 1999, which was adequately replied by the petitioner on 29th December, 1999. The petitioner has further asserted that the inquiry was conducted and second show cause notice was also issued on 11.7.2000, but ultimately, vide order dated 13th September, 2000, the petitioner was removed from service. As a result of which, the petitioner has raised an industrial dispute which, ultimately, referred to the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and thereafter registered as Reference (LCB) No.15 of 2001. As a result of which, the petitioner has raised an industrial dispute which, ultimately, referred to the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and thereafter registered as Reference (LCB) No.15 of 2001. The petitioner has further stated that on account of hyper technical stand taken by the company, the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has also rejected the Reference only on technical and flimsy ground and passed an award on 5.1.2008, which was published as per the requirement on 15.1.2008. Against the aforesaid award, which has been passed by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, the present petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. This petition was entertained by this Court on 4.3.2008, whereby notice was issued upon the respondent authorities and subsequently, the same was admitted vide oral order dated 19.10.2008, which, later on, came up for final consideration before this Court wherein the learned advocate Mr. D.S. Vasavada has represented the petitioner whereas, Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Advocate has appeared with Mr. Hamesh C. Naidu and Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocates for respondent No.1 and Mr. Hemang Shah, learned advocate has appeared for respondent No.2 and canvassed their respective submissions. 5. Mr. D.S. Vasavada, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that the impugned award dated 19.10.2008, passed by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, is not just and proper and the same is not in consonance with the material on record and the finding which was arrived at by the Presiding officer, is a perverse finding and thereby such award is required to be corrected by quashing and setting aside the same. The learned advocate for the petitioner has further contended that it is evident from the record that though it is admitted that inquiry is not much agitated, but at the same time, in respect of penalty, there is a hostile discrimination meted out by the respondent authority. The disciplinary authority has not considered at all the circumstances leading to the occurrence, which were made the subject matter of the charge sheet. The disciplinary authority has also not considered the defence of the petitioner in right spirit and this aspect has not at all been examined in its proper perspective by the learned Presiding Officer. The disciplinary authority has not considered at all the circumstances leading to the occurrence, which were made the subject matter of the charge sheet. The disciplinary authority has also not considered the defence of the petitioner in right spirit and this aspect has not at all been examined in its proper perspective by the learned Presiding Officer. It has been contended by learned advocate for the petitioner that irrespective of applicable standing order, and the ultimate misconduct which has been alleged remained the same and particularly, when such misconduct is explained in detail by way of reply to the charge sheet, the disciplinary authority has not taken into consideration. To canvass the submission, the learned advocate for the petitioner has taken the Court to the relevant contents at page 61 and Page 63 of the charge sheet and reply of charge sheet respectively and by drawing attention about the conduct of Dr.Murti on 13.12.1999, it has been contended that all these could have been examined in detail by the disciplinary authority. Having not done so the, the consequential order was passed by the disciplinary authority, which deserves to be corrected as the main circumstance has not been properly evaluated. Learned advocate for the petitioner has further contended that there is a clear object underlying in vesting the power under Section 11 of the Code and the said exercise of power under Section 11 of the ID Act, could not have been so lightly exercised in a mechanical manner. The learned Judge has appreciated erroneously that the validity of the inquiry is not questioned by the petitioner. However, other aspects like disproportionate penalty, discrimination meted out to the petitioner, etc. have not been gone into at all neither by the disciplinary authority nor examined by the learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. He further submitted that at least opinion of Bhailal Hospital ought to have been taken into consideration when the petitioner has shown readiness to produce and insisted upon and therefore, the entire exercise is suffering from vice of non-application of mind and hence, since the impugned award is passed upon such exercise which is not germane to law, the order in question deserves to be corrected by quashing and setting aside impugned award. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate has further submitted that apart from these facts, though the validity of inquiry was not questioned, but the very quantum of punishment being thoroughly disproportionate to the charge. At least that aspect of disproportionate issue of penalty could have been gone into the learned Presiding Officer and that is the purport of Section 11A of the ID Act. On this issue, series of decisions were cited before the learned Presiding Officer, but none of those decisions were considered by the Labour Court in right spirit and therefore, the said exercise has vitiated the impugned order and that being so, the order in question deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. To strengthen the submission, Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate has submitted few decisions in this regard, but essentially he has pressed into service a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301 and has contended that since the proportionality of penalty under Section 11A of the ID, Act ought to have been taken into consideration by the learned Presiding Officer, and that having not done so, such jurisdictional error is sufficient enough to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. No other submissions have been made. 8. To meet with the stand taken by Mr. Vasavada, learned advocate, Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the authority has vehemently submitted that first of all, as regards negligence of Dr.Murti, the evidence which is reflecting on page 84 of petition compilation, makes it clear that it is not established that instead of admitting the patient, Dr. Murti was looking after her child. In fact, paragraph No.5 of such evidence makes it very clear that the plea submitted by the petitioner as regards irresponsibility of Dr. Murti, is not proved. On the contrary, for that purpose, evidence of a defence witness - Dr.Jaiprakash is not found to be corroborated, but in fact such treatment generally comes in a planned manner and having gone on without prior approval, the reference at present was not possible. This evidence is material enough to suggest that what has been pressed into service for canvassing irresponsibility of Dr Murti is not correct. It also reveals from this evidence that the wife of the petitioner was merely an OPD patient on 13th December, 1990. This evidence is material enough to suggest that what has been pressed into service for canvassing irresponsibility of Dr Murti is not correct. It also reveals from this evidence that the wife of the petitioner was merely an OPD patient on 13th December, 1990. Mr.Patel has further submitted that for the period from 20th December, 1999 to 13th December, 2000, no bills were produced by the petitioner for reimbursement and therefore, there is no question of making any discrimination. 9. Mr.Patel, has further submitted that standing order relied upon by the petitioner is different and is not applicable to the Unit in which the petitioner was working whereas, the disciplinary authority is also different. The relevant standing order which is applicable for Bharuch Unit is a standing order No.27 (11) (12) produced at Exh:18 before the Court concerned and therefore, it is not correct that there is hostile discrimination made by respondent No.1 while dealing with the petitioner departmentally. It was also contended that looking to the gravity of misconduct, looking to the past service and looking to two incidents which happened earlier, the authority on the contrary, constrained to initiate the action and for that purpose, Mr.Patel, learned Senior Advocate has drawn attention of this Court to past incidents of July, 1998 and 24th August, 1998 and has vehemently contended that this is not a case in which any leniency is required to be shown. In fact, that is the categorically averment made in reply affidavit in paragraph Nos.4 and 5 which clearly indicates that the petitioner was not victimized and as such, this repeated behaviour during the course of employment have justified an action against him which aspect has been revealed from the record. 10. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that neither there is any arbitrary nor any excessive power of exercise against the petitioner in taking action against the petitioner nor there is any discrimination meted out to the petitioner in any manner. To substantiate the stand taken by the authority, three decision have been cited by Mr. Patel, learned Senior Advocate, (i) (2005) LLR 420 (ii) 2006 (1) LLJ 1004 ; and 2007 (0) GLHEL SC 40172. On the issue of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes, Act. Mr.Patel, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon one another decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Kooking Coal Limited 2005 (3) SCC 331 . Patel, learned Senior Advocate, (i) (2005) LLR 420 (ii) 2006 (1) LLJ 1004 ; and 2007 (0) GLHEL SC 40172. On the issue of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes, Act. Mr.Patel, learned Senior Advocate has relied upon one another decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bharat Kooking Coal Limited 2005 (3) SCC 331 . 11. By referring these decisions, Mr. Patel, learned Senior Advocate has contested the petition and contended that no case is made out by the petitioner which would justify the invocation of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In addition to this, Mr.Patel, learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that it is settled position of law that there is no concept of negative equality in respect of imposition of punishment and for that purpose, Mr.Patel, learned Senior Advocate has drawn the attention of this Court to decision reported in AIR 2014 SC 3640 and by referring to this decision, the learned Senior Advocate Mr.Patel has submitted that while passing the order, the Presiding Officer has categorically concluded which is squarely in consonance with the record of the case and therefore, in absence of act of perversity from the impugned award, the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227, of the Constitution of India cannot be allowed to be invoked by this petition especially when the action has been initiated after following the process of detailed inquiry and therefore, keeping these factors in mind, the learned Senior Advocate Mr.Patel has requested the Court to dismiss the petition with cost. 12. Having heard the submissions made by learned advocate for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record in correlation with the award which has been passed, following circumstances are not possible to be ignored by this Court while ultimately, dealing with the grievance of the petitioner: (i) From the bare reading of the impugned award, it reflects that the impugned award has been passed after considering the submissions made by the rival sides and when the detailed material which has been adduced on record, is considered at length, it is not possible to treat the same as the one which suffers from vice of non-application of mind. (ii) The learned Presiding Officer while passing the impugned award, has not only considered the relevant documentary evidence including the medical papers and a perusal to the relevant standing order and the deposition which took place by either side and hence, this is not a case in which it can be possible to canvass that the award as passed in a casual manner or perverse in any manner. (iii) The perusal of the impugned award further reveals that the petitioner - employee has not questioned the validity of enquiry which has been undertaken and for that purpose, a specific pursis has been given at Exh:20 whereby it is declared that inquiry procedure is not questioned by him. (iv) Further reading of the award impugned makes it clear that allegations which have been levelled in the charge sheet are grave in nature so much so that the petitioner has even slapped Dr.Jaiprakash and has committed a serious misconduct. (v) While coming to the conclusion that the learned Presiding Officer has considered the relevant clauses contained in the standing order which is applicable in case of the petitioner produced at Exh:18, it is also specifically concluded by the Presiding Officer that adequate opportunity of defending himself was given to the petitioner during the course of inquiry by Inquiry Officer and the report of the Inquiry Officer is accepted by the petitioner without any demur. The learned Presiding Officer on the basis of such material found that not only the inquiry was conducted in a lawful manner which is admitted by the petitioner, but during the course of inquiry, enough opportunity of defence was also given. The learned Presiding Officer on the basis of such material found that not only the inquiry was conducted in a lawful manner which is admitted by the petitioner, but during the course of inquiry, enough opportunity of defence was also given. The entire procedure has been conducted in a lawful manner and it is in consonance with the procedure recognised by law and it has also been found by the Presiding Officer that neither there is any victimization nor any discrimination meted out and to prove that the petitioner has miserably failed to lead any evidence, it has also been found that the case has been considered not only by the Appellate Authority, but also by Reviewing Authority itself and it has been found further specifically that the inquiry was strictly conducted in accordance with the provisions contained in the standing orders and that could not be contradicted by the petitioner even by coming to the conclusion that no case is made out, the detailed evidence has been examined and only thereafter an award is passed after assigning reasons and it appears that the same is not erroneous or perverse in any manner. It also appears that the order in question is passed after due application of mind and in accordance with law. 13. It also appears that the order in question is passed after due application of mind and in accordance with law. 13. Now, in the context of aforesaid circumstances which are reflecting from the record, it appears that the conclusion is not perverse at all and what is perversity is well defined by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Golla Rajanna & Others v. Divisional Manager & Another, reported in (2017) 1 SCC 45 , catch note read as under: "b Tort Law - Employees' compensation Act, 1923 - Sections 30 and 4(1) (c) (ii) - Appeal to High Court - Interference with findings of facts by High Court - When permissible - No perversity in findings of fact of authorities below - Interference with findings of fact, held, impermissible in such circumstances c - Workmen Compensation Commissioner ascertained disability tot he extent of 35% and determined compensation based on such disability - in appeal, High Court doubted medical certificate and considered disability to the extent of 5% only - Compensation awarded by Commissioner was substantially reduced - Sustainability of d - Held, workmen Compensation Commissioner is last authority on facts - Parliament restricted scope of appeals under Section 30 only to substantial questions of law, being welfare legislation - In view of this limited jurisdiction, exercise made by High Court not in consonance with Section 30 of the Act - On facts held, determination of disability of Workmen Commissioner was purely question of fact - As per Section 4(1)(c) (ii), only a qualified medical practitioner had to assess permanent disability - Insurance company did not contend that assessment of disability was not based on evidence or it was perverse - Nowhere was it contend that doctor who assessed disability was not qualified - Commissioner passed compensation award based on certificate issued by doctor, which was proved before him - Therefore, High Court not justified in interfering with order passed by Commissioner - Hence, order passed by High Court, set aside and order passed by Commissioner, restored" 14. Further this Court also keeps in mind the decision laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lucknow K. Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, reported in 13 AIR 2013 SC 3540 , some of other observations are relevant deserve to be quoted hereinafter on the issue of punishment: "12. Further this Court also keeps in mind the decision laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lucknow K. Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, reported in 13 AIR 2013 SC 3540 , some of other observations are relevant deserve to be quoted hereinafter on the issue of punishment: "12. Indubitably, the well ingrained principle of law is that it is the Disciplinary Authority, or the Appellate Authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of the Disciplinary Authority. In the matter of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A. K.Chopra reported in 1999 (1) SCC 759 this principle was explained in the following manner: "22 .......The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. .....The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone..." Yet again, in the case of State of Meghalaya & Ors. v. Mecken Singh N.Marak reported in 2008 (7) SCC 580 , this Court reiterated the law by stating: "14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 15&16 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the appellate authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted." 13. As is clear from the above that the Judicial Review of the quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shocking disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a decision afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a decision afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. In the present case, however, we find that the High Court has, on the one hand directed the appellate authority to take a decision and in the same breath, snatched the discretion by directing the Appellate Authority to pass a particular order of punishment. In normal course, such an order would clearly be unsustainable, having regard to the legal position outlined above. 15. So far as the stand of discrimination is concerned, it is not cogently pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioner that there are no different standing orders for separate units. On the contrary, it is evident that units are different and there are different Disciplinary Authorities as well. It also reveals from the record that in a short span of 2 - 3 years' service, there are two serious incidents took place, in which the authority has left the petitioner instead of taking action and therefore, overall circumstances are reflecting that the evidence of Dr. Murti as well as defence witness - Ramesh Bhaskar and defence witness - Dr. Jayprakash are making it clear that there is no illegality committed by the Court below in arriving at the conclusion. 16. The aforesaid factual scenario which is emerging from the record before coming to ultimate conclusion in the present proceedings, this Court also keeps in mind certain proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta v. Rahul Kumar Agarwal, reported in (2013) 9 SCC 374 , which reads as under: "6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai. After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai. After considering various facets of the issue, the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: (SCC pp. 69496, para 38) "(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 172002 in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practise, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, and it was held: (SCC pp. 34749, para 49) "(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above." (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 17. This Court also keeps in mind the decision laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 , which reads as under: "15.We find the judgment and award of the labour court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. This Court also keeps in mind the decision laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Limited, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 , which reads as under: "15.We find the judgment and award of the labour court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour court in its Award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or re appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the Award of the labour court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. 16. It is relevant to mention that in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that- "49. (m) ...The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to a minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court." It was also held that" 49 (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it." Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice." 18. Yet another decision brought to the notice and consideration of this Court is that the clear proposition of law is laid down that High Court while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction cannot sit over and act as an appellate authority over disciplinary authority and it is left to the disciplinary authority to deal the aspect of penalty. Such proposition of law laid down in the case of Lucknow K. Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, reported in AIR (2013) SC 3540, catch note read as under: (A) Constitution of India, Article 226, 311 - service matter - punishment to be awarded to delinquent - Is for disciplinary authority to decide - Not for the Courts - Quantum of punishment even if found disproportionate matter has to be referred back to disciplinary authority to take fresh decision - Court cannot usurp jurisdiction of disciplinary authority and decide punishment - exception to rule stated. Regional Rural Banks Act (21 of 1976) Section 30." 19. Another proposition of law propounded by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR (2014) SC 3640, which indicates that there is no concept of negative equality. The relevant paragraph No.15 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: "15. More so, it is also settled legal proposition that Article 14 does not envisage for negative equality. In case a wrong benefit has been conferred upon someone inadvertently or otherwise it may not be a ground to grant similar relief to others. This Court in Basawaraj & Anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 considered this issue and held as under: "It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 considered this issue and held as under: "It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide: Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705 , M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565 ; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898 ; and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 2010 SC 1937 )." 20. This Court has also kept in mind the recent decision of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein proposition of law is also not permitting this Court to disturb the impugned judgment which was passed against the petitioner. This Court has also kept in mind the recent decision of the Hon'ble apex Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , wherein proposition of law is also not permitting this Court to disturb the impugned judgment which was passed against the petitioner. The catch note of the aforesaid judgment reads as under: "A. Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227 - Scope of Interference - Interference in service matters - interference with disciplinary proceedings - When permissible - Reiterated - Only in cases of perversity - Held, High Court in exercise its powers under Articles 226 and 227 cannot venture into reappreciation of evidence or interfere with conclusions in enquiry proceedings if the same are conducted in accordance with law, or go into reliability/adequacy of evidence, or interfere if there is some legal evidence on which findings are based, or correct error of fact however grave it may be, or go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks conscience of Court - It can only consider whether enquiry held by competent authority in accordance with procedure established by law and principles of natural justice, whether irrelevant or extraneous considerations and/or exclusion of admissible or material evidence or admission of inadmissible evidence have influenced decision rendering it vulnerable - Further held, it can interfere where finding is wholly arbitrary and capricious based on no evidence which no reasonable man could ever arrive at - In instant case, Charge 1 which related to unauthorized absence of respondent from office after signing in attendance register was found to have been proved by disciplinary authority which was endorsed by Tribunal - Hence, impugned judgment setting aside order of Tribunal and interfering with finding of enquiry officer by appreciating evidence acting as appellate authority in disciplinary proceedings, unsustainable - IN disciplinary proceedings High Court is not and cannot act as second court of first appeal - Hence, order of disciplinary authority restored - Service Law - Departmental Enquiry - Judicial review/Validity." 21. In view of the aforesaid proposition of law which has been laid down broadly by the Hon'ble Apex Court has even independently examined whether any perversity is reflecting in the award or not and for that purpose, it is found that not only the disciplinary authority has initiated action against the petitioner after assigning well reasoned order and after complying with principles of natural justice, inquiry was conducted against him for which the petitioner has no grievance and it appears that against the said decision of disciplinary authority not only the appeal as well as review application is rejected, but even pardon application has also been rejected on 2nd January, 2001 and therefore, apart from these three rejections of the petitioner's applications, even the Presiding Officer has also found no case in his favour and therefore, such concurrent decisions passed by the authorities concerned. It is hardly any circumstance available on record to justify the Court to disturb the finding which has been arrived at and therefore, in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, the Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out. 22. In relation to claim that other two employees i.e. Santosh Sharma and Rajesh Das have been given different treatment, however, as stated earlier that the petitioner cannot take shelter of these two incidents especially, when there was no similarity and they are of a separate unit and even if are same unit than also keeping the aforesaid proposition of law in mind, no distinguished feature emerges from the record, which would permit this Court to take different view and therefore, in absence of any such circumstance, this Court is not inclined to exercise any jurisdiction. On the contrary, not only the aforesaid testimonies of the witnesses, but the reply affidavit has also categorically indicated no lenient view is possible to be taken in respect of punishment. 23. On the contrary, not only the aforesaid testimonies of the witnesses, but the reply affidavit has also categorically indicated no lenient view is possible to be taken in respect of punishment. 23. It has been clarified that there was past history of misconduct in a short duration of petitioner's service in which the authority had taken a lenient view, but when it appeared that these types of misconducts were found to be repetitive, then the authority was constrained to initiate action against the petitioner and whatever action was taken against the petitioner is inconsonance with the principles of natural justice and inconsonance with the lawful process of inquiry and therefore, this is not a fit case in which, this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 24. Keeping all these factors in mind, the judgments which have been relied upon by the learned advocate the petitioner, are almost based on different set of circumstances and the law is very much made emphatically clear by the Hon'ble Apex Court in respect of exercise of power under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of such situation, these judgments are not dealt with by this Court at length to overburden present order. However each judgment has been taken into consideration while arriving at this conclusion. Hence, no case is made out and petition found to be devoid of merits. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief if any stands vacated.