JUDGMENT : P.K. LOHRA, J. 1. Petitioners, by the instant writ petition, under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, have challenged order dated 08.07.2016 (Annex. 5), passed by Additional District Judge, Bhadra, District Hanumangarh (for short, ‘learned Court below’). By the order impugned, the learned Court below has dismissed the application of petitioner-applicants under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for their impleadment as party defendants in a suit for partition filed by respondent-plaintiffs. 2. The fact, apposite for the purpose of this petition, are that respondent-plantiffs filed a civil suit for partition arraying respondent Nos. 3 & 4 as defendants, inter-alia, on the ground that a property, situated in Ward No. 2 (now Ward No. 4) at Bhadra, District Hanumangarh, was jointly purchased by all of them through a registered sale-deed dated 15.03.1991. The particulars of property and its neighborhood are also mentioned in the plaint. As per version of the respondent-plaintiffs, they are owner of half of the property and the another half is owned by respondent Nos. 3 & 4. The constructed part of the property is also mentioned in the plaint. For seeking partition of the property, it is pleaded in the plaint that the property, which was jointly owned by all the four, is presently in dilapidated condition and requires thorough repairing and new construction. With these averments, the respondent-plaintiffs craved for grant of a partition decree in respect of entire property by metes and bounds. In order to show cause of action, it is averred in the plaint by the respondent-plaintiffs that at their behest a request was made to respondent Nos. 3 & 4 for partition but their request was declined, which compelled them to file the suit for partition. 3. When the suit was in progress, at the behest of petitioner-applicants, an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC was laid for being impleaded as party defendant. In the application, it is interalia averred by the petitioner-applicants that the disputed property is not jointly owned by respondent-plaintiffs and respondent Nos. 3 & 4. As per version of the petitioner-applicants, the property in question was purchased out of income of the joint family by father-in-law of first respondent and third respondent Shri Champalal and his other sons, Chhaganlal, Heer Singh, Kamal Singh, Chattar Singh, Ummaid Singh, Amar Singh and Lalit Kumar. 3 & 4. As per version of the petitioner-applicants, the property in question was purchased out of income of the joint family by father-in-law of first respondent and third respondent Shri Champalal and his other sons, Chhaganlal, Heer Singh, Kamal Singh, Chattar Singh, Ummaid Singh, Amar Singh and Lalit Kumar. It is also pleaded in the application that since purchase of the property, one of the petitioner-applicants, Lalit Kumar, is in occupation of shop and godown constructed on the land in question carrying on his business of grocery. It is also averred in the application that the property in question is purchased from the usufruct of joint family income, and therefore, being legal heirs of Late Champalal all the applicants are also entitled for their share and if they are not impleaded as party then they would suffer loss. Petitioner-applicants, in substance, pleaded in the application that they are necessary party to the litigation. 4. The application submitted by petitioner-applicants is contested by respondent-plaintiffs by submitting their reply. In the reply, while reiterating the averments made in the plaint, it is pleaded by the respondent-plaintiffs that none of the applicants are proper party to the litigation much less necessary parties, and therefore, being alien having no right, title or interest in the suit property, are not entitled for impleadment as party defendants. Respondent/plaintiffs in their reply also raised an issue that impleadment of petitioners as party defendants would alter the nature of the suit which is for partition of immovable property jointly owned by the existing parties to the litigation. With these objections, respondent/plaintiffs craved for rejection of the application. 5. Learned Court below heard arguments and during the course of arguments, on behalf of petitioner-applicants, an issue was raised that the property in question was purchased by Champalal from income of joint family but the same was got registered in the name of respondent-plaintiffs as well as respondent Nos. 3 & 4 in the form of ‘Benami transaction’. As against it, on behalf of respondent-plaintiffs, it was urged that after commencement of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (for short, ‘Act of 1988’), such transactions are prohibited. It is further asserted on their behalf that the sale-deed was executed in the year 1991, i.e., after coming into force of the Act of 1988, and therefore, on the strength of that sale-deed, respondent-plaintiffs and respondent Nos. It is further asserted on their behalf that the sale-deed was executed in the year 1991, i.e., after coming into force of the Act of 1988, and therefore, on the strength of that sale-deed, respondent-plaintiffs and respondent Nos. 3 & 4 are joint owners and the claim of petitioner-applicants is wholly untenable. After hearing the rival parties and examining relevant provisions of the Act of 1988, learned Court below rejected the application of petitioner-applicants. 6. Mr. G.R. Punia, learned Senior Counsel, has argued that in fact property was purchased by Champalal from the income of joint family in the name of first respondent Ms. Krishna Devi, Rajneesh and respondent Nos. 3 & 4, which was a Benami transaction, therefore, being legal heirs of Late Champalal, petitioners are also entitled for their share in the property and are necessary party to the litigation. Learned Senior Counsel has contended that the positive assertion of the petitioner-applicants is also concurred/supported by respondent Nos. 3 & 4 in their written statement, therefore, their right is clearly substantiated for being impleaded as party defendants. 7. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Punia would urge that one of the petitioner-applicants, Lalit Kumar, is in possession of the shop and godown constructed on the property and running his grocery shop, therefore, for complete and effectual adjudication of the lis petitioners are necessary parties to the suit. Lastly, learned Senior Counsel contends that learned Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order rejecting the prayer of the petitioner-applicants for impleadment as party defendants. In support of his various arguments, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on following legal precedents: (1) Vardichand v. Nagar Palika [2009 (3) DNJ (Raj) 1595] (2) Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon [ (2005) 11 SCC 403 ] (3) Kalawati Lohar v. Balak Ram Garg [2018 (3) DNJ (Raj) 1231] 8. Per contra, Mr. Arvind Samdariya, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, has stoutly defended the impugned order, passed by learned Court below. It is submitted by Mr. Samdariya that the learned Court below has not committed any error much less manifest error of law in rejecting the application of petitioners, and therefore, the impugned order warrants no interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. It is submitted by Mr. Samdariya that the learned Court below has not committed any error much less manifest error of law in rejecting the application of petitioners, and therefore, the impugned order warrants no interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of this Court. Learned counsel has further contended that after coming into force of the Act of 1988, ‘Benami transactions’ are completely prohibited and the sale-deed in the instant matter is posterior to promulgation of the Act of 1988, therefore, claim of the petitioners for impleadment as party respondent is wholly untenable under Section 4(3) of the Act of 1988. 9. Mr. Samdariya, would contend that one son of Late Champalal, Chhattar Singh, being not applicant is sufficient to show that petitioners are unnecessarily inter-meddling in the matter, and therefore, learned Court below has not committed any error in thwarting their plea for impleadment. It is also submitted by Mr. Samdariya that the application submitted by petitioners is absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific, which is rightly turned down by the learned Court below. Lastly, learned counsel has urged that impleadment of petitioners shall have many ramification on the nature of suit inasmuch as a simple suit for partition is likely to be converted into a suit for declaration also. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments: (1) Sri Chhota v. Sri Nathu [AIR 1996 Allahabad 181] (2) Suresh Mahto v. Sant Kumar Mahto [AIR 2004 Jharkhand 44] Mr. Vikas Bijarnia, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 3 & 4, has supported the case of petitioner-applicants. 10. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced at Bar by learned counsel for the parties and perused impugned order as well as materials available on record. 11. In a civil action, plaintiff is the master of the suit, who has carriage and control of an action. This right of the plaintiff emanates from maxim ‘dominus litis’, which means having dominion over the case. However, the theory of dominus litis cannot be overstretched as it is Court’s duty to see that necessary party be impleaded as per sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 CPC. Besides that, Court may in its discretion implead a proper party also. However, the theory of dominus litis cannot be overstretched as it is Court’s duty to see that necessary party be impleaded as per sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 CPC. Besides that, Court may in its discretion implead a proper party also. A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively whereas a proper party is one in whose absence an effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. 12. A suit filed by the respondent-plaintiffs in this matter is for partition of a property jointly owned by them and respondent Nos. 3 & 4. The joint ownership of all the four individuals is founded on registered sale-deed. There remains no quarrel that in a suit for partition of an immovable property each co-sharer is a necessary party because partition of the property by metes and bounds can be made amongst co-sharers. The endeavour made by the petitioners for their impleadment as party-defendants is precisely on the ground that they are necessary parties. As per the version of the petitioners, property in question was purchased by the ancestor of petitioners as well as party to the litigation out of the income of joint family and therefore their right to claim share in the property as co-sharer is sufficient to adjudge their status as necessary party to the litigation. 13. Well, the contention of the petitioners for impleadment as party-defendants in the suit is founded on alleged Benami transaction of the sale, in my view, said contention of the petitioners cannot be subjected to judicial review ignoring the provisions of the Act of 1988. The Act of 1988 is a piece of prohibitory legislation, which prohibits Benami transactions to subject to stated exceptions and makes such transactions punishable and also prohibits the right to defences against recovery of Benami transactions. Although petitioners have made a positive assertion that suit property was purchased by their ancestor and ancestor of the party to the litigation, from the income of joint family, but there is nothing on record to substantiate this plea. Therefore, at this stage, it is also just and proper to examine the provisions of the Act of 1988. Sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) & (2) clearly envisage prohibition on right to recover property held Benami and on the strength of document, sub-sec. Therefore, at this stage, it is also just and proper to examine the provisions of the Act of 1988. Sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) & (2) clearly envisage prohibition on right to recover property held Benami and on the strength of document, sub-sec. (3) of Section 4 of the Act of 1988 cannot be pressed into service being in the joint name of four individuals and not in the name of a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family. 14. As against it, suit for partition of the respondent-plaintiffs is based on a registered sale deed jointly executed in their favour as well as in favour of respondent Nos. 3 & 4 and therefore this oral assertion is completely mismatch to a registered instrument. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 envisage with clarity and precision that documentary evidence excludes oral evidence under Chapter IV. The argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that respondent Nos. 3 & 4 have also supported their version, cannot change the legal position and mere reiteration of petitioners’ version by them cannot make them proper much less necessary party to the litigation. Moreover, the averments made by the petitioner-applicants in their application are absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific. 15. The judgment in case of Vardichand (supra) is clearly distinguishable because it was a suit for injunction, and therefore, Court while considering the fact that plot in question was allotted to the applicant, found his prima facie interest in the suit property and allowed him to be impleaded as party. The fact situation in the present case is entirely different, and therefore, said judgment cannot render any assistance to the petitioners. In Amit Kumar Shaw (supra), while examining Order 1 Rule 10, Order 22 Rule 10 and Section 146 CPC and their object, the Court dilated on necessary and proper party and observed that while deciding such applications, question to be addressed by the Court is whether an enforceable right of a person can be affected if he not joins as party. The lis involved therein was claim of a party in respect of property in question by way of adverse possession. In totality, in the backdrop of lis involved in that matter vis-à-vis the present one, the judgment is clearly distinguishable. Similarly, the judgment of this Court in Kalawati Lohar (supra) too cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioners. 16. In totality, in the backdrop of lis involved in that matter vis-à-vis the present one, the judgment is clearly distinguishable. Similarly, the judgment of this Court in Kalawati Lohar (supra) too cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioners. 16. As observed supra, besides legal embargo under Section 4 of the Act of 1988, looking to the nature of the suit which relates to immovable property for its partition amongst co-sharers and not for declaration of status or legal character, I am afraid, none of the petitioners have direct or legal interest in the litigation. Upon objective consideration of the petitioners’ afflictions, it can very well be said that, in the backdrop of nature of the suit, joining petitioners as party would embarrass the plaintiffs, and certain issues, not relevant and germane are likely to crop up at their behest. Avoidance of a fresh litigation is by no means a ground to invoke power under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, which being only desirable consequence of the rule rather than its main objective. 17. The learned Court below has examined the matter in its entirety in the light of prohibitory legislation, i.e. the Act of 1988, while non-suiting the petitioners by a detailed order, and therefore, the same also do not suffer from the vice of any error apparent on the face of record. Undeniably, supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see as to whether an inferior Court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameter and not to correct an error apparent on the face of record, much less of an error of law. In exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Court does not act as an appellate Court to review or re-weigh the material/evidence, upon which the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order, or to correct the errors of law in the decision. Upon perusal of the impugned order and its judicial scrutiny, I am unable to comprehend that it has caused grave miscarriage of justice, nor it is a case of dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law by the learned Court below warranting interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. Resultantly, the writ petition fails and the same is hereby rejected.