JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. - Cr.Mp(M) No. 1416 of 2018 By medium of this application, the applicant/petitioner has sought condonation of delay of 412 days, which has crept up in filing of the revision petition. For the reasons so assigned and set-out in the application, the same is allowed and the delay in filing of the revision is condoned. Application stands disposed of. Criminal Revision be registered. Cr. Revision No. 416 of 2018 2. The petitioner has been convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a sum of Rs.5,50,000/- as compensation to the complainantrespondent for an offence having been committed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act(for short the ''Act'') by the learned trial Magistrate on 31.3.2016/01.04.2016., which conviction and sentence was upheld by the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi on 08.09.2017, constraining him to file the present revision petition. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that in the month of August, 2009 the petitioner borrowed Rs.6,00,000/- from the respondent for purchase of Maxi Cab bearing registration No. HP-01A-0345 with a promise to pay every instalment of finance company but the petitioner did not pay regular instalment of the loan till January, 2011. To discharge his legal liability towards the respondent regarding the purchase of Maxi Cab, the petitioner then issued a cheque bearing No.186276 dated 3.2.2011, amounting to Rs.5,00,000/- of H.D.F.C. Bank, Rampur Bushehar, Shimla. On 20.5.2011 the respondent presented the said cheque for encashment through his banker but the same was returned back to the respondent with the reason "CAPS ACCT STAT CLOSE." Thereafter, the respondent issued a legal notice dated 17.6.2011 to the petitioner through registered post through his counsel but the petitioner neither replied nor paid the cheque amount to the respondent. While giving the cheque in question to the respondent, the petitioner was fully aware and in the knowledge that there is no arrangement of funds in his bank account for its encashment nor he made any arrangement for encashment of the cheque and thereby the petitioner cheated the respondent and consequently a complaint against the petitioner under Section 138 of the Act was filed. 4. 4. On the basis of the preliminary evidence led by the respondent, cognizance was taken against the petitioner for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and on his appearance notice of accusation under Section 138 of the Act was put to him, to which he pleaded not guilty. 5. The respondent has examined himself and Branch Manager of H.P. State Cooperative Bank, Branch Chhatri. After the evidence of the respondent, the petitioner was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In his defence, the petitioner examined Amreek Lal as DW-1 and Rajender Singh as DW-2. 6. As observed earlier, the learned trial Magistrate after hearing the parties and perusing the evidence on record, convicted the petitioner as aforesaid. 7. Dis-Satisfied and aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by learned trial Magistrate, the petitioner filed an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Mandi. However, the same was also dismsised and now being aggrieved and dis-satisfied by the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Magistrate and affirmed by learned Sessions Judge, Mandi, the petitioner has filed the instant revision petition on the ground that both the learned Courts below have erred in holding that the cheque Ext.CW-1/1-A was issued by the petitioner in discharge of any liability as the cheque in fact had been issued towards security and the same had been misused by the respondent. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Hemant Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for the respondent would support the impugned judgments as the same have been passed in accordance with law and call for no interference. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case. 9. However, before I deal with the contentions put-forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be necessary to delineate the scope and power of this Court while dealing with revision petition of the instant kind. 10. In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another , (1973) AIR SC 799, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. 11. 11. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu , (1979) AIR SC 663, the Hon''ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram , (1973) AIR SC 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that "judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system". 12. In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad , (1986) AIR SC 1436, the Hon''ble Apex Court observed that High Court "committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence" as in its revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact". 13. In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh , (1986) AIR SC 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following terms: "It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." 14. In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR SC 26, Hon''ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. 15. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." 14. In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR SC 26, Hon''ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. 15. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu , (1993) AIR SC 1126 = II (1992) CCR 458 (SC), the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to reappreciate the evidence. 16. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR SC 26 the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint." 17. In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another , (1997) AIR SC 2485 = II (1997) CCR 109 (SC), the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1962) AIR SC 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh , (1968) AIR SC 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu , (1975) AIR SC 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh , (1981) AIR SC 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when "there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice". 18. In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri , (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." 19. In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao , (2000) 10 SCC 338 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment." 20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law and restricted scope of revisional jurisdiction, I now proceeded to analyze in brief the evidence available on record. 21. The respondent in support of his complaint examined two witnesses and while appearing himself as CW-1, he tendered his statement by way of affidavit Ex.CA wherein he deposed almost the same facts as alleged by him in the complaint. In addition to this, he also filed documents Ex.CW-1/A to Ex.CW-1/E. Ex. CW-1/A is the dishonouring memo, Ex.CW-1/1-A is the cheque in question, Ex.CW-1/B is the memo of the bank, Ex.CW-1/C is the notice, Ex. CW-1/D and Ex.CW-1/E are the postal receipts and acknowledgement. In cross-examination, the respondent stated that he knows the petitioner since 2009 and further stated that so long as the vehicle remained with him he paid the instalments regularly. He admitted that agreement Ex.A-X had taken place between the parties. However, he denied that on the day of agreement the petitioner had paid Rs.40,000/- in cash to him. He also denied that the petitioner had given blank cheque to him. He admitted that agreement Ex.A-X had taken place between the parties. However, he denied that on the day of agreement the petitioner had paid Rs.40,000/- in cash to him. He also denied that the petitioner had given blank cheque to him. He denied that the petitioner had paid the instalments regularly. He further denied that at the time when the vehicle was handed over by him to the petitioner, the condition of the vehicle was very poor. He denied that the cheque had been manipulated by him in order to extract money from the petitioner. He denied that the cheque in question was issued as a security cheque, but it was misused by the respondent/complainant. 22. Chandermani, Branch Manager, H.P.State Cooperative Bank, Branch Chhatri was examined as CW-1-A, who had brought the record pertaining to cheque in question. He stated that the cheque in question was given in their bank by the respondent for encashment and the same was sent by them to HDFC Bank Branch, Mandi for encashment from where it was received back with the memorandum dated 25.5.2011 that the petitioner had closed the account and accordingly the same was returned by their bank to the respondent alongwith cheque and memo. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that cheque in question was not signed by him. He also denied that the cheque in question was not received by their bank for encashment. 23. The petitioner on the other hand also examined two witnesses. DW-1 Amreek Lal, Advocate, is the power of attorney of Shri Ram Transporter Finance Company Ltd., Shimla and stated that their Company had financed Rs.4,80,000/- to the respondent for which he had not taken any NOC from the Company for transfer of the vehicle in favour of the petitioner. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that the entire amount of the vehicle had been recovered by their Company from the respondent. He also admitted that as per record nothing was due towards the Company from the respondent since he had made the entire payment. 24. In cross-examination, this witness admitted that the entire amount of the vehicle had been recovered by their Company from the respondent. He also admitted that as per record nothing was due towards the Company from the respondent since he had made the entire payment. 24. One Rajender Singh appeared as DW-2 and is the witness of agreement Ex.A-X. He stated that this agreement had been executed by the parties in his presence and at the time of its execution, the petitioner had paid Rs.80,000/- in cash to the respondent and for the remaining amount of Rs.40,000/- a cheque was issued by the petitioner and thereafter even this amount of Rs.40,000/- was paid by the petitioner to the respondent/complainant through his father-in-law. In cross-examination, he admitted that at the time of agreement in question the petitioner agreed to pay all the instalments of the Finance Company. However, he feigned ignorance about the fact that the petitioner had issued a cheque amounting to Rs.5,00,000/- in favour of the respondent in the discharge of his liability. 25. This is the entire evidence led by the parties and having gone through the same, it is evidently clear that the cheque in question was issued by the petitioner in favour of the respondent towards discharge of his liability. This cheque upon presentation was dishonoured as is supported by the documents Ex.CW-1/A to Ex.CW-1/E. 26. As regards the contention of the petitioner that the blank cheque was issued as security. There is virtually no evidence whatsoever adduced by him. On the contrary, there is evidence on the record to show that the petitioner had purchased the vehicle from the respondent vide agreement Ex.A-X and in lieu thereof had agreed to pay all the instalments to the Finance Company i.e. Shri Ram Transporter Finance Company Ltd. The petitioner had led no evidence to prove or even establish on record that these instalments had been paid by him to the Company. The petitioner had tried to show that the vehicle in question was purchased by him only for a sum of Rs.1,20,000/-, out of which, he had already paid a sum of Rs.80,000/- to the respondent/complainant in cash and the remaining amount of Rs.40,000/- through his father-in-law, but then he had failed to lead any clear, cogent and convincing evidence to prove this fact. 27. Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, read as under: "118. 27. Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, read as under: "118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:- (a) of consideration -that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date -that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance -that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer -that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of indorsements -that the indorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps -that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course -that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him. 139. Presumption in favour of holder.-It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." 28. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence that has come on record, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are in any manner perverse and even otherwise it was for the petitioner to have rebut the presumption as attached to the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner cannot now question his liability before this Court and having failed to do so, he is bound to suffer the consequences thereof. 29. Having said so, I find no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.