JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The plaintiff is the appellant, who after having lost before both the learned Courts, has filed the instant appeal. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the ‘plaintiff’ and the ‘defendants’. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration against defendants No.1 to 3 that he is owner in possession of land comprised in Khata No. 81, Khatauni No. 131, Khasra No.200/65, measuring 100-16 Bighas, sitaute in Village Palhori, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur. Munshi Khan, defendant No.4, is a tenant on land measuring 26-4 bighas, comprised in Khasra No. 200/65/1 under plaintiff and entry showing defendants No.2 and 3 as co-owners qua the suit land is illegal, wrong and void. The case of the plaintiff is that he and defendant No.1 are real brothers. The father of the plaintiff and defendant No.1, Shri Harpal Singh had ½ share in the property and other ½ share was that of their uncle Shri Jai Pal Singh. Their father sold his ½ share for a sum of Rs.13,000/- out of Khasra No. 28, Khatauni Nos. 92 to 108 to the extent of 308.19 bighas out of 617.19 bighas to one Shri Balbir Singh, Khasra No. 65 measuring 254.12 bighas was also included in the said sale. 3. It was averred that plaintiff and defendant No.1 were minors at the time of said sale. Narinder Singh defendant No.1 through Nathu Ram filed a suit for pre-emption against Balbir Singh and Harpal Singh challenging the sale and suit was decreed on 3.7.1970. It was further averred that plaintiff was not impleaded as co-owner in that suit through the said suit was filed on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 and in these circumstances, the plaintiff could not figure in that suit. In order to rectify this defect, the plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No.104/1 of 1975 in the Court of learned Senior Sub Judge, Nahan, titled as ‘Surinder Singh versus Narinder Singh’, wherein it was claimed that the earlier decree dated 03.08.1970 was fraudulent. This suit was decreed on 25.10.1978 and plaintiff got ½ share in the land, which was sold to Balbir Singh. The plaintiff and defendant No.1 thus became owner in possession of that land. It was also averred that the share of plaintiff No.1 exceeded the limit of ceiling under the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. This suit was decreed on 25.10.1978 and plaintiff got ½ share in the land, which was sold to Balbir Singh. The plaintiff and defendant No.1 thus became owner in possession of that land. It was also averred that the share of plaintiff No.1 exceeded the limit of ceiling under the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. On the strength of decree dated 25.10.1978, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were entitled to exemption and, therefore, a family settlement was arrived at between them whereby defendant No.1 gave up the suit land in favour of the plaintiff and as such the plaintiff became owner of Khasra No. 200/65, measuring 100-16 bighas. A memorandum was executed in this respect in between plaintiff and defendant No.1, which was given to defendant No.1 for attestation of mutation. 4. The plaintiff averred that in the year 1965, Khasra No. 200/65/1, measuring 26-4 bighas remained in the tenancy of Munshi Khan, who used to manage the other property of Shri Harpal Singh. Munshi Khan, proforma defendant No.4, constructed a house, cow shed on this land and also cultivated the same, but name of Munshi Khan could not be recored as non-occupancy tenant. On 01.09.2000, plaintiff consulted Patwari and came to know that name of defendant No.1 is continuing and names of defendants No.2 and 3 have also been incorporated in the revenue record pertaining to the suit land. It was also averred that defendant No.1 has committed fraud with plaintiff and no title has passed to defendants No.2 and 3. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and in the alternative for possession. 5. Defendant No.1 contested the suit by filing written statement and took objections qua maintainability and limitation. On merits, he averred that being owner in possession, he executed an agreement for sale of the suit land in favour of Krishan Dutt for a sum of Rs.64,000/-, but Krishan Dutt could not get the sale deed executed in his favour being non-agriculturist in Himachal Pradesh and on his instructions, sale deed was executed in favour of defendants No.2 and 3. He denied having any family settlement in which his half share was given to the plaintiff and denied the execution of any document in this regard. 6. Defendants No.2 and 3 filed joint written statement wherein objections qua cause of action, locus-standi and limitation were taken. He denied having any family settlement in which his half share was given to the plaintiff and denied the execution of any document in this regard. 6. Defendants No.2 and 3 filed joint written statement wherein objections qua cause of action, locus-standi and limitation were taken. The plea of collusion of plaintiff and defendant No.1 has also been taken by defendants No.2 and 3 in their written statement. Defendants No.2 and 3 averred that defendant No.1 had sold the suit land through registered sale deeds dated 02.07.1987 and 03.07.1987 for a sum of Rs.64,000/- and they were delivered possession and as such they are owners in possession of the suit land. They denied the tenancy of Munshi Khan or his possession on any part of the suit land. It was averred by defendants No.2 and 3 that pre-emption suit of Narinder Singh was decreed and on payment of pre-emption money, the title passed over to Narinder Singh, who became absolute owner of the land which he got pre-empted. Narinder Singh got the joint land partitioned and separated from his uncle Jai Pal Singh and mutation to this effect was attested. Defendant No.1 was the absolute owner and no title passed to plaintiff. The Civil Suit No.104/1 of 1975 titled as ‘Surinder Singh versus Narinder’ was collusive and there existed no pre-existing right, title and interest and decree in that suit was not registered, therefore, no title came to the plaintiff through that decree. 7. Defendants No.2 and 3 also averred that earlier Gulam Deen had instituted a suit claiming tenancy over the suit land which was dismissed on 31.12.1990. Gulam Deen started interfering and in these circumstances defendants No.2 and 3 had to file a suit against him which was decreed. 8. Proforma defendant No.4 filed written statement and took the plea that his predecessor-in-interest was a tenant and entry of his tenancy was got deleted by the father of the plaintiff and defendant No.1. It was averred that earlier Rahimudeen was the tenant and after his death, father of Munshi Khan came in possession and on his death, he came in possession of land measuring 26.4 bighas. Munshi Khan also put up counter-claim by taking the plea that Rahimudeen was tenant on Khasra No. 200/65/1, measuring 26.4 bighas under Harpal Singh and an entry to this effect was made in the revenue record, but it was got deleted. Munshi Khan also put up counter-claim by taking the plea that Rahimudeen was tenant on Khasra No. 200/65/1, measuring 26.4 bighas under Harpal Singh and an entry to this effect was made in the revenue record, but it was got deleted. According to Munshi Khan, he succeeded to the tenancy rights of Rahimudeen and he came to know about the wrong entry on 15.10.2000 and in these circumstances he put up the counter claim for declaration. It was also averred that no written statement to the counter claim was filed either by the plaintiff or any other defendants. The learned Sub Judge dismissed the suit and counter claim vide common judgment and decree dated 21.03.2003 against which plaintiff filed Civil Appeal No.29-CA/13 of 2003 and he filed Civil Appeal No.28-CA/13 of 2003 and both the appeals were dismissed vide common judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, on 08.03.2004. 9. The learned trial Court framed the following issues on 08.01.2002:- “1. Whether plaintiff is exclusive owner over the suit property i.e. Khasra No.200/65/1 measuring 74-12 bighas? OPP. 2. Whether defendant No.4 Munshi Khan is a tenant over Khasra No.200/65/1 measuring 26-4 bighas under plaintiff. If so, its effect? OPP. 3. Whether entries showing defendants No.2 and 3 as co-owners in the suit land are illegal. If so its effect? OPP. 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief of possession. If not found in possession over Khasra No. 200/65/2, measuring 74-12 bighas? OPP. 5. Whether there was family arrangement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1? OPP. 6. Whether defendants No.2 and 3 are owners by way of sale deed dated 2-7-87 and 3-7-87? OPD. 7. Whether decree in civil suit No.104/1 of 1975 titled Surinder Singh v. Narinder Singh was collusive. If so, its effect? OPD. 8. Whether decree in civil suit No. 104/1 of 1975 did not confer title due to non-registration, if so, its effect? OPD. 9. Whether Narinder Singh was absolute owner in possession and on partition, suit land fell to the share of defendant No.1. If so, its effect? OPD. 10. Whether defendant No.4 is entitled to the decree of declaration that he is a tenant over 26-4 bighas under Harpal Singh, if so, its effect? OPD. 11. Relief.” 10. OPD. 9. Whether Narinder Singh was absolute owner in possession and on partition, suit land fell to the share of defendant No.1. If so, its effect? OPD. 10. Whether defendant No.4 is entitled to the decree of declaration that he is a tenant over 26-4 bighas under Harpal Singh, if so, its effect? OPD. 11. Relief.” 10. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit as well as counter-claim on 21.03.2003 and the appeals filed against the aforesaid judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, also came to be dismissed by the learned first appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 08.03.2004. 11. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed concurrently by the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the instant appeal. 12. On 09.07.2004, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law :- “Whether judgment Ex.P-4, decree Ex.P-5 in Civil Suit No.104/1 of 1975 on 25.10.1978 are inadmissible in evidence for want of registration?” 13. In Bhoop Singh versus Ram Singh Major, (1995) 5 SCC 709 , the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether a compromise decree is compulsorily registrable. In that case, there was no pre-existing right to the properties between the parties, but a right was sought to be created for the first time under the compromise. The High Court had taken the view that it was not a compulsorily registrable instrument under Section 17 of the Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered elaborately the circumstances in which clause(vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Registration Act would come into play and stated in paragraph 18 thus:- “The legal position qua clause (vi) can, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below: (1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp duty and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration. (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the vlaue of Rs.100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order would require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration. (2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the vlaue of Rs.100 or upwards in favour of any party to the suit the decree or order would require registration. (3) If the decree were not to attract any of the clauses of sub-section(1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court’s cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration. (4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Fazal Rasul Khan v. Mohd-ul-Nisa, AIR 1944 Lah 394, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of the compromise in question. (5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the ‘subject-matter of the suit or proceeding’, clause (vi) of sub- section (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated.” 14. Similar, reiteration of law can be found in S. Noordeen versus V.S. Thiru Venkita Reddiar and others, (1996) 3 SCC 289 . 15. In Som Dev and others versus Rati Ram and another, (2006) 10 SCC 788 , the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether a decree based on admission recognising pre-existing right under a family settlement required registration. It was held that once a decree did not create any right in immovable property and merely recognized the right put forth by the plaintiff in that suit based on an earlier family arrangement or relinquishment by the defendant in that suit and on the basis that the defendant in the suit admitted such an arrangement or relinquishment, then the decree could not be held to be admissible and could not be treated as evidencing the recognition of the rights of the present plaintiff and his brothers as co-owners for want of registration. 16. 16. However, when similar issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Phool Patti and another versus Ram Singh(dead) through LRS and another, (2009) 13 SCC 22 with regard to the proposition as to whether a consent/compromise decree pertaining to the immovable property requires registration, a two Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court made a reference to a Larger Bench observing inconsistency in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh’s case (supra) and another decision in case titled K. Raghunandan versus Ali Hussain Sabir (2008) 13 SCC 102 , with the following observations:- “6. Since the consent decree dated 24.11.1980 had been held by the First Appellate Court to be not collusive, the High Court in our opinion rightly refused to interfere with that findings of fact. 7. It was then urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was violation of the Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. 11. In this connection, it may be noted that Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act states that: "17.(2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section(1) of Section 17 applies to :- * * * "(vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject- matter of the suit or proceeding." (emphasis supplied) In our opinion the exception mentioned in Section 17(2)(vi) means that if a suit is filed by the plaintiff in respect of property A, then a decree in that suit in respect of immovable property B (which was not the subject- matter of the suit at all) will require registration. This is the view taken by this Court in K. Raghunandan & Ors. vs. Ali Hussain Sabir & Ors. 2008(9) Scale 215 . 13. However, a different view was taken by this Court in Bhoop Singh vs. Ram Singh Major 1995(5) SCC 709 in which it is stated that : (SCC p. 715, para 16) "16.......We would think that the exception engrafted is meant to cover that decree or order of a court, including a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise, which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100 or upwards." (emphasis supplied) 8. In our opinion there seems to be inconsistency between the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra) in so far as the interpretation to the exception in clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act is concerned. Prima facie it seems to us that the decision in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law since Section 17(2)(vi) on its plain reading has nothing to do with any pre existing right. All that seems to have been stated therein is that if a decree is passed regarding some immovable property which is not a subject-matter of the suit then it will require registration. As already explained above, if a suit is filed in respect of property A but the decree is in respect of immovable property B, then the decree so far as it relates to immovable property B will require registration. This seems to be the plain meaning of clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. 9. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add words to the statute or change its language, particularly when on a plain reading the meaning seems to be clear. Since there is no mention of any pre- existing right in the exception in clause (vi) we have found it difficult to accept the views in Bhoop Singh's case (supra). It seems that there is inconsistency in the decisions of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra) and K. Raghunandan's case (supra), and since we are finding it difficult to agree with the decision of this Court in Bhoop Singh's case (supra), the matter should be considered by a larger Bench of this Court.” 17. On reference, three Judges’ Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Phool Patti and another versus Ram Singh (dead) through LRs and another, (2015) 3 SCC 465 observed that there was no inconsistency between the above two judgments and it was held that transfer of land in family settlement by consent decree which was not registered was held to be valid. 18. 18. Thus, what can now be taken to be well settled principle of law is that an exception in clause (vi) of sub-section(2) of Section 17 of the Act is meant to cover that decree or order of a Court including the decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise which declares the pre-existing right and does not by itself create new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards. Any other view would find the mischief of avoidance or registration which requires payment of stamp duty embedded in the decree or order. It would, therefore, be the duty of the Court to examine in each case whether the parties had preexisting right to immovable property or whether under the order or decree of the Court, one party having right, title or interest therein agreed or suffered to extinguish the same and created a right in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards in favour of the other party for the first time either by compromise or pretended consent. If latter be the position, the document is compulsorily registrable. 19. Adverting to the facts, it would be noticed that the admitted case of the parties was that earlier to the present suit, one Nathu Ram, who is maternal grand uncle of the parties, had filed a suit for pre-emption which was decreed on 03.08.1970 in favour of defendant No.1. The plaintiff had not been impleaded as co-plaintiff in that suit. Since, the name of the plaintiff had not been impleaded in that case, therefore, he filed a separate suit claiming his share in the property and the suit came to be compromised and a compromise decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff vide judgment and decree Ex.P-4 and P-5. 20. Now, the moot question whether the compromise decree was compulsorily registrable. 20. Now, the moot question whether the compromise decree was compulsorily registrable. The answer to the question is obviously in the negative for the simple reason that it was only on account of the plaintiff having pre-existing right in the property in the similar manner to the one possessed by the defendant Narinder Singh, who is none other than the real brother of the plaintiff that the suit as filed by the plaintiff eventually came to be compromised and this is clearly evident from the judgment so passed on 25.10.1978 and reads thus:- “IN THE COURT OF SENIOR SUB JUDGE DISTRICT SIRMAUR, NAHAN, (H.P.) Surinder Singh S/o Sh. Chowdhry Harpaul Singh, R/o Khajuri Tehsil Thanesher, District Thanesher. …….Plaintiff. Versus Chowdhry Narinder Singh, S/o Sh. Harpaul Singh, R/o Palhori, Tehsil Paonta, District Sirmaur, Himachal Pradesh. …..Defendant. C. Suit No.104/1 of 75. Instituted on 12.12.75. Decided on : 25.10.78. Suit for Declaration. JUDGEMENT: Sh. Surinder Singh S/O Chowdhry Harpal Singh R/O Khajuri (Plaintiff) has brought this suit against Chowdhry Narinder Singh, his brother (Defendant) for declaration that the decree No. 313/1 passed by the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Nahan on 3.8.70 in respect of the land in Khewat No.27/9091, Khasra No.77, 78, 75, Kittta 3, measuring 12 Bighas 11 Biswas and the land measuring 308 Bighas 19 Biswas, land 617 Bighas 19 Biswas, Khata No.28/92 measuring 108 Bighas in Village Palhori, Tehsil Paonta. That the plaintiff as a member of the joint Hindu family is entitled to half share as owner and is entitled possession thereof. He has also appeared for any other relief. The defendant has filed his written statement and also made statement in court whereby the parties have compounded this suit. Consequently a compromise decree under Order 23 Rule 3 of C.P.C. is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The terms of the compromise as stated in the written statement and the statement made in the court be incorporated in the decreesheet. Necessary instructions be also issued to the Revenue Officer for doing the needful as per terms of the decree. The case file be consigned to the Record-Room. Announced in the open Court. Dated : 25.10.1978. Sd/- (Raja Ram) Senior Sub Judge.” 21. Necessary instructions be also issued to the Revenue Officer for doing the needful as per terms of the decree. The case file be consigned to the Record-Room. Announced in the open Court. Dated : 25.10.1978. Sd/- (Raja Ram) Senior Sub Judge.” 21. Thus, once it is established that the compromise only declared the pre-existing right of the plaintiff and did not by itself create any new right, title or interest in praesenti in immovable property of the value of Rs.100/- or upwards, the same was not required to be compulsorily registered. 22. Therefore, the contrary findings to this effect recorded by the learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside. The learned trial Court failed to realize that both the brothers Surinder Singh and Narinder Singh as regards the property in the earlier litigation were similarly situated and placed and if the defendant Narinder Singh had pre-existing right in the property, then even the plaintiff Surinder Singh had the same right. The first appellate Court has not dealt with this issue very specifically, but nonetheless, has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Therefore, the substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintiff/appellant and against the defendants/respondents. 23. Having answered the substantial question of law in favour of the plaintiff, yet suit filed by him cannot be decreed in his favour on merits, as the learned trial Court has categorically found him not to be the owner of the suit land on the basis of the family settlement as set up by the plaintiff. However, it would be noticed that at the time of arguments of the appeal, the plaintiff/appellant had raised various questions of facts and law as noted by the learned first appellate Court in paragraphs 14 to 16 including the adverse findings regarding the family settlement. Similarly, the defendants/respondents had also raised various contentions of facts and law, as is evident from paragraphs 17 to 20 of the judgment. But, none of these contentions was seriously considered by the learned first appellate Court, who wrapped its findings by making the observations in paragraph-21 of the judgment which read thus : “21. From the perusal of the entire oral as well as documentary evidence, the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership and possession over the suit property comprised in Kh. No.200/65/1 measuring 100 Bighas 16 Biswas. From the perusal of the entire oral as well as documentary evidence, the plaintiff has failed to prove his ownership and possession over the suit property comprised in Kh. No.200/65/1 measuring 100 Bighas 16 Biswas. Even defendant No.1 who is his real brother has also denied the acquisition of right by plaintiff in the suit property. The defendant No.1 has pleaded and even proved that he had sold the entire 100 Bighas 16 Biswas of land to defendants No.2 and 3 through valid sale deed copy of which is Ext. DA and DB dated 2-7-1987 and 3-7-1989 respectively. As the plaintiff has failed to prove any ownership or possession of the suit property, he is not entitled for any relief. Shri Munshi Khan, proforma defendant has also failed to plead or prove the tenancy over the suit land, he is also not entitled for any relief from the Court. Point No.1 is answered accordingly.” 24. On the basis of the aforesaid reasoning, the learned first appellate Court proceeded to dismiss the appeal filed by the plaintiff. 25. It is settled principle of law that right to file first appeal against the decree under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a valuable legal right of the litigant. The jurisdiction of the first appellate Court while hearing the first appeal is very wide like that of learned trial Court and it is open to the appellant to attack all findings of fact or/and of law in the first appeal. It is duty of the first appellate Court to appreciate the entire evidence and may come to a different conclusion from that of the trial Court. While doing so, the judgment of the appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. While reversing a finding of fact, the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. 26. While reversing a finding of fact, the appellate Court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. 26. The scope, ambit and power of the first Appellate Court while deciding the first appeal have been subject matter of various judicial pronouncements and I may refer to the pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh & Ors. versus S.P. Srivastava (dead) through legal representatives (2017) 2 SCC 415 , wherein it was held as under :- “13. An appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of the appellate court must therefore reflect court’s application of mind and record its findings supported by reasons. The law relating to powers and duties of the first appellate court is well fortified by the legal provisions and judicial pronouncements. Considering the nature and scope of duty of first appellate court, in Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 , it was held as under:- (SCC pp. 394-96, paras 12-15) “12. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15) “15. … The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. … while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it.” The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 13. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court stated as under : (SCC p. 244, para 3) “3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 14. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303, para 2) ‘2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.’ 15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5) ‘3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. 530-31, paras 3-5) ‘3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC 756 , SCC p. 758, para 5.) 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.’ ” 27. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law, the matter is remanded back to the learned first appellate Court with a direction to render complete findings on the rival contentions raised by the parties as noted in paragraphs 14 to 16 and 17 to 20 of the judgment so passed by it. 28. The appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending application, if any, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 29. The parties, through their learned counsels, are directed to appear before the learned First Appellate Court on 17.12.2018. 30. Since the suit was filed more than 18 years back i.e. on 5.10.2000, the learned first appellate Court is requested to decide the same as expeditiously as possible and in no event later than 30th June, 2019