JUDGMENT S.J. Vazifdar, Chief Justice. - The learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 02.06.2017 referred the matter to the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench for the determination of the following questions or any other questions arising in the context thereof:- i) Whether the judgment in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu v. Ranjit Kaur Pannu which lays down that a gift deed executed by a senior citizen in favour of his/ her son/ daughter would be irrevocable as per provisions of Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act whereas Section 3 of the Maintenance Act specifically contains a non-obstante clause and provides that the provisions of the Maintenance Act will have an overriding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act is a good law? ii) Whether a senior citizen will be debarred from seeking relief under Section 23 of the Maintenance Act in case a senior citizen has transferred his/ her property to any of his / her relatives/ children out of love and affection in case the transfer deed does not specifically provide a condition that transferee shall provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and whether any specific promise is required in the transfer deed for providing of basic amenities and basic physical needs in future till the life of the senior citizen and when a transfer is made by a senior citizen in favour of his/ her relative/ children on account of love and affection and services rendered, whether the promise of providing basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor would not be an implied condition in view of the objective and scheme of the Act? iii) Whether in the judgment in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu v. Ranjit Kaur Pannu's case, the principle of interpretation of statutes of `Generalisbus specialia derogant' i.e. prior general Act may be effected by the subsequent particular/ special Act, has been ignored while relying upon the provisions of the Transport of Property Act in context to the wording of the transfer deed in favour of close relations? iv) Whether the principles of harmonious construction of two separate statutes i.e. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizen Act, 2007 and the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, can be applied when both the Acts deal in different subjects and are not parimateria? v) Whether the expression used in one Act could be used in another Act especially when there is a non-obstante provision in Section 3 of the Maintenance Act? and vi) Whether alienation of property by way of gift or otherwise by any citizen would be deemed to be the result of fraud, coercion or undue influence, if transferee does not provide basic amenities to the transferor. The learned Judge concluded the order of reference as follows:- "In view of the above circumstances, the matter is referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench for determination of the above said questions or any other question arisen in context to the above said points which are of public importance. The review petition bearing RA No. 214-CII of 2016 in CR No. 7598 of 2015 in which operation of the judgment has been stayed also requires to be listed before the Division Bench as the correctness of law laid down in the judgment of Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case (supra) is sub-judice in Review Application No. 214-CII of 2016 in CR No. 7598 of 2015 which is in conflict with the objective of the Maintenance Act, 2007 and contrary to the spirit of non obstante clause in Section 3 of the Maintenance Act and the judgment of this Court in Promil Tomar's case (supra) and Sumesh Anand's case (supra). As the correctness of the judgment in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case (supra) is debatable and the question of law involved in the said case is left open by Hon'ble Supreme Court and has been consistently arising before the Courts being of public importance, let the case be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a Division Bench to determine the correctness of the judgment in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case (supra), for deciding points (i) to (vi) mentioned above." The reference order also refers to the judgments of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Promil Tomar and others v. State of Haryana and others 2014(1) RCR (Civil) 403 and Sumesh Anand v. Vinod Anand and others 2016(1) RCR (Civil) 278 . We will be referring to these judgments as well. The learned Judge then observed as under:- "There is apparently an ambiguity regarding interpretation and scope of Section 23 of the Maintenance Act. On one hand the judgments of this Court have laid law that alienation of property by way of gift or otherwise by any senior citizen would be deemed to be the result of fraud, coercion or undue influence, if the transferee does not provide basic amenities to the transferor, to the contrary the judgment of Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's (supra) curtails the scope of Section 23 of the Maintenance Act by holding that a specific condition is required to be contained in the transfer deed / gift deed, that transfer is subject to providing amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor by the transferee for invoking the jurisdiction under Section 23 of the Maintenance Act. The said controversy repeatedly arises before the Courts and is required to be settled being a question of public importance. Few instances noticed are mentioned in following para." Before making the order of reference, the learned Judge observed that there were conflicting judgments and therefore, the matter requires to be referred to the Division Bench. The Review Application No.214-CII of 2016 was by an order and judgment dated 12.01.2018 dismissed. 2. The learned counsel, however, invited us to answer only the following question and any other incidental thereto:- `Whether Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is applicable only where the conditions stipulated therein viz. that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor is in writing or a part of the document of transfer? 3. For the purpose of answering this reference, it is sufficient to refer to only a few facts which are stated in the order of reference itself. Respondent No.1 is the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Hoshiarpur. Respondent No.2 is the Sub Divisional Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer, Maintenance Tribunal, Hoshiarpur. Respondent No.3 is the petitioner's mother. The petitioner has two brothers and three sisters who are not parties to these proceedings. One of the petitioner's sister Salochna Devi died. Respondent No.3 transferred land admeasuring 3 Kanals 13 Marlas by a registered document dated 28.07.2008 and land admeasuring 13 Kanals 9 Marlas by a registered document dated 06.09.2012. Respondent No.3 is the petitioner's mother. The petitioner has two brothers and three sisters who are not parties to these proceedings. One of the petitioner's sister Salochna Devi died. Respondent No.3 transferred land admeasuring 3 Kanals 13 Marlas by a registered document dated 28.07.2008 and land admeasuring 13 Kanals 9 Marlas by a registered document dated 06.09.2012. The petitioner alleges that the transfer was on account of respondent No.3 having been deserted by her other siblings and on account of her having looked after respondent No.3 for about 35 years. The petitioner's case is that one of the sisters had respondent No.3 dishonestly and wrongly filed an application under section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 before respondent No.2-Sub Divisional Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer, Maintenance Tribunal, Hoshiarpur. The application was filed by that sister's husband as the constituted attorney of respondent No.3. Respondent No.3 sought the cancellation of the said transfer deeds dated 28.07.2008 and 06.09.2012. Respondent No.3 alleged that the petitioner fraudulently took her in confidence and assured her that she could take care of her in her old age and would get her treated and on the basis of such representation fraudulently induced her into executing the said transfer deeds dated 28.07.2008 and 06.09.2012. She further alleged that thereafter the petitioner and her husband started threatening and harassing her. For instance, they stated that if the petitioner failed to transfer her house in their names they would stop looking after her in every respect compelling her to live with her other daughter. The petitioner, therefore, sought annulment of said transfer deeds in exercise of her right under section 23 of the Act. The petitioner has denied these allegations. The petitioner contended that the application has been filed at the behest of her sister and that the allegations contained therein are totally unfounded. Respondent No.2-Sub Divisional Magistrate-cum-Presiding Officer by an order dated 24.07.2015 allowed the third respondent's application and cancelled the said deeds of transfer. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said order before respondent No.1. By an order dated 24.12.2015 the first respondent-Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The said orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 have been challenged in the above petition. 5. Before going further, it must be clarified that we have not considered the rival contentions on-merits at all. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said order before respondent No.1. By an order dated 24.12.2015 the first respondent-Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal. The said orders passed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 have been challenged in the above petition. 5. Before going further, it must be clarified that we have not considered the rival contentions on-merits at all. The facts have been stated only as they have been alleged by the parties without considering the correctness thereof. 6. As we mentioned at the out set, the learned Judge by an order dated 02.06.2017 has referred the matter to the Division Bench. The learned Judge referred to the judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu v. Ranjit Kaur Pannu, 2016(2) RCR (Civil) 82 . In that case, the Maintenance Tribunal declared as null and void the gift deed executed by the mother in favour of the daughter. We will be dealing with the judgment. Suffice it to note at this stage that the learned Judge in the reference order observed that Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case (supra) had not taken into consideration the effect of Section 3 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short `the Senior Citizens Act'). The learned Judge noted that Section 3 contains a non-obstante clause to the effect that the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act would have an over-riding effect over the provisions of any other Act which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act. He observed that Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act which was referred to in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case (supra) is also subject to Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act. 7. It would be convenient at this stage to set out the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the relevant provisions of the Senior Citizens Act. They are as follow:- (A) "Statement of objects and Reasons:- Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are not forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are not forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents. 2. The Bill proposes to cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives and also proposes to make provisions for setting up old age homes for providing maintenance to the indigent older persons. (B) The relevant provisions of the Act are as follow:- An ACT to provide for more effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:- (B) The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:- 2. Be it enacted by Parliament in the Fifty-eighth Year of the Republic of India as follows:- (B) The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:- 2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- a. "children" includes son, daughter, grandson and grand-daughter but does not include a minor; b. "maintenance" includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment; c. "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained the age of majority; d. "parent" means father or mother whether biological, adoptive or step father or step mother, as the case may be, whether or not the father or the mother is a senior citizen; e. "prescribed" means prescribed by rules made by the State Government under this Act; f. "property" means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property; g. "relative" means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death; h. "senior Citizen" means any person being a citizen of India, who has attained the age of sixty years or above; i. "State Government", in relation to a Union territory, means the administrator thereof appointed under article 239 of the Constitution; j. "Tribunal" means the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under section 7; k. "welfare" means provision for food, health care, recreation centers and other amenities necessary for the senior citizens. 3. Act to have overriding effect.- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than this Act. 22. Authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of this Act.- 1. xx xx xx 2. The State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of life and property of senior citizens. 23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.- 1. 22. Authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of this Act.- 1. xx xx xx 2. The State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of life and property of senior citizens. 23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.- 1. Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. 2. Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right. 3. If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 5. 27. Jurisdiction of civil courts barred.- No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter to which any provision of this Act applies and no injunction shall be granted by any Civil Court in respect of anything which is done or intended to be done by or under this Act. 8. The plain language of Section 23 does not require the condition referred to therein namely the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor, to be stated in writing in the document that transfers the property or in any other document. Considering the nature of the Act we do not consider it necessary or appropriate to read such a requirement into Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. It is neither expressly provided nor required by necessary intendments. Our attention has not been invited to any fact or aspect that warrants a Court reading the same into the Section as an additional requirement. It is neither expressly provided nor required by necessary intendments. Our attention has not been invited to any fact or aspect that warrants a Court reading the same into the Section as an additional requirement. The Preamble to the Act and the Statement of Objects and Reasons militate against reading such a requirement into Section 23. 9. The Statement of Objects and Reasons recognizes an erosion of traditional norms and values of our society in providing care for the elderly and the consequence thereof upon them. The preamble stipulates the need to give more attention to the care and protection of older persons. Clause 2 of the Preamble states that the bill proposes to cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain them. There are other provisions also to protect and to provide for senior citizens. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, therefore, indicate that the purpose of the Act is to protect and provide for the senior citizens. It is a welfare legislation for the benefit of the senior citizens. The provisions of the Act must, therefore, be liberally construed in favour of the senior citizens. Reading a condition into a provision adverse to the interest of the senior citizens would defeat the legislative intent behind the Act. 10. The preamble also states that the Act provides for more effective provision for the maintenance and welfare of the parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The property of a senior citizen has a direct bearing on the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens. There are indeed various other factors and aspects that are necessary for the maintenance and welfare of senior citizens. The importance of property in the maintenance and welfare of parents of senior citizens is evident from the entire Act and in particular Section 23 thereof. The preamble also, therefore, warrants the provisions of the Act to be construed liberally in favour of the senior citizens and not against them. To read into Section 23, a condition absent therein would defeat the legislative intent. 11. It is in fact not even necessary to read Section 23 liberally to reject the condition that the condition stipulated therein must be in writing in the document of transfer or any other connected document. Such a condition is absent. To read into Section 23, a condition absent therein would defeat the legislative intent. 11. It is in fact not even necessary to read Section 23 liberally to reject the condition that the condition stipulated therein must be in writing in the document of transfer or any other connected document. Such a condition is absent. To accept the respondents' contention would require our reading Section 23 liberally and in fact redrafting it contrary to its plain meaning in favour of the transferees and against the rights and interests of the senior citizens. This would be contrary to and in fact destructive of the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act. 12. If the intention of the legislature was that the condition mentioned in Section 23 ought to be in writing in the document of a transfer or in any other document, it would have provided for the same expressly. The legislature not having done so we do not intend re-writing Section 23 which is precisely what would be required if the respondents contentions were to be accepted. One of the possible reasons is that in our society the elders often proceed on the basis of trust. They may also transfer property for convenience or for other benefits. They do not at that stage normally stipulate in writing the condition that the transfer is subject to their being looked after. The legislature was obviously conscious of the fact that if such a condition was to be stipulated it would defeat the very purpose of the Act and in particular Section 23 thereof. 13. Our view is also supported by the definition in Section 2. For instance, the word maintenance includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment. It is an inclusive definition recognizing the fact that there are various other aspects also essential to the maintenance of the senior citizens. The word "property" in Section 2(f) is also of a wide import. The legislature advisedly did not stipulate such a condition in Section 23. 14. A Division Bench of this Court in Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) and another v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others 2014(5) RCR(Civil) 656 , after analyzing the provisions of the Act observed:- "28.........The Act is not restricted to only providing maintenance but cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives. One of the major aims was to provide for the institutionalization of a suitable mechanism for the protection of `life and property of older persons" 29. xx xx xx The aforesaid would thus show the definition of property within the meaning of the Act is wide and comprehensive with the object of securing the interest of the elders. This is to be read along with Section 6 (sick section-3) which makes the provisions of the said Act to have over-riding effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than the said Act including any instrument having effect under any other Act." In paragraph-37, the Division Bench reiterated that the Act has an overriding effect qua any other enactment in view of Section 3 thereof. 15. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Radhamandi v. State of Kerala 2015(64) RCR (Civil) 702 , held:- "4. The respondents 6 to 9 are the widow and children of late Gopalakrishnan Nair. It appears that late Gopalakrishnan Nair came down to Kerala to settle down here, after leaving his business and all immovable properties to be taken care of by his wife and children. While he was in Kerala, he had a hope, he would be taken care of by the petitioners. Therefore, with the hope that they would take care of him, he had executed a settlement deed referred as above. In the settlement deed, it is stated that he is executing the deed, on account of love and affection as well on the ground that the petitioners were taking care of and maintaining Gopalakrishnan Nair in his old age. However, Ext.P1 Deed did not contain recitals providing basic amenities and basic physical needs to Gopalakrishnan Nair by the petitioners, as a condition for transfer. 10. Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act,2007 does not contemplate that the condition should form part as recital in the deed of transfer. It only refers that there should be a condition for such transfer. This condition can be either express or implied. If there is no express recital in the deed, the Tribunal has to look around circumstances to find out whether conduct otherwise dispel the intention of donor to revoke......... 11. It only refers that there should be a condition for such transfer. This condition can be either express or implied. If there is no express recital in the deed, the Tribunal has to look around circumstances to find out whether conduct otherwise dispel the intention of donor to revoke......... 11. It is to be noted that the special scheme in terms of Senior Citizens Act,2007 could declare certain transfer as void, taking note of the fact that by taking advantage of the emotionally dependent senior citizens, relatives grab the property on the pretext of providing emotional support. Therefore, legislature thought such transaction could be declared as void as the conduct leading to transaction was based on malice or fraud. Therefore, condition referred in Section 23 has to be understood based on the conduct of the transferee and not with reference to the specific stipulation in the deed of transfer. Thus, this Court is of the view that it is not necessary that there should be a specific recital or stipulation as a condition in the transfer of deed itself. This condition mentioned in Section 23 is only referable as a conduct of the transferee, prior to and after execution of the deed of transfer. Thus, challenge based on the ground that there is no reference in the recital of deed that transferee will provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor is of no consequence. 12. Under Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 fraud includes a promise made without any intention of performing it. Section 92 of the Evidence Act places a restriction on the admissibility of evidence in variance or in contradiction of the term of a registered document in writing. However, under second proviso to Section 92, the existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. Under third proviso to Section 92, the existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property may be proved. Thus, there is no requirement under law that condition as such should form part of written document. It can be implied from the circumstances of human conduct." (emphasis supplied). Thus, there is no requirement under law that condition as such should form part of written document. It can be implied from the circumstances of human conduct." (emphasis supplied). We are in respectful agreement with the learned Single Judge in so far as it is held that Section 23 does not contemplate that the condition should form a part of the deed of transfer and that it only requires that there should be a condition for such transfer and that condition can either be expressed or implied. 16. In paragraph-12 of the above judgment, the learned Judge holds that Section 92 of the Evidence Act would not bar the case regarding the existence of such a condition stipulated even orally. In addition to the reasons furnished by the learned Single Judge it is important to note that the first proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act would also apply. The first proviso provides that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto such as fraud. Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act provides that where the transfer is subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of the property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud etc. and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. In other words, failure to comply with the conditions results in the transfer being deemed to have been made by fraud and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. If, therefore, a case is asserted to the effect that the transfer of the property was subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide for basic amenities and physical needs, the first proviso to Section 92 of the Evidence Act would permit evidence in support thereof to be led. Such evidence cannot be excluded by the opening part of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. 17. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Shabeen Martin, w/o Williamsree Jayan v. Muriel, w/o late Rejinold Beemello 2017(2) RCR (Civil) 485 , held:- "4. Such evidence cannot be excluded by the opening part of Section 92 of the Evidence Act. 17. A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Shabeen Martin, w/o Williamsree Jayan v. Muriel, w/o late Rejinold Beemello 2017(2) RCR (Civil) 485 , held:- "4. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants was relying on Section 23 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of a specific reservation made in Ext.P1 settlement deed, providing for the conditions subject to which the transfer was made, an application invoking the power under Section 23 was not maintainable. Section 23 of the Act reads thus: ................... 5. Section 23(1) shows that where, after the commencement of the Act, a senior citizen has transferred his property by way of a gift deed or otherwise, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the transfer of such property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion, or under undue influence. Reading of this provision, itself, would show that it is not the legislative requirement or intent that the document evidencing the transfer, either by gift or otherwise, should itself contain an express condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and physical needs of the transfer. On the other hand, if there are evidence to the satisfaction of the authorities under the Act that the requirements of Section 23 are satisfied in a case, it is always open to the authorities to invoke their power under Section 23 of the Act and invalidate the document. Such an understanding of the section, according to us, would only advance the object of the Act. On the other hand, if the contention now advanced is accepted, that will defeat the very object and purpose of the Act." (emphasis supplied). We are for the reasons already stated, in respectful agreement with the judgment. 18. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sumesh Anand v. Smt. Vinod Anand and others 2016(5) RCR (Civil) 297 , is of no assistance in deciding the question before us. Paragraphs 3 and 8 of the judgment read as under:- "3. We are for the reasons already stated, in respectful agreement with the judgment. 18. The judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Sumesh Anand v. Smt. Vinod Anand and others 2016(5) RCR (Civil) 297 , is of no assistance in deciding the question before us. Paragraphs 3 and 8 of the judgment read as under:- "3. The learned Appellate Authority has recorded a finding that the gift deed dated 24.04.2009 has not been executed with the condition that beneficiary will take care of the transferor and in case the beneficiary is unable to do so the gift deed will be void. It is the said finding which has been set aside by learned Single Bench in the order impugned in the writ petition. The finding recorded by learned Single Bench is that the present appellant is taking advantage of the weakness of his mother and got the property transferred in his name. 8. The transfer was affected in lieu of services of the appellant and love and affection. The mother has executed transfer deed in lieu of the love and affection and the services rendered. Such reason is not one time factor but continued hope that the appellant would continue same love and affection even after the property is transferred. The services rendered or the love and affection is not a completed action. The transfer was with a pious hope that son will continue to serve the parents as was being done prior to the execution of the document. Having failed to take care of physical needs and basic amenities of the parents in their old age, the appellant has made himself liable for avoidance of the transfer documents in terms of Section 22 of the Act. Such is the finding recorded by learned Single Bench. (emphasis supplied)." Although in paragraph-3 the Division Bench noted that the Appellate Authority had recorded a finding that the gift deed had not been executed with the condition that the beneficial will take care of the transferor and in case the beneficiary is unable to do so the gift deed will be void, the Division Bench did not deal with the same. The Division Bench upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge who set aside the decision of the Appellate Authority. The contention can at the highest said to have been dealt with only sub-silencio. 19. The Division Bench upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge who set aside the decision of the Appellate Authority. The contention can at the highest said to have been dealt with only sub-silencio. 19. In Vinod Anand v. Deputy Commissioner-cum-Appellate Tribunal and others 2016(1) RCR (Civil) 278 , the learned Single Judge noted the stand of respondent No.3 therein that there was no condition in the transfer deed that the respondent has to maintain the transferor/senior citizen. The learned Judge nevertheless granted relief in favour of the senior citizen. The issue, however, has not been dealt with. At the highest it can be contended that the contention was rejected sub silencio. The judgment, therefore, is of no assistance in deciding the question before us. 20. This brings us to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu v. Ranjit Kaur Pannu 2016(2) RCR(Civil) 82 , which is referred to in the reference order and was the cause for the order of reference to a larger Bench. 21. From a reading of the judgment as a whole it is difficult to ascertain whether the learned Single Judge in Jagmeet Kaur Pannu's case has held that the conditions referred to in Section 23 must be incorporated in the deed of transfer or in any other writing relating to or in connection therewith. In certain parts of the judgment, it appears that the learned Judge did not consider the condition to be necessary to sustain an application under section 23 of the Act whereas in other parts it appears that the learned Judge found that such a condition must be mentioned in the transfer deeds or in any other document connected therewith or in relation thereto. Paragraphs 4, 6 to 12 of the judgment read as under:- "III TERMS OF DOCUMENT EXAMINED 4. The terms of the documents creating a transfer would, therefore, require to be seen whether the condition as contemplated under Section 23 has been referred to in the document or there was any scope for imposing such condition. Paragraphs 4, 6 to 12 of the judgment read as under:- "III TERMS OF DOCUMENT EXAMINED 4. The terms of the documents creating a transfer would, therefore, require to be seen whether the condition as contemplated under Section 23 has been referred to in the document or there was any scope for imposing such condition. The preamble portion that is relevant would be the following: "AND WHEREAS the Transferee being the daughter of the transferor, the transferor has great love and affection for the transferee and out of this love and affection the said transferor has decided to transfer the 25% share of house No. 2560, Sector 35-C Chandigarh in favour of the said transferee and the said transferee has also accepted the transfer of the aforesaid property from the said transferor. NOW, THEREFORE, this transfer deed further witnessed that in consideration of the love and affection the said transferor has for the said transferee, the transferor do hereby transfers, conveys and assings, all her rights, titles, interest, in the said house i.e. 25% share of house No. 2560, Sector 35-C, Chandigarh measuring 475.32 Sq. Yds. Alongwith all her rights titles, interests, easements, appurtenances in favour of the said transferee for all times to come absolutely and for ever to have and to hold by the said transferee subject to the terms and conditions of allotment letter and conveyance deed and the said transferee have agreed to accept the said property." IV CONDITIONS FOR MAINTENANCE CANNOT BE ASSUMED AS A CONSIDERATION FOR GIFT 6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has to traverse a large ground to explain as to how the petition itself could be maintained for cancellation of the document if there was no condition attached. The forceful argument is made by making reference to judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Sumesh Anana v. Smt. Vinod Anand, LPA No. 1689 of 2015 (O&M), decided on 01.12.2015 . It was a case of a challenge to the order passed by the Tribunal annulling a gift deed and affirmed by a single Judge's finding. The forceful argument is made by making reference to judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Sumesh Anana v. Smt. Vinod Anand, LPA No. 1689 of 2015 (O&M), decided on 01.12.2015 . It was a case of a challenge to the order passed by the Tribunal annulling a gift deed and affirmed by a single Judge's finding. The terms of the gift deed has not been recorded in the judgment but the reference to a perusal of what the Division Bench undertook reads as under: "A perusal of the gift deed (AnnexureP-1) shows that it was executed in lieu of the services of the appellant and love and affection. It was not on payment of any monetary consideration. It was recorded therein that the document is being executed of her own will without any pressure." The Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the donee who had challenged the order of the Tribunal and the single Bench, held that the document which recorded that the gift was being executed in lieu of services of the appellant and love and affection, would mean that the transfer was being made with the pious hope of the past services rendered. It must in turn be understood as a document made on the condition that the future conduct would also exist in the same fashion. If the donee had failed to take care of the physical needs and basic amenities in the old age, the appellant had made himself liable for avoidance of transfer of documents. 7. The reliance of this judgment to support an argument that there need be no condition regarding the provision for basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transfer would be causing violence to the simple expression employed under Section 23 of the Act. Yet another judgment relied on by the learned counsel is the Promil Tomar v. State of Haryana, 2013 Lawsuit (P&H) 5896 is also a decision interpreting Section 23 but to our lack of benefit, the recitals of the documents are not set out in the said judgment also. The Court was holding that there is a latent condition of the support for basic amenities and physical needs in a transfer made by parent to his/her son or daughter and if the donor declares that such a latent condition is breached, the gift deed would also be liable for being challenged. The Court was holding that there is a latent condition of the support for basic amenities and physical needs in a transfer made by parent to his/her son or daughter and if the donor declares that such a latent condition is breached, the gift deed would also be liable for being challenged. In my respectful view, it will be wrong to be looking for latent condition when the law requires a condition to be stated and that condition was not being fulfilled. That is the only way I can read it, for, this provision must be seen in the context of what the law already provides in the manner of transfer of rights to immovable properties. V NO CONFLICT BETWEEN TP ACT AND 2007 ACT 8. The Act of 2007 which is a special legislation ought to be no doubt, lent primacy, if there was a conflict with any previous Central Law which is general, viz, The Transfer of Property Act. The golden rule of interpretation always is that the parliament did not intend to bring about any conflict. The two enactments have to be interpreted in such a way that if the provisions can exist side by side, such a harmonious construction shall be made. If there is, however, a direct conflict by the bare reading of provisions then the special legislation will override a general legislation. In Maya Mathew v. State of Kerala, (2010) 4 SCC 498 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: (i) When a provision of law regulates a particular subject and a subsequent law contains a provision regulating the same subject, there is no presumption that the later law repeals the earlier law. The rule making authority while making the later rule is deemed to know the existing law on the subject. If the subsequent law does not repeal the earlier rule, there can be no presumption of an intention to repeal the earlier rule; (ii) When two provisions of law-one being a general law and the other being special law govern a matter, the Court should endeavour to apply a harmonious construction to the said provisions. But where the intention of the rule making authority is made clear either expressly or impliedly, as to which law should prevail, the same shall be given effect. (iii)....... But where the intention of the rule making authority is made clear either expressly or impliedly, as to which law should prevail, the same shall be given effect. (iii)....... (iv) Where a later special law is repugnant to or inconsistent with an earlier general law, the later special law will prevail over the earlier general law. 9. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with revocation or suspension of gift and it reads as under: 126. When gift may be suspended or revoked.-The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be. A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded. Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked. Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice. This important provision lays down a rule of public policy that a person who transfers a right to the property cannot set down his own volition as a basis for his revocation. If the provisions of TP Act, other than the provision relating to sale is not applicable in Punjab, the principle under Section 126 is surely applicable. If there is any condition allowing for a document to be revoked or cancelled at his own will, then that condition itself will be treated as void wholly or in part as the case may be. We have extracted Section 23 already, the provision relating to the transfer shall be made on a condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities. It must be observed that laying down a condition for a revocation is not itself an anathema under the scheme of Transfer of the Property Act. What is, however, interdicted by the general law of Transfer of Property Act is a revocation cannot depend on the will of the donor. That provision has not been breached in any way under Section 23 of 2007. What is, however, interdicted by the general law of Transfer of Property Act is a revocation cannot depend on the will of the donor. That provision has not been breached in any way under Section 23 of 2007. It will be, therefore, wrong to suppose that a new genre of right has been created under Section 23 of 2007 Act of what Section 126 of Transfer of Property Act does not provide for. On the other hand, Section 23 must be treated to make certain things clear of what was merely left to judicial interpretations previously. VI DIRECTION TO MAINTAIN EXPRESSLY STATED COULD BE PIOUS WISH; OR, IT COULD BE A PRE-CONDITION. 10. There have been views held from decisions of several courts that if a gift deed is clear and operative to transfer the right of property to another but also contains expression of desire by the donor that the donee will maintain the person, the expression contained in a gift deed must be treated as pious wish and the sheer fact that the donee did not fulfill the condition cannot vitiate the gift. For instance, the Orissa High court in Tila Bewa v. Mana bewa AIR 1962 (Ori) 130 ; the Travancore Cochin High Court in Gandadhara Iyer v. Kulathu Iyer Sankara AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 47 and this Court in Jai Singh v. Sarabjit Singh in CR No. 8825 of 2014 decided on 27.11.2015 have held that a gift followed by a direction to maintain the donor is only a pious wish and not to be presumed as conditional. 11. It is to make certain that a person who makes the gift under the belief that the donee will support the donor and provide basic amenities and look after the physical needs that Section 23 has been enacted. But if that expectation is belied and the donor is betrayed by the trust by the donee's conduct of indifference, then the donor shall have an assured right under this Section to cancel the gift. It is to ward off a prospect of donee to plead that the gift was not made on such a condition and that it was a pious wish that the express provision of Section 23 has been made. It is to ward off a prospect of donee to plead that the gift was not made on such a condition and that it was a pious wish that the express provision of Section 23 has been made. With or without the provision of Section 23, the polemics of judicial interpretation have always been that a gift cannot be cancelled or revoked at the whims of the transferor. That is precisely what is attempted to be done now. VII IMPUGNED ORDER BETRAYS TOTAL LACK OF APPLICATION OF MIND 12. The order passed by the Tribunal is a shocking revelation of utter lack of application of mind or application of any principle of law. Apart from setting out all the averments regarding the relationship between the parties, the Tribunal makes a sudden inference in one line that by virtue of Section 23 the document is to be treated as void. There is no judicial exercise undertaken by the Tribunal to examine whether the documents contained any condition and whether there had been any demand made by the mother on the daughter that provided the proof for the Tribunal to render a finding that the transferee refused to provide such amenities and physical needs. Shockingly the order does not even say that the transferee refused to maintain the donor. All that the Tribunal has relied on is the assertion made by the mother that "the daughter is not behaving with her properly and abused her and used filthy language to her several times of telephone". The decision rendered without examining the legal requirement of what was required to be found is untenable. Assuming, for argument sake, that such a latent condition must be treated as existing and that is breached in the mother's perception, there is no averment or proof that transferee was not wiling to maintain her or refused or failed to provide for such amenities and physical needs. The order passed by the Tribunal is wholly erroneous and legally unsupportable." (emphasis supplied). Let us analyze the judgment: (A) Paragraph-4 suggests that the learned Judge did not consider the requirement of the condition referred to in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act to be referred to in the document for the learned Judge further observed "or there was any scope for imposing such condition". Let us analyze the judgment: (A) Paragraph-4 suggests that the learned Judge did not consider the requirement of the condition referred to in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act to be referred to in the document for the learned Judge further observed "or there was any scope for imposing such condition". The learned Judge, therefore, contemplated the condition to be mentioned in the document and the scope for imposing such a condition even otherwise. In the first instance in paragraph-6, the learned Judge suggested that "the petition cannot be maintained for cancellation of the document, if there was no condition attached." It is still not clear whether the learned Judge was referring to the condition incorporated in the transfer document or any other document in connection there with or in relation thereto. The learned Judge does not clarify the scope of the words "condition attached" used by him. It is not clear whether it must be a condition attached in writing in the document or documents or whether it may even be a reference to the condition being attached otherwise including orally. (B) The first sentence in paragraph-7 is a correct interpretation of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, if by that the learned Judge meant that the condition must exist. Exist it must. The question is whether it must exist in writing in the document or documents or whether it can exist even otherwise. In the subsequent part of paragraph-7 which refers to Promil Tomar's case, the learned Judge has refused to follow the judgment which he interpreted in a particular manner. Firstly, it was not open to the learned Judge to take a contrary view. The learned Judge ought to have followed the same or recommended referring the matter to a larger Bench. The observation of the learned Judge that it would be wrong to be looking for latent condition when the law requires a condition to be stated is with great respect erroneous and the other observations to this effect in the judgment are with respect also erroneous for the reasons we have already stated. (C) In paragraphs-9 and 10, the learned Judge has dealt with Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and the judgments relating thereto. This is unnecessary and irrelevant. (C) In paragraphs-9 and 10, the learned Judge has dealt with Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and the judgments relating thereto. This is unnecessary and irrelevant. Firstly, assuming that there was any conflict between Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act on the one hand and the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and in particular Sections 122 and 126 thereof on the other, the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act would prevail. Secondly, there is infact no conflict between these provisions. (D) The judgment in so far as it holds that the conditions stipulated in Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act must be stated in the document of transfer is over ruled. 22. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act does not preclude or prevent a donor and donee agreeing that if the donee refuses or fails to provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the donor the transfer of the property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act merely provides that a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be. Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act makes the gift voidable at the option of the donor provided the conditions stipulated therein are not fulfilled. The provisions of Section 23 are in addition to and in any event different to an extent from the provisions of Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act and not in derogation thereof. Section 23 provides for additional safeguards to the senior citizens. Section 126 does not deal with these aspects. Further, as noted earlier, even assuming that there is any inconsistency between Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act and Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, the provisions of the former must prevail as it is a special enactment whereas the Transfer of Property Act is a general enactment relating to the transfer of property. 23. Mr. Bhan submitted that a gift is mandatorily registerable under section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act, 1908. 23. Mr. Bhan submitted that a gift is mandatorily registerable under section 17(1)(a) of the Registration Act, 1908. He submitted that for registration, a document must be in writing and therefore, if the condition stipulated in section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, is not stated in the document of transfer, the party cannot rely upon the document in view of section 49 of the Registration Act. 24. The submission is not well founded. Even assuming that the submission is well founded, the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act would prevail over the provisions of the Registration Act for the same reason that they prevail over the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or any other enactment for that matter. If we are right in holding that the condition may be even oral it would follow that a registered document without such a condition would not prevent the senior citizens from pleading the condition stipulated only orally. We hasten to clarify that we do not express any opinion upon the rights of third parties arising on account of a document not being registered or the condition not being mentioned in a registered document. 25. Mr. Bhan submitted that we must keep in mind that section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act ousts the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. We do not see the relevance of section 27 on the interpretation of section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. The Tribunal can also decide the issue in the manner prescribed. Merely because the procedure to determine an application under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act is summary in nature it would make no difference to the interpretation of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. 26. Mr. Amandeep Singh Talwar, supplementing Mr. Bhan's submissions questioned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. He submitted that under section 23, the Tribunal can only grant a declaration. The submission is not well founded. (A) Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act reads as under:- "22. Authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of this Act.- 1. Bhan's submissions questioned the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. He submitted that under section 23, the Tribunal can only grant a declaration. The submission is not well founded. (A) Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act reads as under:- "22. Authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of this Act.- 1. The State Government may, confer such powers and impose such duties on a District Magistrate as may be necessary, to ensure that the provisions of this Act are properly carried out and the District Magistrate may specify the officer, subordinate to him, who shall exercise all or any of the powers, and perform all or any of the duties, so conferred or imposed and the local limits within which such powers or duties shall be carried out by the officer as may be prescribed. 2. The State Government shall prescribe a comprehensive action plan for providing protection of life and property of senior citizens." (B) Rule 20(3) of the Chandigarh Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009 reads as under:- "Chapter-VI Property of Life and Property of Senior Citizens 20. Action Plan for the protection of life and property of senior citizens:-.................... [3(1) Procedure for eviction from property/residential building of Senior Citizen/Parent.- (i) Complaints received (as per provisions of the Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007) regarding life and property of Senior Citizens by different Departments i.e. Social Welfare, Sub Divisional Magistrates,Police Department, NGOs/Social Workers, Helpline for Senior Citizens and District Magistrate himself, shall be forwarded to the District Magistrate, Union Territory, Chandigarh for further action. (ii) The District Magistrate, Union Territory, Chandigarh shall immediately forward such complaints/applications to the concerned Sub Divisional Magistrates for verification of the title of the property and facts of the case through Revenue Department/ concerned Tehsildars within 15 days from the date of receipt of such complaint/application. (iii) The Sub Divisional Magistrates shall immediately submit its report to the District Magistrate for final orders within 21 days from the date of receipt of the complaint/application. (iii) The Sub Divisional Magistrates shall immediately submit its report to the District Magistrate for final orders within 21 days from the date of receipt of the complaint/application. (iv) If the District Magistrate is of opinion that any son or daughter or legal heir of a senior citizen/parents are in unauthorized occupation of any property as defined in the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and that they should be evicted, the District Magistrate-cum-Estate Officer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause as to why an order of eviction should not be issued against them/him/her. (v) The notice shall- (a) specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made ; and (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the property/premises, to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before such date as is specified in the notice, being a date not earlier than ten days from the date of issued thereof. (c) The District Magistrate shall cause the notice to be served by having it affixed on the outer door or at some other conspicuous part of the public premises and in such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. 3(2) Eviction Order from property/residential building of Senior Citizen/Parent.---lf, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance to the notice and any evidence he/she may produce in support of the same and after giving him/her a reasonable opportunity of being heard, the District Magistrate is satisfied that the property/premises are in unauthorized occupation, the District Magistrate or other officer duly authorized may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the property/residential building shall be vacated, on such date as may be specified in the order, by all persons who may be in occupation thereof or any part thereof, and cause a copy of the order to be affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises ; The District Magistrate may also associate NG0s/Voluntary organizations/social workers working for the welfare of senior citizens for the enforcement of orders. 3(3) Enforcement of Orders.- (i) if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order of eviction within thirty days from the date of its issue, the District Magistrate or any other officer duly authorized by the District Magistrate may evict that person from the premises in question and take possession ; (ii) The District Magistrate, U.T., Chandigarh shall have powers to enforce the eviction orders through Police Department. (iii) The District Magistrate, U.T., Chandigarh further handover the property/premises in question to the concerned Senior Citizens/Parents. (iv) The District Magistrate, U.T., Chandigarh shall forward monthly report of such cases to the Social Welfare Department by 7th of the following month for review of such cases in the State Council for Senior Citizens constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 and Rules of 2009 framed under the said Act under the Chairmanship of the Secretary Social Welfare, Chandigarh Administration.]" 27. Section 22 of the Senior Citizens Act read with Rule 20 of the said Rules provide a detailed procedure for the enforcement of the senior citizens rights upon a declaration issued under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. 28. The reference is accordingly answered as follows:- 29. Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 is applicable even if the conditions stipulated therein viz. that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor, is stipulated only orally and is not in writing or is not a part of the document of transfer. 30. The petition shall now be placed before the learned Single Judge as per roster for the decision on-merits in accordance with this judgment.