ORDER : 1. A common order dated 29.11.2017 passed in Execution Case Nos.01/2010 and 02/2010 is under challenge in both the writ petitions. 2. Contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that the application dated 28.03.2016 filed by him is one under section 47 CPC and the executing court has powers to decide the rival claims for apportionment of the award. To support this contention, Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has relied on decision in “Urban Improvement Trust, Jodhpur Vs. Gokul Narain (dead) by Lrs. & Anr.” reported in (1996) 4 SCC 178 . 3. Briefly stated, lands in question are comprised under Plot Nos.34, 39 and 41/1 within Khata No.353, total area 1.15 acres in village-Ramgarh. One Manik Chand Choudhary, the common ancestor who had three sons namely, Richpal Choudhary, Kalu Ram Choudhary and Suraj Mal Choudhary, purchased the aforesaid lands in the name of his son-Richpal Choudhary. The petitioner claims that his natural father was Kalu Ram Choudhary, however, he was adopted by Suraj Mal Choudhary. The said Suraj Mal Choudhary had one daughter-Geeta Devi who is respondent no.7; Richpal Choudhary died issueless. The aforesaid lands were acquired vide, L.A. Case No.12/85-86 in which an award was prepared in the name of Kalu Ram Choudhary; compensation was assessed to Rs.1,56,180/-, besides solatium and 12% interest. On an objection raised by Kalu Ram Choudhary on valuation of land two separate references vide, L.R. Case No.06/88 and L.R. Case No.20/90 were instituted under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. During pendency of the reference cases, Kalu Ram Choudhary died and in his place his wife- Mostt. Dhapa was substituted. Finally, the Special Judge-cum-Land Acquisition Case enhanced the value of the land to the extent of Rs.10,000/-per decimal. Still aggrieved, Mostt. Dhapa filed Appeal from Original Order No.51 of 2005, in short F.A. No.51 of 2005, which was dismissed by an order dated 27.03.2014 with a direction to the respondent-State to deposit the total compensation amount, if not deposited, within three months. During pendency of F.A. No.51 of 2005 Mostt. Dhapa died and in her place Gopal Lal Choudhary, Girdhari Lal Choudhary and the present petitioner claiming themselves sons of Mostt. During pendency of F.A. No.51 of 2005 Mostt. Dhapa died and in her place Gopal Lal Choudhary, Girdhari Lal Choudhary and the present petitioner claiming themselves sons of Mostt. Dhapa filed an application for their substitution which was allowed vide order dated 18.12.2007, but before the appeal was finally disposed of Girdhari Lal Choudhary also died on 29.05.2011; his wife died on 29.06.2011. Vide order dated 30.01.2013, I.A. No.2441 of 2011 for substitution of the legal heirs and successors of Girdhari Lal Choudhary was allowed. After dismissal of the appeal, a demand draft for Rs.1,21,12,968/-dated 12.02.2016 drawn in the name of the petitioner was deposited in the court; in L.R. Case No.20/90 the total award amount with interest has been calculated to Rs.70,08,620/-and in L.R. Case No.06/88, Rs.51,04,348/-. For enforcing the awards prepared in the aforesaid Reference Cases, two execution cases have been initiated. 4. This demand draft dated 12.02.2016 drawn in the name of the petitioner-Shankar Choudhary has become the bone of contention between the parties. The petitioner has filed an application laying his claim over the entire compensation. He has taken a position that only after the death of the awardee-Mostt. Dhapa he had an occasion to raise objection to the apportionment of the award and, therefore, the application dated 28.03.2016 filed by him is required to be decided on merits. 5. More than half a century ago in “G.H. Grant Dr. (in all the appeals) Vs. State of Bihar (in all the appeals)” reported in AIR 1966 SC 237 the Supreme Court has observed that the Land Acquisition Act discloses a well-knit scheme. There are three provisions in the Act viz. sections 11, 18 and 30, which deal with the apportionment of the compensation. Under section 11 after an enquiry is conducted by the collector into the objection, if any, as any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 the collector shall make apportionment of the compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has known, whether or not they have appeared before him. It is at this stage when section 30 comes into the picture. It provides that if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of compensation settled under section 11, the collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the court. It is at this stage when section 30 comes into the picture. It provides that if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of compensation settled under section 11, the collector may refer such dispute to the decision of the court. Section 18 provides that on a written application of any person interested who has not accepted the award, the collector shall refer the matter for determination of the court. Under section 18 objection to the award by any such person shall be confined to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested. It contemplates a situation in which there may be more than one awardee and an objection on the issues indicated under section 18 has been raised by the one or more. Section 30 also contemplates a dispute as to apportionment. It provides that if any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation settled under section 11 or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the collector “may” refer such dispute for a decision of the court. 6. The fundamental distinction between section 18 and section 30 is that section 18 is mandatory and when a written objection is received by the collector from a person interested the matter must be referred by the collector for determination of the court, whereas section 30 is not mandatory. Section 30 is discretionary and the collector may either decide the dispute raised by a person interested or it may refer such dispute for the decision of the court. Other distinctions between section 18 and section 30 are really not necessary to discuss here, what is relevant to record is that under the Land Acquisition Act objection to the award or the amount of compensation settled under section 11 can be raised only before the collector who may refer the dispute to the court for its decision. The dust over ambit, scope and applicability of section 18 and section 30 now seems to have settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court; section 30 comes before section 18. The dust over ambit, scope and applicability of section 18 and section 30 now seems to have settled by various decisions of the Supreme Court; section 30 comes before section 18. The dispute on apportionment of the compensation settled under section 11 is what is referred by the collector for the decision of the court, whereas dispute on the apportionment of the compensation in the award among the persons interested is one of the matters which, on a written application of the objector, can be referred by the collector for the determination of the court. Apparently, section 30 application can be made before an award attains finality under section 12. Thus, after an award attains finality under section 12, it can be challenged only under section 18 or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and in exceptional cases or where there is allegation of fraud by filing a suit. 7. At any stage of the proceedings before the collector provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply, until the dispute is referred for a decision of the court. The legislative intendment is reflected under section 53 which refers to the proceedings in the “Court”. Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 defines “Court” to mean principal civil court of original jurisdiction. The Act itself makes a distinction between “award of the Collector” and “award of the Court”. When a reference under section 18 or under section 30 is made by the collector, the court as defined under section 3(d) assumes jurisdiction and the final order passed in the reference case becomes “award of the Court”. In a long series of judgments the Supreme Court has held that the Land Acquisition collector is not a court and the court would mean a court of original civil jurisdiction to which a reference under the “Act” would lie [refer “Tota Ram Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.” reported in (1997) 6 SCC 280 ]. 8. There are, however, provisions under the Act which refer to the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 14 and 40 provide that for the purpose of enquiries under the Act the collector shall exercise powers to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, by the same means and in the same manner as are provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. There are, however, provisions under the Act which refer to the Code of Civil Procedure. Sections 14 and 40 provide that for the purpose of enquiries under the Act the collector shall exercise powers to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, by the same means and in the same manner as are provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 53 makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as they are not inconsistent with anything contained in the Act, applicable to all proceedings before the court under the Land Acquisition Act. And, section 26 and section 54 create a deeming fiction for treating the award a decree as defined under section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 opens with the expression “save insofar as they may be inconsistent with anything contained in this Act”. Section 53 apparently is couched in such a language that makes it abundantly clear that nothing contrary to the provisions of the Act is permissible, which otherwise may be provided under the Code. Without an in-depth study of the provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, and that is what can be found from decisions of the Supreme Court, the scheme under the Act indicates that the Code of Civil Procedure in its substantive part is not made applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. It is one thing to say that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply in the proceedings, but it is altogether a different thing that the principles akin to the Code of Civil Procedure are applied in a proceeding. For example, in a writ proceeding applications for substitution, amendment, review etc. are decided on the principles under the Code of Civil Procedure, such as, Order 1 Rule 10, Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 47 Rule 1 and 2, but then we all know that the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply in a writ proceeding. In “Ambey Devi (Smt.) Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” reported in (1996) 9 SCC 84 the Supreme Court has observed that the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is inconsistent with the Code of Civil Procedure; the Code provides only the procedural format to adjudicate the dispute. In “Laxmi Chand & Ors. Vs. In “Ambey Devi (Smt.) Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.” reported in (1996) 9 SCC 84 the Supreme Court has observed that the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is inconsistent with the Code of Civil Procedure; the Code provides only the procedural format to adjudicate the dispute. In “Laxmi Chand & Ors. Vs. Gram Panchayat, Kararia & Ors.” reported in (1996) 7 SCC 218 it has been held that the Land Acquisition Act being a self-contained code, in relation to the matters falling within the purview of the Act the civil courts would have no jurisdiction. In “Ambey Devi” plea raised by a co-owner that under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC all necessary and proper parties are required to be impleaded and therefore irrespective of the fact that one of the co-owners did not make an application in writing under section 18(2) to the Land Acquisition Officer such co-owner is also entitled for enhanced compensation awarded by the reference court on the application filed by other co-owners has been rejected by the Supreme Court holding that section 53 of the Act is applicable only insofar as procedure of trial etc. as contemplated under the Code is concerned. 9. In the aforesaid background of the statutory provisions under the Land Acquisition Act, the application dated 28.03.2016 filed by the petitioner in Execution Case Nos.01/2010 and 02/2010 for claiming the entire award amount of Rs.1,21,12,968/-has to be examined. 10. The petitioner, after F.A. No.51 of 2005 was dismissed, intends to raise a claim asserting that the properties in respect of which award dated 12.04.2005 was prepared in the name of Mostt. Dhapa came in his share and that is the reason the demand draft has been prepared in his name and, in fact, he alone has prosecuted the L.R. proceedings and no other person bear any expenses for litigation. In the affidavit filed in support of the applications filed in Execution Case Nos.01/2010 and 02/2010 he has projected himself as the legal representative of Mostt. Dhapa. The petitioner has set-up a case that Suraj Mal Choudhary had no issue and at the time of his death he was minor and therefore he remained under the guardianship of Kalu Ram Choudhary and Dhapa Devi. Dhapa. The petitioner has set-up a case that Suraj Mal Choudhary had no issue and at the time of his death he was minor and therefore he remained under the guardianship of Kalu Ram Choudhary and Dhapa Devi. For claiming the entire award the petitioner pleads that under an amicable partition among the sons of Manik Chand Choudhary the lands under acquisition fell exclusively in his share and he alone has prosecuted the L.R. proceedings. He has asserted that his other brothers or any descendant have no interest left in the lands in question. Substitution of the legal heirs of Girdhari Lal Choudhary through his sons and daughters seems to be challenged by the petitioner saying that they came on record in a routine manner and since they have no interest left in the properties under acquisition their substitution in pending F.A. No.51 of 2005 is meaningless. 11. On the application dated 28.03.2016 several objections have been filed by persons claiming their share in the award amount. An application under Order 22 Rule 4 CPC has been filed by Rakesh Kumar Choudhary and Nilesh Kumar Choudhary, both sons of Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary, for their substitution in the execution case. This application has been objected by the petitioner on the ground that the applicants and their father Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary had withdrawn themselves from the Land Acquisition proceedings and they have no interest in the acquired properties, may be they are legal heirs of Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary. The applicants have filed another application dated 30.03.2016 claiming that they alone are entitled to receive the awarded amount, and not Shankar Choudhary-the petitioner. They have asserted that the petitioner has somehow managed to get his name inserted as legal heir of Mostt. Dhapa with a view to grab the awarded amount. Another application labelling as “no objection” has been filed by Smt. Renu Devi and Rina Agarwal, both daughters of Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary. They have also asserted that Shankar Choudhary-the petitioner is not the legal heir of Mostt. Dhapa and Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary. They have also pleaded that Shankar Choudhary has managed to insert his name in the execution case for grabbing the entire decreetal amount. They have also asserted that Shankar Choudhary-the petitioner is not the legal heir of Mostt. Dhapa and Late Girdhari Lal Choudhary. They have also pleaded that Shankar Choudhary has managed to insert his name in the execution case for grabbing the entire decreetal amount. An application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC r/w section 151 CPC has been field on behalf of six persons, except Geeta Devi all claiming to be daughters of Late Kalu Ram Choudhary. In paragraph no.13 of this application they have pleaded that in case partition is reopened they lay a claim for their share in the award which previously they had relinquished in favour of Shankar Choudhary. The applicants namely, Rakesh Kumar Choudhary and Nilesh Kumar Choudhary and the petitioner-Shankar Choudhary have filed several affidavits/rejoinder-affidavits in the matter. 12. Apparently, in the aforesaid applications a whole lot of claims have been raised by the applicants. Besides asserting their right for a share in the award, or whole of the award, they are denying a right in the petitioner-Shankar Choudhary to receive any share in the award. And, there is order of this Court passed in F.A. No.51 of 2005 by which Gopal Lal Choudhary, Rakesh Kumar Choudhary, Nilesh Kumar Choudhary, Renu Agrawal, Rina Choriwal and Shankar Choudhary have been substituted as legal heirs of Mostt. Dhapa. In my opinion, by virtue of final order dated 27.03.2014 passed in F.A. No.51 of 2005 the decree prepared under section 26, as modified by the aforesaid order, has attained finality and cannot be reopened by the executing court, definitely not for apportionment of the compensation under the “award of the Court”. In “Kothamasu Kanakarathamma & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.” reported in AIR 1965 SC 304 , the Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the basis of a reference made to it. In the said case a reference under section 30 was made in regard to the apportionment of compensation amongst the various claimants, however, the reference court proceeded also with respect to the amount of compensation. In the said case a reference under section 30 was made in regard to the apportionment of compensation amongst the various claimants, however, the reference court proceeded also with respect to the amount of compensation. The Supreme Court has held that whether or not the State has raised objection to the adjudication on the amount of compensation by the reference court is immaterial and in absence of a reference on the amount of compensation, the reference court could not have assumed jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly connected with the matter under reference. 13. Long before it was held that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code [refer “Union of India Vs. Budh Singh & Ors.” reported in (1995) 6 SCC 233 ]. It is altogether a different matter that during the proceedings in the court for execution of the award by virtue of devolution or assignment of rights under the award an application for substitution is filed. However, if a person like the petitioner is permitted to raise an objection to the apportionment of the award in execution it would enable the Land Acquisition Officer to reopen a final award in the teeth of the express provision of section 12 of the Act. An award can be reopened only by the court in a reference under section 18 and in no other circumstance an award which has attained finality can be reopened by the collector, or by the court except, through a challenge under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act [refer “Kothamasu Kanakarathamma & Ors. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.” reported in AIR 1965 SC 304 ]. 14. Essentially, a decision is an authority for what it actually decides. In “Urban Improvement Trust” what is the effective date of applicability of the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 was the issue. The Supreme Court on a finding that the District Judge inherently lacked jurisdiction to grant additional benefits under the Amendment Act proceeded to examine the plea taken on validity of the award. The inherent lack of jurisdiction of the District Judge to award solatium, interest and additional amount under section 23(2), 23(1-a) and 28 of the Central L.A. Act was the core issue involved there. The inherent lack of jurisdiction of the District Judge to award solatium, interest and additional amount under section 23(2), 23(1-a) and 28 of the Central L.A. Act was the core issue involved there. It was in the context of the seminal principles in law, that decree passed by a court which lacks inherent jurisdiction is a nullity, and that plea of nullity can be set-up at any stage of the trial as well as in a collateral proceeding in which the decree is sought to be enforced, that the Supreme Court in “Urban Improvement Trust” has observed that section 47 CPC shall apply in the execution proceedings. 15. Moreover, section 47 CPC does not contemplate an enquiry into disputed questions of title nor a claim such as the one raised by the petitioner can be adjudicated under it. Claims raised by the various applicants in the execution proceedings are essentially claims for partition which cannot be entertained by the executing court. The petitioner's application purportedly filed under section 47 CPC and the applications filed by other persons have rightly not been entertained by the learned Judge. 16. Final outcome of the above discussions is that there is no merit in the challenge to the impugned order dated 29.11.2017 and accordingly, both the writ petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.