JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellant, aggrieved with the punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 17.12.2002 and the appellate order dated 31.12.2003 confirming the punishment, approached the writ Court, however, without success. By an order dated 08.02.2018 the writ petition has been dismissed. 2. Briefly stated, the petitioner, on an allegation that on threat of posting the Driver-Havildar Sham Barla on general duty outside the Headquarters he has received Rs. 3,000/-through Havildar Rajendra Ravidas, was proceeded against departmentally. At the material point of time, the appellant was working as an ASI with JAP-4, Bokaro. During the departmental proceeding, the department has examined four witnesses in support of charge framed against the appellant. The enquiring officer submitted a report on 30.04.2002 holding the charge framed against the appellant proved and primarily on the basis of the enquiry report the disciplinary authority has inflicted punishment of dismissal from service, as per order dated 17.12.2002 and, as noticed above, the appellant's appeal has been dismissed by an order dated 31.12.2003. 3. Contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that a charge of illegal gratification, even in a departmental proceeding, must be proved to the hilt and merely on ipse-dixit of the enquiring officer the extreme punishment of dismissal from service cannot be awarded. 4. Powers of the writ Court of judicial review of the orders passed by the departmental authority have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in a number of judgments, including the one in “Syed Yakoob vs. K. S. Radhakrishnan and Others” reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . It has been held that normally the writ Court would not interfere with the orders passed by the departmental authority unless it has been passed in breach of the Discipline and Service Rules or in avoidance of the rules of natural justice. By now, however, it is well-settled that if the departmental authority has considered irrelevant materials or ignored the relevant materials from consideration which has led the departmental authority to a wrong conclusion/finding, a writ in the nature of certiorari would lie. No doubt, sufficiency of evidence would not be a ground to interfere with the order of punishment, however, it needs to be kept in mind that the evidence produced before the enquiring officer must connect the delinquent with the charges framed against him. No doubt, sufficiency of evidence would not be a ground to interfere with the order of punishment, however, it needs to be kept in mind that the evidence produced before the enquiring officer must connect the delinquent with the charges framed against him. On the basis of the evidences led by the department if it is found that it turns out to be a case of “no evidence”, the delinquent must be exonerated of the charges framed against him. 5. During the departmental enquiry the witnesses examined in support of the charge framed against the appellant, however, have not deposed that money was paid by the complainant to the appellant. The material witnesses including Havildar Rajendra Ravidas-P.W. 4 who has stated that Rs.3,000/-was given to the appellant, however, have not stated that it was illegal gratification paid for not posting the complainant-Havildar Sham Barla outside the Headquarters. During the cross-examination, these witnesses have admitted that they had no knowledge of the appellant demanding money from others. The witness-Sham Barla, who is the complainant, has admitted that there was no talk of demand and he has failed to state the date when Rs. 3,000/-was paid to the appellant. The appellant has taken a defence that he had no authority to post a sub-ordinate like Driver-Havildar on general duty outside the campus of JAP-4. There is no reference of any circular/guidelines produced by the department which would indicate that the appellant had such powers. Neither the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority has held that the defence taken by the delinquent-appellant is false, or that it cannot be accepted. There was inordinate delay of about two years in lodging the complaint by the Driver-Havildar Sham Barla making an allegation of demand of money for not posting him outside JAP-4 and the attending circumstances revealed from the materials brought during the departmental enquiry also do not establish that the appellant had demanded illegal gratification which allegedly was paid by the complainant under threat of outside posting. The disciplinary authority, it appears, was swayed by the final conclusion of the enquiring officer. The appellate authority has also ignored the aforesaid aspects of the matter and the learned writ Court has primarily confined itself to the findings recorded by the departmental authority. The disciplinary authority, it appears, was swayed by the final conclusion of the enquiring officer. The appellate authority has also ignored the aforesaid aspects of the matter and the learned writ Court has primarily confined itself to the findings recorded by the departmental authority. The learned writ Court has held as under:- “It appears that after opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner, an enquiry officer was appointed. It further appears from the facts of the case that the enquiry was conducted and several witnesses were examined by the employer. After taking into consideration the evidences put forth through the four witnesses examined by the enquiry committee, it has been held that the charges against the petitioner have been proved. So in the facts and circumstances of this case, I have no hesitation in holding that the enquiry report is not a finding based on no evidence or perverse. It is a settled principle of law as already referred to above that this writ court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of an enquiry committee. Hence, it is not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the finding of the enquiry committee involved in this case is concerned.” 6. No doubt, test in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probability, but it certainly is not a mere possibility. On a mere possibility that the appellant could have demanded and received illegal gratification for not posting the complainant outside JAP-4 charge framed against him cannot be said to have been proved during the enquiry. In “Kuldeep Singh vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors.” reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court has held as under : “6. It is no doubt true that the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32 would not interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry by the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer as a matter of course. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority.” 7. The order of appellate authority dated 31.12.2003 is a cryptic order. The departmental authorities have apparently adopted a procedure, to arrive at a conclusion that charge against the appellant has been proved, which is flawed in law, and accordingly the decisions taken by them have become unsustainable. Another aspect of the matter is that on a vague charge and on such state of evidence the appellant could not have been inflicted the extreme punishment of dismissal from service. The aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned writ Court. 8. In the aforesaid facts and taking into consideration the materials brought on record, we are satisfied that order dated 08.02.2018 passed in W.P.(S) No. 2056 of 2004 warrants interference and accordingly, it is set-aside. Consequently, punishment of dismissal from service, on a finding that the charge of taking illegal gratification against the petitioner has been found proved, is quashed. We are informed that the appellant has by now crossed the age of superannuation. Accordingly, he shall be entitled for continuity in service but without back-wages as he did not perform duty in the interregnum. However, it is clarified that period between 17.12.2002 till he attained the age of superannuation shall be counted for computation of pension. 9. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.