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2018 DIGILAW 2080 (ALL)

AMAN SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2018-09-28

SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Siddhartha Varma, J.—On 6.4.1979, the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Ceiling Act’) declared 76 bighas, 16 biswas and 11 Biswansis of land as surplus of D.C.M. Shriram Industries Ltd., which preferred an Appeal which was also dismissed on 30.7.1987. Against the Appellate Order a writ petition being Writ C No. 14929 of 1987 was filed by D.C.M. Shriram Industries Ltd. Even before 17.4.2002 when this High Court while deciding Writ Petition No. 14929 of 1987 had maintained the order of Prescribed Authority, the surplus land as was declared by the Prescribed Authority was taken over by the State and was allotted to the petitioners and possession was also handed over to them. D.C.M. Shriram Industries Ltd., which was challenging the orders of the Authorities under the Ceiling Act, was also challenging the pattas which were granted to the petitioners as were executed in their favour on 26.3.1986 and, therefore, had moved an application under Section 27(4) of the Ceiling Act. This application came to be rejected on 24.3.1988 and was challenged by means of a writ petition being Writ C No. 6387 of 1988 which was ultimately dismissed vide order dated 16.1.2012. The High Court held that D.C.M. Shriram Industries Ltd. had no ground to challenge the leases/pattas in favour of the petitioners and other bhumidhars as it’s challenge to the land being declared surplus had been turned down by the High Court on 17.4.2002. The portion of the order dated 16.1.2012 passed in Writ Petition No. 6387 of 1988 which was read out by the learned counsel for the petitioner is being reproduced here as under : “The order of the High Court has the affect of affirming the declaration of surplus land, which has been taken possession by the Sub-Divisional Officer, which was allotted and possession was delivered. He submits that whatever may have been substance in the plea of the petitioner with reference to the interim order, which was operating in his favour during the pendency of the appeal, the same has lost all efficacy in view of the conclusion of the ceiling proceedings under the judgement and order of the High Court. Petition has no substance now qua the challenge to the allotment made of the surplus land in favour of the respondents.” 2. Petition has no substance now qua the challenge to the allotment made of the surplus land in favour of the respondents.” 2. After the writ petition was dismissed the patta holders including the petitioners were entered as bhumidhars with non-transferable rights on 21.7.2014. In the meantime, the land in question was declared abadi land under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. Thereafter, on 23/27.7.2014, an order was passed by which the order dated 21.7.2014 was recalled. This necessitated the filing of the Writ Petition No. 51745 of 2014, which was ultimately allowed and the order dated 23/27.7.2014 was quashed on 28.3.2017. However, in the meantime, the State of U.P. filed a case in the Court of the Commissioner Meerut Mandal, Meerut, being case No. 1 of 2015 (State v. Phool Singh and others) under Section 27(4) of the Ceiling Act, 1960. In this case, the pattas of the petitioners were also under challenge and they were arrayed as opposite parties in it and, therefore, being aggrieved by the filing of the case, the petitioners filed the instant writ petition. On 13.4.2015, an interim order was passed which was as follows : “Notice on behalf of the respondents has been accepted by Chief Standing Counsel. The counsel for the petitioner submits that the application has been filed by Collector for cancellation of the pattas only on the ground that the pattas were executed by the Assistant Collector, who was not the competent authority. He submits that under Section 43 of the Act, power of the Collector has been delegated to the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Incharge of the Sub Division. Accordingly, patta executed by Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Incharge of the Sub Division, cannot be challenged. The matter requires consideration. The respondents are granted one month time to file counter-affidavit. The petitioner will have three weeks thereafter to file rejoinder-affidavit. List thereafter. Till the next date of listing,further proceedings in Case No. 1/2015 (State v. Phool Singh and others), pending before the Court of Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut, shall remain stayed.” 3. The petitioners’ counsel has submitted that the Case No. 1 of 2015 could not be proceeded with and, therefore, by means of the instant writ petition, has prayed that the entire proceedings of Case No. 1 of 2015 filed by the respondent No. 3 i.e. Collector Meerut, be quashed. The petitioners’ counsel has submitted that the Case No. 1 of 2015 could not be proceeded with and, therefore, by means of the instant writ petition, has prayed that the entire proceedings of Case No. 1 of 2015 filed by the respondent No. 3 i.e. Collector Meerut, be quashed. He has made the following submissions : I. The proceedings as were being sought to be initiated were barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that under Section 27(6) proceedings could not have been initiated after five years from the date of settlement. The State was always in the know of the fact that pattas were granted. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the counter-affidavit which the State had filed in Writ Petition No. 6387 of 1988 which was filed by DCM Shriram Industries Ltd. for the setting aside of the pattas of the petitioners, the State, in paragraph 26 to the Counter-affidavit, had stated that the Collector had delegated powers to the Assistant Collector and, therefore, the Assistant Collector had the Authority to settle the pattas. The paragraph No. 26 of the Counter-affidavit in writ petition No. 6387 of 2008 is being reproduced here as under : “That in continuation to what has been stated in the preceding paras, it is stated that the Collector has been defined under Section 3(4) of the U.P.Z.A. And L.R. Act. The Collector means an Officer appointed as Collector under the provisions of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and includes an Assistant Collector of Ist Class empowered by the State Government by a notification in the Gazette to discharge all or any of the functions of a Collector under the Act. The Sub Divisional Officer is the Assistant Collector, Ist Class and as such he has the authority to settle the lease.” He, therefore, submits that the State, in fact, when in the counter-affidavit, had supported the pattas of the petitioners, it could not now turn around and file Case No. 1 of 2015 and challenge the pattas granted to the petitioners and the other pattedars. II. Learned counsel for the petitioners has even otherwise submitted that under Section 43, the powers of the Collector could be exercised by the Assistant Collector. II. Learned counsel for the petitioners has even otherwise submitted that under Section 43, the powers of the Collector could be exercised by the Assistant Collector. In this regard, he points out to the order dated 24.3.1988 of the Additional Commissioner which specifically states that the Assistant Collector had the power to execute the patta at the relevant time. The order dated 24.3.1988 was passed by the Commissioner when the DCM Shriram Industries Ltd. had challenged the pattas. The relevant paragraph of the order dated 24.3.1988 which was read out by the learned counsel for the petitioners is being reproduced here as under: ^^ÁkFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk us fQj cgl dh fd iVVs dyDVj ;k ijxukf/kdkjh }kjk fn;s tk ldrs gS u fd ys[kiky] dkuwuxks }kjkA muds }kjk ÁLrqr ;g fcUnq fcYdqy xyr gSA D;ksafd u dsoy iVVs ijxuk vf/kdkjh ds gLrk{kj ls tkjh gq, gS cfYd vkoaVu dh Lohd`fr Hkh ijxukf/kdkjh us dh gS tSlk fd vkoaVu i=koyh ls Li"V gSA ijxukf/kdkjh dks dysDVj us leLr vf/kdkj tŒmŒ vf/kfu;e esa ÁkIr gS vkSj tŒmŒ dh ifjHkk"kk lhfyax vf/kfu;e esa yh xbZ gSA** Therefore, he submits that even the ground No. 9 which has been taken in the case filed by the State as Case No. 1 of 2015 had no substance. III. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that when the petitioners had become bhumidhars with non-transferable rights and thereafter they had become Bhumidhars with transferable rights as per the Amendment Act No. 19 of 1995 (w.e.f. 14.1.1995) then they could be evicted only by filing a suit and no useful purpose would be served by initiating proceedings for the cancellation of pattas. If the respondents, the State, considers the patta to be defective and they do not deny the possession of the petitioners then eviction was possible only by filing suits under Section 202 and under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. This having not been done, the petitioners had accrued rights under the various Revenue Laws and the proceedings, thus, under challenge were nothing else but an exercise in futility. IV. This having not been done, the petitioners had accrued rights under the various Revenue Laws and the proceedings, thus, under challenge were nothing else but an exercise in futility. IV. In the end, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the proceedings as had been initiated by the State were absolutely vexatious in nature and appear to have been filed at the instance of the DCM Shriram Industries Ltd. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the Supreme Court has held that vexatious litigation should be shunned and has in this regard cited T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal and others, 1977 SC 2421. Learned counsel read out paragraphs No. 5 to 7 and so they are being reproduced here as under : “5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the Court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now, pending before the First Munsif’s Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful - not formal - reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, be should exercise his power under Order VII Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever, drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order X C.P.C. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial Court would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first bearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men,(Ch. XI) and must be triggered against them. In this case, the learned Judge to his cost realised what George Bernard Shaw remarked on the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi “It is dangerous to be too good. 6. The trial Court in this case will remind itself of s. 35-A C.P.C. and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless. 6. The trial Court in this case will remind itself of s. 35-A C.P.C. and take deterrent action if it is satisfied that the litigation was inspired by vexatious motives and altogether groundless. In any view, that suit has no survival value and should be disposed of forthwith after giving an immediate hearing to the parties concerned. 7. We regret the infliction of the ordeal upon the learned Judge of the High-Court by a callous party. We more than regret the circumstance that the party concerned has been able to prevail upon one lawyer or the other to present to the Court a case which was disingenuous or worse. It may be a valuable contribution to the cause of justice if counsel screen wholly fraudulent and frivolous litigation refusing to be beguiled by dubious clients. And remembering that an advocate is an officer of justice he owes it to society not to collaborate in shady actions. The Bar Council of India, we hope will activate this obligation. We are constrained to make these observations and hope that the co-operation of the Bar will be readily forthcoming to the Bench for spending judicial time on worthwhile disputes and avoiding the distraction of sham litigation such as the one we are disposing of. Another moral of this unrighteous chain litigation is the gullible grant of ex parte orders tempts gamblers in litigation into easy Courts. A judge who succumbs to ex parte pressure in unmerited cases helps devalue the judicial process. We must appreciate Shri Ramasesh for his young candour and correct advocacy.” 4. In reply, learned Standing Counsel, however, submitted that the case as had been filed was in its inceptive stage and, therefore, this Court may not interfere at all. The petitioners should have filed their reply and the Court below would have considered the reply on its own merits. 5. Learned Standing Counsel also submitted that it was yet to be decided as to whether there was a delegation by the Authority to the Assistant Collector by the Collector under Section 43 of the Ceiling Act, and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the writ petition. 6. 5. Learned Standing Counsel also submitted that it was yet to be decided as to whether there was a delegation by the Authority to the Assistant Collector by the Collector under Section 43 of the Ceiling Act, and therefore, this Court may not interfere with the writ petition. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the definite view that when the Commissioner himself had held by the order dated 24.3.1988 when the DCM Shriram Industries Ltd. had filed its case against the pattas of the petitioners under Section 27 (4), that the Assistant Collector had the Authority then nothing remained to be decided. Further, once when the pattas were adjudicated to be rightly executed, and that too at the instance of the State itself which had admitted in the counter-affidavit filed in writ petition No. 6387 of 1988 then definitely nothing remained to be further adjudicated upon. The presumption is that the State must have looked into its record and only thereafter must have passed the order dated 24.3.1988. Also the counter-affidavit in writ petition No. 6387 of 1988, must have been filed after looking into the record. Also, I hold that once it was held by this Court that the petitioners were rightly held to be bhumidhars with transferable rights by the order of this Court dated 28.3.2017 in Writ Petition No. 51745 of 2014 then nothing further remained to be adjudicated. 7. I further hold that when it was held by judicial pronouncements that the patta was rightly granted, the possession was in order and the petitioners had became Bhumidhars with transferable rights then the cancellation of pattas would be absolutely an exercise in futility. Therefore, it becomes imperative that proceedings which were absolutely futile should not be allowed to continue. 8. Under such circumstances, the proceedings which have been initiated by the filing of the Suit/Case No. 1 of 2015 (State v. Phool Singh and others) are quashed. 9. Since the petitioners have been unnecessarily embroiled in any number of litigations, I also award a cost of Rs. 50,000/- to the petitioners. This cost shall be borne by the State of Uttar Pradesh. 10. The writ petition is allowed with costs.