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2018 DIGILAW 2088 (ALL)

Sooraj Automobiles Ltd. v. Collector

2018-09-28

SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2018
JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTHA VARMA, J. 1. This writ petition has been filed against the order dated 4.2.2013 by which it was directed that the petitioner had to pay to the respondent no. 3 wages for 18 days in the month of December 2012 i.e. from the 1st December till the 18th of December, 2012. Further, the writ petition has been filed against the recovery order issued thereafter under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent no. 3 filed an application on 9.1.2013 stating that the wages for the month of December 2012 be paid to the employees of the petitioner. Upon notices being issued to the petitioner, objections were filed by it on 24.1.2013. In it, the petitioner had stated that the Labour Commissioner, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur, himself was holding conciliation meeting and that he was aware of the fact that the employees of the petitioner had not reported for work in the month of December and, it had, thus, stated that there was no requirement to produce any evidence regarding the fact that the employees had not worked. The petitioner had also stated that only an admitted wage bill could have been ordered to be paid but for the month of December, 2012 as employees of the petitioner had not worked at all, there was no question of any wage bill for the month of December, 2012. However, the impugned order dated 4.2.2014 was passed and the petitioner assails it on the following grounds:- I. As per section 3 of the Act only if the Labour Commissioner was satisfied that the employer of the Industrial Establishment was in default of payment of wages could the wage bill be paid. He submitted that in the instant case when the employees had not worked there could not have been a Wage Bill at all. II. Learned counsel for the petitioner, further, submitted that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur, wrongly had stated that it was not in dispute that the employees had worked with effect from 1st December, 2012, to the 18th December, 2012. II. Learned counsel for the petitioner, further, submitted that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Saharanpur Region, Saharanpur, wrongly had stated that it was not in dispute that the employees had worked with effect from 1st December, 2012, to the 18th December, 2012. In fact, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the attendance register went to show that in the month of December, barring two employees no other employee, had attended work and, therefore, he submits that definitely, it was not admitted to the petitioner that the employees had attended work from 1st to 18th December, 2012. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Section 3 of the Act and submitted that the moment the petitioner had disputed that the employees had not worked from the 1st of December, 2012, to the 18th of December, 2012, then the Labour Commissioner could not have acted as an adjudicator and could not have decided whether or not the workmen had worked and, therefore, he should have out right referred the matter to the proper forum i.e. the Labour Court or the Labour Tribunal for a proper Adjudication. 3. Learned counsel relied upon Section 3 of the Act and the same is being reproduced here as under:- 3. Recovery of wages in certain industrial establishments as arrear of land revenue. - (1) Where the Labour Commissioner is satisfied that the occupier of an industrial establishment is in default of payment of wages and that the wage-bill in respect of which such occupier is in default exceeds fifty thousand rupees, he may, without prejudice to the provisions of Sections 5 and 6, forward to the Collector, a certificate under his signature specifying the amount of wages due from the industrial establishment concerned. (2) Upon receipt of the certificate referred to in sub-section (1), the Collector shall proceed to realise, from the industrial establishment, the amount specified therein, besides recovery charges at the rate of ten per cent, as if such amount were an arrear of land revenue. (3) The amount realised under-section (2) shall, after deducting the recovery charges, be placed at the disposal of the Labour Commissioner who shall disburse, the same or cause it to be disbursed among the workmen entitled thereto. (3) The amount realised under-section (2) shall, after deducting the recovery charges, be placed at the disposal of the Labour Commissioner who shall disburse, the same or cause it to be disbursed among the workmen entitled thereto. (4) Where the amount so realised falls short of the wages-bill in respect of which the occupier has been in default, the Labour Commissioner may arrange for disbursement of such proportion or respective proportions of the wages due to various categories of workmen as he may think fit. (5) The liability of the occupier towards each workman in respect of payment of wages, shall to the extent of the amount paid to such workman under this section stand discharged. III. Learned counsel further relied upon a decision reported in AIR 1994 SC 536 (Modi Industries Ltd, vs. State of U.P. And others). Relying upon paragraph 4, he submitted that when there was a definite dispute between the parties as to whether the employees had worked with the petitioner or not in between the 1st of December, 2012 to 18th of December, 2012 then the matter should have been referred for an industrial adjudication before the proper forum. Since the learned counsel read out of the paragraph 4 of the judgment, the same is being reproduced here as under:- "4. On the facts of the present case, we are more than satisfied that there did exist a genuine dispute between the parties as to whose acts of omission or commission were responsible for the halting of the production in the factory for the period in question. This was put into issue before the Labour Commissioner by the appellant-company. The Labour Commissioner, in the circumstances, could not have proceeded to issue the certificate. He ought to have referred the parties to industrial adjudication which was the proper forum for the purpose. Under the circumstances, we set aside the impugned certificate dated April 29, 1991 issued by the Labour Commissioner." 4. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, however, submitted that when a finding had been arrived at that the petitioner had admitted that the respondents had worked from 1st of December, 2012, to 18th December, 2012, then this finding of fact could not be interfered with by this Court. 5. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 3, however, submitted that when a finding had been arrived at that the petitioner had admitted that the respondents had worked from 1st of December, 2012, to 18th December, 2012, then this finding of fact could not be interfered with by this Court. 5. Learned counsel further submitted that despite the various opportunities, the petitioner did not produce the attendance register before the Court below and, therefore, it could not be said that the petitioner had raised a dispute. Further submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party is that if the order-sheet dated 10.1.2013 is perused then it would be evident that the Labour Court had directed the employers to produce certain documents and he further submits that despite those orders the petitioners had not produced the evidence which was required to be produced by the Tribunal. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that as per Section 3 of the Act, if the Labour Commissioner was satisfied that any particular admitted Wage Bill was not being paid and that the employees were not paid the amount, could the amount be recovered from the employers. However, in the instant case when the employers had denied that their employees had worked then as per Section 3 of the Act and as per the judgment reported in AIR 1994 SC 536 , the matter ought to have been referred for a proper industrial adjudication and, therefore, the order dated 4.2.2013 cannot be sustained. 7. Further more, there is one more reason for finding fault with the impugned order. By the impugned order, the Labour Commissioner had found that the employers had admitted that the employees had worked with effect from 1st December, 2012 to 18th December, 2012. I do no find any where in the record or from the objection or the order sheet (which had been filed by the respondents alongwith the supplementary affidavit filed on 29.1.2018) that the petitioners had any where admitted that the employees had worked with the employers with effect from 1st December 2012 to 18th of December, 2012, and, therefore, the order dated 4.2.2013 cannot be sustained and, therefore, is quashed. The employees will be at liberty to raise an industrial dispute. 8. The writ petition is allowed.