JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. This Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is all about an answer to the following questions: (a) Whether the absence of a preliminary inquiry held by the department or a responsible officer of the police before registering an FIR and proceeding with investigation against a public servant, charged with acts of dishonesty in the discharge of his official duties, would vitiate the FIR and the resultant prosecution? (b) Whether the Assistant Registrar of a University incorporated under a State Legislation is a public servant within the meaning of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C.? 2. The petitioner is an Assistant Registrar with the Sardar Ballabh Bhai Patel Krishi Evam Prodyogik Vishvavidyalaya, Modipuram, District Meerut, and, hereinafter referred to as the ‘University’. The University is incorporated under the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Evam Prodyogik Vishvavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). 3. The petitioner has been charge sheeted, vide charge sheet dated 04.04.2017, in Case Crime no.487 of 2016, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Daurala, District Meerut. Cognizance of the said offence has been taken by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut on 15.04.2017, and, Case no.552/09/2017, State vs. Devendra Singh Yadav is pending before the Court of the learned Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut. The petitioner has come up laying challenge to the proceedings of the aforesaid case, with a prayer that the same be set aside. In effect, the petitioner desires the charge sheet to be quashed. 4. The facts giving rise to this petition in brief are these, that Public Interest Litigation Petition (PIL) no.58424 of 2016 was filed before this Court by one Dr. Sandeep Pahal, where it appears embezzlement of funds of the University out of the Education Head of Account, was alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, and, the embezzled moneys were indicated to be to the tune of Rs.17 lakhs. These were shown to be expended towards an ex facie quaint head of expenditure, called High Court Fee. Sandeep Pahal, where it appears embezzlement of funds of the University out of the Education Head of Account, was alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, and, the embezzled moneys were indicated to be to the tune of Rs.17 lakhs. These were shown to be expended towards an ex facie quaint head of expenditure, called High Court Fee. The following material reliefs were sought in the PIL Petition aforesaid: “(i) Issue a writ, appropriate order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the concerned Respondents i.e. to Registrar General of High Court (Respondent No.3) in present case to apprise/ place before this Hon’ble Court its findings/ truth about the genuineness of used cash receipts of High Value shown issued by High Court Allahabad and its Lucknow Bench (Annexure-4 Page 41 to 47) which are prima facie fake, forged/ fabricated and which have been used by the racketeers in embezzlement of public funds to the tune of approximately Rs. Seventeen lakh (Embezzlement may run from Rs. 50 lakh to Rs. One Crore). (ii) Issue a writ, appropriate order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the concerned Respondents to set the law in to motion forthwith against the racket involved in fabricating/ using cash receipts by using fake signature and fake seal/ stamps of High Court. (iii) Issue appropriate order or direction to Respondent No. 4, 5, 6 to forthwith place the internal inquiry report and action taken report, if any, before this Hon’ble Court which they were supposed to promptly submit in 15 days from the date of forming of inquiry committee on 11.03.16, but they have failed to submit it despite the order dated 22.08.16 and reminder order dated 08.09.16 passed by Chancellor of University (Respondent No.2). (iv) Issue appropriate order or direction to Respondents to explain the reasons for having failed to discharge their statutory duty in taking prompt effective stern action in this serious matter involved by setting the law in to motion against the fraud/ racketeers. (v) Issue appropriate order or direction to form an independent time bound inquiry committee under monitoring by this Hon’ble Court to inquire in to the conduct/ role of person(s) in shielding the fraud/ racketeers.” 5. (v) Issue appropriate order or direction to form an independent time bound inquiry committee under monitoring by this Hon’ble Court to inquire in to the conduct/ role of person(s) in shielding the fraud/ racketeers.” 5. On the basis of whatever evidence was placed on record by the PIL petitioner, a Division Bench of this Court, on 14.12.2016 appears to have indicated their Lordships serious concern about the matter, where forged receipts purporting to have been issued by the High Court, were brought to the notice of the Court. The matter was ordered to stand out to 16.12.2016, to come up as a fresh matter. It appears that acting on the observations of their Lordships during hearing, the learned Chief Standing Counsel addressed a memo to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Meerut, dated 14.12.2016, apprising the Senior S.P. that the petitioner had embezzled Rs.17 lakh in connivance with officials of the University, in the name of High Court Fee. He further indicated that receipts produced in Court are fabricated on a mere look, and, also conveyed the observations of their Lordships, that it was a fit case where an FIR should have been lodged with the Police Station concerned, and, action taken against those who fabricated money receipts, purporting to have been issued by the Court. The Senior S.P., Meerut, promptly acted on the letter of the learned Chief Standing Counsel dated 14.12.2016, and, directed registration of a case through a written information dated 14.12.2016, addressed to the Inspector In-charge, Police Station Daurala, District Meerut, signed by J. Ravinder Gaur, the then Senior S.P., Meerut. Acting on the said information, the S.O. of Police Station Daurala registered an FIR on 14.12.2016, at 18.05 hours, giving rise to Case Crime no.487 of 2016 (supra). A copy of the Chik FIR has been annexed as Annexure 2 to the petition. 6. On 16.12.2016 when PIL no.58424 of 2016 again came up before the Court, their Lordships were apprised of the fact that a crime had been registered against the petitioner, and, the Investigating Officer has also seized some documents from the University. The learned counsel for the University informed the Court that the petitioner had been placed under suspension. 6. On 16.12.2016 when PIL no.58424 of 2016 again came up before the Court, their Lordships were apprised of the fact that a crime had been registered against the petitioner, and, the Investigating Officer has also seized some documents from the University. The learned counsel for the University informed the Court that the petitioner had been placed under suspension. The learned counsel appearing for the High Court, represented by the Registrar General, informed the Court that the receipts annexed as Annexure 4 to the PIL Petition, are not issued by the High Court, and, that those are all forged receipts. The Court recorded the statements of learned counsel made at the Bar, and, accepted the same. It was ordered by the Court that the Investigating Officer shall issue a letter to the Bank, where the petitioner maintains his account, requesting the Bank to freeze his account, and, further that if any such request is made, the Bank shall freeze the account of the petitioner. A copy of the said order passed by the Division Bench in PIL no.58424 of 2016 on 16.12.2014 is on record as Annexure 3 to this petition. 7. Heard Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri D.P.S. Chauhan, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State and Sri Vivek Prakash Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr. Sandeep Pahal, who has been heard in this petition though not impleaded as a party, under Chapter XXII, Rule 5-A of the Rules of the Court. 8. Dr. Sandeep Pahal has been heard, bearing in mind the fact that he is the petitioner of PIL No.58424 of 2016, wherein orders have been passed above detailed, leading to registration of Case Crime 487 of 2016 (supra) against the petitioner, and, wherein after investigation, proceedings impugned in the present petition have commenced. He is, thus, the de facto complainant. 9. Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged as the first ground of challenge, though not the principal one, that the first information dated 14.12.2016 has come to be registered in a manner, that shows it ex facie to be the outcome of manipulation. He is, thus, the de facto complainant. 9. Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged as the first ground of challenge, though not the principal one, that the first information dated 14.12.2016 has come to be registered in a manner, that shows it ex facie to be the outcome of manipulation. He has taken the Court through the First Information Report, to which allusion has already been made hereinbefore, and, submits that the First Information Report was lodged by the Senior S.P., Meerut, acting on a letter dated 14.12.2016, from the learned Chief Standing Counsel, High Court, Allahabad, conveying an oral observation of their Lordships of the Division Bench, during hearing of PIL No.58424 of 2016. He submits that there was no such observation of the Division Bench, in the order dated 14.12.2016, passed in the PIL under reference. Neither, the learned Chief Standing Counsel could have conveyed an oral observation of the Court to the Senior S.P., even if made during the course of hearing, or could an FIR on its basis be registered. He submits, therefore, that the FIR dated 14.12.2016 registered as it was, on the letter of the learned Chief Standing Counsel by the Senior S.P., through a written information addressed to the Inspector In-charge, Police Station Daurala, District Meerut is illegal and unconstitutional. It is also urged by the learned counsel that this Court vide order dated 16.05.2018, passed in the present petition, had required the State to obtain instructions, both with respect to the manner in which the case crime came to be registered against the petitioner, and, the procedure to be followed. He submits that on the first part, that is the manner in which the case crime came to be registered, the State have not come up with any instruction. 10. In answer, Sri D.P.S. Chauhan, learned A.G.A. submits that the law about registration of an FIR, relating to a cognizable offence is transparently clear. It says that a cognizable offence can be registered by the police always, upon information of such an offence being committed. 10. In answer, Sri D.P.S. Chauhan, learned A.G.A. submits that the law about registration of an FIR, relating to a cognizable offence is transparently clear. It says that a cognizable offence can be registered by the police always, upon information of such an offence being committed. He submits once registered, a cognizable offence is to be investigated to its logical conclusion, ending in a police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. The validity of proceedings commenced on the police report, whatever the nature of the report may be, cannot be questioned by impeaching the manner in which the FIR came to be registered. 11. Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner has stiffly contested the aforesaid submission of Sri D.P.S. Chauhan, the learned A.G.A., and, submits that it is a well acknowledged principle that before a public servant like the petitioner, is reported to the police, and, a case registered against him, there must be some fact finding and a preliminary inquiry into the allegations, by a responsible officer. A First Information Report against a public servant lodged according to him, impromptu, on the directions of authority howsoever high, without a preliminary inquiry by a responsible officer made in-house, can do irremediable damage, not only to the public servant reported to the police, but also the institution of which he is a part. 12. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335. He has invited the attention of the Court to what has been held on this issue, by their Lordships, referring to earlier authority. It has been held thus: “77. In this connection, it will be appropriate to recall the views expressed by Mitter, J. in Sirajuddin v. State of Madras, (1970) 1 SCC 595 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 240: 1970(3) SCR 93 in the following words: (SCC p. 601, para 17) “Before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged in this case and a first information is lodged against him, there must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible officer. The lodging of such a report against a person specially one who like the appellant occupied the top position in a department, even if baseless, would do incalculable harm not only to the officer in particular but to the department he belonged to, in general.... The means adopted no less than the end to be achieved must be impeccable.” 78. Mudholkar, J in a separate judgment in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, (1964) 3 SCR 71 : AIR 1964 SC 221 while agreeing with the conclusion of Subba Rao, J (as he then was) has expressed his opinion stating: (SCC pp.86-87) “In the absence of any prohibition in the Code, express or implied, I am of opinion that it is open to a police officer to make preliminary enquiries before registering an offence and making a full scale investigation into it.” 79. We are in agreement with the views, expressed by Mitter, J and Mudholkar, J in the above two decisions. 80. Now coming to the present case, we regret to note that the SP seems to have exhibited some over-enthusiasm, presumably to please 'some one' and had directed the SHO to register the case and investigate the same even on the very first day of the receipt of the complaint from the DGP, in whose office the complaint was lying for nearly 9 days. This unprecedented over-enthusiasm shown by the S.P., without disclosing the reasons for making an order entrusting the investigation to the SHO who is not a designated officer under Section 5-A(1), about which we shall advert to in detail in the ensuing part of the judgment, really shocks one's sense of justice and fair play even though the untested allegations made in the complaint require a thorough investigation. Still, it is an inexplicable riddle as to why the S.P. had departed from the normal rule and hastily ordered the S.H.O to investigate the serious allegations, levelled against a former Chief Minister and a Minister in the Cabinet of the Central Government on the date of the registration of the case. However, this conduct of the S.P. can never serve as a ground for quashing this F.I.R.” 13. This Court has keenly considered the submissions made on the issue by learned counsel on both sides. However, this conduct of the S.P. can never serve as a ground for quashing this F.I.R.” 13. This Court has keenly considered the submissions made on the issue by learned counsel on both sides. There cannot be any doubt that registration of an FIR relating to a cognizable offence is the mandate of the law and duty of the police. It does not matter who reports the offence and manner in which he reports. That, in general, is the principle of law about cognizable offences, can brook little doubt. However, as a matter of prudence there can be a variety of situations, where the reckless registration of an FIR, irresponsibly or motivatedly, reporting a cognizable offence may indeed embarrass the conduct of public affairs, and, expose various institutions, in the vastly pluralistically modern society, to the ever looming threat of a policeman’s knock at the doors of a responsible man in an institution, or its functionaries, or a professional, baselessly made by a mischief monger, or an utter lier, or a motivated complainant, with no truth about his complaint. It is, therefore, that time and again it has been reflected in judicial authority as a principle of prudence, contrasted from a principle of law, that in given situations or a certain class of cases, before the law about registration of an FIR is mechanically set in motion, it should be scrutinized by an antecedent in-house, domestic or preliminary scrutiny to eliminate counterproductive aberrations. 14. It is in keeping with this pragmatic and prudent approach, though in the context of the exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P. and others, (2015) 6 SCC 287 , resting their decision on the Constitution Bench decision of their Lordships in Lalita Kumari vs. State of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 have endorsed a guarded approach in certain class of cases. The decision of their Lordships in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) and the guidance of the Constitution Bench of their Lordships in Lalita Kumari (supra) are clear pointers to the principle, that while it is trite law, that an FIR in relation to a cognizable offence ought to be registered, prudence demands that in specific class of cases, a preliminary inquiry should be undertaken, before proceeding further, as not doing so, would imperil the smooth functioning of many institutions of the complex modern society. May be, years ago the same problem was encountered in the smooth functioning of the State, and, its various institutions, that led their Lordships to lay down the principle in Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras, (1971) SCC 595, and, still earlier in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi, AIR 1964 SC 221 , that preliminary inquiry by a responsible officer into allegations should be made, before a public servant is charged with acts of dishonesty. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) the proposition was extended to oblige a police officer, in general, to make a preliminary inquiry, before registering an offence and undertaking a full-fledged investigation. The common thread of anxiety, vivid in all these authorities, is to sieve out vexatious, baseless and malicious complaints from turning into unwarranted hurdles, hindering the smooth transaction of all non-criminal activity in society. 15. It would, thus, appear that whether the manner of registration of an FIR, or the requirement of holding a preliminary investigation would be relevant, and, of some consequence, would depend on the facts of each case. It would most importantly depend on the gravity of the allegation, and, the apparent or the doubtful character of evidence, that comes along. All that is said about the requirement of holding a preliminary investigation, before a public servant is charged with dishonesty, or corruption connected to his office, may whither away in the face of the gravity of the charge, and, perhaps more than that, the strong character of prima facie evidence appearing. 16. In the present case, what cannot be ignored is the fact that as part of the PIL, receipts of money shown to be spent towards fee paid to the High Court, that are apparently forged, were utilized by the petitioner to draw moneys from the Public Exchequer. 16. In the present case, what cannot be ignored is the fact that as part of the PIL, receipts of money shown to be spent towards fee paid to the High Court, that are apparently forged, were utilized by the petitioner to draw moneys from the Public Exchequer. Those receipts were certified as forged by the High Court, in proceedings of the PIL. Though, not in any manner to be held in prejudice to the petitioner’s defence at the trial, this Court has been taken through the paper book of the PIL, produced at the hearing by the learned A.G.A., where the receipts in question are annexed as Annexure 4, to the PIL Petition no.58424 of 2016. The receipts carry such glaring features, that it is difficult to ignore them as products of forgery. 17. The Court has also been taken through the Photostat copies of some receipts that are part of the Case Diary, also produced during the hearing, by the learned A.G.A. Illustratively, one of the receipts annexed at page 42 of the PIL paper book opens with the words “In the Court of Judicature at Allahabad Branch, Lucknow”. For sure no document of this Court would fail to mention the word “High Court” and would certainly never employ words “Allahabad Branch”. It further indicates, to be some kind of a prescribed proforma, referable to the same Act or Rules of Court, but does not specify the Act or the Rules. It shows it to be “FORM NO.2 FOR SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES” followed by words/ figures in the next line placed in brackets to the effect “Order V Rules 3 & 5”. In the next line it mentions “IN THE COURT OF THE --------------”, and, in the blank column after the word, “THE”, the words “High Court” has been filled up in hand. It next mentions OS No.46423 of 2015 with the words “OS No.” being printed, and, the No. “46423” being written in hand. It carries a column for Court Fee, where the sum of Rs.5,07,650/-only, both in words and figures, has been entered in hand. There are innumerable telltale signs to this receipt, that would lead any person, acquainted with practice and business of the Court, to prima facie conclude the document to be the product of forgery. 18. It carries a column for Court Fee, where the sum of Rs.5,07,650/-only, both in words and figures, has been entered in hand. There are innumerable telltale signs to this receipt, that would lead any person, acquainted with practice and business of the Court, to prima facie conclude the document to be the product of forgery. 18. This Court has deliberately refrained from highlighting further what those features are, because it is not the purpose of this Court or the scope of these proceedings, to pronounce upon the genuineness or otherwise of the various Court Fee Receipts that have been allegedly fabricated by the petitioner to draw moneys in the sum of Rs.17 lakh from the University. For the sake of clarification it is made explicit, that whatever has been said about the receipt, is limited to the purpose of decision of this Petition, and, would in no way affect the petitioner’s defence at the trial. 19. The allegations, and, the prima facie evidence against the petitioner, a passing survey of which has been done hereinabove, spares little doubt that there is explicit evidence, staring the petitioner in the face, which no one could ignore to register an FIR against him, and, further to investigate the same. It is one of those cases referable to discharge of official duties by a public servant, where the care and caution of a preliminary inquiry, antecedent to the FIR, on principles in law well settled, can hardly be called in aid by the petitioner. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed heavy reliance on the decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) to canvass his case for a preliminary inquiry, before proceeding to register an FIR. In the relevant part of the decision in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) learned counsel for the petitioner referred to para 80 of the report, to say that their Lordships came down heavily upon the S.P., like here, in exhibiting some overenthusiasm, in the words of their Lordships, presumably to please 'some one', while directing the S.H.O. to register the case, and, investigate the same, even on the very first day of receipt of the complaint from the D.G.P. He submits that this is precisely what has happened here. The First Information Report was lodged on the letter of the learned Chief Standing Counsel, by the Senior S.P. communicating some oral observation of their Lordships of the Division Bench hearing the PIL, that an FIR ought to be registered, and, that in unholy haste the Senior S.P. himself proceeded to lodge an FIR, the same day as he received the letter, addressing it to the S.H.O. concerned. 21. Regrettably, this Court cannot agree with the otherwise attractive submission of the learned counsel. In para 80 of the report in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) their Lordships have clearly held, after castigating the S.P. for his hasty action in that case, that the conduct of the S.P. can never serve as a ground for quashing the FIR. The legal principle on which the petitioner relies, predicates a course to be followed in dealing with registration of an FIR, or more so its investigation, that involves discharge of public duties by a public servant; and, there it favours a preliminary inquiry. However, the absence of a preliminary inquiry, in cases where an offence is disclosed, does not serve to quash an FIR, that is registered even with somewhat undue haste. 22. The law apart, on facts too, the gravity of the offence, and, prima facie, the nature of the evidence appearing in the present case, certainly required the prompt lodging an FIR. And, here, post lodging of that FIR their Lordships of the Division Bench hearing the PIL have passed a further order dated 16.12.2016 in PIL No.58424 of 2016, freezing the Bank Account of the petitioner. Later, a thorough investigation into the offence has led the petitioner to be charge sheeted, and, materials against him, worth taking cognizance, appear in the Case Diary. 23. In the background of these facts, the material on record, and, the contours of the law noticed above, this Court is not at all in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is anything exceptional about the manner in which the FIR has been registered, to an extent as may entitle the petitioner to the relief he seeks. 24. 24. The second ground on which the petitioner seeks to support the relief claimed is that he is a public servant, and, therefore, the cognizance taken against him of an offence, that is clearly alleged to be committed by him while acting in the discharge of his official duty, is barred by the provisions of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C., sanction of the State Government having not been taken prior to cognizance. 25. In order to assess the worth of this ground urged by Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be gainful to refer the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C., that are the basis of the plea. The provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are being quoted in extenso: “197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.-(1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2015] (a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government. [Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression "State Government" occurring therein, the expression "Central Government" were substituted.] [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under section 166A, section 166B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376, section 376A, section 376C, section 376D or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).] (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "Central Government" occurring therein, the expression "State Government" were substituted. [(3-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3), no Court shall take cognizance of any offence, alleged to have been committed by any member of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order in a State while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force therein, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3-B) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Code or any other law, it is hereby declared that any sanction accorded by the State Government or any cognizance taken by a Court upon such sanction, during the period commencing on the 20th day of August, 1991 and ending with the date immediately preceding the date on which the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1991, receives the assent of the President, with respect to an offence alleged to have been committed during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 356 of the Constitution was in force in the State, shall be invalid and it shall be competent for the Central Government in such matter to accord sanction and for the court to take cognizance thereon.] (4) The Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, may determine the person by whom, the manner in which, and the offence or offences for which, the prosecution of such Judge, Magistrate or public servant is to be conducted, and may specify the Court before which the trial is to be held.” 26. The question that falls for determination, therefore, is that what has been formulated as question no.(a), in the opening part of this judgment. 27. It does not brook any dispute that the word ‘public servant’ is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 2(y) Cr.P.C., however, says “words and expression used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code”. Public Servant is defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, which is extracted below: “21. Section 2(y) Cr.P.C., however, says “words and expression used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code”. Public Servant is defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, which is extracted below: “21. “Public servant”.—The words “public servant” denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely:— [First — omitted by the A.O. 1950] Second — Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, [Naval or Air] Forces [[***] of India]; [Third — Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;] Fourth — Every officer of a Court of Justice [(including a liquidator, receiver or commissioner)] whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property, or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in the Court, and every person specially authorized by a Court of Justice to perform any of such duties; Fifth — Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or public servant; Sixth — Every arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority; Seventh — Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confinement; Eighth — Every officer of [the Government] whose duty it is, as such officer, to prevent offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public health, safety or convenience; Ninth — Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property on behalf of [the Government], or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of [the Government], or to execute any revenue process, or to investigate, or to report, on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of [the Government], or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of [the Government], or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of [the Government] [***]; Tenth — Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common purpose of any village, town or district, or to make, authenticate or keep any document for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district; [(Eleventh) — Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election;] [(Twelfth) — Every person— (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government; (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).] Illustration A Municipal Commissioner is a public servant. Explanation 1.—Persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not. Explanation 2.—Wherever the words “public servant” occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation. [Explanation 3.—The word “election” denotes an election for the purpose of selecting members of any legislative, municipal or other public authority, of whatever character, the method of selection to which is by, or under, any law prescribed as by election.] [***] STATE AMENDMENT (Rajasthan)—In section 21, after clause twelfth, the following new clause shall be added, namely:— “Thirteenth.—Every person employed or engaged by any public body in the conduct and supervision of any examination recognised or approved under any law. Explanation.—The expression ‘Public Body’ includes— (a) a University, Board of Education or other body, either established by or under a Central or State Act or under the provisions of the Constitution of India or constituted by the Government; and (b) a local authority.” [Vide Rajasthan Act, 4 of 1993, sec. 2 (w.e.f. 11-2-1993)]. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner, relies on the twelfth clause of Section 21 to say that he is public servant. The petitioner, admittedly, is an Assistant Registrar in the employ of the University. The Act under which the University has been incorporated, details who would be officers of the University, under Section 10 of the Act, that occurs in Chapter IV. It reads:- “10. (1) The following shall be the officers of each University:- (i) The Chancellor; (ii) The Vice-chancellor; (iii) The Registrar; (iv) The Dean Post Graduate Studies; (v) The Director of Research (vi) The Director of Extension; (vii) The Deans of Faculties (viii) The Director of Student welfare; (ix) The Finance Controller; (x) The University Librarian, and (xi) Such other persons in the service of the University as may be declared by the Statutes to be officers of the university.” 29. Now the petitioner not being one of the officers specified in the Act as such, he too, to all seeming, is an officer of the University declared as such by the statutes framed under Section 10(1) (xi) of the Act. 30. Thus, apparently the petitioner is not a public servant, or officer, by the twelfth clause to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. 30. Thus, apparently the petitioner is not a public servant, or officer, by the twelfth clause to Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. It is divided into two parts. In the first part, it is about a person who is in the service, or pay of the Government, or remunerated by fees, or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government. In the second part it is about a person in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in G A Monterio vs. State of Ajmer, AIR 1957 SC 13 , where it has been held, thus: “13. The true test, therefore, in order to determine whether a person is an officer of the Government, is: (1) whether he is in the service or pay of the Government, and (2) whether he is entrusted with the performance of any public duty. If both these requirements are satisfied it matters not the least what is the nature of his office, whether the duties he is performing are of an exalted character or very humble indeed. As has been stated in Bacon's Abridgment at Vol. 6, page 2, in the article headed "Of the nature of an officer and the several kinds of officers": "The word "officium' principally implies a duty, and in the next place, the charge of such duty; and that it is a rule that where one man hath to do with another's affairs against his will, and without his leave, that this is an office, and he who is in it is an officer". The next paragraph thereafter may also be referred to in this context: "There is, a difference between an office and an employment, every office being an employment; but there are employments which do not come under the denomination of offices; such as an agreement to make hay, herd a flock, &c which differ widely from that of steward of a manor" and c. (Vide 12 Bom HCR 1 page 5(B)). 14. 14. This was the sense in which the decision in 12 Bom H C R 1(B), was understood by the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court in Ahad Shah v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Lah 152(2)(D), when they observed at page 157: "But it is not enough that a person should be in the pay or service of Government to Constitute him a public servant within the meaning of S.21 (ninthly), I.P.C. He must also be an "Officer". That expression is not, of course, to be restricted to its colloquial meaning of a Commissioned or non-Commissioned Officer; it means a functional or holder of some "officium" or office. The office may be one of dignity or importance; it may equally be humble. But whatever its nature, it is essential that the person holding the office, should have in some degree delegated to him certain functions of Government". The question for consideration before the learned Judges of the Lahore High Court was whether a Quarter Master's 'clerk was a public servant within the meaning of that expression in S.21, Penal Code. On the facts elicited before them the learned Judges came to the conclusion that the Quarter Master's clerk as such was just a Babu and no more an officer than a labourer or menial employed and paid by Government to do public work (See Queen v. Nachimuttu, I.L.R. 7 Mad. 18(E)). 15. If therefore on the facts of a particular case the Court comes to the conclusion that a person is not only in the service or pay of the Government but is also performing a public duty, he has delegated to him the functions of the Government or is in any event performing duties immediately auxiliary to those of some one who is an officer of the Government and is therefore 'an officer' of the Government within the meaning of S.21 (9), Penal Code.” 32. Learned counsel has laid particular emphasis on paragraph 15 of the report in Monterio (supra), to submit that it is said in the last part, that any person, who in any event performs duty immediately auxiliary to an officer of the Government, is a public servant within the meaning of Section 21(1)(ix) of the Penal Code. Learned counsel has laid particular emphasis on paragraph 15 of the report in Monterio (supra), to submit that it is said in the last part, that any person, who in any event performs duty immediately auxiliary to an officer of the Government, is a public servant within the meaning of Section 21(1)(ix) of the Penal Code. It is urged, that on that basis in Monterio (supra), the Court held the appellant there, a Class III Railway Employee, holding the post of a Chaser in the Railway Carriage Work Shop, to be an officer within the ninth clause of Section 21 IPC as he was working under the Works Manager, who was an officer of the Government, and, the duties the petitioner performed were immediately auxiliary to the Works Manager. The appellant in that case, on facts, was held based on his auxiliary function, to be armed with some authority, or representative character qua the Government. 33. It may be noticed that since the decision in Monterio (supra), there appears to be some amendment to the provisions of Section 21 of the Penal Code, where provisions of the ninth clause have been moved to clause twelfth (a). Also, for the words “every officer”, “every person” has been substituted, somewhat expanding the fold of the provision, to include persons other than officers. Apparently, the amendment is designed to include persons who may technically not be officers of the Government, may be lesser functionaries, who do not qualify for the rank of an officer. There would still be persons, not at all in the service or pay of the Government, but remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty, by the Government. In Monterio (supra) the decision of their Lordships indicates that the Court had to do a painstaking interpretation to unravel the legislative intent and find the appellant in the case, who was the holder of an inferior post, within the protective fold of the pre-amended clause ninth of Section 21. Now, that difficulty may not be there by the statute employing the words “every person” for the words “every officer”. 34. In the opinion of this Court, however, even the more liberalized statutory context does not bring about any support to the petitioner, based on their Lordships' decision in Monterio (supra). Now, that difficulty may not be there by the statute employing the words “every person” for the words “every officer”. 34. In the opinion of this Court, however, even the more liberalized statutory context does not bring about any support to the petitioner, based on their Lordships' decision in Monterio (supra). The reason is that unlike Monterio (supra), where the appellant was discharging an auxiliary function to an officer of the Government Railway Carriage Work Shop, who was undisputedly an officer of the Government, the higher ranking petitioner is not an officer of the Government, but an officer of the University. It is also not the petitioner's case that he is remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government. He is remunerated by a monthly salary paid by the University which is a distinct body corporate established under a State Legislation, that is to say, the Act. The University is not by any principle a Department of the Government or an inseparable part of it. Sub-clause (b) of twelfth clause of Section 21, refers to a person in service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central or State Act or a Government Company as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. This Court does not think that a University falls into any of the three classes, vis-a-vis a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. If it were, the Rajasthan Amendment to Section 21 would not have been necessitated, adding a clause thirteenth to Section 21, which brings within the fold of a Public Servant, every person employed or engaged by any “Public Body” in the conduct and supervision of any examination recognized or approved under any law, to which is appended an explanation, about what is meant by a Public Body. The expression says, in inclusive terms, that the expression Public Body includes (a) a University, Board of Education or other body, either established by or under a Central or State Act, or under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or constituted by the Government; and (b) a local authority. 35. The expression says, in inclusive terms, that the expression Public Body includes (a) a University, Board of Education or other body, either established by or under a Central or State Act, or under the provisions of the Constitution of India, or constituted by the Government; and (b) a local authority. 35. The Court would, however, refrain from holding that a corporation under clause twelfth of Section 21, does not include a University, and, leaves the question open as the same is not required to be decided, on the issue involved in this case. 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Prakash Rekhi vs. Union of India, 1981(1) SCC 449 , Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, 1981(1) SCC722, and the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Ujjam Bai vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1621 , all to canvas the point that different kind of bodies like the U.P. Warehousing Corporation as in Som Prakash Rekhi or the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar, established by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act as in Ajay Hasia (supra), are all instrumentalities of the Government, and, hence, authority within the meaning of Section 12, so as to render them amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Court, and, answerable in the same manner as the State itself, in the matter of protection of fundamental rights of the citizens, besides other things. There is absolutely no quarrel about the well settled propositions, that the said high judicial authorities of their Lordships have placed beyond cavil. But, the legal position that a University incorporated by or under a State Legislation would be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, would make its officers public servants, within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code, is a different issue. Assuming, that officers of a University incorporated under a State Legislation are public servant within the meaning of the twelfth clause to Section 21 of the Penal Code, are they public servants, also entitled to the protection of Section 197(1) Cr.P.C.? 37. The said question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Hadi Raja vs. State of Bihar and another, (1998) 5 SCC 91 , where it was formulated, dealt with and answered thus: “1. 37. The said question was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Hadi Raja vs. State of Bihar and another, (1998) 5 SCC 91 , where it was formulated, dealt with and answered thus: “1. The common question of law that arises in all these matters is whether the provisions of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 are applicable for prosecuting officers of the public sector undertakings or the government companies when on account of deep and pervasive control of finance and administration of such undertakings and government companies, they are held as State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 4. What acts can be alleged to have been committed by a public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties is a vexed question and had often troubled various courts including this Court. Broadly speaking, it has been indicated in various decisions of this Court that the alleged action constituting the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant must have a reasonable and rational nexus with the official duties required to be discharged by such public servant. It is, however, not necessary to elaborate on this aspect of the purpose of deciding the question raised in these matters. The question for decision is that even if in a given case. The concerned officer of the public sector undertaking or the government company being State under Article 12 of the Constitution is removable from office by or with the sanction of the Government and such officer is alleged to have committed an offence by his action which can be construed as action taken while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, whether for prosecuting such officer, sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is warranted or not. 18. 18. After giving our careful consideration to the question of law raised in these appeals and submissions made by the respective counsel of the parties, it appears that the justification for the protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lies in the public policy to ensure that official acts performed by a public servant do not lead to needless and vexatious prosecution of such public servant and it is desirable that it should be left to the Government to determine the question of expediency in prosecuting a public servant. The 41st Report of Law Commission observed that under Section 197 of the old Criminal Procedure Code, the protection given to the public servant applied only during his tenure in office and such protection did not apply after he had left the service. Such protection only during the tenure in service was considered insufficient because a person if he had any grievance against a public servant on account of discharging the of public duties, could lodge a complaint against the said public servant after he would cease to hold public office. Therefore, Section 197 Cr. P.C. was redrafted so as to give protection to a public servant even when he had ceased to hold office in respect of an alleged offence which had been committed when such officer was holding the public office. 19. “Public Servant' has not been defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure but Section 2(y) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the words used in the Criminal Procedure Code but not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code but defined in the Indian Penal Code shall be deemed to have the same meaning attributed to them in the Indian Penal Code. Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code defines 'public servant' and therefore, the expression 'public servant' will have the same meaning in the Criminal procedure Code. It will be appropriate to refer to clauses 9 and 12 of Section 21 IPC. “21. Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code defines 'public servant' and therefore, the expression 'public servant' will have the same meaning in the Criminal procedure Code. It will be appropriate to refer to clauses 9 and 12 of Section 21 IPC. “21. Ninth.—Every officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expand any property on behalf of the Government or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of the government or to execute any revenue process or to investigate or to report on any matter affecting the pecuniary interests of the government, or to make, authenticate or keep any document relating to the pecuniary interests of the government or to prevent the infraction of any law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the government. *** Twelfth - Every person- (a) in the service or pay of the government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the government; (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956). 20. Although the instrumentality or agency with a corporate veil, for all intents and purposes may be held to be a third arm of the Government and such instrumentality discharges the duties and functions which the State intends to do as indicated in Ajay Hasia's case (supra), such instrumentality or agency is none the less juridical person having a separate legal entity. Therefore, such instrumentality must be held to have an independent status distinct from the State and cannot be treated as a government department for all purposes. Therefore, even if an officer of such instrumentality or agency takes or receives, keeps or expends any property or executes any contract, such acts even though in ultimate analysis may be held to have been done in the interest of the State, such action cannot be construed, as of rule, an action of the government by its employees or by an authority empowered by the Government. It may be indicated here that it is not necessary that persons falling under any of the descriptions given in various clauses under Section 21 of IPC need to be appointed by the government. It may be indicated here that it is not necessary that persons falling under any of the descriptions given in various clauses under Section 21 of IPC need to be appointed by the government. If such person falls under any of the descriptions as contained in various clauses of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, such person must be held to be a public servant. Explanation 1 of Section 21 indicates that persons falling under any of the above descriptions are public servants whether appointed by the Government or not. Explanation 2 indicates that wherever the words 'public servant' occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation. Sub-clause (b) of clause twelve of Section 21 expressly makes the officers of local authority and corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a government-owned company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, public servants. But protection under Section 197 CrPC is not available to a public servant unless other condition indicated in that Section are fulfilled. 21. It is to be noted that though through the contrivance or mechanism of corporate structure, some of the public undertakings are performing the functions which are intended to be performed by the State, ex facie, such instrumentality or agency being a juridical person has an independent status and the action taken by them, however important the same may be in the interest of the State cannot be held to be an action taken by or on behalf of the Government as such within the meaning of Section 197 CrPC. 22. For the purposes of enforcing the fundamental rights, the public undertakings which, on account of deep and pervasive control can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 has been treated at par with the government department but in all its facets, public undertaking has not been equated with the department run directly by the Government. It was on this account that the surgeon appointed in Hindustan Steel Works Ltd. has not been equated with the government servant for the purpose of applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution. It was on this account that the surgeon appointed in Hindustan Steel Works Ltd. has not been equated with the government servant for the purpose of applicability of Article 311 of the Constitution. In Praga Tool's case (supra), even though Praga Tools was held to be an instrumentality or agency of the State, it has been indicated by this Court that Praga Tools Corporation had a separate legal existence and being a juridical person cannot be held to be a government concern run by or under the authority of the Government. Similar view was taken by the Patna High Court in Sindhri Fertilizer's case (supra) by indicating that even though the said concern was completely owned by the President of India who could also issue directions and the Directors were to be appointed by the President of India, in the eye of law, the company was a separate legal entity and had a separate legal existences. Such decision of Patna High Court has been approved by this Court. In Dhonoa's case (supra), an IAS officer when on deputation to a public undertaking having deep and pervasive control of the State, was not held to be a government officer entitled to protection under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though such officer did not cease to be a government servant and had a lien in government service while on deputation. The protection which a government department was entitled to has also not been given to the Hindustan Steel Works Ltd. in K. Jaymohan's case (supra). 23. The importance of the public undertaking should not minimised. The Government's concern for the smooth functioning of such instrumentality or agency can be well appreciated but on the plain language of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the protection by way of sanction is not available to the officers of the public undertaking because being a juridical person and distinct legal entity such instrumentality stands on a different footing than the government departments. 24. It is also to be indicated here that in 1973, the concept of instrumentality or agency of State was quite distinct. The interest of the State in such instrumentality or agency was well known. 24. It is also to be indicated here that in 1973, the concept of instrumentality or agency of State was quite distinct. The interest of the State in such instrumentality or agency was well known. Even then, the legislature, in its wisdom, did not think it necessary to expressly include the officers of such instrumentality or the government company for affording protection by way of sanction under Section 197 CrPC. 25. It will be appropriate to notice that whenever there was a felt need to include other functionaries within the definition of 'public servant', they have been declared to be 'public servants' under several special and local acts. If the legislature had intended to include officers of instrumentality or agency for bringing such officers under the protective umbrella of Section 197 CrPC. It would have done so expressly. 26. Therefore, it will not be just and proper to bring such persons within the ambit of Section 197 by liberally construing the provisions of Section 197. Such exercise of liberal construction will not be confined to the permissible limit of interpretation of a statute by a court of law but will amount to legislation by Court. 27. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the protection by way of sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal procedure is not applicable to the officers of government companies or the public undertakings even when such public undertakings are 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution on account of deep and pervasive control of the government. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. It is, however, made clear that we have not taken into consideration various other grounds raised in these appeals challenging the maintainability of the criminal proceedings initiated against the concerned officers concerned of the public undertakings or the government companies. It will be open to the accused concerned to challenge the validity of the criminal cases initiated against them on other grounds, if such challenge is available in law. Such questions, if raised, in these appeals are kept open to be considered in accordance with law by the appropriate authority.” 38. It will be open to the accused concerned to challenge the validity of the criminal cases initiated against them on other grounds, if such challenge is available in law. Such questions, if raised, in these appeals are kept open to be considered in accordance with law by the appropriate authority.” 38. Now, that the protection of Section 197 Cr.P.C. is not available to officers of Government Companies, or public undertakings, that are undoubtedly as much instrumentalities of the State as a University incorporated under a State Legislation like the Act, there is absolutely no basis to hold that an officer of the University, like the petitioner, is a public servant within the meaning of Section 197 Cr.P.C. 39. Accordingly, questions (a) and (b) are both answered in the negative. 40. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Costs made easy. 41. Interim order dated 24.05.2018 stands vacated.