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2018 DIGILAW 2015 (HP)

Manasi Sahay Thakur v. Madan Lal Sharma

2018-11-19

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

body2018
JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - The instant revision petition reflects dismal picture, where the subordinate courts without even caring to go through the contents of the plaint(s), especially with regard to its maintainability, not only entertain such suits, but randomly issue notices to the opposite parties, thereby compelling them to incur unnecessary and otherwise avoidable expenses in defending such litigation(s) and making them unnecessary go through the ordeal and agony of a full fledged trial. Not only this, at times, the appeals arising out of such frivolous and otherwise not maintainable litigation (s) are carried forward not only to the first appellate court, but examples are not wanting, where such kind of cases have even reached the Hon''ble Supreme Court. 2. The background of this case is that the respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "plaintiff") had filed three appeals under the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short, R.T.I. Act) before the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the "defendant"), who being the then Deputy Commissioner was exercising the powers of an appellate authority under the R.T.I. Act, and the same were decided vide order dated 23.7.2015. The plaintiff thereafter issued a legal notice to the defendant stating therein that the latter, while exercising the powers of an appellate authority under R.T.I. Act, had denied the plaintiff''s right to engage a counsel and, therefore, she was liable to pay damages to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- along with interest @ 15% till the realization of payment along with the legal notice fee to the tune of Rs. 2200/-. 3. The defendant responded to the legal notice by filing a reply, however the reply did not deter the plaintiff from filing the suit for recovery of the aforesaid amount, which he did before the learned trial court. The defendant, after putting in appearance before the learned trial court, filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11(d) CPC for rejection of the plaint as the same was barred under law. 4. However, the learned trial court dismissed the application vide order dated 4.9.2017 by observing that since the plaintiff had not assailed the order passed by the defendant under R.T.I. Act and had rather filed a suit on the basis of violation of his legal right, whereby the defendant had refused to accept the power of attorney of the counsel for the plaintiff, therefore, the suit was maintainable. 5. 5. It is against this order that the defendant has filed the instant petition on various grounds including the ground that the learned trial court while passing the impugned order had failed to take into consideration the provisions of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record. 7. Adverting to the relative merits of the case, it would be necessary to reproduce the plaint and the same reads as under:- "IN THE COURT OF LD. CIVIL JUDGE SR. DIVISION BILASPUR (H.P.) IN THE MATTER OF :- Madan Lal Sharma S/O Shri Hari Ram R/O village Bagtheru P.O. Bhager, Tehsil Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P.................Plaintiff Versus Mansi Sahay Thakur, the then Deputy Commissioner, District Bilaspur, H.P. at present posted as Director Woman and Child Devlopment Department, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh.................Defendant Suit for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- along with interest @18% P.A. accrued thereon till realization, in favour of the plaintif and against. Hon''ble Sir, The plaintiff respectfully submits as under: 1. That the plaintiff had engaged a counsel/Advocate Shri Rajesh Kumar Mishra, Advocate District Courts Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh for representing/contesting three appeals titled as Madan Lal Sharma vs. PIO office of Deputy Commissioner, District Bilaspur, H.P. filed under section 18(1) of Right To Information Act, 2005. 2. That the plaintiff had engaged the counsel for placing/representing/contesting his version as an expert before defendant in the above mentioned appeals after paying him fee to the tune of Rs. 15,000/- for each appeal totaling to the tune of Rs. 45,000/- as the plaintiff was not well aware about technicalities and legal complication/technicalities for these appeal. 3. That thereafter the plaintiff along with his engaged counsel appear before defendant on date 13.7.2015 And filed a power of attorney to contest three appeals, but defendant refused to accept the power of attorney of the counsel of the plaintiff which had been duly signed by the plaintiff and at the same time defendant used hot, harass and insulting words to the counsel of the plaintiff. As a result of which counsel of the plaintiff had to leave defendant''s office. 4. As a result of which counsel of the plaintiff had to leave defendant''s office. 4. That by doing so defendant has deprived the plaintiff of availing expertise legal services and violated his legal rights besides the damages in the form which the plaintiff had paid to his counsel as fee for his engagement for contesting the above mentioned appeals. 5. That in this way defendant have committed a tort under ''Damnum sine injuria'' which has caused damaged to the plaintiff in two way i.e. the fee which the plaintiff has to pay to his counsel and secondly, the deprivation of the plaintiff from his legal assistance of expertise. In this way the defendant has violated the legal right of the plaintiff willingly with malafide intentions. 6. That by doing so the defendant has put the plaintiff in the loss of reputation, unnecessary harassment, mental agonies, discomforts, for which he is bound to pay additionally. 7. That thereafter the plaintiff sent a legal Notice through counsel to the defendant to pay the damages to the plaintiff, but the defendant denied the legitimate claim of the plaintiff. 8. That the cause of action arose to the plaintiff on date 13.7.2015 when the defendant refused to accept the power of attorney of the counsel of the plaintiff which had been duly signed by the plaintiff and at the same time defendant used hot, harass and insulting words to the plaintiff. As a result of which counsel of the plaintiff had to leave defendant''s office. And further on date 6.5.2016 when the defendant replied the Legal Notice of the plaintiff and denied the legitimate claim of the plaintiff. 9. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction is assessed at Rs. 1,00,000/- and a court fee of Rs. 3,560/- is being paid thereon. 10. That there is no other suit pending between the same parties with regard to the same subject matter in any other court of law. 11. That the Hon''ble Court had got jurisdiction to hear and decide the present suit. That plaint in duplicate is filed along with the affidavit. PRAYER:- It is therefore, respectfully prayed that:- I. A decree for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 11. That the Hon''ble Court had got jurisdiction to hear and decide the present suit. That plaint in duplicate is filed along with the affidavit. PRAYER:- It is therefore, respectfully prayed that:- I. A decree for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- i.e. along with interest @ 18% P.A. accrued thereon from the date of the damages caused till the realization of the payment along with the cost of this suit may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. II. A decree for any other appropriate relief which the Hon''ble Court deems fit and proper in the light of the facts and circumstances of the suit be also passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. Date:06.8.2016 Place: Bilaspur Plaintiff Through Counsel. VERIFICATION: Verified that the contents of the para No. 1 to 11 of this plaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and that nothing has been concealed therein which is ture. Date:06.8.2016 Place: Bilaspur Plaintiff" 8. The perusal of the plaint would show that the same does not contain any provision of law under which it has been filed. Even before this Court, the learned counsel for the plaintiff was not in a position to state as to under which provisions of law, the same has been filed. How, therefore, such plaint came to be entertained by the learned trial court is not at all understandable. After all, for claiming damages, one has to plead the bare minimal facts of the law, under which he is entitled to claim damages, be it under law of torts or the general law or any special law etc. 9. Apart from above, it would be noticed that the sole ground for claiming damages from the defendant is that she did not accept the power of attorney of the counsel for the plaintiff and is alleged to have used "hot, harass and insulting" words to the counsel for the plaintiff, who had to leave the defendant''s office. 10. Even if the version of the plaintiff is accepted as such, the mere non-acceptance of the power of attorney per se could not be a ground to file a suit and claim damages as the plaintiff had remedy to file an appeal before the H.P. State Information Commission. 11. 10. Even if the version of the plaintiff is accepted as such, the mere non-acceptance of the power of attorney per se could not be a ground to file a suit and claim damages as the plaintiff had remedy to file an appeal before the H.P. State Information Commission. 11. It is not in dispute that the damages sought for by the plaintiff relate to the so called act(s) that was performed by the defendant in quasi-judicial capacity while discharging the duties of the appellate authority under R.T.I Act and was, thus, protected not only under the Judicial Officers'' Protection Act, 1850, but even under the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. 12. Section 1 of the Judicial Officer''s Protection Act, 1850, reads as under:- I. Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith, and of officers executing warrants and orders. - No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time, in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same. 13. It would be noticed that Section 1 of the Judicial Officer''s Protection Act, 1850, as reproduced above, contains the common law rule of immunity of Judges, which is based on the principle that a person holding a judicial office should be in a position to discharge his/her functions with complete independence and, what is more important, without there being, in his/her mind, fear of consequences. 14. This section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his/her judicial capacity. 14. This section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his/her judicial capacity. In the first category fall those acts, which are within the limits of his/her jurisdiction and the second category encompasses those acts, which though may not be within the jurisdiction of Judicial Officers, but are nevertheless done or ordered to be done by him/her believing in good faith that he/she had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done. If the Judicial Officer is found to have been acting in the discharge of his/her judicial duties, then, in order to exclude him/her from the protection of this statue, the complainant has to establish that - (i) the Judicial Officer complained against was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever; and (ii) he/she was acting without good faith in believing himself/herself to have jurisdiction. 15. Here, it shall be opposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Rachapudi Subba Rao vs. The Advocate-General, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 755 , wherein it was observed as under:- 9. As pointed out by this Court in Anwar Hussain vs. Ajoy Kumar Mukerjee & Ors the Section affords protection to two broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his judicial capacity. In the first category fall those acts which are within the limits of his jurisdiction. The second category encompasses those acts which may not be within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer, but are, nevertheless, done or ordered to be done by him, believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to do them or order them to be done. 10. In the case of acts of the first category committed in the discharge of his judicial duties, the protection afforded by the statute is absolute, and no enquiry will be entertained as to whether the act done or ordered to bed done was erroneous, or even illegal, or was done or ordered without believing in good faith. II. In the case of acts of the second category, the protection of the statute will be available if at the time of doing, ordering the act, the judicial officer acting judicially, in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the same. II. In the case of acts of the second category, the protection of the statute will be available if at the time of doing, ordering the act, the judicial officer acting judicially, in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the same. The expression "jurisdiction" in this Section has not been used in the limited sense of the term, as connoting the "power" to do or order to do the particular act complained of, but is used in a wide sense as meaning "generally the authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the matters". Therefore, if the judicial officer had the general authority to enter upon the enquiry into the cause, action, petition or other proceeding in the course of which the impugned act was done or ordered by him in his judicial capacity, the act, even if erroneous, will still be within his ''jurisdiction'', and the mere fact that it was erroneous will not put it beyond his "jurisdiction". Error in the exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with lack of jurisdiction in entertaining the cause or proceeding. It follows that if the judicial officer is found to have been acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then, in order to exclude him from the protection of this statute, the complainant has to establish that (1) the judicial officer complained against was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever, and (2) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction. 16. In order to make position of Judges, Judicial Officers and Magistrates, more secure, the Parliament has enacted the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. 17. Section 2 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 defines a "Judge" in the following terms: 2. Definition-In this Act, "Judge" means not only every person who is officially designated as Judge, but also every person- (a) who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment, which if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive; or (b) who is one of a body of persons which body of persons is empowered by law to give such a judgment as is referred to in Clause (a). 18. 18. Since a person, who is empowered by law to give in any legal proceeding a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would be definitive, or a judgment, which if confirmed by some other authority, would be definitive would include the appellate authority under R.T.I. Act and, therefore, such person performing his duties as the appellate authority would obviously be immune from legal action. 19. Apart from above, Section 21 of the R.T.I. Act, itself provides as under:- 21. Protection of action taken in good faith - No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act or any rule made thereunder. 20. This Section provides complete protection to the appellate authority for the things done or intended to be done by him/her in good faith under R.T.I. Act. 21. Finally, it would be necessary to advert to the order that was passed by the defendant on 13.7.2015, which forms the foundation of the plaintiff''s suit and reads thus:- Case called. Appellant Madan Lal Sharma present in person. Sh. Rajesh Kumar Mishra, ld. Counsel also present for appellant. The appellant was told that as per Rule 6 of Himachal Pradesh Right to Information Rules, 2006, there is no provision of counsel and he was urged to plead his case himself. As per the spirit of the Act, the aggrieved person needs to be given a complete and fair hearing in person and provided relief, unless and until he is unable to speak for himself due to some grave reason, which is not the present case. It is further clarified that as per RTI Act, PIO is custodian of Information which is to be furnished to the applicants and providing of information is not litigation. The First Appellate Authority is not a court but it is only a departmental authority to ensure that information is not denied to the rightful applicant. Before the First Appellate Authority under RTI Act, neither any evidence is recorded nor two parties are involved, because the appeal is filed by the appellant on dissatisfaction of the information given by the PIO who is the custodian of the information as well as official record. Moreover, no penalty can be imposed by the First Appellate Authority. Before the First Appellate Authority under RTI Act, neither any evidence is recorded nor two parties are involved, because the appeal is filed by the appellant on dissatisfaction of the information given by the PIO who is the custodian of the information as well as official record. Moreover, no penalty can be imposed by the First Appellate Authority. Therefore, it is clear that there is no necessity to allow the advocate for pleading the RTI appeals before the First Appellate Authority. The appellant was thus asked to plead the present matter. If he is dissatisfied he can go in appeal to the next higher authority. It was also told that his counsel can remain present during the proceedings. However, the appellant refused saying that either his counsel would plead or else he would leave the court, and he left the Court. Taking a lenient view in the matter and in order to address the appellant''s grievance, he was asked telephonically to be present today on 13.7.2015 at 4.00 P.M. along with his ld. Counsel but he stated that he has left for Shimla. Therefore, the case is now fixed for 17.7.2015 at 10.30 A.M. The appellant be summoned for 17.7.2015 at 10.30 A.M. If the service is not effect in person upon the appellant then the service may be done through affixation. He should also be informed telephonically. 22. A bare perusal of the aforesaid order would clearly go to show that the same was based upon the understanding of the defendant of the R.T.I. Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Even if it is assumed that the aforesaid order was not based upon the correct interpretation of the provisions of the R.T.I. Act and the Rules framed thereunder, even then the only remedy with the plaintiff was to file an appeal before the State Information Commission and under no circumstances, the suit of the instant kind could have been filed much less entertained. 23. The entire sequence of events, as narrated above, only go to show that the plaintiff all throughout the proceedings was trying to browbeat, terrorize and intimidate the Presiding Officer, i.e. the defendant. 24. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the Courts and quasi-judicial authorities to enable them to discharge their functions without fear. 24. No affront to the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The protection is necessary for the Courts and quasi-judicial authorities to enable them to discharge their functions without fear. Even the quasi-judicial authorities like the Judges need to be insulated so that they are able to perform their duties freely and fairly or else, the administration of justice would become a casualty and Rule of Law would receive a set back. Even the quasi-judicial authorities are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear or favour. Therefore, litigants cannot be allowed to terrorize or intimidate these authorities with a view to secure orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and no civilized system of administration of justice can permit it. 25. Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as under:- 3. Additional protection to Judges.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), no court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal, or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge. 26. Any person, aggrieved by the order, which, according to him, is not in accordance with law, has legal remedy or approaching the next higher authority or the writ Court etc. for redressal of the grievances, but cannot file a suit for damages against the Officer and such suit is obviously barred under Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. 27. Admittedly, even as per the case set up by the plaintiff, there was no personal involvement of the defendant in the matter, therefore, the suit as filed is obviously misconceived and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 28. 27. Admittedly, even as per the case set up by the plaintiff, there was no personal involvement of the defendant in the matter, therefore, the suit as filed is obviously misconceived and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 28. Similar issue came up before the Bombay High Court in N.V. Shamsunder, Civil Judge (Senior Division) vs. Savitabai, 2006 Law-Suit (BOM) 1230 , where suit for compensation had been filed against the Civil Judge (Senior Division) for not investing the amount of compensation, as directed by the appellate authority, awarded in land acquisition matter, which resulted in loss of interest amount to successful party. The Court held the suit to be barred by observing as under: 6. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel and perused the record. Since the immunity is claimed by the defendant No. 1 under the above two Acts, it would be appropriate to quote Section 1 of the Judicial Officers'' Protection Act of 1850 and Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. section 1 of the Judicial Officers Protection Act of 1850 reads as under: 1. Non-liability to suit of officers acting judicially, for official acts done in good faith and of officers executing warrants and order:- No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his jurisdiction: Provided that he at the time in good faith, believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or orders of any such judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the execution of any warrant or order, which he would be bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the person issuing the same. Section 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 reads as under: Additional protection to Judges :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force and subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceeding against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. (2) Nothing in Sub-section (1) shall debar or affect in any manner the power of the Central Government or the State Government or the Supreme Court of India or any High Court or any other authority under any law for the time being in force to take such action (whether by way of civil, criminal or departmental proceedings or otherwise) against any person who is or was a Judge. 7. From the bare perusal of the Section 1 of The 1850 Act, it is clear that the Judicial Officer acting judicially is protected in respect of any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty provided he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. Insofar as Section 3 of The 1985 Act, which provides additional protection to Judges clearly stipulates that no Court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceedings against any person who is or was a Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Thus, Section 3 gives complete immunity to a Judge or Ex-Judge in respect of any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of, acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official or judicial duty or function. Section 4 of the said Act also provides that provision of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force providing for protection of Judges. Section 4 of the said Act also provides that provision of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force providing for protection of Judges. The conjoint reading of sections 3 and 4 makes it clear that the protection given to a Judge or Ex-Judge for any act, thing or word committed, done or spoken by him while discharging official or judicial function is absolute. Under Section 1 of The 1850 Act the protection from being sued in civil suit is available to a Judge or Magistrate for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty provided he in good faith believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order the act complained of. As such the protection available to a Judge under The 1850 Act is in respect of any action taken in good faith whereas the protection available under The 1985 Act is absolute and is even available not only to a sitting Judge but also to an Ex-Judge in respect of the actions taken or words spoken by him while discharging his official or judicial function. The reason behind giving absolute protection by The 1985 Act is quite obvious. If such an absolute protection is not given, the Judge or Ex Judge runs the risk of facing civil action at the instance of the disgruntled litigants who may have been aggrieved by adverse orders passed against them. If such an absolute protection is not given, a Judge or an Ex-judge is likely to face frivolous suits at the instance of the litigants who are aggrieved by adverse orders passed by the Judge or Ex-Judge. Therefore, in order to give absolute protection to the Judge not only during his tenure but even thereafter, the Legislature thought it fit to enact The Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. A bare reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act makes the intention of the legislature to give complete protection to a Judge sitting or retired clear. That being the position, in my view, there is considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Bhangde that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That being the position, in my view, there is considerable merit in the submission of Mr. Bhangde that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is the case of the defendant No. 1 that the suit filed against the defendant No. 1 was clearly barred and, therefore, the plaint was liable to be rejected as against the defendant No. 1 under Order 7, Rule 11(d) of Civil Procedure Code on the ground that there was a bar to file the suit. Since the suit was clearly barred under Section 3 of the 1985 Act, the application filed by the defendant No. 1 ought to have been allowed by the trial Court. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the trial Court exercised jurisdiction illegally in rejecting the application filed by the defendant No. 1. I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Darda appearing on behalf of the respondents 1 to 6 that the respondents 1 to 6 have filed the suit against the defendants in good faith believing that the suit is the only remedy available in view of the communication of the Registrar and the notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure issued to the defendants. The suit must have been filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants after obtaining legal advise and if the plaintiffs have been wrongly advised in filing the suit which is patently not maintainable, they cannot come with the plea that the suit was filed in good faith. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the defendant No. 1 in the trial Court was vehemently contested in the trial Court by respondents 1 to 6. They have also contested the present Revision Application. Therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of Mr. Darda, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. 29. Even otherwise, demoralizing of the officers discharging their duties, more particularly, those who are discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions, needs to be avoided at all costs, as surely, public would not only lose faith, but shall be imparted no justice if those, who are entrusted with discharging public functions, are demoralized. 30. 29. Even otherwise, demoralizing of the officers discharging their duties, more particularly, those who are discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions, needs to be avoided at all costs, as surely, public would not only lose faith, but shall be imparted no justice if those, who are entrusted with discharging public functions, are demoralized. 30. In view of the aforesaid discussions, I find merit in this petition and the same is accordingly allowed and consequently, the impugned order dated 4.9.2017 passed by the learned trial court is set aside. Resultantly, the application filed by the defendant under Order 7, Rule 11(d) CPC is allowed and the plaint of the plaintiff is rejected. 31. Admittedly, the plaintiff has dragged the defendant to unnecessary and otherwise avoidable litigation and has thereby abused process of the Court and has, therefore, made himself liable to pay a special costs to the opposite party, quantified at Rs. 25,000/-, which shall be paid to the defendant on or before 15.12.2018 and in case, the same is not paid within the aforesaid period, then it shall be open to the defendant to recover the same by filing an execution petition before this Court. 32. However, before parting it needs to be observed that the learned trial court was equally at fault in entertaining the plaint wherein even the provisions of law had not been mentioned. If the learned trial court would have cared to go through the instructions issued from time to time by this Court, it would have definitely not entertained the plaint. 33. This Court vide notification No. HHC/Rules/Misc.-1/97, dated 21.7.1997 has issued the following instructions:- 13(i) Mention of Provision of Law in the Head Note of the Plaint-Instruction regarding: It has been observed that many of the plaint(s), petition(s), Application(s) and Misc. Application(s) are being filed in the Court(s) without quoting the provision of law in the Head Note leading thereby to confusion. I have, therefore, been directed by the Hon''ble Chief Justice to impress upon you to ensure that no plaint(s), petition(s), Application(s) and Misc. Application(s) etc. be entertained unless in the Head Note provision of law is mentioned. Please ensure that the above instructions be complied with in letter and spirit. 34. The Registrar (Rules) is directed to once again circulate the aforesaid notification throughout the State so as to ensure that no plaint(s), petition(s), application(s) and misc. Application(s) etc. be entertained unless in the Head Note provision of law is mentioned. Please ensure that the above instructions be complied with in letter and spirit. 34. The Registrar (Rules) is directed to once again circulate the aforesaid notification throughout the State so as to ensure that no plaint(s), petition(s), application(s) and misc. application(s) are entertained by the courts unless in the head note, provision of law is clearly mentioned. 35. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.