ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. The appellant is plaintiff. 3. The plaintiff has instituted the suit for declaration of right, title and interest, confirmation of possession of the suit land and in alternative for recovery of possession. 4. The disputed land so far as present proceeding is concerned, has been mentioned in Schedule-E. 5. The plaintiff is claiming title over the Schedule-E land on the basis of registered sale deed from Niranjan Mahtha, Prabhakar Mahatha and Kiran Chandra Mahtha, who are the respondents herein and on that basis the plaintiff has claimed that they have come into possession of the suit land. 6. The defendants have taken a plea that the suit land in question is a joint family property. The defendants have claimed the suit land from Sunderbala Debya who is one of the co-sharer of the property in question. There are four co-sharer of the Schedule-E property. Three co-sharers sold the property in favour of the plaintiff and one co-sharer sold the property in favour of the defendant nos. 1 to 4, who are subsequent purchaser from the Sunderbala Debya. Thus four shareholders are of the suit property of Schedule-E. 7. Now the question is only with regard to share and the specific share of the vendors. 8. Both the parties are claiming title over the suit land and certainly it is a triable issue and there is prima facie case. So far as balance of convenience, irreparable loss and injury are concerned, it depends upon the possession of the suit land. 9. It has been pleaded in the petition under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC that defendants are making construction over the suit land and for this purpose they are using JCB Machine and hoarding sands, bricks and cement etc. 10. Thus construction is being made by the defendants. This itself suggests that defendants are in possession of the suit land. The present finding is being recorded only for the purpose of the present petition filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. This is not relating so far as merits of the suit is concerned. 11. 10. Thus construction is being made by the defendants. This itself suggests that defendants are in possession of the suit land. The present finding is being recorded only for the purpose of the present petition filed under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. This is not relating so far as merits of the suit is concerned. 11. From perusal of the impugned order of the Trial Court, it appears that the Trial Court has gone into prima facie case of title and after elaborate consideration it has been recorded that defendant has better case than the plaintiff so far as suit land is concerned. This approach of the Trial Court is not in accordance with law. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719 . Para-4 of the said judgment is quoted herein under: “4. Order 39, Rule 1(c) provides that temporary injunction may be granted where, in any suit, it is proved by the affidavit or otherwise, that the defendant threatens to dispossess the plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing... or dispossession of the plaintiff or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Law Commission clause(c) was brought on statute by Section 88(i)(c) of the Amending Act 104 of 1966 with effect from February 1, 1977. Earlier thereto there was no express power except the inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. to grant ad interim injunction against dispossession. Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. Rule 1 primarily concerns with the preservation of the property in dispute till legal rights are adjudicated. Injunction is a judicial process by which a party is required to do or to refrain from doing any particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court in exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. 5. Therefore, the burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.” 13. Thus, law is clear that prima facie case means, the case is triable. The real issue is possession of the suit land for which learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Transport Corporation of India, Ltd. Ranchi Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2007(1) JLJR 401 . Para-6 of the said judgment is quoted herein under: “6. Both the courts have committed glaring illegality in not addressing the crucial and important question of possession of the suit property. Though title is a relevant factor in a Title Suit but for the purposes of granting interim injunction, actual physical possession over the suit property constitutes the most relevant issue. Both the courts have misdirected themselves in ignoring the question of actual physical possession of the petitioner, which was not disputed by the respondents. After observing that the question of title has to be gone into during the trial after the evidence is adduced, the trial court still rejected the injunction application, holding that the petitioner has no valid title. Both the courts have misdirected themselves in ignoring the question of actual physical possession of the petitioner, which was not disputed by the respondents. After observing that the question of title has to be gone into during the trial after the evidence is adduced, the trial court still rejected the injunction application, holding that the petitioner has no valid title. I am at pain to observe that the cardinal principles for granting injunction, namely, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, have not been properly applied on the facts of the case. It is also undisputed that the petitioner has a sale deed in his favour and this is the third sale in the series of transaction. Not even a single sale deed was challenged by any person at any relevant time. In any case, the question of validity of the sale deeds and the right to possess has to be considered during the trial. Petitioner has specifically, alleged that after purchasing the land in the year, 1987 it raised construction over the suit land. Thus, prima facie, possession of the petitioner is established as this fact has not been denied by the defendants in the suit. Assuming petitioner’s title is defective but the fact remains that it is in continuous, uninterrupted and unchallenged possession right from 1987, which means the settled possession. In such circumstances petitioner can only be dispossessed by adopting due course of law and not by use of force. Applying the principles, enunciated under law for grant of injunction, petitioner having a sale deed in its favour and uninterrupted possession since 1987, it cannot be said that it has no prima facie case. If the respondents are allowed to demolish the construction and take over the possession, it will render the suit infructuous and, thus, the balance of convenience also tilts in favour of the petitioner, consequently resulting in irreparable loss. It is a settled law that prima facie case means a triable issue, which definitely arises in the present case, as observed by the Munsif in its judgment that the question of title is to be decided after the evidence is adduced. How then the Munsif refused injunction is not understandable. Petitioner cannot be non-suited at this stage by refusing injunction. How then the Munsif refused injunction is not understandable. Petitioner cannot be non-suited at this stage by refusing injunction. In view of the above discussions, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 30th Jan, 2006 passed by the learned Munsif-II, Dhanbad, in Title Suit No.151 of 2005, and the order dated 7th July, 2006, passed by the learned District Judge, Dhanbad, in Misc. Appeal No.9 of 2006, dismissing the appeal are not sustainable in law. The orders impugned are hereby set aside and the application of the petitioner for grant of injunction is allowed. Consequently, the defendants/respondents are restrained from evicting the petitioner from the suit property without adopting due course of law.” 14. Thus, law is clear that possession of the suit land is main consideration while considering the petition under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. 15. As discussed hereinabove, this Court finds that the suit land is in possession of the defendants, who are making construction over the suit land and this fact has been accepted by the plaintiff. 16. In view of the above discussion, it clearly shows that balance of convenience lies in the favour of defendants as they have claimed title through registered sale deed and are in possession of suit land. As defendants are in possession of the suit land, there is no question of irreparable loss and injury to the plaintiff. 17. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court rejecting the petition under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC. Accordingly, this instant Appeal is hereby dismissed. 18. I.A. No. 2275 of 2016 also stands dismissed. 19. However, it is made clear that finding recorded in the present order will not prejudice to the proceeding of the main suit.