JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. 1. This case is listed under the caption for orders on office note, on the objections raised by the Registry to the maintainability of this appeal. The Contempt Appeal, filed by the appellants herein, was returned by the Registry with the objection that the appellants should clarify how the Contempt Appeal is entertain-able against the Form-I Notice issued in C.C.No.2185 of 2016 dated 23.02.2018; and at the request of the Learned Government Pleader for Revenue, appearing on behalf of the appellants, the matter has been listed before us today. 2. Facts, to the limited extent necessary, are that W.P.No.32353 of 2013 was disposed of by a Learned Single Judge of this Court, by order dated 02.12.2013, directing respondents 1 to 4 therein (appellants herein) to regularise the writ petitioners possession, subject to their satisfying the conditions envisaged in G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008; and to communicate the decision, to the writ petitioners, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. Contending that the order, in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, was wilfully and deliberately violated, the petitioners in the said Writ Petition filed C.C.No.2185 of 2016, and on the said Contempt Case being admitted and notice in Form-I being issued by order dated 23.02.2018, the respondents in the Contempt Case have preferred this appeal under Section 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. In the order under appeal dated 23.02.2018, the Learned Single Judge, after extracting the directions issued in W.P. No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, noted the contention, in the counter-affidavit of District Collector, that, in view of the order in PIL No.517 of 2013, it was not possible to take further action on the representation filed for regularisation of the land as requested by the petitioner; and, in his prima facie opinion, this communication was in patent violation of the order dated 02.12.2013 passed by the Court in W.P. No.32353 of 2013 which had attained finality. The Learned Single Judge further observed that it was not as though the Division bench had adjudicated PIL No.517 of 2013 on merits declaring G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008 as illegal. On the contrary, on the statement made by the Advocate-General for the State of Telangana, the Division bench had disposed of the Writ Petition accepting the statement that the State would not implement or act upon G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008. No.166 dated 16.02.2008 as illegal. On the contrary, on the statement made by the Advocate-General for the State of Telangana, the Division bench had disposed of the Writ Petition accepting the statement that the State would not implement or act upon G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008. Having noted that the order, in W.P. No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, was allowed to become final, the Learned Single Judge observed that the State, on its own volition, had undertaken, in PIL No.517 of 2013, that it would not implement and act upon G.O. Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008; such an undertaking would not prevail over the judicial adjudication made by the Court in W.P. No.32353 of 2013; and he was, therefore, of the prima facie opinion that the order of rejection, of the application of the petitioners for regularisation, was in violation of the order passed in W.P. No.32353 of 2013 which had attained finality. 3. The order in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 was passed on 02.12.2013. The four months period stipulated by the Learned Judge, for regularisation of the petitioners possession and for communicating the decision, expired by 02.04.2014. It is the case of the appellants herein, in the counter-affidavit filed by them in C.C.No.2185 of 2016, that PIL.No.517 of 2013 was filed by the Communist Party of India praying the Court to direct the Government to restrain themselves from taking any final decision in respect of the pending applications under G.O.Ms.No.166 pending disposal of PIL.No.517 of 2013; a Division Bench of this Court had passed an interim order on 30.12.2013 that no further steps should be taken in the matter; therefore, they could not have regularised the writ petitioners possession over Government lands in terms of G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008; PIL.No.517 of 2013 was finally disposed of by the Division Bench on 10.09.2015 accepting the submission of both the learned Advocates General that G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008 would not be implemented or acted upon; and while the Learned Single Judge had passed the order in the Writ Petition on 02.12.2013, the Contempt Case was filed on 18.03.2016 beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 20 of the Act. 4. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue would submit that the Learned Single Judge failed to notice that PIL No.517 of 2013 was filed to declare the action of the respondents therein (appellants herein), in issuing G.O.Ms. 4. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue would submit that the Learned Single Judge failed to notice that PIL No.517 of 2013 was filed to declare the action of the respondents therein (appellants herein), in issuing G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008, as illegal and arbitrary and to consequently set aside G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008, or alternatively direct the respondents to modify the said G.O. making it exclusively applicable to below poverty line families as defined in the said G.O; an interim order came to be passed, in PILMP. No.795 of 2013 in PIL No.517 of 2013 dated 30.12.2013, directing that no further steps be taken in the matter; consequently, on or after 30.12.2013, the appellants were precluded, by the aforesaid interim order of this Court, from taking any further steps pursuant to G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008; the requirement of the Division Bench considering the validity of G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008 was obviated, as the Advocate General for the State of Telangana had stated that, after bifurcation, the Government of Telangana had issued G.O.Ms. Nos.58 and 59 dated 30.12.2014, and the Learned Advocate General for the State of Andhra Pradesh had made a statement that the Government of Andhra Pradesh had also taken a decision not to implement G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008, and it would not act on G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008; and, in the light of the statement made by the Advocates-General of both the States, nothing survived for adjudication in the instant PIL; P.I.L. No.517 of 2013 was, therefore, disposed of by the Division bench recording the statements made by the Advocates-General of both the States that the respective State Governments would not implement or act upon G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008, and recording this statement the PIL was disposed of; the undertaking given by the Advocates-General to the Division bench, which resulted in the order dated 10.09.2015 being passed, was binding on the State Governments; in the light of the aforesaid order of the Division bench, recording the undertaking given on behalf of the State Governments, the petitioner in W.P. No.32353 of 2013 could, thereafter, not seek regularisation in terms of G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008; W.P. No.32353 of 2013 was disposed of at the stage of admission, and on the basis of the instructions of the Assistant Government Pleader; the direction to the respondents therein, as is evident from the order in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, is only to consider the petitioners application for regularisation; the order in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 must be read as a whole in order to determine whether or not the said order has been wilfully and deliberately violated; having directed respondents 1 to 4 therein, to consider the petitioners application for regularisation, the Learned Single Judge had, thereafter, directed respondents 1 to 4 therein to regularise the petitioners possession subject to their satisfying the conditions envisaged in G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008, and to communicate their decision to the petitioners within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order; less than a month after the order was passed, in W.P. No.32353 of 2013, on 02.12.2013 the Division bench had passed the order, in PILMP. No.795 of 2013 in PIL No.517 of 2013, on 30.12.2013 directing the appellants not to take any further steps pursuant to G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.02.2008; the interim order passed by the Division Bench prohibited the appellants from considering the petitioners representation in terms of G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008; PIL No.517 of 2013 was finally disposed of on 10.09.2015, and till then the interim order passed in PILMP. No.166 dated 16.02.2008; the interim order passed by the Division Bench prohibited the appellants from considering the petitioners representation in terms of G.O.Ms.No.166 dated 16.02.2008; PIL No.517 of 2013 was finally disposed of on 10.09.2015, and till then the interim order passed in PILMP. No.795 of 2013 in PIL No.517 of 2013 dated 30.12.2013 continued to remain in force; the order of the Learned Single Judge is only to consider the petitioners representation; the said order was complied, on the District Collector passing an order on 26.08.2016; the validity of the proceedings dated 26.08.2016 cannot be subjected to examination in contempt proceedings; the petitioners remedy is only to question the validity of the District Collectors order dated 26.08.2016 in independent writ proceedings, and not by resorting to the coercive measures under the Contempt of Courts Act; even otherwise, the appellants cannot be said to have wilfully and deliberately violated the orders passed in W.P. No.342353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, as complying with the said order, and regularising the petitioners possession in terms of G.O.Ms. No.166 dated 16.12.2008, would result in violation of the undertaking furnished to the Division bench; this would result in the possibility of the appellants being punished for contempt for violating the undertaking furnished to the Division bench, as is recorded in the order in PIL No.517 of 2013 dated 10.09.2015; and, though the plea of limitation was taken in the counter- affidavit filed in the Contempt Case, the Learned Single Judge had admitted the Contempt Case, and had issued notice in Form-I, without considering the contents of the counter-affidavit, including the contention raised therein that the Contempt Case, filed by the respondents, was barred by limitation. Learned Government Pleader would rely on Purushotam Dass Goel v. Honble Mr. Justice B.S. Dhillon (1978) 2 SCC 370 and R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik (2000) 4 SCC 400 to contend that an appeal would lie against issuance of Form-I notice. He would also rely on V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N.Ratnam Raju (2004) 13 SCC 610 , and Maheshwar Peri v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (2016) 14 SCC 251 , to contend that since the order, which resulted in the Contempt Case being filed, was passed more than two years prior to the Contempt Case being filed, the Contempt Case is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Act. 5. 5. While the above referred submission of the Learned Government Pleader for Revenue, that the appellants cannot be said to have wilfully and deliberately violated the order passed in WP No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, cannot be said to be without merit, these are all matters which the appellants are required to put forth before the Learned Single Judge, after they appear before him pursuant to the notice in Form I. The only question which necessitates examination, in these proceedings, is whether an appeal would lie against the order of the Learned Single Judge admitting the Contempt Case and in issuing notice in Form-I, and whether the prima-facie views of the Learned Single Judge, as referred to therein, can be said to be a decision taken or an order passed in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, for it is only then would an appeal lie, under Section 19(1) of the Act, against such an order. 6. It is useful, in this context, to take note of the relevant provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, and the Rules made thereunder. Section 23 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers power on the High Court to make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act providing for any matter relating to its procedure. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 23 read with Articles 215 and 227 of the Constitution of India and by Section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh made the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 which came into force, on its publication in the A.P. Gazette, on 26.03.1981. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 23 read with Articles 215 and 227 of the Constitution of India and by Section 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh made the Contempt of Court Rules, 1980 which came into force, on its publication in the A.P. Gazette, on 26.03.1981. Rule 18 of the Rules stipulates that notice of every Contempt Case, if ordered by the Court for service on the contemnor, shall be in Form-1, and shall be accompanied by one set of all papers filed in the case; and the said notice, with all its enclosures, shall be served personally on the alleged contemnor, unless the court otherwise directs for reasons to be recorded, requiring him to appear in person, unless otherwise ordered, on a day fixed which shall be not less than four weeks from the date of the order or as fixed by the Court, for hearing of the proceedings, and to show cause why he may not be suitably punished under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; and he shall continue to remain present, during the hearing, till the proceeding is finally disposed of by order of the Court, unless otherwise directed. Under the proviso thereto, the Court, on an application made by the contemnor before the date fixed for appearance in the notice to dispense with his personal appearance in Court, may, for sufficient cause, dispense with his personal appearance and permit him to appear by his pleader. The notice in Form 1 informs the respondent in the Contempt Case that his attendance is necessary to a charge of contempt, and he is required to appear in person, or by an Advocate of the Court, as ordered before the Court and show cause why he should not be punished, or other appropriate order be not passed against him, for Contempt of the High Court. 7. In effect, the notice in Form I is only a notice to the respondent, in the Contempt Case, to show cause why he should not be punished or other appropriate order be not passed against him for contempt of the High Court. 7. In effect, the notice in Form I is only a notice to the respondent, in the Contempt Case, to show cause why he should not be punished or other appropriate order be not passed against him for contempt of the High Court. It is always open to the contemnor to appear before the Court, and show cause why the Court should not take any action against him under the Contempt of Courts Act; and to raise all such contentions as are available to him in law, including those which have been urged before us, before the Learned Single Judge after appearing before him pursuant to the notice issued in Form I. 8. In Purushotam Dass Goel, on which reliance is placed by the Learned Government Pleader to contend that an appeal would lie even against a Form-I notice being issued in a Contempt Case, the appeal was filed under Section 19 of the Act, against an order passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court directing issue of notice to the appellant therein to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised, on behalf of the respondents therein, that no appeal would lie to the Supreme Court, under Section 19 of the Act, from an order issuing notice as nothing yet had been decided by the High Court. While upholding the preliminary objection raised by the Solicitor General as well founded, the Supreme Court observed:- Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. This Court, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemnor asking the High Court to drop the proceeding. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under Section 19. A final order, surely, will be appealable. Our attention was drawn by Mr. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under Section 19. A final order, surely, will be appealable. Our attention was drawn by Mr. Mohan Behari Lal, to Section 20 of the Act which provides: No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year form the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. 9. He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of Section 20. It may be so. If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High court. We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19. In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19. (emphasis supplied) 10. In our considered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Section 19. (emphasis supplied) 10. The law declared by the Supreme Court, in Purushotam Dass Goel, is that mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt, by the issuance of a notice on the prima facie view, that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question; the appellate Court, for the first time, cannot be asked, in such an appeal, to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt or not; the matter has to be decided; such a decision may either be final or even at an earlier stage; however the order made should decide a contention raised by the alleged contemnor asking the High Court to drop the proceeding; and it was neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. 11. In R.N. Dey, appeals were preferred to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court accepting the unqualified apology tendered by the appellants therein in not paying the balance award money due to the respondents therein in compliance with the orders of the Court, and in directing the appellants therein to deposit, with the Registrar (Appellate Side), the compensation money determined in terms of the order of the learned Land Acquisition Judge in respect of the lands acquired by the State as mentioned in the order. The Calcutta High Court did not pass any order on the application filed by the Collector, for vacating the rule issued in the contempt proceeding, holding that the Collector cannot go behind the award passed by him as provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 12. The Supreme Court, in R.N. Dey, took note of the submission of the counsel for the respondents therein that, after issuance of notice for contempt, in the proceedings initiated by the respondents therein, the Court had only issued a rule, the matter was not finally decided and, therefore, the appeal against such order was not maintainable. 12. The Supreme Court, in R.N. Dey, took note of the submission of the counsel for the respondents therein that, after issuance of notice for contempt, in the proceedings initiated by the respondents therein, the Court had only issued a rule, the matter was not finally decided and, therefore, the appeal against such order was not maintainable. It was contended, on behalf of the appellants therein, that the respondents wanted to take undue advantage of the pending contempt proceedings, and coerce officers of the State in making payment on the basis of the award, even though they were not entitled to recover the same as the property had already vested in the State. It is in this context that the Supreme Court observed: 13. In our view the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, concerned officers tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the Rule issued for contempt action. When the Court either suo moto or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the Rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable. 14. For the aforesaid purpose, reference can be made to the decision in P.D. Goel v. B.S. Dhillon and Others [ (1978) 2 SCC 370 ] wherein the Court observed that: 15. If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under Section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. 16. 16. The Court further observed that if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. 17. In the present proceedings the question whether appeal under Section 19 is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as, in our view, facts of this case are grossly inadequate and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and Rule ought to have been discharged.. (emphasis supplied) 18. Unlike in the present case, the concerned officers in R.N. Dey had tendered unconditional apology after receipt of the notice and, after accepting the same, the High Court had rejected the prayer for discharge of the Rule issued for contempt action. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that when the Court, either suo moto or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiates proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt; the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt; if an order is passed, not discharging the Rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt; and against such an order, an appeal would be maintainable. 19. The Supreme Court, in R.N. Dey, did not take a different view from, and had in fact referred with approval to, its earlier judgment in P.D. Goel that, if the order decides some disputes raised before the Court by the contemnor, asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, the appeal against the said order is maintainable. In the present case the appeal is preferred against the order of the Learned Single Judge admitting the Contempt Case, and issuing notice in Form-I. The order under appeal is not a decision taken, or an order passed, in contempt proceedings after the appellants have appeared in Court in response to the notice issued in Form-I. The observations in the order under appeal are only the prima-facie views expressed by the Learned Single Judge for the limited purpose of admitting the Contempt Case, and nothing more. 20. 20. Even otherwise the Supreme Court, in R.N. Dey, made it clear that, in the proceedings before it, the question, whether or not an appeal under Section 19 of the Act was maintainable, was not required to be decided finally as the facts of the case were grossly inadequate, and the contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all; and, in any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted, further proceedings dropped, and the Rule ought to have been discharged. Reliance placed by the Learned Government Pleader on R.N. Dey to contend that an appeal under Section 19 of the Act is maintainable, against the show-cause notice issued by the Learned Single Judge in Form-I, is wholly misplaced. 21. Learned Government Pleader would rely on V.M. Manohar Prasad3 in support of his submission that the Learned Single Judge had acted without jurisdiction in passing the order under appeal. In V.M. Manohar Prasad3, certain employees of the A.P. Scheduled Castes Finance Corporation had moved this Court seeking regularisation of their services. On relief being granted in their favour, the matter was carried in appeal and a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court directed that those employees, who had completed five years continuous service, should be considered for regularisation. Some other employees, who were parties to these appeals, moved this Court for regularisation; and a Learned Single Judge of this Court directed that those employees, who had completed five years continuous service and fulfilled other conditions laid down in G.O.Ms.No.212 dated 22.04.1994, should be considered for regularisation. This request for regularisation was turned down by the Government holding that posts, against which regularisation was being sought, were not sanctioned posts. Aggrieved by the rejection of their request, the petitioners therein filed a contempt petition wherein a Learned Single Judge observed that they should be deemed to have been working against clear vacancies. The respondents therein were directed to sanction posts so that the petitioners therein could be absorbed in permanent posts. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred and the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal holding that an appeal, against the order passed by the Contempt Judge, was not maintainable. 22. The respondents therein were directed to sanction posts so that the petitioners therein could be absorbed in permanent posts. Against the said order, an appeal was preferred and the Division Bench of this Court dismissed the appeal holding that an appeal, against the order passed by the Contempt Judge, was not maintainable. 22. On the matter being carried in appeal, the Supreme Court in, V.M. Manohar Prasad3, held that, in contempt proceedings, no further direction can be issued by the Court; in case, it is found that there is violation of the order passed by the Court, the Court may punish the contemnor, otherwise the notice of contempt should be discharged; an order passed in the contempt petition could not be a supplemental order to the main order granting relief; if a direction is given by a Court without jurisdiction, an appeal would lie before a Court, normally, exercising appellate jurisdiction; and the Learned Single Judge could not have issued directions to the authorities to sanction posts in contempt proceedings. In the present case, the Learned Single Judge has not issued any directions in the Contempt Case filed before him. He has only expressed his prima-facie opinion, that the order passed by him earlier had been violated, for the limited purpose of admitting the Contempt Case and issuing notice in Form-I. In Maheshwar Peri, on which reliance is placed by the learned Government Pleader, Outlook Magazine had published an article dealing with the infamous Provident Fund Scam. The names of the Judges, who were allegedly involved in the case, were published therein. A petition was filed by two practising Advocates before the Allahabad High Court requesting it to initiate criminal contempt proceedings, on its own motion, and to punish the contemnors under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. According to them, the article had caused great insult to the higher judiciary, the remarks were derogatory, and had lowered the authority of the higher judiciary. Thereafter, for a period of about four years, nothing happened in the matter, till it was listed before the Division Bench of the High Court leading to an order being passed on 28.04.2015 whereby notice was issued to the contemnor-opposite parties to show cause why charges not be framed against them for committing contempt of Court. 23. Thereafter, for a period of about four years, nothing happened in the matter, till it was listed before the Division Bench of the High Court leading to an order being passed on 28.04.2015 whereby notice was issued to the contemnor-opposite parties to show cause why charges not be framed against them for committing contempt of Court. 23. Before the Supreme Court, the contention urged on behalf of the appellants therein was that, as the High Court had initiated action only after four years of the alleged contempt, the whole proceedings were barred by Section 20 of the Act which prescribed the period of limitation as one year. This contention of limitation was examined by the Supreme Court and, relying on its earlier three-Judge Bench judgment in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) 7 SCC 549 , the Supreme Court held that the petition was barred by limitation. 24. Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act stipulates that no Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. While holding that initiation of proceedings by the High Court may be without jurisdiction, if it is in violation of Section 20 of the Act (i.e. if it is barred by limitation), the Supreme Court, in Purushotam Dass Goel, observed that, if the alleged contemnor, in response to the notice, appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act, but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie under Section 19 from such an order, although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court; and this type of orders were an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19 of the Act. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that an order, merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, did not decide anything against the alleged contemnor, and could not be appealed against, as a matter of right, under Section 19 of the Act. 25. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that an order, merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, did not decide anything against the alleged contemnor, and could not be appealed against, as a matter of right, under Section 19 of the Act. 25. While the appellants have taken the plea, in the counter-affidavit filed by them in C.C. No.2185 of 2016, that the Contempt Case as filed is barred by limitation, this question has not been adjudicated by the Learned Single Judge. As he was of the prima facie view that the order passed in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013 had been violated, the Learned Single Judge has admitted the Contempt Case, and has issued notice in Form-I. The Contempt Case is still pending before the Learned Single Judge for his consideration. The law declared by the Supreme Court, in Purushotam Dass Goel and in R.N. Dey, is that an order deciding the question of limitation, even if it be at the interlocutory stage when the Contempt Case is still pending, is appealable under Section 19(1) of the Act. As noted hereinabove, the order under appeal does not decide any dispute raised before the Court including on the question of limitation. 26. All that the Learned Single Judge has done, while admitting the Contempt Case and in issuing Notice in Form-I, is to express his, prima facie, view that the order passed by him earlier, in W.P.No.32353 of 2013 dated 02.12.2013, had been violated. In the absence of any decision, by the Learned Single Judge, on this question it would be wholly inappropriate for us, in an appeal preferred under Section 19(1) of the Act, to decide this question for the first time. As this contention, of the Contempt Case being barred by limitation, can also be urged before the Learned Single Judge, after the appellants herein appear before him, pursuant to the Form-I notice issued in terms of the order under appeal dated 23.02.2018, it would be wholly inappropriate for us to examine this plea of limitation, for the first time, in an appeal preferred against the order passed by the Learned Single Judge admitting the Contempt Case, and issuing notice in Form-I. 27. It is always open to the appellants herein, on receipt of the Form-I notice, to appear before the Learned Single Judge and put forth all such contentions as are available to them in law, including on the plea of limitation, and request him not to take any further action against them, under the Act, including for imposition of punishment. 28. It is only a decision taken, or an order passed, by the Learned Single Judge, in the exercise of his jurisdiction to punish for contempt, which is appealable under Section 19(1) of the Act. The views expressed by the Learned Single Judge in the order under appeal are only his prima facie view, based on which the notice in Form I was issued calling upon the appellants herein to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. The prima facie view expressed by the Learned Single Judge are tentative, and it is always open to the appellants, after they appear before him pursuant to the notice issued in Form-I, to satisfy the Learned Single Judge that his earlier tentative view was not justified. Prima facie observations made in the context of admission of the Contempt Case, and for the limited purpose of issuing notice in Form I, do not amount to a decision taken, or an order made, in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, against which alone an appeal lies under Section 19(1). It is always open to the appellants to satisfy the Court either that the prima facie view, reflected in the order under appeal, was not justified or that no action should be taken against them under the Contempt of Courts Act. 29. While we see no reason to interdict the contempt proceedings, pending before the Learned Single Judge, we have no reason to doubt that on the respondent-contemnors appearing before him, pursuant to the notice issued in Form-I, the Contempt Case would be heard and decided on its merits, and all the contentions raised by the appellants shall be dealt with in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observations made either in the order under appeal or in the order now passed by us. We sustain the objections raised by the Registry holding that the present Contempt Appeal is not maintainable. The Contempt Appeal (SR) is, accordingly, rejected. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand rejected. We sustain the objections raised by the Registry holding that the present Contempt Appeal is not maintainable. The Contempt Appeal (SR) is, accordingly, rejected. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.