ORDER : Surviving defect is ignored as counsel for the petitioner points out that typed copy of page-20 has already been supplied. 2. Heard counsel for the parties. 3. Petitioner is the widow of the deceased employee late Fattu Manjhi who died in harness on 04.03.2016 while working as PR Loader at Bhurkunda Colliery of the Respondent CCL. Petitioner applied for appointment of her daughter on compassionate ground on 19.01.2017 and also made second application for compassionate appointment of her son-in-law as according to her, he is unemployed and totally dependent upon his in-laws. By Annexure-5 communication dated 29.05.2018, the Assistant Manager (Personnel), Bhurkunda Colliery, CCL informed the applicant daughter Smt. Parbati Devi that she is ineligible for appointment on compassionate ground being a married daughter. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner being an illiterate lady, chose to apply for appointment of her married daughter or her elder son-in-law, both of whom were dependent upon earnings of the deceased employee. However, learned counsel for the petitioner makes a categorical statement that in view of stipulation of clause 9.3.0 of NCWA-VI, petitioner shall pursue the case of compassionate appointment of her daughter and not her son-in-law. Learned counsel has relied upon the judgment rendered by the learned Division Bench of this Court in LPA No. 196/2017 dated 16.08.2018 in the case of Central Coalfields Limited versus Hemanti Devi & others. He submits that eligibility of a married daughter for appointment on compassionate ground on death of her father in harness was the very issue before the learned Division Bench. Learned Division Bench interpreted the provisions under Clause 9.3.3 of NCWA-VI in the manner that the expression ‘unmarried’ prefixed to ‘daughter’ is non-essential component of the aforesaid clause, otherwise it would be discriminatory and not based on any reasonable or rational criteria. There is no justification for not qualifying the son’s eligibility on the basis of marital status, whereas a restriction is placed upon the daughter on that count. In that light, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Respondent may be directed to reconsider the matter. 5. Learned counsel for the Respondent CCL submits that the case has been taken up for the first time. No instruction have been received as yet. In that light, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Respondent may be directed to reconsider the matter. 5. Learned counsel for the Respondent CCL submits that the case has been taken up for the first time. No instruction have been received as yet. Learned counsel for the Respondent however does not dispute that the instant issue relating to eligibility of a married daughter in terms of Clause 9.3.3 has been interpreted by the learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hemanti Devi (Supra). She submits that if so directed, competent authority under the Respondent would re-examine the matter in the light of the ratio rendered in the case of Hemanti Devi (Supra) and all other eligibility conditions as prescribed under Clause 9.3.0 of Social Security Chapter-IX of NCWA-VI. 6. Considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and the relevant material pleadings noted above. Learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hemanti Devi (Supra) has on the issue of compassionate appointment of a married daughter in terms of Clause 9.3.3 held as under : “In this background, in our opinion, the clause 9.3.3 has to be construed to include married dependant daughter also. We are conscious of the fact that before us, vires of the aforesaid clause of the NCWA has not been challenged and what we are dealing with in this appeal is a industry-wide agreement and not a direct statutory provision. But the employer in this appeal is a public sector unit coming within the ambit of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Thus, since the agreement directly deals with matters of employment, the said provision has to meet the tests of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The manner in which the appellant wants the aforesaid provision to be interpreted would render it invalid as there can be no justification for not qualifying the son’s eligibility on the basis of marital status whereas a daughter has been placed under restriction on that count. Such discrimination is not based on any reasonable or rational criteria. We have to read down the expression “unmarried” qualifying the expression daughter as a non-essential component of the aforesaid clause and this interpretation would otherwise save the said provision. We accordingly sustain the decision which is appealed against. Such discrimination is not based on any reasonable or rational criteria. We have to read down the expression “unmarried” qualifying the expression daughter as a non-essential component of the aforesaid clause and this interpretation would otherwise save the said provision. We accordingly sustain the decision which is appealed against. We, however, make it clear that the authority, taking decision on the basis of the direction of the learned First Court, should ascertain, upon giving the writ petitioner an opportunity of hearing, that she was dependent on her mother’s income at the time of her mother’s death and at present does not have sufficient means to run her household irrespective of the fact as to whether she was married or not. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. The exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. As we disposed of the main appeal, the connected application (I.A Nos.1437/18) shall stand disposed of.” 7. In such light, the claim of the petitioner’s married daughter Parbati Devi needs reconsideration by the competent authority / Respondent No. 4, which shall be done within a reasonable time, preferably ten weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Writ petition is disposed of without making any comments on the merits of the claim of the petitioner.